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ABSTRACT
In the literature focusing on various aspects of the twin transitions from socialism,
development and social well-being are mainly analyzed with respect to privatization process
(Stark and Bruszt 1998, Applegate 1994); economic growth and institutional design (North
1990; Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998; Kolodko 1999; Norgaard 2000); party and election
politics, the development of social networks and deliberative associations (Stark and Bruszt
1998); and the bargaining power of labor (Bandelj and Mahutga 2005). While the importance
of these factors is not underestimated, this study addresses a significantly understudied theme
– social exclusion as a consequence of overweening state power. The problem of social
exclusion cuts to the core of the distribution of power in society; and in most of the postSoviet societies, there has occurred predominantly negative change in societal power after
1990s, with vast power concentrated in the hands of governing elites. In the case of Armenia,
the problem is specifically striking.
This dissertation centers around durable social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia
generated as a consequence of the twin transition and explores the conditions that explain the
high degree of social exclusion in contemporary Armenian society. It aims to answer the
following research question: what factors contributed to the development of durable social
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia from 1988-2008?
As an exploratory case study based on the examination of recent socio-economic and,
more notably, political developments of post-Soviet Armenian state, this dissertation
generates new hypotheses to study social exclusion. Appending to the mainstream literature
that focuses on primarily the socio-economic drivers of social exclusion, I emphasize that not
only consequences of economic reform affect the level of social exclusion, but also, and
more significantly, the historic trajectory of the society. I argue that privatization was an
important but not a sufficient factor in the emergence of social exclusion in post-Soviet
Armenia. State militarization through war was another necessary and largely overlooked
condition for the persistence of social exclusion in Armenia. The assessment of these
hypotheses provides evidence that allows a test of whether privatization and militarization
are plausible factors for the persistence of social exclusion in other developing countries.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Why Is the Study of Durable Social Exclusion Important?
At the 2011 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, income inequality and
corruption were singled out as the two most serious challenges facing the world. 1 As Zhu
Min, a special adviser of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stated at the WEF 2011,
“the increase in inequality isthe most serious challenge for the world" (Aldrick 2011).
Worldwide increase in inequality in its turn feeds another societal problem

— social

exclusion. "Social exclusion is a multidimensional process of progressive social rupture,
detaching groups and individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them
from full participation in the normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which
they live" (Silver 2007:15). A major global issue, the problem of exclusion has become the
focus of worldwide concern. Not only have practitioners attempted to find a panacea to the
issue of exclusion, but recently there has been a remarkable upsurge of academic research
focusing on social exclusion.
The phenomenon of social exclusion has a negative impact on development,
competitiveness, investment opportunities and allocation of public resources. Most notably, it
deprives people of property rights, the right to education and health services, of social
welfare and thus, creates social discontent and mass movements.
Comparative evidence from Western Europe suggests a strong link between social
exclusion and a variety of socio-economic ills. The problem is chiefly considered to be
caused by an interplay of demographic, economic, social and behavioral factors, such as
unemployment, ill-health, low educational attainment, and lack of skills. In the sphere of
health, for example, high death rates and stress-related illnesses appear to be closely related
with high levels of income inequality, which is an element of social exclusion. Low levels of
education and violent crime are also correlated with income inequality.

1

The Conference Board of Canada, "World Income Inequality: Is the World Becoming More Unequal?"
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/hot-topics/worldinequality.aspx.

1

Concerning democratic development, deepening inequalities within and between
different groups in society are associated with low levels of social cohesion and participatory
citizenship. Social exclusion may hamper democratic consolidation by stimulating social
conflict and political instability, and in turn may act as a support for the establishment of
authoritarian regimes. The post-Soviet transition literature attributes the rise of inequality and
socio-economic stratification chiefly to the increase in wage dispersion and the destruction of
old social security and government transfers (Yemelyanau 2011). Yemtsov (2001), for
instance, attributes inequality in post-Soviet Georgia to high informal incomes and to
significant decline in state transfers. For the problem of inequality in post-Soviet Armenia,
Griffin/UNDP (2002) points to the changing wage structure and widening wage differentials.
Ganguli and Terrell (2005, 2006) provide a similar argument for post-Soviet Ukraine.
Given the negative consequences of social exclusion for achieving economic growth
with equity, studies of durable social exclusion have significant policy implicatio ns for
problems in democratization, human rights, and socioeconomic development, especially with
respect to poverty reduction, the structure of private property rights, and inclusive political
participation. Elements of the problem, such as long-term damage to living conditions, lack
of social, economic and political participation, poor health and educational status, emotional
and physical insecurity coupled with feelings of estrangement, isolation and unhealthy
lifestyles require special attention.
The study of social exclusion becomes more critical, considering the fact that the
problem is expressed in different countries of the world in different forms and severity.
Whereas the problem of inequality and exclusion is growing in the US and Europe, it is even
worse in other regions of the world. 2 The problem of social exclusion is more severe in South
America and Southern Africa, where countries with extremely high inequalities are clustered.
For decades, Latin America had the world's worst income inequality.With the breakup of the

2

For example, the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 (minimal
income inequality) to 1 (maximu m income inequality),stood at an average of 0.29 in OECD (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in the mid-1980s. By the late 2000s, however, it had
increased by almost 10% to 0.316. OECD (2011) stresses that it rose in 17 of the 22 OECD countries for which
long-term data series are available, climbing by more than 4 percentage points in Finland, Germany, Israel,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Only Turkey, Greece, France, Hungary, and
Belgium recorded no increase or small declines in their Gini coefficients. (OECD 2011:2)

2

USSR, post-Soviet space became another region with high levels of social inequality, and
polarization. A few of the post-Soviet countries had income inequalities similar to the most
unequal countries in Latin America.
By far, it is clear that social exclusion

— an

social, economic, cultural and political institutions

outcome and a reflection of a country’s
— has

negative implications and

consequences for the development of egalitarian societies. Nonetheless, little is known for
certain about what exactly determines the extent and duration of social exclusion, let alone
about definitive measures to combat it or to construct more inclusive states and societies.
What is more important, wider causes and consequences of social exclusion
poverty and deprivation

— are

— those

beyond

not thoroughly researched either in Western societies or,

particularly, in developing countries.
Although an extensive body of literature exists on the question of social exclusion, it
does not provide adequate theoretical tools to explain the development of durable exclusion
in the case of Armenia. Nearly all of the recent literature on social exclusion interprets it as a
new social problem that has arisen as a result of the economic restructuring of advanced
capitalist democracies (Silver 1994, Atkinson 1998). Furthermore, focusing primarily on the
socio-economic and behavioral causes, it largely disregards the political, cultural, and
historical sources of social exclusion.It particularly overlooks the political conditions that
cause high levels of social exclusion to persist over time, such as key critical junctures that
affect state formation.
This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap. It contributes to the existing literature
on social exclusion by examining the underlying sources of social exclusion in the context of
post-Soviet states, focusing primarily on the case of post-Soviet Armenia. Against a
background of rising inequalities, social exclusion, and continued waves of massive protest,
understanding the causes and consequences of social exclusion in this tiny country is a
central agenda of this study.

3

1.2 The Puzzle of Durable Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet Societies
Within the wave of democratization that started around two decades ago, the
transformation of the socialist system and the transition to capitalism have become most
remarkable elements of research. Although the fullest coverage of international
democratization in the Third World has been devoted to Latin America, starting from 1990s
scholarly attention slightly shifted to the post-communist world, focusing to the
transformation of the socialist political systems. The mainstream transition literature has been
positive and optimistic about the rupture of the post-Soviet countries from the USSR, the
disavowal of the Marxist-Leninist ideology by the latter, as well as the speed and quality of
the neoliberal adjustments taking place parallel with the reinvention of politics and
institutions in the region. While in Latin American democratization literature there have been
strong challenges and confrontations of several aspects of the democratization, the postSoviet literature hardly ever contests problems of the twin transition in a systematic manner.
The twin transition to democracy and market capitalism in the transition from
socialism was expected to produce prosperous and socially inclusive societies. Contrary to
this prediction, social exclusion has been a widespread problem in most of the post-socialist
republics. The official dismantling of Soviet ideology, coupled with liberalization and
reinvention of politics, throughout the former Soviet bloc did not produce significant
progress towards a liberal-democratic order. The economic, political and social
transformations of the twin transition in the post-Soviet societies, forecasted to enhance the
speeding up of development and the reduction of poverty, had huge negative effects on these
societies. There was a sharp and continuous decline in production and a rise in inflation. The
economic transformations of the post-Soviet societies have also had massive political
consequences, particularly in regard to power distribution and the use of power for selfinterest.
This paradox of the democratization evolution and the failed process of inclusion
pose a problem for the literature on twin transitions from socialism. The range of
distributional outcomes evidenced in the region was not expected at all. Economic theory
assumed that, after an initial increase, socioeconomic exclusion and inequality would

4

decrease over time (Kuznets 1995). Democratic theory reinforced this assumption. It posited
that newly-gained democracy would open ample opportunity for political inclusion, which
would permit the excluded people to organize in favor of their interests and influence policy
making (Dahl 1971, Mainwaring 1992, Huntington 1991).
After a difficult beginning some post-Soviet countries began to approach the ideal
market systems advocated by the western specialists. Some of them managed to
simultaneously accomplish the task of capitalist transformation and maintenance of socially
egalitarian societies. A few countries, such as formerly Soviet Ukraine, Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan, changed their exclusionary ruling regimes through social mobilization and, thus,
opened new opportunities for political expression and economic redistribution. 3 However,
others have moved in the opposite direction, not being able to counteract authoritarian states
and prevent growing social exclusion.
In conjunction with these developments, scholars of the post-Soviet transitions have
identified different factors that caused massive undesirable societal developments. For
example, the policy-oriented literature on inequality and exclusion, chiefly stemming from
the World Bank initiatives, suggests that post-communist countries that implemented slower
and less consistent pro-market reforms also witnessed the largest increases in overall
inequality. The empirical evidence from a few of those countries, however, confirm the
contrary. Belarus and Armenia are good examples.
Belarus, which had the lowest level of Gini coefficient of 0.24 during the Soviet
period (in 1988), maintained social equality after its independence from the USSR (Alexeev
and Gaddy 1993; Yemelyanau 2011).4 According to Yemelyanau (2011), the inequality
evolution in post-Soviet Belarus was similar to those of the Czech Republic and Hungary,
Many authors of “"colored revolutions"” are hesitant to draw conclusions from the experiences of Georgia,
Ukraine and particularly Kyrgyzstan for the future of “"color revolutions"", specifically in terms of
consequences. It is often argued that these movements, although successful in overthrowing their regimes, d id
not improve the lives of ordinary people. They, however, provided ordinary people in these countries with
confidence and strength to effectively challenge and oust any regime that would endanger their rights and
opportunities. This, if not creating greater social inclusion, at least opens a window of opportunity for excluded
masses to try new options, new leaders and new elites that might and will finally be in favor of better policies
for their citizens. This is, certainly, a feature and objective of any successful social movement.
4 The Gini coefficient shows the inequality of income distribution among the population. The closer this
coefficient is to 1, the higher is the degree of income polarization of the population.
3

5

transition countries that had experienced rapid and significant pro-market reforms, at the
same time maintaining their high levels of income equality and good social support systems.
Belarus avoided mass privatization and maintained many of the Soviet social security
features (Yemelyanau 2009:1).
Similar to Belarus, Soviet Armenia had a low Gini coefficient of 0.28 in 1988
(Alexeev and Gaddy 1993). But unlike Belarus, Armenia experienced significant pro-market
reforms, including mass privatization. Despite these reforms, unlike Belarus or the Czech
Republic and Hungary, post-Soviet Armenia did not manage to prevent largest increases in
inequality and high levels of Gini coefficients varying from 0.56 in 1996 to 0.31 in 2007. 5
This discrepancy in the evolution of the Gini coefficients, especially since the mentioned
countries inherited similar political and economic legacy and possessed comparable
institutions, contradicts the scholarly assumption suggesting that countries with a slow pace
of pro-market reforms experienced the largest increases in inequality.
Social exclusion, including income and wealth inequality, has been particularly harsh
in some of the Central Asian countries and South Caucasus countries, especially in Armenia
and Azerbaijan. There we see the development of durable social exclusion, that is, the
persistence of high levels of exclusion over time. The unexpected development and
persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, as compared to some other postSoviet states with similar Soviet legacy, makes the analysis of the problem critical.
This dissertation focuses on the South Caucasus case of Armenia in the post-Soviet
region to address the problem of durable social exclusion. More precisely, this dissertatio n
asks the following question. What are the factors that explain the emergence of durable social
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia’s transition to free-market capitalism between 1988 and
2008? Armenia offers an interesting benchmark case for studying social exclusion. The case
is significant for three reasons. Armenia has among the highest levels of social exclusion
that have persisted for more than two decades since the beginning of the twin transition from

5

The main source for these numbers is the World Bank, Development Research Group. Data are based on
primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country
departments. For more information and methodology, please see PovcalNet
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm).
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socialism.6 It has not changed course despite even stronger civil society opposition than
comparable cases where the trend was reversed. The second reason for the case of Armenia
to be a good laboratory for research on the theme is due to the fact that Armenia has earned
the title of the 'Caucasian Tiger' among post-Soviet republics in the Caucasus region, but at
the same time, acquired a status of a non-egalitarian society.7 Thus, opposite to the dominant
view within the social exclusion literature that high economic growth is linked with inclus ive
societies, Armenia— a Caucasian tiger with a stellar growth

—,

is characterized with high

degrees of social exclusion. Armenia's growth, which was not economically and politically
inclusive, is, thus, paradoxical and requires special deliberation in regard to its consequences
on social segregation. Finally, as already discussed in the above paragraphs, Armenia
initiated very rapid structural reforms predicted to decrease inequality, which as a matter of
fact did not hinder the formation of social exclusion.
Based on the Armenian case, I hypothesize that the privatization of public enterprises
and state militarization through war were key necessary factors in the emergence and
persistence of social exclusion in the country. They promoted exclusionary policies and
contained mobilization that demanded greater social equity and political reform. There may
be many other reasons for social inequality and prevailing poverty in Armenia, such as its
disadvantaged geopolitical setting, its diplomatic isolation by neighboring countries, and lack
of transportation links and routes (being bypassed in the developing oil economy of the
region). But these overlook the very significant impact of policy in the distribution of income
and life chances, in particular the effect of capital and coercion in the policymaking process,
6

The situation on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. There I dwell
more specifically on the economic, political and social dimensions of social exclusion, stressing that most of
their elements are present in severe forms in Armenia as compared to other post -communist republics.
Moreover, the Gini coefficient has been one of the highest in Armenia during mid 1990s. This high level of
inequality has somehow decreased throughout 2000s, but the decrease is estimated to be chiefly due to
remittances from abroad, rather than redistributive policies. In any case, th ere are no reliable and consistent data
on inequality in Armenia for the studied years of transition in Armenia, therefore, my conclusions are base d on
the existing ones found in the World Bank and UN reports only.
The high level of social exclusion in Armenia is also presented in Chapter 4, where I evaluate Armenian
students' self-perceptions of economic, social and political exclusion.
7 Armenia has been bestowed with the title 'Caucasian Tiger' for its rapid economic growth record at the
beginning of 2000s. The term derives from and is reminiscent of the popular term 'Asian Tigers' or 'Asian
Dragons', used in reference to the high-growth east Asian economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan. Those four Asian tigers consistently maintained high levels of economic growth since the 1960s,
fueled by exports and rapid industrialization, which enabled these economies to join the ranks of the world 's
richest nations.
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which my research suggests are critical. My argument is that privatization of firms and social
services coupled with state militarization through war are the most significant factors
explaining the formation and persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The
privatization process created large-scale private capital and business interests that support
crony laissez faire capitalism, while militarization is intimately intertwined with state
coercive capacity.
Militarization distorted the Armenian state, retarded the development of domestic
institutions that would protect social equity, and contributed to a process of privatization that
de-industrialized Armenia and left most of its people excluded from the economy while a few
prospered.After the Karabakh war was finished, the Armenian state militarization became an
instrument for safeguarding established interests of the new class of state elites and oligarchs,
several of who rose to leadership due to the war, a matter of imposing and maintaining their
power.
In those circumstances, market reforms had several implications for the politics of
inequality in post-Soviet Armenia. Most significantly, the market restructuring, particularly
the privatization process, altered the regional class structure by shifting employment from the
formal to the informal sector of the economy and by creating a new class of oligarchs with
monopolistic control over resources. The privatization process, with its rent-seeking nature,
accelerated the concentration of wealth into the hands of a few. It provided more
advantageous economic opportunities for the powerful groups of the society, including
government representatives, Karabakh military and para-military who were already promoted
to political positions, and enterprise managers and directors to prosper. Powerful in both
economic and political affairs of the newly independent country, networks of these elites
persistently restricted other citizens' access to resources and opportunities, making social
exclusion durable in post-Soviet Armenia.
These alterations in the labor market generated new challenges for labor unions and
consequently, impediments for collective action. Finally, the weakening of class-based
collective action protected the newly ascended oligarchs and neoliberal technocrats from
social pressure and allowed them to use the new system in their own benefit. Meanwhile, the
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legal system, the judicial system and the armed forces, all corrupted and co-opted by the state
leaders and their oligarchic networks, have made "opportunity hoarding" unpunished and
voracious.
1.3 Organization of the Study
This dissertation engages two main themes with regard to social exclusion in postSoviet Armenia. The first argument stresses that the role of the privatization process during
the neoliberal adjustment is a necessary condition for the emergence of social exclusion in
Armenia. The privatization process largely affected the unequal distribution of economic
resources and social opportunities. The second argument highlights the idea that privatization
of firms and social services is not a sufficient condition for the persistence of social
exclusion: state militarization is another key and necessary factor for the explanation of
durable social exclusion in the case of Armenia. With the militarization of the Armenian
state, the Armenian citizens, beyond their economic and social exclusion, became also
politically marginalized.
The study consists of nine chapters and is organized as follows. Having outlined the
scope of the study in this chapter, the second chapter provides the analysis of the central
concept of the study

— durable

social exclusion. It provides an overview of social exclusion

and its definitions, analyses the three key dimensions of social exclusion, explores its various
forms and causes, and presents available methods of measuring the problem. A major section
of the chapter examines causes of social exclusion in post-Soviet societies. With the analysis
of the drivers of social exclusion, I simultaneously construct the theoretical framework of the
study. This chapter also explains what the term ‘durable social exclusion’ means and why it
is so essential to examine it in the case of Armenia.
Chapter Three is concerned with the problem of social exclusion in the case of
Armenia. The historical events of Soviet disintegration that led to deepening social exclusion
in the newly independent Armenian republic as a social consequence of the transformation
and liberalization process is briefly analyzed. The chapter further discusses the problem by
separately analyzing its economic, social and political dimensions in great detail.
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Chapter Four turns to the description of the method and the hypotheses. It specifies
the research method, followed by the formulation of the hypotheses. Each of the two main
hypotheses is explained more thoroughly. The first hypothesis stresses that within the
neoliberal change specifically the privatization of firms and services in Armenia is important.
The second hypothesis deals with the central concept of state militarization and why it is
found to be yet another and even more vital factor in sustaining social inequalities within
Armenian society. The chapter is concluded with the operationalization of central concepts.
An adequate understanding of the exceptionally complex theoretical issue of durable
exclusion and domination of certain groups of a society by others requires not only the
description of the nature of the economic and political changes occurring in the country, but
also how ordinary people feel about their own situation. Learning people’s own feelings and
experiences makes the story of social exclusion more complete, as well as convincing that it
is an essential problem to draw academics’ and policy-makers’ attention to. Thus, in Chapter
Five, a quantitative examination of a student survey is conducted with the aim of presenting
public perceptions of social exclusion. The results of the quantitative analysis in some way
complement the qualitative part of this dissertation.
In efforts to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Armenian case in terms of state
militarization, Chapter Six shares a comparative perspective of state coercion in terms of
containment of social movements in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The chapter situates the five country cases in an intellectual framework of state militarization
generated in chapter two and highlights some of the principal themes we addressed in the
state militarization and coercion hypothesis. The investigation of the various outcomes of
success and failure of these similar post-Soviet cases confirms the militarization hypothesis.
ChaptersSeven and Eight apply the social exclusion framework to the Armenian case.
These chapters include the analysis of policies and historical developments that have had
their impact on social exclusion in Armenia. Chapter Seven reviews the Karabakh war and
the peace process after the cease-fire, stressing that this war was a catalyst for the post-war
militaristic activism. Initial elements of Armenian state militarization began to develop due
to the Karabakh war. This is the chapter that highlights how mechanisms of maintaining
10

coercive power of the state is essential in containing opposition movements, further leaving
the discontented masses excluded and unhappy. Whereas state militarization during war can
be strongly connected to the economic dimension of social exclusion, post-war militarization
focuses more on the political exclusion facilitated during the post-war regimes.
Chapter Eight discusses the main mechanisms and avenues through which industrial
privatization and privatization of services in Armenia affected economic exclusion of
ordinary citizens, as well as small entrepreneurs.
The concluding chapter, Chapter Nine, discusses the key theoretical contributions of
the dissertation. The shortcomings of the study are acknowledged with an emphasis on future
research. The chapter ends the conclusion with a brief note on the prospects of greater social
inclusion in Armenia.
1.4 Conclusion
Although some policy-oriented literature offers insights for the general problem of
social exclusion in advanced capitalist societies, little is known about the political economy
of persistent social exclusion in post-Soviet transitions. This study contributes to that
knowledge. Concretely, my dissertation contributes to the knowledge of social exclusion in
two areas. It develops the concept of durable social exclusion, highlighting the severity of
the problem in post-Soviet Armenia. It then assesses durable social exclusion through not
only the socio-economic perspective, but also through the lens of political processes that
contain social movements in favor of more inclusionary forms of citizenship and democratic
practices.
My main contention throughout this dissertation is that privatization of firms and
social services coupled with state militarization through war are the most significant factors
explaining the formation and persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The
privatization process created large-scale private capital and business interests that support
crony laissez faire capitalism, while militarization is intimately intertwined with state
coercive capacity. In particular, the Armenian state militarization after the Karabakh war
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promoted exclusionary policies and contained mobilization that demanded greater social
equity and political reform. This is an original contribution to the social exclusion literature.
Indeed, one of the few instances that treated the relationship between state
militarization and social polarization claimed it was a positive one. 8 Stanislav Andreski
(1968:30) argued that higher military participation ratios decreased social stratification.
Regarding Andreski's statement that the existence of external threat eliminates or decreases
social stratification, based on the repressive practices of post-Soviet Armenian and
Azerbaijani states regularly exercised against their societies, I contend that external threat
does not decrease stratification.9 It might create a powerful sense of nationalism and strong
national cohesion among the lower strata of the population. But for the higher ranks of the
government, this threat serves as a motive for keeping their coercive organizatio n powerful in
place, regardless of whether that force will be used for maintaining their domestic supremacy
or for an external war.My study, then, is a direct challenge to the generally accepted assertion
that high military participation ratios flatten social stratification. Consequently, advancing the
scholarship on social exclusion will be useful for policy debates concerning the tolerable
boundaries of militarized and repressive democratic states and its consequences on economic
redistribution and socio-political fairness.
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See Andreski (1968). There will be a more detailed analysis on the relation of state militarization to social
exclusion in Chapter Two and Chapter Four.
9 Both of these countries face external threat even after the cease-fire of 1994. The hazard of re-starting a war
with each other is constantly in the air.For instance, still in 2006, Azeri president Aliyev threatened Armenia by
stating that the overall budget of Azerbaijan was 500% bigger than the budget of Armenia and the military
budget of Azerbaijan equaled the overall budget of Armenia (for reference, see
http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?74757-Ilkham-Aliyev-Threatens-Armenians). In 2008, he
threatened Armenia again, now with deeper isolation (for reference, see
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/27233). Yet again, the article entitled “Aliyev again Threatens
Military Action” in the August 11, 2010 issue of www.asbarez.com reports Aliyev’s speech: “The war is
continuing. We must be ready and we are ready to liberate our lands from occupiers at any moment. I want to
once again state that this primarily requires a military might. We have for the most part created that might and
this process is successfully continuing.” These types of military and isolationist threats by the Azerbaijani side
have been often repeated tactics during the recent 15 years after the war ended.
Moreover, shootings are common between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces that are spread across a ceasefire line in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and often face each other at close range. There have been tens of
soldiers, as well as civilians, shot dead by both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces near the de -facto border of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The most significant breach of the cease-fire occurred in Martakert on March 8, 2008,
where sixteen soldiers were killed. Both sides accused the other of starting the shootings.
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There may be many other reasons for social inequality and poverty in Armenia, such
as its disadvantaged geopolitical setting, its diplomatic isolation by neighboring countries,
and lack of transportation links and routes (being bypassed in the developing oil economy of
the region). But these overlook the very significant impact of politics in the distribution of
income and life chances, in particular the effect of capital and coercion in the policymaking
process, which my research suggests are critical.
The production of persuasive evidence and exploration of causal mechanisms of the
problem are critical for reevaluating state-society relationships, power distribution patterns
within a society, and for fostering collective awareness, willingness, and strategies to redress
injustices at the domestic level and within international communities. Given these theoretical
and empirical contributions, and given the lack of literature that sufficiently covers the
relationship introduced in this dissertation, this project is essential for comparative political
science, particularly for the analysis and understanding of the dynamics of exclusionary
states. Its findings will help to identify policy instruments to prevent or control the
development of durable social exclusion. Thus, it will play a part in the search for policies
capable of promoting market-driven economic growth with equity in this region of the world.
On a more general note, this study is also significant, because as Asbed Kotchikyan
(2006) mentions, the scholarship on post-Soviet Armenia has been limited to the topics of
conflict resolution and nationalism. This limitation of themes in post-Soviet Armenian
literature concerning economic and socio-political issues shaping the process of state-making
is due to the fact that very few scholars try to utilize various disciplines to study the South
Caucasus. Another limitation of the research on Armenia is that most studies tend to apply
existing theories instead of proposing new theories and approaches. This said, my
dissertation is an effort to devise a new approach for studying social exclusion and to
contribute to the larger field of social exclusion study, at the same time introducing a new
perspective of social exclusion based on the case of post-Soviet Armenia.
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CHAPTER 2
Durable Social Exclusion: A Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of social exclusion. It presents the history and
common definitions of the phenomenon, examines economic, social and political dimensions
of exclusion, and explores its causes and forms. The chapter starts with definitions and main
features of social exclusion. Because social exclusion is frequently equaled with poverty, in
this section I provide the main distinctions between poverty and social exclusion. Having
defined social exclusion, this chapter further deals with the drivers of social exclusion widely
presented in literature. As a multidimensional phenomenon that is studied by various
intellectual disciplines, such as political science, sociology, economics, and psychology,
social exclusion has numerous causes discussed in literature. Particularly, its causes and
consequences vary greatly in developed and developing countries.
Stressing the multidimensional nature of social exclusion in the first sections of this
chapter, next I proceed to survey the mainstream literature that underscores institutional and
non-institutional sources in explaining social exclusion. Agreeing that institutional factors
affecting social exclusion are important, I further argue that in the post-communist region,
similar to Latin America, institutions are not autonomous, and that, as Przeworski put it,
certain "conditions shape institutions" (Przeworski 2004:529). In the case of post-Soviet
Armenia, those conditions are predominantly embedded in the nature of the state. Therefore,
in the examination of social exclusion, the role of institutions alone is not sufficient. Beyond
institutions, the specific features of state elites, conditions that shape those features and, most
essentially, the interrelationship of institutions with the state are important. Contrary to the
industrialized and developed part of the world, this premise is principally valid for the
analysis of social exclusion in the developing and underdeveloped countries.
Owing to the lack of social exclusion theories regarding post-Soviet democratization
and considering the strong link between democratic consolidation and social inclusion, in the
next section, I examine theories of democratic consolidationthat may be related to the study
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of social exclusion in the post-Soviet societies. In a separate section, the main theories of
political power emphasize the relation of state militarization to the defeat of social
movements— social efforts to achieve greater inclusion. This section emphasizes the
usefulness of the social closure and opportunity hoarding theories for the exploration of
social exclusion in transitioning countries, in this case

— Armenia.

2.2 History, Definitions, and Durability of Social Exclusion
The notion of social exclusion covers a remarkably wide range of social and
economic issues. Coined and developed by French sociologists, social exclusion refers to “a
process of ‘social disqualification’ (Paugam, 1993) or ‘social disaffiliation’ (Castel, 1995)
leading to a breakdown of the relationship between society and the individual” (Bhala and
Laperye, 2004:5).10 It concerns social divisions and inequalities between certain groups of
people along economic, social, cultural and political opportunities. The concept of social
exclusion has a relatively recent origin, but it has managed to gain substantial academic and
policy-oriented attention. While the concept originated in discussions concerning economic
and social inequalities in European contexts, the problem of social exclusion spans
geographic and political boundaries and reflects universal social dynamics. The topic of
social exclusion fuels a growing apprehension of distributive fairness of social services,
employment and income patterns globally.
The use of the term initially related to widespread European unemployment in mid1970s that provoked criticism of welfare systems’ failure to protect people from prolonged
unemployment and states’ role in promoting social cohesion. Exclusion was closely linked
to diminishing labor market participation and declining welfare provision. The concept’s
historical roots can be traced back to Aristotle; nonetheless, according to Sen (2000:1), the
expression and notion of ‘social exclusion’, in its modern form, was first coined by René
Lenoir, the former French Secretary of State for Social Action. The socially excluded, in
Lenoir’s reference, were groups of people, who were excluded from state social protection
Castel (1995) defines social disaffiliation as “the particular way in which social bonds are dissolved”, which
is characteristic of modern poverty: “To be in an area of integration means to possess guarantees of perman ent
employment and an ability to rely on the support of firm relationships; in the area of vulnerability the precarious
tenure of employment is doubled by weakened social supports; the situation of disaffiliation combines
unemployment with social isolation”.
10
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systems. Further, French sociologists extended the implication of the term to include people,
who were socially and/or economically isolated. Later, in 1980s, the concept quickly spread
beyond France to the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU) and Northern America,
highlighting the need of adequate universal social protection policies. Social exclusion
became a subject of interest in EU mainly due to its concern and involvement in anti-poverty
policies. In EU anti-poverty programs, the naming of the phenomenon of interest shifted
from ‘poverty’ to ‘exclusion’. Still currently, social exclusion is a fundamental focus of EU
social policies.
The phenomenon of social exclusion gained magnitude particularly after the World
Summit for Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen in 1995. At the Summit, a large
gathering of 117 world leaders, a consensus was reached on the need to put people’s wellbeing at the center of development. The consensus pledged to make the conquest of poverty,
the goal of full employment and the fostering of safe, equal and fair societies overriding
objectives of development (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) –
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)). 11
Social exclusion is often perceived as poverty or deprivation; however, these are not
the same. Poverty is often an element of social exclusion. Social exclusion is a
multidimensional concept, and it should be studied as a result of dynamic causal factors. The
process includes economic marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization
(Parkin 1979; Collins 1974; Collins 1979; Bourdieu 1984; Murphy 1988; Silver 1995; Beall
and Piron 2005).
In fact, we have a better understanding of social exclusion when it is compared to
poverty and/or deprivation. Most comparisons of the two phenomena suggest that the
primary difference between social exclusion and poverty concerns their time perspectives
(Abrahamson 2001; Barnes 2002 & 2005; Estvill 2003; Todman 2004). Poverty is a static
condition, while social exclusion is a dynamic process. In a more figurative language, “if
poverty is a photograph, exclusion is a film” (Estvill 2003:21).

UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) – Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
http://social.un.org/index/Home/WSSD1995.asp x, last access on November 21, 2011
11
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There are other distinctions between the two concepts in terms of the situations where
they occur, their causes, the forms of social stratification they address, their prevailing policy
prescriptions, and the key disciplinary approaches used in their analyses. Based on Table 2.1,
which Abrahamson (2001) developed, the primary cause of poverty is unmet needs, and the
main cause of social exclusion is discrimination and denial of access to institutions of social
integration. The situation in which poverty typically arises is characterized by insufficient
resources, while the situation that characterizes social exclusion is the inability to exercise
rights. Abrahamson describes the form of stratification in the case of poverty as vertical,
between the wealthy and the poor classes. The form of stratification in the case of social
exclusion is horizontal, between the outsiders and the insiders. The core policy prescription
for poverty reduction is income generation through employment and social welfare transfers.
The core policy prescription for social exclusion is enabling access to important social
service delivery systems and institutions. Finally, while poverty is a widely studied topic,
mainly in economics, the major disciplinary approach of social exclusion analysis is
sociology. Because social exclusion is focused not only on lack of sufficient resources and
material needs, but also societal participation, and it addresses not only distributional issues
(economic issues), but also relational issues, it is natural that economics alone cannot
sufficiently examine the phenomenon. Sociology and political science are the disciplines that
more accurately study social exclusion as a multi-dimensional process.
Table 2.1: Main Distinctions between Poverty and Social Exclusion
Poverty
Social Exclusion
Time Perspective
Static condition
Dynamic process
Situation
Insufficient resources
Denial of ability to exercise rights
Cause
Unmet needs
Discrimination/denial of access to
institutions of social integration
Form of
Vertical (e.g., lower vs.
Horizontal (e.g., outsiders vs.
Stratification
upper classes)
insiders)
Policy Prescription
Social transfers (e.g.,
Social services (e.g., activation
minimum income
measures to ensure access to service
guarantees)
delivery institutions
Discipline
Economics
Sociology, Political Science
Source: Adapted from Abrahamson (2001).
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Social exclusion theories have evolved over time, giving birth to a number of
definitions that are closely related to theories and definitions of poverty and deprivation, as
well as theories of societal disintegration. These definitions and theories provide multiple
ways of analyzing diverse forms of social disadvantage in respect to economic, social and
political understanding of societies. Some definitions of social exclusion challenge the
popular versions of “the underclass’ argument and refer to notions of both social structures
and implications of agency12 . They suggest that the people who are located at the other side
of the relationship – the people who gain – have their say in the process of exclusion. These
people “might be shaping the character of economic and social arrangements, the very stuff
of social politics, to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others” (Byrne 2005:2).
Social exclusion [is] a more comprehensive formulation which refers to the dynamic process
of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political or cultural
systems which determine the social integration of a person in society. Social exclusion may,
therefore, be seen as the denial (or non-realization) of the civil, political and social rights of
citizenship (Walker and Walker 1997: 8).
Definitions and operationalization of social exclusion by many authors are very
similar. Bhala and Laperye (2004:1) define it as “the lack of access of a growing number of
individuals to a decent job (or simply a job), income, housing, health service or education
and a more diffused feeling of insecurity among some portions of the population goes hand
in hand with new opportunities for others who can take advantage of the potential for
prosperity”. Silver (1995) adds that the material deprivation is accompanied with social
deprivation and incomplete participation in main political institutions, which has also been
expressed by the DFID (see Figure 2.1). Bhala and Laperye (2004:1) very accurately note
that exclusion has two essential processes hampering social integration, those being
exclusion from the productive system and social deprivation (italics added).
Under certain conditions, exclusion becomes durable. Durable social exclusion is a
persistent process of disqualification from economic opportunities, from participation in

12

These theories argue that exclusionary conditions are self-induced, and that the excluded are responsible for
their miserable conditions. According to political theorists of social exclusion it is the fault of “society” as a
whole.
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political institutions and access to social services that endures over long periods of time, such
as from generation to generation. It suggests a condition in which large numbers of citizens
are not able to move along boundaries of economic, political and social mobility due to
external circumstances rather their own intellectual abilities or moral attributes (Tilly 1998).
Silver (1994), following the Anglo-Saxon tradition and drawing on liberal thinkers
like Locke, perceives social actors mainly as individuals, who are able to move across
boundaries of social differentiation and economic divisions of labor. When individuals are
not able to move along boundaries of economic, political and social differentiation due to
external circumstances rather their own intellectual abilities or moral characteristics, they
become immobile in a society. Three important paradigms that attribute social exclusion to a
different cause and different political philosophy are introduced by Silver (1994). Those
paradigms are solidarity, specialization and monopoly. The first paradigm, solidarity, which
refers to social relations rather than political or market relations, is considered as social
bonds between individuals and the larger society. 13 Social exclusion from the solidarity
perspective is viewed as a failure of this relationship because a number of institutions do not
provide adequate mechanisms to channel the individual into the society. The second
paradigm, specialization, deals with the incapacity of individuals to engage in contractual
exchange and overcome barriers. Here exclusion occurs mainly through exclusion from paid
work and the job market or imposition of rigid employment regulations. 14 The third
paradigm, monopoly or social closure paradigm, is a most essential paradigm in terms of the
power relations analysis that will be constructed in this study. It stems from the works of
Weber and Marx and emphasizes power relations, examining powerful class and status
groups that use social closure to restrict the access of other groups to different resources and
opportunities.

The name ‘solidarity’ can be traced back to the notion of solidarity by the French Republican State. Social
provision in France is founded on the principle of solidarite´ (solidarity), which holds that all citizens face a
series of social risks that make them dependent on one another. The commitment to social protection is
expressed in the first article of the French Code of Social Security.
14 Specialization has an Anglo-American origin and is based on liberal-individualism. In contrast to the notion
of solidarity, it is more individualist. Here, the emphasis is placed on individual responsibility.
13
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Levitas (1998, 2000, 2005) similarly identifies three discourses of social exclusion:
the redistributionist discourse (RED), the moral underclass discourse (MUD), and the social
integrationist discourse (SID). The redistributionist discourse (RED), which is similar to
Silver’s (1994) monopoly or social closure paradigm, emphasizes poverty as a primary cause
of social exclusion. Poverty means “something more complex than [what] is colloquially
understood by poverty, in that it is dynamic, processual, multidimensional, and relational,
and it allows spacefor the understanding that discriminatory and exclusionary practices may
be causes of poverty…” (Levitas 2000:359.) Consequently, the main policy prescription to
reduce social exclusion is to decrease poverty by increasing social benefit/welfare levels.
RED addresses social, political, cultural and economic citizenships, broadening out into a
critique of inequality (Levitas, 2005:14). The moral underclass discourse (MUD) emphasizes
cultural rather than material roots of poverty. The focal point of the moral underclass
discourse is the behavior of the poor, the moral and cultural characteristics of the excluded.
MUD states that moral characteristics of lower class representatives, such as criminality,
unemployment, single parenthood, lack of work ethic, and welfare dependency create social
exclusion. The discourse argues that welfare benefits are bad for people because they weaken
the latter’s ability to be self sufficient (Levitas 2005:21). The social integrationist discourse
(SID), which is aligned with Silver’s solidarity paradigm, explains social exclusion largely in
terms of labor market attachment. SID defines social exclusion as nonparticipation in the
labor market. In this discourse, social exclusion is argued to be a consequence of
unemployment.
Social exclusion is not a uniform concept, and itdefinitely does not refer to the same
thing in different cultures.Although the concept of social exclusion originated in developed
countries and, as mentioned earlier, its original meaning was different than its modern
meaning, there has been a wide application of the phenomenon to developing countries, both
conceptually and empirically. Most elements of social exclusion and deprivation, such as
unemployment, problems related to coverage of essential social services, including health
care and education, issues of status and social empowerment, are problems of general
concern and often do not recognize national boundaries. Today, policies to eradicate social
exclusion are popular in most regions of the world, chiefly through the actions of United
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Nations agencies, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and developmental programs,
such as the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom and
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The problem of exclusion
has been specifically studied in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Studies of social exclusion
in those countries include topics, such as exclusion of indigenous people, rural poverty, labor
reform (Latin America), social change and exclusion of the poor, specifically children
(Africa), unfair provision of social services, etc.
Some key nuances in the nature of social exclusion around the world are highlighted
in Social Exclusion Knowledge Network (SEKN). In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the
leading discourse around social exclusion is focused on poverty, marginalization,
vulnerability, and sustainable development. In Latin America the discourse is dominated by
the ‘social risk management’ approach, promoted by the World Bank. “The concept
repositions the traditional areas of Social Protection (labor market intervention, social
insurance and social safety nets) in a framework that includes three strategies to deal with
risk (prevention, mitigation and coping), three levels of formality of risk management
(informal, market-based, public) and many actors (individuals, households, communities,
NGOs, governments at various levels and international organizations) against the background
of asymmetric information and different types of risk” (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000:1). In
south-east Asia, the discussion of social exclusion focuses on primarily poverty and on
concepts of capability and resource enhancement. In Europe, the discussion of exclusion is
deeply embedded in parallel concepts, such as social cohesion, social capital, social justice,
empowerment, emancipation, disaffiliation and marginalization. Discussing the applicability
of European literature on social exclusion to developing countries, Sen (2000:27) points out
that social understanding involves give and take, stressing that “the absence of “social safety
nets” when economic growth falters and lives are battered probably afflicts Asia and Africa
more than western Europe because of the protection offered by certain features of the
European “welfare state”.”
While we can adapt and apply the European notion of social exclusion to other less
developed regions of the world, there are certain limitations and dangers in doing so. Indeed,
it is erroneous to apply a concept instituted in industrialized countries with appropriate, well21

developed welfare systems to countries with poor resources, disadvantaged geopolitics,
extremely weak governance, and basically non-existent welfare provision. Social Exclusion
Knowledge Network (SEKN) points out that there is a “danger that ‘exclusion’ may be used
as a screen to hide extreme poverty and as a blaming label to make the poor responsible for
their condition” (Popay, et al. 2008:10). Gore and Figueiredo are also concerned about social
exclusion becoming a “blaming label”, used to make “the poor responsible for the
predicament as had happened with the term “underclass” in the USA” (Gore and Figueiredo
1997:44). Application of the concept of social exclusion fashioned in North America and
Western Europe to developing countries is problematic, because exclusion is often a mass
phenomenon in many developing countries and not confined to a minority or a categorical
boundary. Exclusion and inclusion are theoretical concepts, or as de Haan (1998:28) notes,
exclusion and inclusion are a “lens through which people look at reality and not reality
itself”. Their operationalization depends on our own methodological perspectives and our
political leanings.
The literature emphasizes that while it is normal to address the issue of social
exclusion in different regions of the world, one should pay attention to the different nuances
of the problem. In Europe and the US exclusion means predominantly prolonged
unemployment, loss of rights at work, and loss of social networks. In developing and
transitioning countries, exclusion is very much associated with the consequences of labor
market formation and transformation. In the latter, exclusion does not refer to only the loss of
social ties and affiliations, but also to economic, civil and political marginalization.
Although after the breakup of the USSR, the formation of labor markets and, due to
it, transforming employment trends have left millions of people left out of labor market or
with extremely low salaries, as well as excluded from social services and social networks,
there is extremely little research on social exclusion in this part of the world. There is an
abundant literature focusing on poverty and poverty reduction, but not much that is
concerned with the problem of social exclusion. The few articles of social exclusion in this
region examine the issue in mainly Russia and Ukraine (Tchernina 1996; Round 2004;
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Manning, Tikhonova, and George 2004; Rechitsky 2010), leaving ample space for further
research and empirical analysis on other post-Soviet states.15
2.3 Economic, Social, and Political Dimensions of Social Exclusion
The discussion of social exclusion is often emphasized in terms of processes and
dynamics rather than as a condition. According to UK Department for International
Development (DFID) Social Exclusion Review, social exclusion can be a condition or an
outcome on one hand, and a dynamic process on the other (DFID, 2005:8). In the case of
social exclusion as a condition, groups of society are excluded from participation in their
society, mainly due to their social identity (race, gender, nationality, religion, sexual
orientation, etc.) or social location (remote or rural areas, poor with resources, suffering from
war or conflict). As a dynamic process, social exclusion refers to certain relations and
barriers that block equal opportunities and citizenship. In this case of exclusion, we deal with
social and political relations that hinder access to organizational and institutional sites of
power. DFID, thus, provides a good definition of social exclusio n in the following way:
“Social exclusion is a process and a state that prevents individuals or groups from
participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives
from exclusionary relationships based on power”. (DFID, 2005:9)
Figure 2.1 presents the three processes that comprise social exclusion. While the three
circles of exclusion are important, the central quadrangle that deals with social relations and
powers, organizations and institutions is the most interesting part to research. There are
theories that examine these relations. Weber’s theory of “social closure” (1958) and Tilly’ s
theory of “opportunity hoarding” (1998) examine the interaction of groups from the point of
view of acquiring resources and power. 16 In both these cases, certain groups of people, most
typically powerful elites, exploit and monopolize resources excluding others from sharing
with them.
15 To

the best of my knowledge, Nazim Habibov's " Self-perceived social stratification in low-income
transitional countries: Examining the multi-country survey in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia" is one of the
first studies concerned with social polarization in the South Caucasus region . The social implications and
empirical findings of Habibov's work will be briefly described in Chapter 4, Public Perceptions of Social
Exclusion.
16 For a thorough discussion of Weber’s “social closure” theory, see also Collins 1974; Collins 1979; Parkin
1979, Bourdieu 1984; and Murphy 1988.
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Figure 2.1: Social, Economic and Political Dimensions of Social Exclusion

Source: DFID “Social Exclusion Review”, London, 2005, page 9.
Tilly’s exploitation or “opportunity hoarding” is defined as a situation where
members of a network “acquire access to a resource … supportive of network activities”
(Tilly 1998:10). To Weber, the idea of closure is related to exploitation based on both
property advantages and forms of prestige or status. Not only power and status, but also
ethnicity and kinship, as in the case of hoarders, may become sources of exploitation and
exclusion. Social closure is a process of subordination, where a group closes opportunities
for others, who are accepted as more inferior and ineligible (Murphy, 1988:8).
Similar to DFID, Weber and Tilly, Bhala and Laperye conclude that social exclusion
is a multidimensional concept, and that its analysis should be studied as a result of dynamic
causal factors (as presented in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). This process embraces economic
marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization. Economic exclusion mainly
concerns the lack of employment and worsening of income distribution over time. Long
periods of unemployment deprive people of not only income, but also social legitimacy,
social status, prestige and participation in decision-making. These two dimensions strongly
affect the political dimension of exclusion that according to the UNDP (1992:29) includes
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personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation, and equality of
opportunity. Exclusion in each dimension increases the risk of exclusion in the other two.
However, a person who is economically excluded is not necessarily excluded in one or two
of the other two dimensions, and vice versa.
Figure 2.2:Economic marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization
Economic Marginalization
(insecure and low-paid jobs; long-term
and recurrentunemployment)

Social Marginalization
(loss of networking and

opportunities for social participation)

Political Marginalization
(loss of participation andinfluence)

Political Polarization
(loss of social cohesion)

Source: Bhala and Laperye, “Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World”, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004.
Exclusion from economic life is expressed by unequal assets, incomes and
employment opportunities. People are economically excluded when they have limited or no
access to material resources due to external forces. They are marginalized in the distribut ion
of economic resources. Once this dimension of exclusion marginalizes certain groups of a
society, they are likely to be further excluded from the other two dimensions as well. While
many major reports on poverty, such as World Bank or UN reports indicate sharp inequalities
of incomes between, for example rural and urban areas in developing countries, access to
social services and political participation is often not taken into account.
Exclusion from social services is expressed by unequal access to various public
services. People are socially excluded if they face limited or no access to social services,
such as education, health care and medicine, social protection, basic infrastructure and
transport, water and energy. Here exclusion refers to not only the availability and quality, but
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also to accessibility and affordability of those services. For example, population groups
residing in villages or mountainous areas might have worse access to water than those living
in urban areas. Another example of social exclusion for the same group may be rare access to
internet technologies.
Exclusion from political life is expressedbyinequalities in political, cultural and civic
opportunities, liberty and justice, as well as unfair exercise of power. Political exclusion
occurs not only through formal institutions but also may happen due to lack of access to
informal structures and opportunities.
There isa popular assertion within the social exclusion literature to attach more
weight to the distributional issues when dealing with the economic dimension of exclusion.
In the case of social and political dimensions, greater attention is paid to relational issues.
One should not forget, though, that these two are closely correlated. Unemployment not only
excludes the individual from having income; it is related to the concept of entitlement, which
extends beyond the pure economic dimension. Very simply, if an individual does not have
income, he/she is likely to be excluded of appropriate social status and social legitimacy. If
lack of employment continues for a long period of time, the individual finds himself/herself
within a vicious cycle of denial: denial of revenue and output, denial of other economic rights
and opportunities, access to various social services and networks, and finally, this process
fails to recognize the person’s productive role as a human being in a society. All of these
significantly affect human ability, desire and inclusion in political engagement. Thus, another
social dimension concerns participation of social groups in decision-making. Other indicators
of the social aspect of exclusion are increasing violence and crime, and increasing number of
prisoners. The most popular indicators of social well-being are related to the quality of health
and educational services and whether one can access those services at all.
Bhalla and Lapeyre (1999/2004) conclude three most important aspects of the social
aspect of exclusion as follows:
a) Access to social services, such as health and education;
b) Access to the labor market; and
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c) Level of social participation reflected in a weakening of social fabric, as measured by
greater crime, juvenile delinquency and homelessness, etc.
This summary yet again shows the link between the economic and social dimensions
of exclusion; both dimensions are heavily dependent on access to the labor market, health
and education.
Bhalla and Laperye (2004) suggest that the distributional problems (the economic
dimension) are more predominant in developing countries and relational problems (the social
dimension) are more predominant in the industrialized ones. According to them, in
developing countries the lack of the welfare state is substituted and ameliorated by social and
family ties and kinship networks, and thus serves as risk insurance for the unemployed. The
authors argue that the decline of social institutions, such as family and marriage and social
support networks, as well as long-term unemployment results from the wealth and
appropriate welfare system in the industrialized countries, while in developing countries,
despite the newly-emerging industrialization trend, social networks continue to prevail. Here,
people fight against exclusion through informal institutional mechanisms to substitute for the
formal ones (Bhalla and Laperye, 2004:90-91).
As a theoretical concept, social exclusion does not focus on bounded groups, but
stresses social relations and processes through which people are deprived. In social
exclusion, as a multi-dimensional concept, people can be excluded from employment,
earnings, property, education, health services, personal contacts or respect, freedom of
speech, political participation or activism, etc. All of these create a cycle of socio-economic
and political disadvantages. A second aspect of the concept, which is less discussed but quite
relevant for the theoretical contribution of the concept, considers relations and processes.
There is a clear link between economic and social indicators and weak socio-political
participation. Long-term unemployment, for example, has a significant effect on not only
material deprivation but also on social marginalization and political polarization, or in other
words, on both distributionaland relational aspects in societies where employment and
workplace is core to not only having income but also social recognition and status. The
workplace also provides opportunities for social networks. Employment loss, thus, results in
27

loss of solidarity networks and a sense of social inferiority, isolation and alienation. This, in
its turn, affects the ability and extent of socially isolated and alienated people to political
participation. The accumulation of disadvantages on each level aggravates social exclusion,
and if this state lasts for a long time, social exclusion becomes durable.
Defining and understanding social exclusion is much easier than measuring it. There
have been a few efforts to measure social exclusion or roots of deprivation. Haan (1999:1112) mentions some sources and methods, such as UNDP’s Human Development Index and
poverty assessments’ ‘correlates of poverty’, London Research Center’s index of deprivation
areas that focus on the polarization within British cities, and other 30-40 quantitative
measures created by the EU, the French Action Plan for Employment and Britain’s New
Labor’s ‘poverty charter’. Paugam (1995) also uses a quantitative analysis of correlations
between elements of deprivation in order to examine ‘spirals of precariousness’ of French
deprived neighborhoods.
Employing quantitative analysis is useful in measuring social exclusion, but again it
does not sufficiently cover relations. It demonstrates that, for example, an individual or a
number of individuals in a society are excluded from, for instance, employment, but it does
not lay out the scenarios why the same people are excluded also from politics and policy
making.
In this study, social exclusion as an outcome or condition is analyzed through
measuring the following phenomena, which are key elements of social exclusion and which
include all three dimensions of social exclusion:


Gini coefficient rates,



Lack of employment or exclusion from the labor market,



Lack of access to education to acquire skills,



Lack of access to health services, and therefore inequalities in health,



Increasing homelessness;



Increasing crime rates.



Increased feeling of insecurity;
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Self-perception of lower-status social identity;17



Decreased freedom of speech;



Administrative difficulties to run for parliamentary or presidential elections and
extremely unequal chances to win in elections by secondary political party members or
independent candidates.



More cases of political arrests and uncovered cases of politicians’ and/or politically
active citizens’ assassination.



Human rights abuses in general.

2.4 Causes of Social Exclusion
Various interpretations of social exclusion, as well as its multidimensional nature,
allow scholars to focus on a variety of causes and multiple origins of social exclusion. Every
human being has a set of characteristics that will create a certain threat of social exclusion for
him/her. These features may be gender, age, language, religion, norms and values, disability,
as well as socio-economic status, such as educational level, employment, wealth, networks.
Any of these characteristics alone is not always enough to put a person at risk of marginality;
most often social exclusion manifests, when these characteristics interact with other causes of
social exclusion related to formal and informal institutions, state elites, and governmenta l
policies.
The causes of social exclusion have been attributed mainly to socio-economic
changes of labor markets in free-market economies and to the flaws of government policies
and services. Labor markets often foment social exclusion; yet, it would be erroneous to say
that social exclusion depends on the deficiencies of labor market alone.A free-market system
is basically an arrangement through which people interact and undertake mutually beneficial
activities, thus theoretically, it is irrational to blame the market mechanism for social
exclusion. Existence of free markets per se does not create inequalities. Exclusionary
practices arise when the employment of markets is not done properly: when there are
insufficient assets, when there is inadequate preparedness to effectively organize market
transactions, a very limited role of the state in the market regulations, unconstrained disguise
of information by business leaders, and financial activities that allow the powerful to exclude
17

By social identity I mean the devaluation of people based on who they are or rather who they are perceived to
be.
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others from processes and fruits of markets. This is how in practice a market mechanism
becomes a culprit of unfairness and exclusion. The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of a
market depends on the conditions in which social opportunities offered by the state and other
institutions can be commonly shared instead of being reserved for a limited elite.
Exclusion may also be reinforced by history, religion, traditions and culture of a
country, and embedded in dominant social attitudes, behaviors and prejudicial practices. It
may be perpetuated by authoritarian and exclusive state leaders and political elites that
concentrate power and centralize decision making process. Social exclusion, as a process of
discrimination on the basis of economic class, ethnic status, as well as racial and cultural
identity, results from policies which are embedded in the formal institutions of the state.
Weak civil society is another reason for a society not to be able to become more inclusive.
Finally, exogenous factors, such as external shocks, are sometimes important in creating
exclusionary practices.
The causes of social exclusion may be systematized into three main groups: 1) causes
that are analyzed through the lens of agency, 2) structural/institutional causes, and 3) causes
originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial, and self-destructive values and lifestyles.
Authors, who focus on agency as a main cause of social exclusion, argue that exclusion
arises from discriminatory policies and actions of a state, a consequence of certain actions of
a society’s political, social, and economic elites, who pursue privileges for themselves,
excluding other members of a society. “Powerful class and status groups, which have distinct
social and cultural identities as well as institutions, use social closure to restrict the access of
outsiders to valued resources (such as jobs, good benefits, education, urban locations, valued
patterns of consumption)” (Saraceno 2002:7-8). The disadvantaged groups of the society
often do not challenge those elites because they are incapable of enforcing rights that
undergird inclusion and/or power to do so.
The second group, which possibly is the most prevalent one, explores the institutiona l
basis of social exclusion and is popular in research analyzing exclusion in Europe. 18 Authors
that belong to this school of thought propose that an individual’s opportunities within a
18

A more detailed account of institutional causes of social exclusion in Europe is presented by Evans (1998).
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society chiefly depend on the type of institutions and the way they function. Institutions are
key instruments for promotion of social cohesion, and they are responsible for social
exclusion, because they limit access to resources and opportunities necessary for inclusion,
such as, for instance, adequate training and education, insurance and assistance, legal rights
and protection, as well as property rights. It is important to mention that those limitations are
sometimes unintended and are beyond the control of a single institution. A legal framework
that is discriminatory or inadequate in its implementation, such as a flawed legislation,
expands the exclusion of some social groups. Often, particularly in developing countries,
informal rules and cultural behavior may be at the root of social exclusion. Certain values
and norms are discriminatory against an individual or a social group, such as females in the
labor market and/or refugees in political, social and cultural life. Minority ethnic
communities may be denied educational opportunities available for some others. Refugees
may be denied citizenship. People may be openly discriminated against in the labor market
because of their nationality, language, creed, skin color, or just because they are
handicapped.
While unfair policies and exclusive attitudes of government authorities (agency as a
cause of social exclusion) or bad institutional design (structural drivers of exclusion) are
important and predominant drivers of social exclusion, there are individuals or groups of
individuals within the society, who are themselves responsible for their own disadvantage. In
this case, exclusion is attributed to perverse, pathological and antisocial values and behaviors
of those groups. This perspective is equivalent to Levitas’s (1998, 2000, 2005) moral
underclass discourse of social exclusion, which suggests that the norms, behaviors, values
and attitudes of certain individuals or groups lead to their marginality. Those are believed to
be low-income, drug and alcohol using people, criminals, single and underage parents, etc.
The institutional drivers of social exclusion include various causes, among which the
most commonly mentioned ones are globalization and economic restructuring. These two
have a strong impact on labor markets and employment trends and undermine the role of
state in regards to provision of welfare and social assistance. Other institutional/structural
sources of exclusion include, but are not limited to the following: 1) advancement of the
knowledge-based society and technological evolution, which marginalize technologically31

challenged people and people with outdated knowledge and skills; 2) demographic changes,
such as immigration, declining birth rates, and increasing ethnic and religious diversity; and
3) territorialism (The European Commission (2000, 2001)).
The 2001 Social Exclusion Unit, UK, indicates two main institutional causes. The
first group of causes has economic and social character and includes: 1) economic
restructuring; 2) family restructuring; and 3) community polarization with decreased and
weak social networks and other support groups. The other group of causes originates from
ineffective government policies, working methods, and coordination.
A significant categorization of sources of social exclusion is offered by Atkinson and
Davoudi (2000). Their framework includes causes that have been already identified in earlier
paragraphs, but the organization is more clearly arranged into four key societal institutions:
1) the legal system; 2) the labor market; 3) the social welfare system; and 4) family and
community system. Because social rights are embedded in those institutional systems, social
exclusion occurs if any of these institutional subsystems breaks down or becomes
discriminatory. Atkinson and Davoudi’s framework clearly highlights the multidimensional
nature of the phenomenon of social exclusion.
Kaasa (2003) offers another comprehensive overview of factors affecting income
inequality as a part of social exclusion. Kaasa organizes all of the factors thought to affect
inequality in transition economies into five categories: (1) economic growth and overall
development level of a country, (2) macroeconomic factors, (3) demographic factors, (4)
political factors, and (5) historical, cultural, and natural factors.
Within the institutional drivers of social exclusion, Keane and Prasad (2001) stress
education to be an essential factor affecting income inequality in transition economies. The
authors argue that the financial return to education and experience increased dramatically in
transitioning societies, increasing labor earnings inequality.
Besides the above-mentioned causes, exclusion is also influenced by the local
context, such as for example type of residence (urban vs. rural, the latter of which is often
away from industrial centers and employment opportunities, vibrant cultural and political
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activities), existence of religious and ethnic diversity, existence of natural resource wealth,
etc. Local context may deepen exclusion or, vice versa, promote inclusion.
A myriad of factors that include institutional or non-institutional sources of social
exclusion lies within each of the above mentioned categories. Addressing the particular
effects of each of these factors lies outside of the scope of this chapter, but a few of them that
are deemed in mainstream literature to be particularly significant in determining social
exclusion will be addressed below. Among those are privatization and changes in market
labor, weak/strong civil society, natural resource abundance, and finally exclusive and
militarized state elites.
2.4.1. Globalization, Privatization, and Labor Markets:Economic growth remains at the heart
of strategies to decrease or eliminate poverty and social exclusion. Economic and social
exclusion, however, persist along with economic expansion. While economic growth,
calculated as gross national income (GNI), is strongly correlated with key human
development indicators, the chronically poor are the least likely to benefit from growth
(Global Chronic Poverty [GCP] 2004-5:37). An argument that economic growth increases
inequality, giving rise to higher income poverty for an average GNI per capita, is currently
mainstream (Global Chronic Poverty (GCP) 2004-5:37). The post-Soviet literature largely
connects economic growth, as well as, issues of inequality, to the nature of the privatizat ion
process that post-Soviet republics experienced.
Privatization is broadly defined as “the shifting of a function, either in whole or in
part, from the public sector to the private sector” (Butler, in Gormley 1991:17). Privatization
increases reliance on the private sector and the market system, and shrinks the role of the
state to pursue social goals. The literature on privatization is quite large and a review of it
demonstrates that the field touches upon too many areas, and has proponents, skeptics as well
as opponents. The theoretical framework behind the idea of privatization is largely dependent
on understanding the concept of property rights. In order to develop a market system, people
have to effectively deal with transactions. Competitive markets, in which transactions are
best handled by market prices, rely heavily on formal, well-defined property rights (Mankiw,
2001). The proponents of privatization also argue that governments have become very large
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and quite bureaucratized and thus, are not efficient. They contend that the private sector is
more motivated in the maximization of production and output.
Poole (1996), a fervent supporter of privatization, mentions that by increasing the
private sector, the government collects taxes from the privatized firms and is able to diminish
over-borrowing and continuous national debt. He also argues that privatization provides
ownership for a large percentage of the society, which is yet another incentive for
underdeveloped or developing countries to take the privatization path. Another advantage of
privatization is the emergence and boost of foreign direct investments that affects economic
growth.
Many of the privatization opponents would agree to some of the points expressed by
the supporters of privatization, specifically, that private firms have a more efficient
production and output results. Nonetheless, some of the above-presented assumptions and
other aspects of the privatization process have been critiqued. Most essentially, the
importance of equitable concerns, such as income distribution, has been ignored to a great
extent by the privatization proponents. Even disregarding the issues of equality and social
inclusion, there is literature demonstrating that the efficiency implications of private
ownership are dubious, and there is a need for government intervention.
In their article “From State to Market: A survey of Empirical Studies”, Megginson
and Netter (2001) survey the rapidly growing literature on privatization and present the
promises and perils of privatization as an economic policy in Russia and former Soviet
republics. In doing so, the authors suggest that it is difficult to summarize privatization
effects in post-Soviet countries, based on four reasons. 1) The transition from socialism to
capitalism was a very complicated process in this region, because these republics had
experienced the longest communist control, and moreover, this transition coincided with the
breakup of the USSR as a whole economic system. 2) The contraction in output that occurred
in the FSU was much greater than anywhere else, yet there has been no upturn, making it
difficult to document relative performance improvement. 3) Most post-Soviet republics,
specifically Russia, experienced worsening economies after 1997, so examining the impact
of privatization at different time periods in the same country or region would lead to different
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conclusions. And finally, 4) studies on the post-Soviet republics rely on survey data or
anecdotal evidence, so the material here for empirical analysis is of much poorer quality than
in other regions (Megginson and Netter, 2001:35). Therefore, a conclusion that economic and
political merits of private ownership are greater than those of government ownership is
flawed, and should not be extrapolated to individual countries or regions. Instead, each
country’s privatization process has brought its own benefits and perils that should be studied.
Contrary to Megginson and Netter, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (2002) in
“Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of Privatization” conclude that
most privatization programs have worsened the distribution of assets and income, at least in
the short run. According to them, it has provided opportunities for the enrichment of the agile
and corrupt, making the wealthy wealthier and the poor poorer. “The complaint is that, even
if privatization contributes to improved efficiency and financial performance (and some
contest this as well), it has a negative effect on the distribution of wealth, income and
political power” (Birdsall and Nellis, 2002:2). With an overall negative attitude towards
privatization, the authors’ conclusion, however, is that the distributional effects of
privatization depend on initial conditions, the sale event, and the post-privatization political
and economic environment of a country.
Other theories of privatization and issues closely related to privatization, such as
openness to trade and globalization, help in restricted ways to address but not adequately
explain social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Some, opposite to conventional wisdom,
say that greater openness to trade has been accompanied with increasing rather than reducing
wage inequality (Wood 1997), others relate globalization with less polarization of
distribution (Aisbett 2005), while others explain the phenomenon of inequality and exclusion
through stages of relative dependence on foreign direct investments (Kentor 1998; Alderson
and Nielson 1999). More helpful views, which are closely related to the privatization
hypothesis developed in this study, are stated by Branco Milanovich and Stephen Haber.
Milanovich (1999) points out that the most important factor driving inequality upwards is
increased inequality of wage distribution, which is, indeed, common sense. Haber (2002)
examines distribution from quite another angle. He theorizes that crony capitalism (defined
as a system, in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies,
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receive favors that have large economic value) has negative consequences for the distribution
of income. In this system, which is similar to the modern Armenian state, privileged asset
holders earn rents on behalf of everyone else in the society.
Privatization typically modifies the institutional framework through which people
formulate, mediate and promote their interests. The consequences of this institutional
restructuring do not work the same way for all social groups. Some social groups and strata
benefit more, as they find their interests more clearly defined and more easily promoted,
while others find themselves in more disadvantaged circumstances, as they lack free access
to social services previously arranged by the state. Although much of the literature
deemphasizes privatization as a political process and analyzes it as “a pragmatic adaptation
of well-tested administrative techniques or a necessary exercise in economic adjustment to
structural constraints”, privatization should be regarded as an intensely political
phenomenon, considering the nature of the-above mentioned consequences (Feigenbaum and
Henig, 1994:186).
The literature that connects privatization to social exclusion provides a variety of
approaches to modeling social exclusion. It analyzes how different aspects of the
privatization process cause or determine social inequalities. In their analysis of social
inclusion Barlow, Grimalda, and Meschi (2009) regress Gini coefficient, as a determinant of
income inequality, on globalization variables (imports, exports, and foreign direct
investment), institutional variables (privatization and price liberalization), control variables,
and a time trend on inequality. Their main finding is that price liberalization has the strongest
effect on income inequality. Bennett, Estrin, and Urga (2007) similarly argue that voucher
privatization significantly increased GDP, at the same time causing growth in inequality.
Kornei (2006) offers a more general discussion of how privatization affects levels of income
inequality in transition economies. He attributes most of income inequality to structural
unemployment, which he deems an inevitable aspect of transition. Whereas a socialist
economy typically guaranteed job security for the overwhelming percentage of its society,
the post-transition capitalist system created unemployment that most citizens had never
experienced. Besides the unemployment increase that the capitalist system created through
privatization of firm and companies, people additionally were not knowledgeable about
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important issues of the capitalist system, such as vouchers, price fluctuations, interest rates,
and floating exchange rates. According to Kornei, the lack of knowledge on these issues most
strongly affected income inequality.
Privatization and free trade are associated with sharp increases in relative deprivation
and unequal distribution of sources of wealth and prosperity, which are only intensified by
reduced state protection (Chua 2003; Storm and Rao 2004: 573–74; Nissanke and Thorbecke
2006). While capitalist relationships perpetuate inequalities and exclusion within a society,
the popular idea of globalization incessantly denies capitalism as a “system of power and
conflict” (Fine 2004: 586, 588). The logic of globalization chiefly focuses on the ways
political economy of capitalism generates wealth, with infrequent assessments of national
policies and domestic traditions of distribution of that wealth, and ignores the social
irrationality of neoliberal order that brings massive suffering (Robinson 2002:1057, 1062)
For example, the socialist economic transition to market economy was accompanied with
loss of property and work entitlements for millions (Humphrey 1996-7, in Elyachar 2005,
page 30).
Exclusionary practices are thoroughly embedded in the operations of labor markets.
A market economy is typically characterized with high rates of unemployment,
discriminatory practices, lack of basic legal protection on the job, extremely low wages, long
working hours, etc. All these processes solidify social exclusion by creating segregation of
underpaid or low-paid workers in poor neighborhoods, social stigma related to poor-quality
jobs, low income and pitiable lifestyle. Most notoriously, market economies are also
associated with child labor and early school leaving, which have a lifelong impact on
opportunities.
In conclusion, the literature identifies three major ways through which labor markets
can become agents of social exclusion (Mazza 2004:181). Table 2.2identifies exclusion
features of each of these three forms of social exclusion more specifically.


Lack of access to jobs (unemployment, severe underemployment)



Access to only very low wage, (“poverty” employment)



Lack of access to quality jobs with mobility.
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Table 2.2: Principal Forms of Labor Market Exclusion
Type oflabor
Chief labor
Exclusion features
market
marketcharacteristic
exclusion
Type 1
Open unemployment;
Discrimination;
Lack of access
Discouraged workers
Family and community isolation
to jobs
Type 2
Low wage employment or
Poverty and associated social exclusion;
Access to only
employment under poverty Long working hours;
low-wage
line;
Lack of benefits;
“poverty”
High rates of informality;
Greater likelihood of unhealthy working
employment
Very low returns to labor
conditions;
Physical or spatial segregation in poor
regions or neighborhoods
Type 3
Underemployment;
Lack of access to social networks for
Lack of access
Poor quality and low
advancement;
to quality jobs
productivity work;
Employment trap with little chance of
with mobility
Low returns to labor
improvement
Lack of access to productivity
enhancing training
Source: Mazza 2004:182.
2.4.2. Civil Society:A strong civil society provides excellent opportunities for people to join
groups based on different causes, needs and social features. It, therefore, represents a main
protection of rights and is an important safeguard against social exclusion. A civil society
with strong foundations and powerful structures may encourage the adoption of more
inclusive policies in a country. On the contrary, a weak civil society and its lack of capacity
to act as a check on the accountability of leaders creates an environment conducive to
inequality in various spheres of society and the persistence of exclusion. Independent and
unbiased mass media, non-government organizations with missions oriented at inclusive
policies, and strong social movements, specifically youth movements are important elements
of vibrant civil society.
Media is an important agent structuring people’s everyday life. Today’s media
constructs the image of outer reality. In this capacity, mass media can be either objective or
biased sources of dissemination of information. Unbiased media, especially investigative
media, can be an essential source of social inclusion in as much as it objectively portrays new
policies, discusses their benefits and disadvantages for the society, finds out dishonest
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government officials and their actions, uncovers socially outlawed and taboo issues, informs
the public about the wrongdoers, and equips people with legal or non-legal ways and
methods to deal with them. On the other hand, biased media can contribute to discrimination
against members of different social groups or minorities by either publishing or announcing
predisposed and unfair information about them or in the least by failing to explicitly
deprecate this information. Thus, mass media affects those groups’ exclusion from the
majority of the society. The same type of biased approach can support certain candidates
during elections, thus becoming a political source of discrimination and exclusion for the rest
of the candidates, as well as the electorate.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a significant role in minimizing
social exclusion on all three levels: economic, political and social. They equip marginal
groups, which are excluded from employment markets, political participation, social services
and networks with knowledge and essential skills to participate in the market-place, in
policy-making, and in social networking. Those agencies not only help the excluded groups
indirectly by providing a set of skills, but also support those groups directly by providing
finances, goods and products essential for survival. There are dozens of examples of the
latter. A good example is microcredit programs that have proven to be a particularly
successful method to enable people to improve their household situatio n and lifestyles. Other
effective programs are health and education related projects that supply marginal groups in
developing countries with medicine and medical equipment, educational materials and
equipment. Agricultural projects immensely assist farmers in rural areas, who otherwise
would be doomed to unemployment and lack of means to provide for their families.
It is not disputable that the NGO sector, mainly financed and implemented by
Western donors, such as the USAID (United States Agency for International Development),
different UN (United Nations) agencies, World Vision, World Learning, the World Bank,
and the Eurasia Foundation, has had a significant impact in the decrease of social exclusio n.
While civil society efforts to create socially more inclusive societies in developing countries
are important, they do not have a long-term impact on the reduction of social exclusion. It
does not affect the intergenerational or durable social exclusion significantly. A popular
Chinese proverb follows: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish
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and you feed him for a lifetime”. Most of the NGOs, for example, whether local or
international give the developing societies ‘food’ for a day or so, but very few teach them to
fish.
2.4.3. Natural Resources and Resource Curse:While it is not certain that increased inequality
may be a result of natural resource wealth, often termed as the ‘oil curse’, there is a prevalent
assertion that natural resource wealth is related to the rise of authoritarian trends and,
consequently, an increase of inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Kaasa 2005; Scherbak
2010) The abundance of natural resources is in general associated with a higher
concentration of ownership and rent, which in their turn affect the increase of income
inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme, 2002).
Scherbak (2010) states that based on statistical data in the late 1990s inequality
increased in post-Soviet countries that were rich in resources, and it decreased in post-Soviet
countries that were poor in resources. This happened because state elites of oil-rich states aim
to preserve their control over rents, and to maximize their share of the rent. According to
Scherbak, all the successful post-Soviet"color revolutions" occurred in the resource-poor
countries, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In oil-rich countries – Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia – any social movements challenging the ruling elites
either failed or did not take place at all. “In these countries the governments have more to
lose if they lose power, especially with the rally of oil prices on world markets.” (Scherbak,
2010:64)
Scherbak is right indicating that natural resources may be related to increase of
inequality, but he fails to notice that continued waves of social movements did not succeed in
some resource-poor countries as well. Armenia is an example of it. This certainly points to
the idea that being blessed with natural resources does not necessarily mean for a country to
be highly exclusionary, or vice versa. Armenia does not possess oil or other natural
resources, but its society is quite polarized with a high degree of social exclusion for certain
classes of the society. Therefore, to reason that natural resource wealth is a resource curse
and a source of social exclusion might not be universal. The effect of abundant natural
resources on social exclusion should be examined in combination with globalization and
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market operations, institutional weaknesses of a country, its state structure and its coercive
strength.
2.4.4. Nature of State Elites: Repressive States:A prodigious amount of research is available
on the state-society relationship, and how a weak or an exclusive state can impact
polarization and marginalization within a society. There are couple of ways a state can
induce social exclusion, such as red tape, bureaucracy, insufficient state support related to
social welfare and citizens’ rights protection through legal system, complete absence of
market regulation by the state, and finally through a state leader with authoritarian
inclinations and practices. Simply, a state can create or worsen social exclusion through
bureaucratic tendencies, monopolization of political power, skewed state policy choices, and
coercive practice and human rights violations towards its citizens.
In most post-Soviet countries, for example, state bureaucracy typically revolves
around documentation requirements.Public officials are very rigid in creating alternative
routes or rules of gaining access to resources, besides the requirement to present certain
documentation. Documentation as a means of excluding the poor is commonly cited in
reports as a motive for their inability to access resources. Other bureaucratic barriers are the
resentment and unfairness that excluded people, particularly single mothers and the elderly,
often face. Documentation as a requirement is a device through which certain groups are
socially excluded, a device that allows the state to deny services and resources to certain
groups. This happens especially in the judicial and the welfare system. Another way to
exclude people is asking for bribes in return to access to institutions or services. This is also
practiced in most of the post-Soviet countries, where due to lack of money or connections
people are discriminated against for nearly any kind of service, resource or life opportunity: a
job, health care, social security, pensions, admission to universities, trading licenses, etc.
A weak state is also a means through which social exclusion perpetuates. In this
sense, the state does not try or is unable to intervene in unemployment and poverty reduction,
equal access to education and health services. When the state does not intervene in reducing
poverty, unemployment, and increasing equal access opportunities to education and health
services, social exclusion deepens. As the formal state weakens, state elites gain increasing
41

power and they exercise it arbitrarily and without punishment. Public officials demand bribes
without impunity or even threaten brutality by using the police or the security system in
general. Poor and powerless citizens in this atmosphere feel unprotected and rejected as
compared to fellow citizens who have networks and powerful resources.
Bureaucratic states elites that support policies in favor of certain classes are typical
not only in developing countries, but also in Western societies. This tendency, however, is
stronger in developing countries, where the level of state elites’ power and how they choose
to exercise that power may be a substantial means of societal polarization. The exclusion of
social groups occurs within a political economy that allocates scarce resources, when power
is exerted by state officials, police, contractors, employers or traders to the disadvantage of
poor people. It is achieved through the arrangement of formal systems of public policies and
laws. In societies with high degrees of social exclusion, the decision making power of the
ruling elite is manifest mainly in the skewed targeting of public services.
The nature and extent of state repression is another important factor in explaining
levels of social exclusion. State repression and authoritarian tendencies in their turn are
typically related to an increase of the size of the coercive apparatus of the state. An
authoritarian state with increased militarization is a critical causal mechanism for the rise of
inequality and exclusion (Ross 1999, 2001; Torvik 2002; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier
2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Scherbak 2008).Mann defines state militarization
as “preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (Mann, 1987:35). Other
definitions of the concept are quite similar (Andreski 1954 and 1968, Huntington 1957,
Janowitz 1964 and 1977, Dunne and Smith 1990, Bowman 2002).
The foundation of the militarization scholarship is basically rooted in three authors’
works: Stanislav Andreski, Samuel Huntington, and Morris Janowitz. Among these founding
works on the theme, Andreski’s “Military Organization and Society” is more appealing for
the sake of this dissertation’s research question. He notes that war-making can either increase
or decrease social stratification depending on the military participation ratio (MPR).The
higher this ratio, the less stratification (1968:30). Although there is a similar line between the
hypothesis of this study that militarization is a major factor underlying social exclusion and
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Andreski’s judgment about the relationship between militancy and social stratification, my
argument is a direct challenge to Andreski’s assertion that a high MPR flattens social
stratification.
Andreski re-examined his statement in a second edition noting that a high level of
militarism causes less stratification, when there exists an external threat, as the latter
heightens national cohesion. Similar to Andreski, Janowitz’s “The Military in the Political
Development of New Nations” (1964) is also positive about the political capacity of military
forces. It explains the greater political capacity and power of military institutions and its
authorities. The significance of the military in internal political affairs is mainly due to the
fact that the military has control over instruments of violence. According to Janowitz, the
army is a device for developing a sense of identity, building morale and has the ability to
enhance human capital by providing education and training.19 Later, in 1977, Janowitz
reevaluates the control structure of the military in his new book “Military Institutions and
Coercion in the Developing Nations”. Here, the military structure includes the paramilitary
forces. Paramilitary forces are “essentially including the different types of national police
forces and those militia personnel who have internal security functions” (Janowitz 1977:29).
Another scholar of the field, Marek Thee, distinguishes between militarization and
militarism. Militarism is a set of “such symptoms as rush to armaments, the growing role of
our military (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs,
the use of force as an instrument of supremacy and political power and the increasing
influence to civilian affairs”. Militarization is “an extension of military influence to civilian
spheres, including economic and socio-political life” (Eide and Thee, 1980:15). In the same
collection of essays, “Problems of Contemporary Militarism”, militarism is defined by Jan
Oberg as “merging of major civil and military interests” (page 49). The best exposition,
which is very elegant although again broadly expressed, is that “the militarized stateapparatus is the weapon of the whole monopoly” (page 173). At its most extreme,
militarization entails subservience of the entire society to the needs of the army, and finally,
ideology promoting military ideas (Andreski, 1968:429).

19 See

Morris Janowitz's "Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait", pages 80-83.
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2.5 Drivers of Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet Societies
Social inclusion is a critical element of democratic consolidation; thus, existence of
social exclusion is a deficiency of democratic consolidation, which results in popular
mobilization. Theories of democratic consolidation may interpret durable social exclusion
and social unrest, as its consequence, in terms of various factors. Theoretical approaches in
regard to the foundations of sustainable democracy with equal rights and opportunities
emphasize economic structures (Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989), political
institutions(North 1990,Haggard & Kaufman 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993; Tsebelis 1995;
Stepan and Skach 1993), international and transnational factors (Pridham, Herring and
Sanford 1994 (1997); Zielonka and Pravda 2001), and civil society (Nichols 1996; Diamond
1999; O’Loughlin and Bell, 1999; Henderson 2000; Marsh 2000; Paxton 2002; Kuchukeeva
and O’Loughlin 2003). Among political institutions the focus is on party systems, electoral
structure, courts and the rule of law. In regard to civil society (associational life), in the 19 th
century Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-1840) referred to the relationship between civil society
and democracy. Since then civil society has long been identified as a link to democratic
governance (Almond and Verba 1989; Putnam 2000 and 2002).
The most popular insight of the democratic consolidation of post-communist states,
specifically the Eastern Europe, rests on the process of institution building. The premise of
the institutionalist literature in comparative politics is that democracy depends not only
economic and social features of the country, but also on the establishment and design of
political institutions. Weak institutions are roots of deficient democracy and mass discontent.
Based on the new institutionalism, transitioning states everywhere – Latin America, Eastern
Europe, as well as the rest of the post-Soviet states – have had to re-evaluate and re-establish
not only their economic institutions, economic markets and economic institutions, but also
their political institutions (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Przeworski 1991; Clague and
Rausser 1992; North 1990, Kolodko 1999). In terms of social exclusion, following this
premise of the institutionalist scholars and practitioners, revamping institutional
insufficiencies would restore greater social inclusion in economic resources and opportunit ies
as well as political participation. Continued strengthening of political institutions would
decrease social unrest and demands of better public policy and equal opportunities.
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Whereas the widely-advocated institutionalist perspective has potentialities, in many
post-Soviet countries its application has not resulted in desired outcomes regarding social
inclusion, at least for the first few decades after the USSR's breakup. Eduardo Silva in his
analysis of anti-neoliberal mass mobilization in Latin America, contends that “institutions are
social constructs that crystallize relations of domination and subordination in society (Mann
1993, 1986; Weber 1978). He further observes, "analysts steeped in this [institutionalist]
perspective missed the point that the very institutions they advocated caused inequalities that
generated the grievances that drive popular mobilization” (Silva 2009:11).
Przeworski, stressing the importance of endogeneity, notes that, "conditions shape
institutions and institutions only transmit the causal effects of these conditions" (Przeworski
2004:529). Institutions that perpetuate the power and domination of the powerful and the
exclusion of the powerless are viable under the given circumstances. In the absence of those
conditions, the discussion of the role of institutions becomes relatively meaningless.
Therefore, "projects of institutional reform must take as their point of departure the actual
conditions, not blueprints based on institutions that have been successful elsewhere"
(Przeworski 2004:540).20
While it is indeed important to examine the post-Soviet Armenian democratization
process, and within this process issues of social exclusion in terms of the institutional and
structural context, we do need to recognize the political transformations that are specific to
the post-Soviet Armenian state, as an agency. In the explanation of durable social exclusion,
not only the economic structure and institutional design of a country are focal, but also the
political features specific to a state are critical agents. Specifically, the state plays a central
role in the processes of commodification of labor and social relations. From this point of
view, state-oriented theories of democratic consolidation are worth studying. The role of the
state, as an actor and a main generator of processes, becomes important in the discussion of
20

In his seminal article "Institutions Matter?", Przeworski (2004) recollects that Guillermo O'Donnell, an
adversary of the institutional perspective, once remarked to him: "One cannot stop a coup d’état by an article in
the constitution’, any article in the constitution" (Przeworski 2004:529). Reckoning on O'Donnell's remark, in a
similar vein, I add that any article of the Armenian constitution has not been able to stop state elites from using
constitutionally banned coercive methods towards peaceful s ocial movements. Not only was the constitution not
able to refrain those in power, but also the actions of a vibrant civil society could not st op the latter. Ironically,
both — the Constitution and civil society — are believed to be key institutions able to influence democracy,
social participation, and inclusion.

45

social exclusion, because states often become engines of elimination of a large number of
social groups in support of particular classes, or even a small number of individuals and their
close networks. This support is typically rationalized and implemented through governmental
policies and programs in favor of the latter groups.
The state, other political institutes and social networks become more important when
we look at their interrelationships. As Silva argues, “state strength also hinges on the state’s
relationship to other organized power networks nationally and internationally, such as the
economy, class relations, the military, and ideological production. In other words, state
power is relational. It depends, at least in part, on its relationship to these other sources of
power in society” (Silva 2009:13). Especially when we try to study social exclusion, it is
impossible to look at it from one angle, and the relational approach becomes very useful.
Policy-oriented theories of social exclusion that emphasize the multidimensionality of the
phenomenon offer a useful first cut into the problem by analyzing dynamic causal factors.
These theories stress that social exclusion and its causes have economic, social, and political
dimensions. They take a relational approach to social exclusion that focuses not only on who
is excluded but also on who is doing the excluding. Moreover, they highlight the
institutional structures that serve to include or exclude. This relational approach to the
problem directs our attention to crucial issues of process and power relationships that lie at
the heart of social exclusion (DFID, 2009; Parkin 1979; Collins 1974; Collins 1979;
Bourdieu 1984; Murphy 1988; Silver 1995; Beall and Piron 2005).
These state-centered approaches that are at the same time relational-oriented theories
of social exclusion fit well with the central problem of transitions to market capitalism and
democracy in post-Soviet states. The twin transition in those cases involved the wholesale
restructuring of economies, political regimes, and social relations.

These changes also

involved a dramatic reconstitution of political and economic power, which had profound
effects on patterns of socioeconomic and political exclusion in the post-Soviet nominally
democratic regimes.
Theoretical approaches in political economy and in contentious politics offer useful
perspectives on the question of power from a relational point of view. The social closure and
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opportunity hoarding theories, mentioned before, share a central insight.

They examine the

interaction of groups in the structuring of inequality from the point of view of acquiring
resources and power. In both approaches, powerful elites exploit and monopolize resources
to the exclusion of other social groups. Weber draws our attention to a critical factor for the
reconstruction of power relationships in the twin transitions from post-Soviet societies. He
argues that social closure results from exploitation based on property advantages, as well as
from forms of prestige or status. Similarly, as Murphy (1988: 8) proposes, social closure is a
process of subordination, where a group closes opportunities for others who are accepted as
more inferior and ineligible. Tilly introduces us to another critical dimension of power in the
development of social exclusion: networks.

Opportunity hoarding involves a situation where

the members of a network “acquire access to a resource… supportive of network activities”,
which was critical to rebuilding socioeconomic and political power in the twin transitions of
post-Soviet societies (Tilly 1998:10).
The central role of property advantages and the constitution of networks to control it
to the exclusion of others focuses our attention on the critical part that privatization played in
the process of transitions from socialism. The political economy of free-market reforms in
Latin America clearly establishes the relationship (Foxley 1983, Vanden and Prevost 2002,
Gwynne and Kay 2005). Political leaders in control of the privatization of state enterprises
shape the process to benefit specific favored domestic economic interests.

This creates a

network of powerful supporters for both the general process of market reforms and for
incumbent political leaders. Cronyism, sweetheart deals, and generally opaque transactions
and rules characterize the resulting power networks.
The vast literature on privatization generally focuses on the evaluation of the process
in terms of its contributions to the efficiency of the market economy that replaced the
command economy. Some conclude the process in the post-Soviet region has had largely
positive outcomes (Poole 1996, Mankiw 2001, Aisbett 2005). Others argue it has not (Wood
1997, Milanovich 1999, Megginson and Netter 2001, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis 2002).
Although many aspects of the privatization process are of great importance, this study is
more concerned with the equality issue resulting from the privatization process. The
privatization model that directed the post-Soviet transformation vastly ignored the
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interrelationship between the economy and politics, as well as economic growth and social
inequality. While most technical assessments regard privatization as a success, it remains
increasingly and extensively unpopular, largely on the perception that it is fundamentally
unfair, both in conception and execution. Thus, a closer examination of the consequences of
the privatization process for political institutions is warranted. 21
Indeed, a growing body of theory, especially related to Latin America, shows a strong
connection between the imposition of free-market economic reforms (without adequate social
safety nets) and defensive mass mobilization.

The contentious politics literature emphasizes

that mobilization occurs because excluded social groups lack institutional channels to defend
their threatened interests (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).
Many studies on radical free-market economic reforms in Latin America have drawn on that
insight.

They have shown how radical free-market economic reforms increase social

inequality,

and

that when such projects are implemented by nominally democratic

governments that effectively shut out opposition from the policy process defensive social
movements and mass mobilization ensue (Silver 2003; Yashar 2005; Munck 2007; Silva,
2009). The contentious politics of social movements, however, is typically ineffective in the
presence of militarized states.
Other factors affecting social grievances and social protestresulting from deprivation
and exclusionare connected with military and authoritarian states. Theories of state formation
have established a clear link between war-making and militarization on the development of
both the state and the political regimes that link civil society to it (Tilly 1975 and 1978;
Centeno, 2002). Of particular concern for the twin transitions in post-Soviet societies is the
expansion of military prerogatives.

Among others, these include direct control of economic

resources, the military’s independent participation in domestic politics, and their deployment
to suppress protest movements (Stepan 1988; Bowman 2003; Way 2006). In this context, the
intertwining of networks of political leaders and military officers can have negative
consequences

for

democratic

governance.

Militarization

can

lead

to

creeping

authoritarianism. This closes the political space necessary for the political opposition –
21

A detailed examination of the influence of the privatization process on social exclusion in Armenia is
conducted in Chapter 8.
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including civil society organizations and social movements – to organize and act freely
(Yashar 2005).

Clearly, such a condition would affect the development of durable social

exclusion.
While militarization has been extensively studied in regard to democracy and
development in Latin America and the Middle East (Hewedy 1989; Burgess, Davis and Kick
1994; Williams and Walter1998; Hashim 2003; Bowman 2002; Kick, Davis, Kiefer and
Burns, 2006), surprisingly, the role of the state's coercive capacity as a significant force in
shaping the path of state-building has received relatively minor attention in the context of the
post-Soviet region.The literature on militarization in Latin America and Middle East has an
unenthusiastic position concerning the role of the militarized states in the consolidation of
democracy, high-quality economic transformation and social inclusion. Considering the
experience from those countries in regard to militarization and social development, it is not
inaccurate to link the coercive power of the state to social exclusion in post-Soviet societies.
Hewedy (1989), for instance, argues that democracy and “its socio-economic
requisites” are the victims of militarization. Militarization threatens not only human survival,
but also economic welfare. In the Middle East, “it also causes the increase of illiterate adults,
underemployment and unemployment, children who are unable to attend even primary
schools, people who suffer from hunger or malnutrition ...” (p. 9). Hewedy further posits that
militarization diverts resources from development and “sacrifices citizen’s security in favor
of the state’s security or, in fact, the favor of the security of the administration” (p. 113).
Bowman (2002) demonstrates that militarization in Latin America has had a particularly evil
impact on three key measures of its development: democracy, economic growth, and equity.
Hence, he challenges the classical notion that military buildup is good by showing that
militarization has had negative consequences on these three aspects in Latin America.
In fact, the examination of theories of political power broadens the scope and
understanding of a state's tendency to become militarized during peacetime and its linkage to
persistence of social exclusion. In the next section of this chapter, the main schools of power,
related to the assessment of military states, the breakdown of social movements and the
failure of revolutionary attempts, will be appraised. This is anessential task, because the
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corearguments of this dissertation are basically grounded in those theories and approaches,
and in the logical progression of this work, I often refer to them.
2.6 Theories of State Power, Social exclusion, and Social Movements
Whereas sometimes power can also be positive and productive, the main theories of
political power describe the effects of power in negative terms. Power is often repressive,
exclusionary, abstractive, and prohibitive. It typically includes state incumbents'
organizational power, specifically how state elites exercise monopoly on violence. In this
sense, a militarized state is similar to a Weberian type of state, which maintains a monopoly
on violence (Weber 1919).
An influential sociologist and political economist, Weber conceived of power as the
capacity of a social actor to achieve a desired outcome even if confronted by resistance.
“Power is the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action
even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber,
1998:21).For militarized states, in the same way, power is the opportunity to achieve their
will against opposition, regardless of what this opportunity is based on. A prominent
behavioralist view of power was put forth by Robert Dahl, who asserted that “A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl
1957:202)
Scholars, such as Anthony Giddens and Barry Barnes, challenged the behavioralist
conceptions of power and developed the structural school of political power. They examined
structural conditions affecting the exercise of power by certain individuals and groups.
Finally, social psychologists who explore the phenomenon of power focused on behavior in
interpersonal relations, groups and organizations.
Using those approaches of power, the literature on post-Soviet Union regime change
have focused on institutional and constitutional design (Roeder 1993; McFaul 2001; Fish
2005, 2006; Stepan 2005) and social movement theories, among those the theories of
resource mobilization, as well as the structure and organization of movements. ""colored
revolutions"" and the failure of protest movements have been explained through opposition
50

tactics and mobilization (McFaul 2005, Beissinger 2007; Tucker 2007).Levitsky and Way
(2010) explain the diverging authoritarian regime trajectories based on the international
dimension of democratization, Western linkage and leverage, and the domestic structural
variable, that is, the organizational power of incumbents.
There are plenty of explanations concerning the driving forces that lead some states to
violently contain mass protests, while other states manage to deal with civil and political
oppositions peacefully. Historically, the role of wars and the emergence of centralized
bureaucracies has been the key answer. For the modern states, a variety of institut ional
design explanations have been posited for understanding the differences of states to coerce
election-related uprisings and protests resisting exclusionary policies, oppression,
dictatorship and military rule (Roeder 2007; Grzymala-Busse 2007). Sjoberg argues that “the
capacity of central authorities, the State, to coerce and impose its will is crucial, as is the
capacity of societal Elites to challenge the state. Wherever there is a balance of forces,
politics will be competitive” (Sjoberg 2010:1).
In the comparative analysis of post-Soviet states' authoritarianism and its affect on
social exclusion, this dissertation dwells on the organizational power of incumbents, focusing
specifically on how state elites exercise the monopoly on violence. In this sense, a militarized
state is similar to a Weberian type of state which claims a monopoly on violence, which it
may therefore elect to delegate as it sees fit (Weber, 1919, “Politics as a Vocation” (Politik
als Beruf)). The Weberian type of state is fundamental for opportunity hoarding and
alterations in the distribution of power. “A strong, coercive apparatus enhances incumbent’s
capacity to monitor, intimidate, and when necessary, repress opponents. The greater the
incumbents’ capacity to crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in
the first place, the greater are the prospects for stable authoritarianism” (Way, 2006:9).While
institutions, oppositional elites, coalition building within the state, as well as among
challenging societal actors, oppositional tactics, and organizational structure of mobilizations
are all significant factors in explaining political power, I argue that to a great extent the
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coercive capacity of the state itself is the most significant variable in the examination of
protest repressions and "colored revolutions".22
Assessing and quantifying political power is not easy. Peter Morriss (1987) noted that
“the study of power indices is in a mess: several rival indices are in existence, each with its
adherents who want to apply ‘their’ index to every conceivable situation” (Morriss
1987:154)The task becomes even more complicated for the non-democratic countries, such
as many of the post-Soviet republics. According to Kramer, “with the partial exception of
several scales of presidential power, no indices have yet been proposed to quantify political
power in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries — the sorts of countries that belong to
the CIS.” (Kramer 2010:16)
A good indicator and measurement of state power is perhaps the monopoly on use of
forces developed as the World Bank Governance Indicators or Bertelsmann Transformation
Index (BTI) democracy status. For example, Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn (2008), as a
measurement of statehood, have used the ‘monopoly on use of forces’ to assess the
performance of the three South Caucasian states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.23 Based
on the 2005 BTI indicators, the authors report that Armenia’s monopoly on use of force is 9,
Azerbaijan’s is 6 and Georgia’s is 4. This implies that Armenian state possesses a stronger
capacity to deploy coercive power compared to its neighboring states. The country’s
disturbing trend toward authoritarian rule is a result of the structural composition of
Armenian governance, specifically characterized by a dominant executive, a submissive
judiciary, and a powerless parliament. At the same time, political parties are weak and mass
media is restricted.
Having an understanding of political power, it is equally imperative to lay out core
theories of contentious politics and social revolutions as techniques used by people against
durable social exclusion. Contentious politics is the use of disruptive techniques that people
have as the only resource against the better-equipped states in the construction and
organization of social movements. According to Tarrow, social movements are not just
22

This argument is supported in Chapter Six.
indicator “stateness” is part of the BTI Democracy Status. It includes the sub-indicators monopoly on the
use of force, citizenship agreement, no religious dogma, and basic administration.
23 The
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expressions of deprivation, discontent and violence, but are better defined as “collective
challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interactions with
elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1998:4). “Contentious politics is triggered when
changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack
resources on their own” (Tarrow, 1998:2). Tilly’s and Tarrow’s contentious politics is very
distinctive of the collective action process sprouting in many post-Soviet states for the last
two decades.
Most scholars define social revolutions as rapid, basic transformation of a society’s
state and class structures that are carried through class-based revolts from below (Skocpol
1979:4). Skocpol’s contribution to the theory of revolutions has three distinguishing features:
1) structuralist, which identifies the objective conditions necessary for the emergence of
revolutionary situation; 2) internationalist, which displays how transnational economic
relations and the international structure of competing states influence domestic
developments; and 3) statist, which explores the emergence of revolutionary situations based
on the administrative and coercive powers of the state and its relation to classes, particularly
the dominant landed class (1979:4). Another author similar to Skocpol in the
conceptualization of revolutions, Goodwin, defines social revolution as a fundamental and
relatively rapid transformation of a national society’s state structure, economic institutions
and/or culture; these changes are initiated and/or achieved, at least in part, by popular
mobilizations, including armed movements, strikes or demonstrations (Goodwin 2001:260).
He believes that five main points play a significant role in the formation of the revolutio nary
movement: state’s protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements, as well as
cultural institutions; repression and exclusion of mobilized groups from certain resources;
state’s violence against mobilized groups or oppositional political powers; weak policing
capacities and infrastructure power; and corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,
weakens, or divides the counterrevolutionary elites (2001:45-47). Parsa agrees to the statecentrist approach of revolutions and adds to the analysis state repression and exclusion. In
cases where strong state repression pertains, it is more difficult to produce a revolution (Parsa
2000).
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Further, state-centrist approaches add more insight to the discussion of how social
movements, arisen as a consequence of social exclusion, are contained due to strong state
militarization. Chandler, similar to the above-stated authors, emphasizes the
inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the leadership/government towards opposition or challenge
(Chandler 2005:3). Within the analysis of collective action, Tilly discusses "revolutionary"
situations" and "revolutionary outcomes". Tilly's analysis accurately captures the moment of
power transfers and how revolutions burst out (Tilly 1978:198). For a revolutionary situation
to arise there should be: 1) contenders making claims, 2) significant commitment to those
claims, and 3) repressive incapacity of the government (1978:202). Another three sets of
conditions appear to be causes of revolutionary outcomes or transfers of power: 1) the
presence of revolutionary situation, 2) revolutionary coalitions between challengers and
members of the polity, and 3) control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition
(1978:212).
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the phenomenon of social exclusion in great detail, providing
its definitions, history, measurement, causes and theories. To fully convey the importance of
studying social exclusion as "a breakdown of the relationship between society and the
individual", the chapter stressed the negative consequences of social exclusion. It also
provided extended sections devoted to the multidimensional nature of social exclusion,
highlighting the imperativeness to study exclusion as a result of dynamic causal factors. The
process of social exclusion includes economic marginalization, social disintegration, and
political polarization. These three dimensions are strongly interrelated. Each of them,
however, is a cause and consequence of certain factors and conditions. I further suggest that
when these conditions persist over long periods of time, such as from generation to
generation, the process of exclusion becomes durable. In the presence of durable social
exclusion, large numbers of the society are deprived of economic and social resources, as
well as political participation due to external circumstances for more than several years.
Based on the works of Silver (1994) and Levitas (1998, 2004, 2005), the chapter
introduced the three paradigms/discourses of social exclusion, those being solidarity,
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specialization and monopoly (the social integrationist discourse, the moral underclass
discourse, and the redistributionist discourse). Levitas's social integrationist discourse argues
that exclusion occurs mainly due to labor markets. The moral underclass discourse blames
the poor for their exclusion, stressing the moral and cultural characteristics of the excluded.
The redistributionist discourse emphasizes discriminatory and exclusionary practices. Silver's
solidarity paradigm suggests that social exclusion occurs because of the insufficiency and
inadequate function of certain institutions that fail to channel the individual into the society.
Specialization suggests that social exclusion is mainly due to the individual's own inabilities
to engage in contractual exchange. Finally, the monopoly or social closure paradigm implies
that social exclusion occurs as a consequence of power relations, in which powerful social
groups deprive other groups of resources and opportunities. Whereas one cannot reject the
role of the first two paradigms in examining social exclusion, the evidence on the situation of
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia suggests that the social closure or monopoly
paradigm is the central discourse through which durable social exclusion should be
examined. In the following chapters of this dissertation, I have followed the social closure
theory of social exclusion in analyzing the persistence of the problem in Armenia.
Considering that social exclusion is a set of various economic, political and social
processes, theories of social exclusion are vast. Discussing some of the key theories on social
exclusion in post-Soviet states, I particularly concentrate on the state-centered perspective,
because insights stemming from the basic institutionalist perception have not proved to be
valid for Armenia. The state-centered approach is more applicable to understand the social
closure and monopoly process theorized by Marx and Weber, Tilly, Silver, Levitas and many
others. The state-centered approach is heavily supported in Chapter Seven, where I argue that
militarization of the post-Soviet Armenian state has been a critical factor in explaining the
durability of social exclusion.
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CHAPTER 3
Social Exclusion in Armenia
“Between persons of equal income there is no social distinction except the distinction
of merit. Money is nothing: character, conduct, and capacity are everything.
… That is why idiots are always in favor of inequality of income (their only chance of
eminence), and the really great in favor of equality.”
George Bernard Shaw
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified theories of social exclusion, emphasizing that there is
a gap in the scarce literature examining the problem for the post-Soviet republics. The
existing literature focuses on the design of economic and political institutions, mainly
ignoring the history and culture of the examined societies, and above all, disregarding the
inherent nature of the given state. The aim of this chapter is to show that the case of Armenia
is a good example for studying social exclusion. It specifies reasons why examining social
exclusion in Armenia is a good way to fill the above-mentioned gap by focusing on the
contradictions of the twin transition in Armenia. Whereas most post-Soviet countries
experienced economic challenges and problems related to socio-economic inequality after the
USSR breakup, some of those countries struggled with the issue of social exclusion even
more. Armenia is one of those.
The chapter reveals that although post-SovietArmenia is considered to be a Caucasian
Tiger, termed by WB analysts, it has had one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world
throughout the 1990s and in mid 2000s. The inequality levels are higher in Armenia not only
compared to other South Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan and Georgia), but also compared to
most of the post-Soviet republics. By providing tables and figures, the chapter further
stresses that most of the indicators of social exclusion are present in post-Soviet Armenia.
Moreover, compared to other Latin American, Eastern and Central European, Central Asian
and other former Soviet Union countries, in Armenia those indicators have high levels and
are persistent. Income distribution is unequal, access to educational and health services are
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not equal for all, political rights are not protected, elections are fraudulent, etc. Therefore, it
becomes vital to find out factors that make the case of Armenian social exclusion
unprecedented and phenomenal in a negative sense.
This chapter also discusses the problem of exclusion in Armenia by separately
analyzing its economic, social and political dimensions. This demarcation of social exclusion
here is necessary, because in further chapters we can see that some factors, such as the
privatization of firms, have affected more the worsening of economic and social exclusion,
while other processes, such as state militarization, have more deeply impacted the
exacerbation of political exclusion. In any case, the political lack and unwillingness of
powerful elites to distribute assets, resources and opportunities evenly, as well as to allow
equal political participation was essential.
3.2 Independence and its Challenges: Contradictions of Twin Transition in Armenia
One of the world's oldest civilizations, Armenia prides itself on being the first nation
to formally adopt Christianity (early 4th century). Despite periods of autonomy, over
centuries Armenia has been under the reign of various empires including the Roman,
Byzantine, Arab, Persian and Ottoman. After the Turkish defeat in World War I, Armenia
became independent in 1918, but survived only until 1920, when it was annexed by the
Soviet army. In 1922, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were joined by the Soviets to form
the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic, which became part of the USSR. In 1936, after
reorganization, Armenia became a separate constituent republic of the USSR. Armenia once
again declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and is an independent
republic today.
Armenia's Constitution (Chapter 1. Article 1) declares Armenia as a sovereign,
democratic, social, constitutional state, where the power belongs to the people. 24 Armenia is,
de jure, a presidential representative democratic republic, where executive power is exercised
by the government, whereas the legislative power is vested in both the government and
parliament. In reality, the executive's power is enormous, with huge influence over the
24

Please see the official website of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, www.parliament.am,
Chapter 1, The Foundations of Constitutional Order.
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judiciary and the municipal governments. The President, who is elected by the citizens for a
five-year term, is the head of State. The President ensures adherence to the Constitution and
provides for regular functioning of legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The
President also guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the state.
The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers. The President
appoints the Prime Minister, but the parliament (National Assembly) has to express a vote of
confidence in a Prime Minster designate. He/she is also responsible for appointing and
discharging members of the government on the Prime Minister's proposal.The National
Assembly, elected through general elections for a five-year term, is the supreme legislative
authority of the Republic of Armenia. It consists of 131 deputies, 90 of which are elected on
the basis of proportional representation and 41on the basis of majority representation.
Finally, the judicial power in the Republic of Armenia is represented and administered by the
courts in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. 25
Armenia is engaged in a long conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh, a primarily Armenian-populated region, assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan in the
1920s by Moscow. Armenia and Azerbaijan began fighting over the area in 1988; the
struggle escalated into a war after both countries seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991. The
war ensued from 1991–1994. Armenia effectively controls the region today, although no
formal resolution exists.
Armenia has a territory of 11,506 sq mi (29,800 sq km) with a population of
2,968,586.26 It is about the size of Maryland. The population is very homogenous; 98% of
inhabitants are Armenians. The country is not rich with natural resources. It possesses small
deposits of gold, copper, molybdenum, zinc, and bauxite. According to the 2007 estimates,
the GDP (purchasing power parity) per capita is $5,700. The rare sources on the Gini
coefficient present a Gini coefficient of 0.59% for the years of 1996-1999 (WB 2000) and
0.45% in 2005 (UNICEF 2011).

25

The information is presented in the official website of the Government of Armenia,
http://www.gov.am/en/gov-system/, last accessed on December 16, 2013).
26 The population number is an official number; some sources estimate that number to be less than 2.8 million
due to labor migration.
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Map 3.1: Political Map of Armenia that includes the Azerbaijani territories captured by
Armenians during the Karabakh war

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/armenia_map.htm, last access
Decmber15, 2013.
As mentioned earlier, Armenia declared its independence in the fall of 1991,
following a referendum which took place on September 21, 1991. There was a feeling of
happiness and a feeling of insensible pride all around the nation rejoicing over Armenia’s
secession from the Soviet rule. Everybody was happy; indeed, it was thought that
independence opened up new perspectives for sovereign Armenia to engage in collaborative
economic relations with other countries that used to be the unreachable abroad and to
develop enormous potential for regional economic expansion; indeed, it was supposed that
independence encouraged the establishment of a democratic system and statehood.
A year earlier, on August 23 of 1990, Armenia’s Parliament adopted the Resolution
of Intent to declare independence from the Soviet Union. On that day, Edmond Azadian, one
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of the few Armenian leaders from the Diaspora addressed the Parliament, proposing “certain
issues of vital importance to our people”, among which was the following:“Independent
national statehood is not simply a declaration on paper. It is action and achievement.
Therefore, the entire nation must take those actions which will lead our homeland, in
successive stages, to the achievement of full independence, politically and economically.”
(Azadian 1999:5)
Alas, neither in his book “History on the Move”, nor in the mentioned speech, does
Azadian elaborate on those actions that would lead Armenia to the achievement of full
independence and consolidated democracy. Not only Azadian, but many others in the
Armenian political circles have not been able to offer the steps that would encumber the
forthcoming perils of independence and facilitate the transition to capitalism.
The winter of the independence was cold and long. Many more winters following that
year have been difficult for Armenians to overcome with temporary housing in the regions
where the earthquake had struck in 1988, with scarce heating and electricity in the country.
The period of transition in Armenia was conditioned not only by some anticipated
consequences of the breakdown of the Soviet integrated economy, but it was also marred
with the earthquake that left approximately 200,000 people homeless, with the Karabakh
war, and with the blockade of the Armenian borders by Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Ignoring the widespread poverty, destitution and inequality in post-Soviet Armenia,
most experts of transition consider Armenia's transition from Soviet to a capitalist system as
a smooth and positive process resulting in high economic growth. For instance, the 2007
World Bank Publication “The Caucasian Tiger: Sustaining Economic Growth in Armenia”
recognizes the Republic of Armenia as the Caucasian Tiger. 27 The authors Mitra, Andrew and
Kaminski highlight the stellar growth record that has led the country to the analogous label
of tiger akin to the Asian, Anatolian, or Baltic tigers noted for maintaining exceptionally high
economic growth rates. The publication fails to report, however, that although Armenia has
had the highest economic growth rate of any country in the former Soviet Union, more than

27

The contradictions of the Armenian case as a Caucasian Tiger are further recounted in Chapter Four,
specifically in the section where the main hypotheses are developed.
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50% of the population still lives in poverty. It is true that Armenia experienced relatively
high rates of macroeconomic growth and positive annual GDP growth rates – average of 5%
in 1994-2000, then average of 12% in 2000-2005. Despite economic growth, output in
Armenia in 2005 was still only about 65% of its 1990 level and poverty was widespread.
While the book mentions economic growth countless times, hardly ever can you find any
mention of inequality and/or high rates of Gini coefficient in Armenia. The World Bank
experts dub Armenia a “Caucasian Tiger” based on purely quantitative indicators, but they
fail and are least interested to discuss the qualitative aspect of this growth.
According to a 2007 policy brief by Armenian International Center for Human
Development (ICHD), Azerbaijan, Armenia and China are the countries that have surprised
the world with their economic growth in the years of 2002-2007. In 2006 Armenia ranked
fifth in the annual growth rate of GDP. Azerbaijan ranked first. Within the next five years
Armenia has ranked fifth and Azerbaijan has ranked first in terms of the same indicator. The
economic growth in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has been conditioned with their natural
resources. Regarding Armenia and China, the economic experts of ICHD argue that
Armenia’s economic growth does not possess the qualitative features China does. Factors
accounting for the economic growth of Armenia do not target spheres and directions which
would ensure a high level of competitiveness for the country in the context of international
economy. On the contrary, Armenia’s current unprecedented economic growth is weakening
the country’s competitiveness. The ICHD policy brief states that Armenia “paradoxically has
an uncompetitive economy, uneven distribution of income and a policy (or the lack of it)”
(ICHD 2007:2).
The independence and transition from socialism to capitalism, thus, is characterized
by contradictions in Armenia: on one hand it experienced a high economic growth; on the
other hand it reinforced social exclusion, which has been durable for about 20 years now.
3.3 Social Exclusion in Armenia as an Element of Post-Soviet Transition
The result of the post-Soviet transition was a total disaster for many states –
economically, socially and politically.
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In the first year of reform, industrial output collapsed by 26 percent in Russia. Between
1992 and 1995, Russia’s GDP fell 42 percent and industrial production fell 46 percent – far
worse than the contraction of the U.S. economy during the Great Depression. … The
Russian government, bankrupted by the collapse of economic activity, stopped paying the
salaries of millions of employees and dependents. Unemployment soared, particularly
among women. By the mid to late nineties, more than forty-four million of Russia’s 148
million people were living in poverty (defined as living on less than thirty-two dollars per
month [or $1 a day]); three quarters of the population live on less than one hundred dollars
per month.” (Holmstrom and Smith, 2000:3)

The depicted scene characterizes initial years of transition in Russia, but many other
republics of Former Soviet Union suffered equally badly, if not more. In the transition
countries “the worse aspect of the economic restructuring is the appalling growth in the
number of people living in poverty” (ILO 1995:111). Armenia was among the countries with
highest percentage of population living in absolute poverty, and in the below figure it ranks
fourth in 1996 after Tajikistan, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan.
Figure 3.1:Percentage of Population Living in Absolute Poverty in Eastern and Central
Asian (ECA) Transition Countries

Source: World Bank, 2000, Making Transition Work for Everyone, Chapter 1, page 4.
Note: PPP stands for purchasing power parity.
As former USSR countries shifted from state-controlled to market-driven economic
systems, the nature of social inequalities in the post-Soviet societies started to undergo major
changes that raise new concerns for post-Soviet studies. Income and wealth inequality have
dramatically increased in most post-Soviet states. Many of those states are characterized by
extremes of poverty and wealth. Access to education, health services and the labor market
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has become highly stratified in post-socialist societies. As the market makes access to
different services and forms of consumption dependent on individual means, the inability to
access those services have become significantly individualized. This process boosts social
inequalities that are apparent not only in the mentioned social domains, but also are
expressed in the political realm – new forms of political representation and power
distribution, as well as how citizens perceive and are able to act upon their exclusion from
various forms of economic, social and political opportunities and services.
Even though the transition from planned to market economy would, without doubts,
produce changes in income and wealth, the scale and range of the distributional outcomes
have been huge and unexpected throughout most of the USSR. A comparison of ECA, Latin
American and Southern European Countries shows that while in countries of Central and
South Eastern Countries and the Baltic States (CSB) the problems of transition have slowly
decreased over time and the distribution remained fairly egalitarian, the former USSR
countries, most notably the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have experienced
increasing disparities between the rich and the poor – a change of unprecedented magnitude
and pace.
Figure 3.2:Income Inequality: A Comparison of ECA, Latin American and Southern
European Countries

Source: World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 141.
In Russia, Armenia, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where the Gini
coefficient has been around 0.5 or above, inequality can be compared to Gini coefficients
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observed in Latin American countries with the most unequal economies. This change has left
millions of post-Soviet citizens with a feeling of strong deprivation and exclusion. The
picture is even worse if we consider the social distance between the very poor and the very
rich. As World Bank reports, the decile ratios for per capita incomes in the CIS states have
been extremely high: for example, in Georgia, the top 10 percent earned 7 times more than
the top 10 percent. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan this same ratio was 10 and in Armenia it
was 19, which is unbelievably high. 28
In certain circumstances, income inequality is not enough to represent or measure
inequality between the rich and the poor. When income measurements are not accurate, it is
better to rely on measures of inequality that capture consumption or expenditures rather than
incomes. Besides accuracy issues, consumption is less volatile than income, and thus
consumption-based measures present a more meaningful picture. According to the World
Bank reports, there is a big gap between income-based inequality and consumption-based
inequality in some of the CIS countries, which means that, for example Armenia may be the
country with highest Gini coefficient based on income measure (0.59), but not a country with
as high Gini coefficient if we consider consumption-based measures (0.39).29

28

Following January-February 2011 events in Tunisia and Egypt and comparing those countries to Armenia, the
Armenian government has made statements that Armenia is immune to social unrests and that there is no
constituency in Armenia that is not pleased with the state of affairs in the country. In reaction to this evaluation,
Policy Forum Armenia (PFA) presents GDP per capita values based on purchasing power parity (PPP, in 2010
US$) for Tunisia, Egypt, and Armenia. They are as follows:
Tunisia
$9,488.5
Egypt
$6,367.4
Armenia
$5,178.7
These numbers (available in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database at
www.imf.org) show that an average citizen of Armenia is poorer than that of Egypt and Tunisia by a sizable
margin. The ordering still holds if one does not account for the purchasing power of the local currency. In that
case the numbers are equal to $4,159.9, $2,771.4, and $2,676.5 for Tunisia, Egypt, and Armenia respectively .
It is ironic to argue that there is no constituency for social change when the Armenian Statistical Office has
recently released social sector data reporting that 214,000 people in Armenia became poor in just one year
(2009), raising the total in poverty to 1.1 million (for a country with a population of less than 3 million). And
while extremely low per capita GDP alone may not be an indicator of social exclusion and social unrest, it
generates public frustration and affects how people deal with it.
29 The difference between countries may be explained by the fact that wages represent le ss than 40 percent of
total incomes in CIS countries, and the cases of Armenia and Georgia even less than 15 percent. A second
reason is that state transfers represent very little percentage of total incomes in CIS countries, such as, for
example, 3 percent in Georgia. Yet another reason is that non-formal sources of labor in CIS states have been
easily and often underreported, and thus decreases the total income percentage.
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Based on this gap, Milanovich argues that “if our main interest is to understand how
changes in distribution affect living standards and poverty, we should rely only on
consumption-based measures of distribution” (World Bank 2000:146). While the above
suggested explanation sounds reasonable for understanding the gap between the consumption
and income-based inequalities in some of the CIS countries, we should not undermine the
fact that not only are income-based measures not accurate, neither are the consumption-based
measures. If the poor can underreport their earnings, in the same way the wealthy can and do
misrepresent their purchases. It is not a secret that in post-Soviet countries, the wealthy
habitually register their purchases in the name of a less wealthy relative or friend in order to
avoid taxes or for other reasons. Thus, contrary to Milanovich, we can claim that the
consumption-based figures of inequality can be considered even more inaccurate in
measuring the gap between the poor and the wealthy in countries, such as, for instance,
Armenia.
The economic aspect of social exclusion in this dissertation deals with chiefly
exclusion from labor market and income. In this sense, increased inequality is explained by
earnings from labor. Wage earning and self-employment earnings account for 60 and 80
percent of observedinequality of incomes. As we can see in the figure, earnings from self
employment, which generally tend to be more unequally distributed than wages, account for
most of the total inequality in Armenia (see Figure 3.3).
Common sense and empirical evidence suggest that rising educational premiums
could have been an important factor explaining increase in income inequality. While this has
been true for CBS countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Czech and Slovak
republics, differences between education groups in CIS countries explain only 2-3 percent of
inequality as illustrated in figure 3.4 (Lindauer 1998; Lehman, Wadsworth and Yemtsov
2000; Yemtsov 2001; Alam et al. 2005).
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Figure 3.3:Income Inequality in Selected ECA Countries, by Income Components, Selected
Years, 1993–98

Source:World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 147.
Figure 3.4: Percentage of Total Inequality Explained by Differences between Education
Levels, Selected ECA Countries, Selected Years, 1993–98

Source: World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 151.
The decline of the formal employment market and the boost of private ownership
created more opportunities of self-employment. Income from self-employment formed more
than 50 percent in the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. This self-employment
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emergence – a consequence of liberalization and privatization – however did not provide new
opportunities or grant advantages to the lower strata of the population. For most of the selfemployed it was merely a way of survival and not an opportunity to accrue wealth, with the
exception of a few entrepreneurs concentrated at the top of the distribution. Incomes from
self-employment are more unequal than wage employment even in well-functioning markets.
Thus, in many post-Soviet countries, particularly in the South Caucasus or Central Asian
regions, which are new to the market economy functioning and at the same time full of
corruption, distorted and often-violated regulations and laws, as well as non-transparent
connections playing a huge role in securing business deals, self-employment incomes are
highly unequal.
Exclusion from the market labor is critically tied to the emergence of private business
as a by-product of transfer of publicly owned assets into private hands. The scale of
enterprise privatization and asset transfers in the post-Soviet region was enormous. For
example, in 1997 Armenians had privatized 80 percent of housing ownership (World Bank
2000:156). But housing privatization did not have a massive or even the slightest influence
on social exclusion of the middle-income or low-income population, because the majority of
the citizens were able to privatize their own homes. In this way, the middle or low-income
people who used to live in publicly provided housing became owners of their houses. There
was no need or opportunity to seize somebody else’s house or apartment, because nearly
everybody had their own from the Soviet period. In short, housing privatization is estimated
to have had progressive distributional impact (Buckley and Gurenko 1997; Milanovich
1998).
Meanwhile, the privatization of enterprises was still in process, and according to
Milanovich’s estimates in 1997 many CIS republics, among them Armenia, privatized about
one-third or more of all medium- and large-scale enterprises and most of the small firms. The
privatization hypothesis of this dissertation clearly argues that specifically enterprise
privatization influenced the emergence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. There is
little evidence based on quantitative data regarding this supposition, but a plethora of analysis
of anecdotal and indirect evidence shows a negative link between privatization and the
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distribution of wealth and income (McHale and Pankov 1999; Milanovich 1999; Ivaschenko
2002; Birdsall and Nellis 2003; Milanovich and Ersado 2008).
Aside from the socio-economic consequences of the transition for the majority of the
people, particularly the low- and middle- income populations, the restructuring period has
also impacted political processes. Thus, economic inequality turned into a bigger evil – social
exclusion. Among political processes tax and state transfer policies significantly influenced
the distribution of income in post-Soviet countries. The decrease of government’s ability to
provide essential public services and, in some cases, just lack of political will to do so have
disproportionately hurt the poor (Milanovich, 1999).
Certain liberalization and privatization policy trends, such as reducing social
expenditures, limiting access to social expenditures through strong selectivity criteria, and
the introduction of fee-based access to many social services had a negative impact on socioeconomic inequality. As Ivanova (2006) argues, this contributes to inequality’s embedded
nature in the transforming societies. Other authors (Commander and Lee 1998; Commander,
Tolstopiatenko, and Yemtsov 1999) echo the same concern. Commander and Lee (1998), for
example, suggest that the share of transfers, specifically through changing concentration of
pensions, reaching the upper quintiles of the distribution grew between 1992 and 1996 in the
CIS. Milanovich (1999:163) reports that “in most of the high inequality countries in the CIS,
taxes and transfers have been at best neutral, and on occasion they have added to high levels
of income inequality”.
The analysis of post-Soviet transition literature sums that privatization process in
post-Soviet societies has left the major coping mechanisms and the main safety nets for the
poor to be family transfers, remittances, humanitarian assistance, and informal sector
activities. Apparently, the very poor are the ones who do not benefit from family transfers
and private remittances and do not receive revenue from the informal sector.
While it is obvious that social exclusion has been a characteristic element of postSoviet structural reforms, it is important to discuss the problem in Armenia as a combination
of economic, political, and social exclusion.
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3.4 Economic exclusion in Armenia
The economic aspect of exclusion, that is income inequality, due to lack of proper
employment, and worsening of income distribution over time, is a most basic element of
social exclusion. It is similar to relative poverty or deprivation and, thus alone is not
considered as social exclusion. The economic element of exclusion is concerned with the
concept of economic disenfranchisement, more specifically exclusion from the labor market.
Sen (1975:5) explicates this concept of economic disenfranchisement in terms of income,
production, and recognition.
According to the IMF 2003 country report on Armenia “Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper”, there is a polarization of society to an appalling degree in Armenian. The paper
concludes that poverty and inequality in the country may become a reason for numerous
hazards and threats with the following consequences, which are all elements of social
exclusion:
 Long-term social polarization may deepen the cleavage among various social layers;
 High poverty rates and inequality will become an obstacle for the expansion and
flourishing of civil society;
 The poor – a social class of many thousands – continue to lag behind general human
development norms, which will hamper the establishment of human capital or will cause
its degradation;
 Widespread poverty causes increasing rates of emigration. Furthermore, the emigrant
population represents mainly the enterprising and the most educated part of the society;
 Persisting impoverishment enhances passiveness, psychological depression, nihilism and
pessimism amongst the vast majority of the population. Consequently, the motivation,
initiative, and participation of the population in the social, economic, and socio-cultural
life of the country are reduced to a minimum (page 7).
As in most of the Soviet republics, in its last twenty years as part of the Soviet Union,
inequality and poverty were not major political or economic problems in Armenia. Before the
transition to a market economy, Armenia was a remarkably equitable society (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1: Mean Income, Inequality Measures, and Family Size the USSR Republics, 1988
Atkinson indices

1. Tajikistan
2. Uzbekistan
3. Kyrgyzstan
4. Turkmenistan
5. Azerbaijan
6. Armenia
7. Kazakhstan
8. Moldova
9. Georgia
10. Ukraine
11. Belarus
12. Russia
13. Lithuania
14. Latvia
15. Estonia

Mean
Income
78
91
101
102
107
125
134
132
141
142
155
159
164
174
186

Gini
0.318
0.306
0.312
0.316
0.317
0.280
0.291
0.264
0.313
0.248
0.242
0.264
0.244
0.250
0.278

A=0.5
0.304
0.269
0.253
0.253
0.246
0.208
0.203
0.194
0.194
0.179
0.172
0.176
0.166
0.157
0.161

A=2
0.459
0.420
0.414
0.418
0.413
0.347
0.354
0.321
0.368
0.294
0.283
0.305
0.278
0.276
0.307

A = 3 Family
Size
0.543 6.1
0.503 5.5
0.501 4.6
0.506 5.6
0.503 4.7
0.426 5.5
0.438 3.8
0.393 3.1
0.463 3.9
0.361 3.0
0.348 2.9
0.380 2.9
0.345 2.9
0.347 2.7
0.390 2.6

Source:Michael V. Alexeev and Clifford Gaddy (1993), "Income Distribution in the USSR in
the 1980s".
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of income was only 0.28%, which means that
Armenia used to be a sufficiently equal and fair society. During the transition from socialism,
however, the Gini coefficient soared and is estimated to be 0.59% based on most household
surveys. It is the highest among most of the post-Soviet countries, as seen in Table 3.2 and
Figure 3.5 below.
Table 3.2: Income Inequality in Selected Transition Countries in 1998
Gini Coefficient for
1998 GNP per capita
Income
(PPP US$)
Armenia
0.59
2,074
Azerbaijan
2,168
Georgia
0.41
3,429
Kyrgyzstan
0.44
2,247
Moldova
0.41
1,995
Tajikistan
0.47
1,041
Source:World Bank,Armenia Poverty Update,2002.
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Figure 3.5:Changes in Inequality: Small in Central Europe, Larger in Former Soviet Union
Countries

Source: World Bank, Armenia Poverty Update, 2002.
The IMF country report (2003) states that in 1988 only 20% of Armenians received
salaries lower than the poverty threshold. The composition of the income sources was the
following: 76% salary, 11% formal transfers, 13% income from agricultural production and
sales and other incomes. The expenses constituted: 41% food purchase, 28% non-food
products and 9% on services. Although many analysts have argued that inequalities existed
during the Soviet reign, considering the nature of the Soviet economic and political system,
the inequality level in Soviet Armenia was one of the lowest in the world during 1987-1990
(IMF 2003:16).
There are reports that demonstrate a certain decrease of inequality in Armenia
(particularly income inequality) from 1999 to 2001, reporting that the 0.593% of inequality
in 1999 has decreased to 0.535 in 2001. First, it should be noted that the income
concentration Gini coefficient persists at a socially tense value higher than 0.5 percent. The
indicated change is an extremely minor change, and the Gini coefficient is still considered to
be very high, indeed one of the highest in the world. Secondly, it is important to mention that
according to many reports and accounts, the same years experienced much higher levels of
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national wealth (GDP level increased in the republic). This means that while GDP level
increased to a great extent, the Gini coefficient decreased by only 0.058%, making the
inequality gap even bigger. In terms of social exclusion, this is not an achievement for which
to be proud.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Armenia experienced an unprecedented energy crisis.
During the following three years, the GDP decreased to less than half, and in 1993 was about
47% of the 1990 level of the GDP. This has been estimated to be the largest decline of GDP
in the CIS countries. The deep and systematic economic crisis resulted in approximately
645,000 job losses in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. Meanwhile, the agricultural
sector was not prospering as well, significantly decreasing the share of agricultural products
for sale (IMF 2003:17).
It is not a surprise that income inequalities increase when there is increased
unemployment and decreased social transfers. In post-Soviet Armenia, both income
generated from hired employment and social transfers changed in volume, as well as in
structure as compared to the Soviet Armenia30 . Other incomes, such as property and business
activity related incomes and informal transfers have also been distributed very unevenly.
“The 1991-1993 period left deep scars in the psychological and historical memory of
the part of population that stayed in the country” (IMF 2003:17). These scars have not been
imprints of economic exclusion alone. Those have been costs of social legitimacy and social
status erosion that are tightly linked to loss of employment and income. Material deprivation
and income insecurity have not been the only consequences of the transition process in the
post-Soviet region. Resulting from the steady loss of employment and income, health and
education systems have deteriorated, increasing social strains. Obviously, high Gini
coefficient is not the only indicator of extreme inequality in post-Soviet Armenia. Other
social indicators have worsened for significant swaths of the population, on which there are
more detailed accounts in the next part of this chapter – the social aspect of exclusion.

30

From the point of view of changing volume, absolute terms of wages, pensions and benefits decreased
significantly. From the point of view of structure, the unequal distribution of wages increased drastically .
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3.5 Social Exclusion in Armenia
The social aspect of exclusion is largely dependent on the implementation of social
policies within a country. Social change, thus, can be achieved within a framework of
people-centered policies and strategies that offer bargaining strength to the poor and ensure
social cohesion and solidarity. These types of policies have been rare in post-Soviet Armenia.
The level of public expenditures for health care in Armenia was the lowest in the
region and the quality and utilization of the health services deteriorated during 1998-2002. In
the 1990s, it ranked lowest among post-Soviet republics in the number of hospital beds per
1,000 persons, and ranked average for the number of doctors per 1,000 persons (Tonoyan,
2004:7). During 1998-2002 the highest indicator of state health budget was 1.4% of GDP
(which according to the recommendation of WHO should not be less than 6-9%) and
accounted for approximately 25% of total health care expenditure.
In many developing countries, public health care institutions are typically
characterized by what is widely known as 'informal payments'.31 “By definition, informal
payments are those made to individuals or institutions in cash or in kind outside official
channels for services that are meant to be covered by the public health care system” (Liu and
Sun, 2009:1). The basic motivebehind widespread informal payments is that formal
healthcare prices do not fully differentiate patients’ various needs. Another fundamental
cause of informal payments is that health care providers’ salaries are very low in developing
countries; thus, they seek other avenues of income. Subsequently, patients pay extra in order
to get a proper treatment. Conventional wisdom suggests that the groups of the society, who
face financial constraints, are in a disadvantaged situation in health systems that do not
prohibit or punish the practice of informal payments. Poor patients are systematically
eliminated from the process of receiving proper health care.The reliance on direct out-ofpocket payments undermines the principle of equity with respect to both financing and
access. In order to have adequate access to health care, a household must be able to afford
informal payments to doctors, nurses, and other staff in the hospital.
31

Informal payments are literally out-of-pocket payments and they are often called 'out-of pockets payments'.
Contrary to co-payments or out-of-pocket payments - popular practices of the American healthcare/ health
insurance system, the out-of-pocket payments are not legal practices of healthcare systems in developing
countries.
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Informal payments account for more than 85 percent of all expenditures in the health
sector for the countries of South Caucasus. Figure 3.6 shows that among selected ECA
countries Armenia takes the first place regarding the share of patients making informal
payments. It is 91%.
Figure 3.6: Share of Patients Making Informal Payments in Selected ECA Countries

Source:World Bank “Making Transitions Work for Everyone”, 2000
Naturally, the poor suffer more in this type of health system, as medical care funded
by the state is basically non-existent. The loss of access to free health care previously
provided by the state is a significant concern for the poor of the society and creates a sense of
vulnerability within this class. The accessibility of the most essential services has become a
very serious problem mainly for socially vulnerable groups in the Armenian population.
Public spending has also decreased in regard to education (8% of total government
spending), housing (4.5%) and transport (2.9%) during 1990-2001 (Griffin/UNDP,
2002:132).
School enrollment in post-Soviet countries has much higher levels than in countries
of similar income levels. However, enrollment rates have fallen in some of the poorest CIS
countries. The World Bank 2000 report “Making Transitions Work for Everyone”notes that
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Armenia is among those CIS countries, where the primary school enrollment rate of 90% in
1989 has fallen by about 10 or more percent. There are signs of school attendance declining
even further. There is evidence that poor children are the ones who often drop out of school
or attend poorly and their parents are the least able to afford school costs for their children,
such as clothing, textbooks and transportation (World Bank 2000).
Other problems concerning secondary education in Armenia are the decrease of funds
for educational materials, unpaid teachers’ wages, and lack of heating and school
maintenance. There are also corruption issues prevalent in the school system, such as asking
for bribes from parents in order to send their kids to specialized schools, or demands of extra
pay for supplemental tutoring after school by teachers, etc. These problems create unequal
educational opportunities for children from poor families starting from primary education.
For higher education, inequality of opportunities is even worse. Not considering similar
issues already described for primary education, there are additional strains for both student
and parents within the higher educational system in Armenia.
The decrease or the removal of subsidies and many essential social services, and the
erosion of the social safety nets have had severe implications. While at the initial period of
the transformation and market restructuring almost everyone suffered from these changes,
economically vulnerable social groups, who were well protected through safety nets and
welfare programs during the USSR, suffered intolerably after independence. These include
low-income social groups, certain groups of women, elderly and pensioners, children, and
subaltern social groups in general. Those, who had been the beneficiaries of Soviet
egalitarian measures, have suffered the most. 32
Among vulnerable social groups, children and young adults are increasingly at risk. A
growing number of children live on the streets, and youth unemployment is high. Teen
pregnancies have increased. The total abortion rate in Armenia is significantly higher than
other Eurasian countries (Abrahamyan & Avagyan, 2000). Armenia is primarily a source
32

While it is often argued that there was inequality during the Soviet period, inequality was not as widespread.
The only group of the wealthy was the Party elites, while the rest of the society was doing equally well, e ven
the social groups mentioned in the text above. At the same time, it should be n oted that those who had more
money had to hide it, since it was “wrong” and “illegal”, while nowadays, wealth and extreme well-being is a
means of openly and proudly displaying their status and employing their power.
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country for women and girls trafficked to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey for
the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation; Armenian men and women are trafficked to
Turkey and Russia for the purpose of forced labor. 33 Obviously, those trafficked are typically
from the poor and the very poor classes; people, who are easily mouse-trapped with promises
of making money abroad.
The high crime rates, particularly among the youth, are another indicator of the
expansion of poverty, inequality and lack of opportunities for a decent life. Sociological
theories on crime suggest there is an association between inequality and crime rates. The
feeling of disadvantage, unfairness and exclusion leads the poor to seek retribution and
satisfaction by committing crimes. A well-known sociological paradigm on crime, the theory
of relative deprivation, argues that inequality breeds social tensions as the poor feel
dispossessed when compared with wealthier people. 34 Other authors, among them
Bourguignon (1998), Kelly (2000), Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002), conclude that
income inequality, measured by the Gini index, has a significant and positive effect on the
incidence of crime. Braithwaite (1979) states that lower-class people, and people living in
lower class areas, have higher official crime rates than other groups. Crime and Society: A
Comparative Criminology Tour of the World portrays trends in crime in Armenia, reporting
that overall crime in 1991 increased 11.5 percent over 1990; then it increased 24.8 percent
from 1991 to 1992. ““Major” crimes (murder, robbery, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated
assault) increased 3 percent from 1991 to 1992. The largest increases in that category were in
murder, robbery, and armed robbery. White-collar crime (bribery and fraud) increased about
2 percent in that time, crimes by juveniles increased about 40 percent, and drug-related
crimes increased 240 percent”.35 The number of economic crimes has increased by 14.8%
and constitutes around 6.3% of the overall crimes. 36 A most disturbing fact concerning crime
rates is that crime by juveniles has increased.

33 Source:

CIA World Factbook ,18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008
For a more detailed view on the link between inequality and crime, see Steven Stack, Income Inequality and
Property Crime: A Cross-National Analysis of Relative Deprivation Theory, 22 Criminology 229 (1984).
35 Source: http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacific/armenia.html
36 Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/seventh_survey/7sc.pdf
34
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Similar to the association of inequality and crime rates, literature shows that there is a
direct link between social exclusion and suicide, and suicide attempts are traceable to
experiences of social exclusion, such as loss of employment. Durkheim’s (1897/1963) insight
proposing suicide rates are highest among people, who are not well integrated into society, is
applicable for the case of Armenia. Other sociological findings have continued to support this
conclusion (Trout, 1980; Baumeister, 1990; Williams, Cheung, and Choi, 2000). Suicides of
young and middle-aged males have increased in Armenia, which may be due to
unemployment, financial problems and social isolation.The World Health Organization
found that the suicide rate was 3.3% in 1985. It grew to 3.6% in 1992, and increased to 3.9%
in 2006.37 According to the Armenian statistical data, the prevailing percentage of people
committing suicide are people at the ages of 35 to 65 years old (50.8%) while people at the
age of 18-29 make up 19.3%. Not surprisingly, 48.2% suicides were committed by the
unemployed and 19.9% by the retired.
Migration is another major social problem in Armenia. Gevorgyan, Mashuryan, and
Gevorgyan (2006) reveal that while teenagers migrate for mainly family re-unions, among
the top reasons for migration for older people, such as people in the age groups of 20-49 and
of 50 and over, are lack of job vacancies, inability to earn a decent living and unhealthy
moral environment. For a small percentage of people the geopolitically unstable situation and
difficulties in carrying out entrepreneurship are among other reasons for departure.
The above paragraphs, depicting problems concerning the quality of health and
education services, crime and suicides rates, trafficking and migration, convey the decline of
social cohesiveness, which is an element of social exclusion. The mentioned problems have
weakened the ability of people to participate in informal networks of self-help. Meanwhile
the prosperity and wealth of the rich has become more striking, contributing to a bigger gap
between the poor and the wealthy and fueling social tensions. The very poor are starving,
while the rich “have been plundering everything and eating so much that they cannot carry
their own stomachs” (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology 1998:8).

37

Source: http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide_rates/en/
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3.6 Political Exclusion in Armenia
The social and political dimensions of exclusion are often interrelated. The politica l
dimension, however, specifically deals with the denial of certain political and human rights
to individuals and groups of society. According to UNDP (1992:29),these rights are personal
security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of
opportunity.
Political exclusion concerns the general democratization process. More specifically,
Marshall (1964) categorizes political exclusion into: a) civil rights (freedom of speech and
rule of law), b) political rights (right to participate in political decision-making), and c)
socio-economic rights (personal security and equality of opportunity, right to health care and
education, unemployment benefits, etc.). In analyzing political exclusion in this study, I
follow Marshall’s categorization of political exclusio n.
The process of social exclusion is based predominantlyon the political process
through which certain groups of the society, who formerly used to be well-integrated into the
whole society, start facing social and economic vulnerability. The political aspect of social
exclusion suggests that the state and the institutional system, both of which grant basic civil
rights, serve as vehicles of the dominant classes instead of being either a neutral agency or an
agency promoting equal economic opportunities and civil liberties. The state’s support for
elites is expressed through prevailing policies and programs. Thus, from the perspective of
political economy, it can be noted that the role of the state and its redefined framework,
under which many of the state functions are replaced by the private sector are highly critical
for either producing or preventing social exclusion.
People excluded from the economic and social arenas start challenging traditional
hegemonies through using politics as an arena within which such challenge could be
exercised. Hegemonic elites, in their turn, are often aware of this potential challenge. The
ruling elites begin to close political and decision-making options for others in addition to
cornering resources and privileges for themselves. The excluded majority are left with no
voice because there is no politically relevant representation of their interests that would make
them a political force. Through political exclusion, such as restraining participation and
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inhibiting policy influence of the excluded, the state creates “permanently outvoted
minorities” (Silver 1997:60). This generates a tendency towards shrinkage rather than
inclusion of the excluded. A further polarization within the power structure occurs, where the
powerful elites become more and more unwilling to increase the scope of economic and
political opportunities through the free and fair game of the political process.
In a similar vein, the unwillingness of the system to create new institutional modes
and policies dealing with exclusion has produced a growing gap between the agitated restive
masses and the political elites in Armenia during the last 15-20 years. The country has
followed a path of state-building and a model of development that has created two
'Armenia's: one Armenia is concerned with power preservation through draining away
resources from the poorer masses and fighting opposition, while the other Armenia is left to
fend for itself. This growing convergence and the failure of the new system to provide a
relatively equal delivery of goods and opportunities result in public discontent with a
stronger scale of demands, in which the socio-economic terms are now combined with the
political.
Post-Soviet Armenia has never experienced a civil war, given the dangerous contexts
that it has faced a few times during its 20 year independence. While two of Armenia’s
neighboring states in South Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan, experienced civil wars in the
wake of the break-up of the USSR, Armenia was able to avoid a civil war. Armenia’s most
vulnerable moments, according to Fiarron and Laitin (2006), were in 1991-92, the point of
independence and the period from 1996-1999, when Armenia suffered from anocracy and
instability.38 The Fiarron and Laitin paper was written in 2006, hence we can add to these
politically instable periods the period of 2008-present, when Armenia experienced one of its
most serious civil and political rights crisis.
Historian and physicist Spencer Weart in his book “Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One
Another” (1998) defines anocracies as societies, where central authority is weak or nonexistent. Kinship bonds
extended by personal allegiances to notable leaders are the principal relations. A society may in theory be a
state but if the above applies then Weart classifies it as an anocracy. In anocracies, influential families fight
street battles. Importantly, there is no central authority which can effectively restrain personal violence such as
raids which often escalate by involving friends and relatives to vendettas and wars. In anocrac ies, power is not
vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups, who are constantly competing with each other for
power.
By another definition, an anocracy lies midway between a democracy and an autocracy.
38
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Despite the absence of a civil war in the third Republic of Armenia, political
exclusion and human rights abuse have been common in the country during its postindependence. The 2009 World Report of Human Rights Watch records that “Armenia
experienced one of its most serious civil and political rights crises since independence when
security forces used excessive force on March 1 against opposition demonstrators protesting
the results of the February 2008 presidential election” (Human Rights Watch, 2009:334).
There were violent clashes between police forces and the demonstrators, arrests of hundreds
of demonstrators and opposition supporters. A state of emergency declared by the
government restricted basic freedoms of Armenian citizens, including freedom of movement,
freedom of assembly, expression and access to information. According to the report, there
was an excessive international condemnation of the use of excessive coercion during the
March 1 events and the state of emergency. The report dwells on 1) election-related violence,
2) media freedom, 3) freedom of assembly, and 4) torture and ill-treatment. All of these
issues generate political exclusion.
The election-related violence in 2008 post-election events caused 10 deaths, hundreds
of injured citizens and hundreds arrested. Police detained and charged hundreds of opposition
supporters. There were incommunicado detentions, denial of access to counsel and failure to
investigate claims of ill-treatment.
The report raises a particularly serious concern regarding freedom of media in the
country, noting that police often target journalists covering demonstrations. Under the state
emergency, the National Security Service (NSS) banned at least seven oppositional and
independent newspapers from publishing and blocked websites. The ban was lifted in about
two weeks, but NSS continued to interfere with the printing of the mentioned newspapers for
another week. Later, in the same month, tax authorities hit four of those newspapers with
apparently politically motivated audits.
Concerning the freedom of assembly, the restrictive amendments to the law on
meetings passed by the National Assembly of Armenia just before the government lift of the
state of the emergency on March 17, 2008 should be mentioned. With this law, which was
criticized by the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
80

Europe (OSCE), the government denied people’s requests to hold public rallies. This law, of
course, makes the majority of political arrests seem legitimate and the employment of police
and military force by the state permissible. Political exclusion does not end with the
imprisonment of hundreds of citizens contesting the repressive state regime and social
exclusion; those in custody are often tortured and ill-treated.
There have been past cases of demonstrator beatings and arrests in 1996 and 2004
post-election crises. The repeated violence and coercion used against demonstrating citizens
and social movement groups during different administrations shows the durability of political
exclusion along with social and economic exclusion. On the other hand, it is essential to note
that there are stark differences in the three of those cases regarding the intensity of social
mobilization, the organization and violence of demonstrators and coercion used by
government elites. Armine Ishkhanyan (2008), for instance, uncovers three of those
differences: 1) the support of the main opposition candidate by government officials, civil
servants and diplomats; 2) the forms of media, communication, and information-sharing
(which I call ‘the state of civil society’ here); and 3) the emergence of a generation of young
Armenians as an active political constituency. 39
Aside from pre- and post-election beatings, threats and intimidation, arrests and
political assassinations that constitute mainly political rights as an element of political
exclusion, there is also widespread police abuse of prisoners in Armenia, which, based on
Marshall’s categorization, can be considered as neglect of both civil and political rights. In
their 2010 April statement, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and
Armenian human rights groups stressed a deep concern about “the seemingly pervasive
culture of impunity for crimes committed by or under the responsibility of law enforcement
bodies in Armenia” (Abrahamyan, 2010). This, indeed, speaks to the flawed and rotten
system of the rule of law in the republic.
The European Union for Democracy and Solidarity in the country update for Armenia
among other important political developments emphasizes clans, corruption, business

39

The similarities and differences of social movements and state reaction to them will be analyzed in detail in
Chapter 5.
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involvement of political party funding, and human rights violations. 40 Further, Armenia’s
Human Rights ombudsman states that approximately half of the 5,000 reported abuse cases
received are police-related. These issues embody elements and interactions of capital and
coercion in Armenia, operating as sources of political inequality.
3.7 Conclusion
The reality of the post-socialist transition is that most of those countries moved from
a relatively egalitarian system to a less-egalitarian one, producing long-term social exclusion
for certain social groups. The naive beliefs of the post-Soviet people that market system will
cause a more equitably distributed income and wealth have been shattered after each and
every recent election in some transition countries (e.g., in Ukraine in 1998, in Armenia in
1998, 2003 and 2008, in Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2008, in 2003 and 2008 in Georgia).
This chapter explored the problem of social exclusion in Armenia as an element of
transition, depicting the main issues by which we defined and characterized social exclusion
in Chapter Two. These issues were categorized into three main fields: economic, social and
political. All three of these aspects of exclusion are highly critical in post-Soviet Armenia,
based on several international reports and reviews. Armenia’s Gini coefficient of 5.6 has
been among the highest in world, income distribution is unequal, access to education and
health services is very limited for the poor strata of the population, migration trends have
intensified, crime, juvenile delinquency and homelessness have increased, and civil, political
and socio-economic rights are often violated.
Social exclusion is durable in Armenia, because it lasts for more than 20 years after
the Republic’s independence, and there have been rare efforts by any of the two ruling
administrations to reduce it. The problem started to develop at the beginning of 1990s, when
Armenia was going through both economic restructuring and a war, and has continued to
expand into a more severe form of exclusion during the post-war period. During the latter
period social and political exclusion exacerbated even more, as political and human rights
violations increased and became widespread.

40

Source: http://www.europeanforum.net/country/armenia
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CHAPTER 4
Hypotheses and Methods
Capitalism has twins, the market and war. The market converts life into commodities,
it converts land into a commodity. And when capitalists cannot sustain this economic model
based on looting, on exploitation, on marginalization, on exclusion, and above all, on the
accumulation of capital, they rely on war. – Evo Morales
Income inequality is where the capitalist system is most vulnerable. You can’t have the
capitalist system if an increasing number of people think it is unjust. - Alan Greenspan
The military caste did not originate as a party of patriots, but as a party of bandits.
– Henry Louis Mencken
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the steps I have undertaken to address the research question of
the dissertation. It starts with a brief section presenting the research design and explaining
why the chosen research design isadequate for studying social exclusion in post-Soviet
Armenia. The research design is a case study utilizing both quantitative and qualitative
research methods. The quantitative analysis is based on the results of a student survey that I
carried out in Armenia in 2009. The qualitative research includes historical analysis, elite
interviewing, and newspaper content analysis. This mixed research design was necessary in
order to demonstrate not only social exclusion and deprivation indicators, described in
Chapter Two, but it also enabled me to identify the processes and relations that tend to cause
exclusion in the specific context. This way, we can understand social exclusion as a dynamic
process.
The second part of the chapter formulates the two main hypotheses of the dissertation,
speculating that privatization was an important factor in the formation of social exclusion in
post-Soviet Armenia, particularly its economic dimension, and that state militarization
through war has further exacerbated social exclusion, affecting most heavily on its social and
political dimensions. Further, the development of these hypotheses offers a theoretical
framework through which durable social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia will be examined.
This section assesses existing theories of privatization and state militarization, and whether
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they can sufficiently explain the problem of exclusion and inequality. It reargues that from a
qualitative research perspective, using Weber’s concept of social closure and Tilly’s concept
of opportunity hoarding can make a valuable contribution to enhancing understanding about
the processes that result in the formation, reinforcement and durability of social exclusio n.
Adapting these theories helps to establish the interrelations between the Armenian postindependence state building, privatization process, the Karabakh war and consequent state
militarization that are designed by state elites and business oligarchs in a specific way to
exclude others. The mentioned conditions and processes are examined through a 20 year
period, in an effort to capture the durability of exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia.
4.2 Research Design
This study is an exploratory case study. 41 I chose this research design for two main
reasons. First, because social exclusion is a rarely-studied problem in not only post-Soviet
Armenia, but also in most of the post-Soviet space, there is a shortage of data concerning the
topic, and therefore an exploratory study seemed to be the most appropriate and available
method. As Russel Schutt (2006) put it, the goal of an exploratory study is "to investigate
social phenomena without explicit expectations", which I have tried to do for studying social
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Secondly, exploratory research is considered to be a good
method for social scientists who seek to examine social issues that are difficult to quantify,
such as processes and relations. In this sense, the use of an exploratory study seems to be an
appropriate method to study social exclusion, especially since I intend to examine how
political processes that involve issues of power, domination and hegemony affect the
polarization and marginalization of certain groups within a society. As an exploratory case
study, this research provides significant insight into the problem of social exclusion in postSoviet Armenia and is a rare effort to generate formal hypotheses for studying social
exclusion in the post-Soviet space. It is an attempt to develop a preliminary theory on the
problem of social exclusion in developing countries, based on the case of post-Soviet
Armenia.

41 An

exploratory study is generally conducted for a problem that has not been clearly defined, particularly for
the case in which the researcher is interested. Whereas an exploratory study may produce important
observations about the problem, it should represent definitive conclusions with extreme caution.
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The research design combines qualitative historica l analysis, as well as a survey of
university students, and interviewing party elite and leaders of research organizations. 42 The
aim of the student survey was to evaluate public perceptions of social exclusion
quantitatively. Undertaking interviews with political party elites and heads of research
organizations in Armenia enabled me to better assess coalition-building processes between
the military and state elites, and how they transform the Armenian state and class structures,
creating social mobilization and state repression against this mobilization. 43 On the basis of
the data gathered in these interviews, I was able to pinpoint key (para)military leaders active
in state politics, and the type of interactions between state elites and those (para)military
figures, that act as obstacles of social inclusion. The interviews also helped me better assess
the connection of the Armenian elites' rigid position on the Karabakh question and its
resolution to the militarization and autocracy of the Armenian state, the use of the Karabakh
issue by the same elites to maintain their power and to restrain social discontent.

Finally,

through these interviews I discovered more details and specifics of the privatization process,
and how the latter generated widespread unemployment, increased low-wage employment,
black markets, etc.
The historical analysis is based on previous literature covering the period of 19882008. The information collected from the historical analysis, as well as interviews and
surveys, although valid and helpful in uncovering the relationships of underlying forces, were
not sufficient. Academic books and articles that focus on latest political events in Armenia
are limited. This lack was ameliorated by the Armenian media, which is a good commentator
on the Armenian and South Caucasus socio-economic and political development process. To
fill the gap, I also employed mass media content analysis, concerning events related to the
42

During the summers of 2009, 2011 and 2012, I conducted several interviews on themes of privatization, the
Karabakh war, state militarization, and social movements. State elites for interviewing were chosen from major
political parties, both pro-government and oppositional. Among interviewees there were former and current
state elites, such as three of the former Prime Ministers of the Republic of Armenia (RA), a senior advisor to
President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and several pro-government and oppositional political party leaders.
Leaders and representatives of research organizations were chosen based on the lev el of their political
awareness, active participation in the socio-political life of the republic, as well as their research input in the
academic realm and policy-making. The initial list of the interviewees, particularly the state elites, included
more individuals, but because of the unavailability and/or unwillingness of some of them to discuss the topic
with me, I managed to interview only 15 of them. Most of the interviews were conducted in Armenia, except
two of them, which were conducted in the US.
43 The interview and survey questions can be found in the Appendix.
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Karabakh movement, Armenia’s independence in September 1991, the privatization process
and the emergence of oligarchic echelon, Karabakh war and the peace process, social
movements and their repression, starting from year of 1988. Specifically, articles from the
following newspaper sources were used: Armenia Liberty (Radio Free Europe/ Radio
Liberty), Hetq Investigative News, Azg, Haykakan Jamanak, Tert, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun,
Aravot, EuraisNetand ArmeniaPedia.
A few of the chosen newspapers, such as Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, are considered to
be main official information sources in Armenia. They are not privately owned and present
the pro-government view on events. Some newspapers and online media sources, such as
Haykakan Jamanak, have been used because they articulate the views of oppositional forces.
Others, such asRFE/RL, are considered to be fairly unbiased sources of news. A few of those
mass media sources are external and express foreign analysts', as well as diaspora Armenians'
observations on Armenia's political developments. In rare cases of information deficiency, I
have consulted WikiLeaks, which presents information that is common knowledge in
Armenia, but is not published by journalists due to fear of potential intimidation and
suppression. In this way, by consulting a variety of pro-government, oppositional and
external sources, I intended to present a comparatively realistic and an unbiased picture of
events.
4.3 Hypotheses
Given the theoretical framework around the phenomenon of durable social exclusion
presented in Chapter Two (Durable Social Exclusion), this study proposes to test two
hypotheses related to the development of durable social exclusion in Armenia. They are:
(1) As a critical component of free-market economic reforms, the privatization of
firms and social services was a necessary but not a sufficient factor in the formation of social
exclusion, particularly the economic dimension of social exclusion. The relative absence of
policies to promote social equity and political inclusion were intended consequences of a
market model that concentrated wealth and life chances at the top of the income scale. In the
process of industrial privatization, particularly of the largest firms and industries since the
beginning of 2000, government officials spun firms off to political supporters who became
86

large-scale entrepreneurs. The critical point is that these “oligarchs” also participated in the
policy process of free-market reforms. Their networks with policymakers provided crucial
political and material support for market reforms beneficial to oligarchs. This relationship
was also favorable for state elites in maintaining their power.
(2) State militarization through war is a second necessary and largely overlooked
condition for the persistence of social exclusion, particularly the social and political
dimensions of social exclusion, in Armenia over more than two decades. It consolidated an
authoritarian and repressive electoral political regime. This militarized form of democracy
defeated strong social movements pressing for social equity and political inclusion. A
militarized state also resulted in an extreme sense of nationalism and an uncompromising
position on the Karabakh question, which in their turn affected the deepening of social
exclusion in Armenia, as well as the insecurity of the South Caucasus region.
Development of the Privatization Hypothesis:
If the great scenarios teach us anything, it is that the problems that threaten
capitalism arise from the private sector, not the public. The saturation of demand
and the degradation of the labor force that are the great difficulties of Smith’s
conception; the crises and contradictions of Marx’s model; the inability to reach
full employment that Keynes selected as the great cultural erosion of Schumpeter’s
scenario – these are all failures that arise from the workings of the capitalist
economy, not from any interference with those workings by the polity. What
solutions, what counter-measures can there be to problems caused by the private
realm except those that originate in the public realm? (Heilbroner as cited in Byrne
2005)

At the same time, it is argued within the policy documents of the European
Union:The cause of exclusion is not the fundamental nature of capitalism (which never gets
discussed) but the ‘contemporary economic and social conditions’ which tend to exclude
some groups from the cycle of opportunities. (Byrne 2005, italics added)
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there are fundamental problems inherent in the
nature of the capitalist system, the balance of power of labor and capital within this system
and the privatization process as a critical component of this system, particularly in the post-
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Soviet space.44 A comprehensive program of free market economic reforms to a great degree
caused the initial deterioration of income, labor, and social indicators in post-Soviet
transitions. That program included the introduction of the price system, the privatization of
firms and social services, financial and trade liberalization, fiscal retrenchment, tight
monetary policy, and deregulation. In particular, the privatization process has been
significant for the transition of post-Soviet societies.
While the post-Soviet literature has a mixed stance in regard to consequences and
outcomes of privatization, there is an extensive literature, which shows that economic reform
produced significant social exclusion and challenges neoliberalism through focusing on antineoliberal protest and mobilization in Latin America (Lopez Maya 1999; Wood and Roberts
2005; Munck 2005; Yashar 2005; Dello Buono, de la Barra, 2009; Silva 2009)45 . For
instance, Silva (2009) challenges neoliberalism in Latin America, arguing that neoliberal
reforms commodified labor by restructuring the state in support of market efficiency to the
exclusion of other values. "Free market policies severed the connections of organized
subaltern social groups to the state, leaving them to fend for themselves against capital in the
market” (Silva 2009:266). Yashar (1998, 1999) strikes a similar chord in her analysis of
Latin American indigenous rights movements arguing that the adoption of neoliberal
economic policies and privatized public assets and commonly held land, states threaten the
coherence of indigenous communities.
Within the framework of the privatization argument, I follow the Latin American
literature in proposing that privatization, as a critical component of neoliberal reform,
affected the economic, political and social sphere in Armenia, threatened live lihoods and
interests of middle classes and a wide variety of popular sectors and raised a range of
grievances, giving rise to waves of social mobilization. Referring to Silva (2009:266) again,
we can speculate that these waves of “anti-neoliberal contention suggest the dawning of a
Polanyian countermovement to contemporary market society” in Armenia. Indeed, post44

The major theories of privatization have been discussed in Chapter 2, in the section where I examined the
causes and drivers of social exclusion in post-Soviet countries.
45 For further empirical findings and conclusions on privatization in post-Soviet republics, please see Barberis,
Boyko, Shleifer, and Tsukarova (1996); Earle (1998); Earle and Estrin (1998); Djankov (1999a); Djankov
(1999b); and Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000). For example, Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000)
imply that Russian privatization has created “kleptocracy” and has essentially failed.
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Soviet Armenia is one of the countries where neoliberal globalization assumed its most
pernicious form. Uneven rates of economic growth were accompanied with extreme poverty
and a tremendous expansion of social exclusion.
The political results of privatization can be studied through different political theories
and perspectives, among which is dependency theory. Many scholars of the dependency or
world systems and neo-dependency theories, such as Rostow (1960), Gunder (1966, 1967,
1969), Sunkel (1969), Cardoso (1972), Amin (1974, 1977), Cardoso and Falleto (1979),
Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980), and Tausch (1992, 1993, 2003) trace the world system
perspective to the writings of Karl Polanyi. In opposition to free market economists, the work
of Polanyi (1944) argues that structural change within any one country or a region cannot be
adequately understood apart from the specific features of the country/region and the domestic
processes that involve local actors, such as social classes, state policies, civil society, the
military, etc. In regard to dependency theory, subsequent research has more specifically
argued that more subordinated and dependant countries within the world system experience a
number of problems, such as slow economic growth (Bornschier et al., 1978, as cited in
Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141), increased levels of income inequality (Rubinson, 1976,
as cited in Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141) and distorted labor force structure (Fiala,
1983, as cited in Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141). Particularly, since the evolution of the
capitalist system in third world countries dependency theory has favored the appearance of
specific patterns of class relations in the latter.
Dependency theory is closely related to the advancement of the neoliberal order,
chiefly the privatization process in post-Soviet region. In this regard, Timberlake and
Williams’ (1984) main finding that dependence contributes directly to political exclusion and
government repression supports the privatization hypothesis developed in this study. More
specifically, Timberlake and Williams argue that “the degree of penetration of peripheral
countries by foreign capital contributes to the formal exclusion of non-elite political
participation and to the greater frequency with which governments actively repress
opposition” (Timberlake and Williams 1984:141).
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The exclusion of non-elite political participation and the greater frequency and
strength of opposition repression by the state hold true not only in the case of foreign capital
penetration as a consequence of privatization, but also in the case of the emergence of a new
class of oligarchs and the accumulation of capital in their hands, again as a consequence of
privatization. The elite, who are enriched by the penetration of the foreign capital or through
the attainment of assets and with political power, have an interest in assuring the security and
longevity of that capital and power. The “important ways these interests are pursued include
promoting political structures and supporting repressive regimes which will impose negative
sanctions when opposition is organized” (Timberlake and Williams, 1984:142).
Armenia can be considered a case of a peripheral country, where during the neoliberal
restructuring, privatization played a special political role. It created large-scale private capital
and, therefore, important business interests desirous of advancing their policy preferences in
pursuit of profit. As a result, the privatization hypothesis involves an examination of the
evolution of business-state relations during the privatization of firms and services in
Armenia.
Privatization provided informal avenues of influence for business communities to
affect policymaking and guarantee a "privileged position" for them in terms of policy output
(Lindblom 1977). Due to the boom of oligarchy and kinship networks resulting from the
privatization process, access to economic assets, financial institutions and business
development was not equal for all. Current structural issues, such as corruption,
protectionism and other challenges create privileges for a few, while restricting the potential
of development for others. Frequently laws are approved for particular people. A high level
of corruption in tax administration and budget expenditures facilitates the increase in
inequality. As a result of corruption, the tax system actually becomes regressive, which
directly increases income inequality. Investments in human capital and social programs
financed from the government budget are biased in favor of financing the projects, where the
level of corruption tends to be high.
According to one of my interviewees, during the 1990s there was a well-known
rhymed phrase in Russian often used by the Armenians, which is the following:
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“приватизация это прихватизациая” (privatizatsiya eto prixvatizatsiya).46 It is translated
into English as “privatization is usurpation” or “privatization is a means to usurp”.
Another interviewee, Richard Giragosian, comments more specifically on the
privatization process like this:47
“During the government of Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan, Armenia was a leading reformer
in the post-Soviet states.48 Privatization went further and faster than in many similar
countries. The reason I mention the success of privatization, is also because it demonstrates
what Armenia could have ensured and accomplished in other sectors of privatization, because
it was land privatization and only land privatization that was transparent and successful. The
later industrial privatization opened a way for the formation of oligarchic cartels ” (italics
added).

Here is another quote from the same interview with Giragosian:
“During the Kocharyan period (1998-2008), when the country enjoyed seven years of double
digit economic growth, that economic growth was more a paradox; it was not growth that
filtered down to the general population and it was sector-specific, for example construction
and services sector. It was not a rising tide that lifted all boats” (italics added).

On the contrary, “The Caucasian Tiger” (Mitra et al.:2007) mentions that due to the
recent period of growth in Armenia there has been a sharp rise in consumption by the poor.
The World Bank authors further state that the poorer quintiles of the income distribution
have gained more from this growth than the richer quintiles, with the extremely poor
enjoying the greatest gain. This finding is, without doubt, consistent with other IMF and
World Bank reports. In the same section, however, the authors discuss high unemployment
rates, which according to survey data stand at about one-fifth of the labor force. The wonder,
thus is, how do the country’s poor and the very poor gain from the economic growth more

46 Gevork

Manoukyan is Chairman of the Armenian Constitutional Legal Protection Centre (ACPRC).
Manukyan is an internationally recognized human rights advocate and activist. Manoukyan was interviewed on
May 20, 2009 in Vanadzor, Armenia.
47 Richard Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS),
Armenia. Girgosyan was interviewed in Yerevan, Armenia on August 2, 2009.
48 Hrant Bagratyan was the 4th Prime Minister of post-independent Armenia in 1993-1996. Before this position,
Bagratyan was Minister of Economy, Vice-Prime Minister of Armenia (1991–1993). Since 1996, he has been
Consultant of the International Monetary Fund as an energy expert, professor of economics at the Russian Armenian University in Armenia, at Kiev International University, and at the University of Banking Affairs of
National Bank of Ukraine. In 2006 Bagratyan was recognized by the independent journalists as the best
economic public man of Armenia during the whole period of the independency of the country in 1991-2006.
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than the rich do in the presence of high unemployment rates?49 The persistence of
unemployment in Armenia is explained by Mitra et al. (2007) by the incompleteness of the
structural reforms and inadequacies of institutions and practices that encourage competition.
Commenting on “The Caucasian Tiger” and Armenia’s unprecedented economic
growth, ICHD experts call it “high but disturbing economic growth” (ICHD 2007:1-2).They
bring up seven symptoms of the issue, a few of which deserve mentioning here, because they
are directly or indirectly linked with the privatization process and its consequences in
Armenia. Those points support the arguments made in disagreement to the World Bank
assumption that the continuation of the neoliberal reforms, specifically privatization and
economic growth as a consequence of it, was a positive experience for Armenia.
1. Capital is centralized and circulated primarily in one city – Yerevan. Economic
growth is not evenly distributed in Armenia both in terms of geography and social layers of
the population. The growth is skewed and pregnant with a series of consequences, including
the poor quality of the national security, which in its turn is specifically associated with
increase of migration.
2. In terms of expenditure components, GDP mostly grows due to import, or more
precisely, due to the difference between current consumption, construction expenditures and
imports. The major source of economic growth of Armenia is direct or indirect expenditures
resulting from remittances.
3. In terms of income components, it is the wealthy social layers that are affected by
the present pace of the economic growth.
4. Improvement of the welfare of the poor and the middle classes is defined with
remittances. The present economic growth is not conditioned with the development of a
competitive real sector. (ICHD 2007:1-2)
The analysis of the impact of privatization and subsequently emerged oligarchic elites
on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, as well as a exhaustive discussion of the abovestated points will be detailed in Chapter 8, Privatization and Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet
Armenia.

49

My explanation to this question would be that the consumption numbers are easier and more frequently
secreted by the wealthy than by the poor, whether those numbers are based on survey data or other official
statistics. Moreover, higher consumption rates reported by the poor may be due to remittances, rather than
redistributive policies. Hence, we get higher consumption numbers for the poor than for the wealthy.
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Development of the Militarization Hypothesis:It is indisputable that war and the
military can become a critical element and a significant force in shaping the path of statebuilding. It only remains a question of whether it is a positive or a negative force for
development, for consolidation of democracy, and for social inclusion. Contending that in the
case of post-Soviet Armenia state militarization after the Karabakh war has been a critical
factor for maintaining elite power and domination and, consequently, for the durability of
social exclusion, the second hypothesis of the dissertation explores the conditions that make
the Armenian state so repressive and able to contain strong mass mobilization by civil society
that demands for greater social inclusion. Several questions here become important. Under
what conditions do military institutions or leaders gain privileges that allow them to be
actively involved in domestic politics? What are the factors that make some military states
more stable than others, maintaining their hegemonic power? And if state militarization
causes social exclusion to become durable, how does it do it?
These questions will be explored mainly in the fifth and sixth chapters, where a
comparative analysis of five post-Soviet states and their repressive power is examined, and a
discussion of the Karabakh war and after-war political events is developed. But before we try
to search answers to these questions, it is essential to succinctly present how state
militarization is expressed in modern Armenia.
The definitions and theories of state militarization discussed in Chapter Two are
significantly related and serve as the foundation for the development of our state
militarization hypothesis. For evaluating the state of growth and equity in post-Soviet
Armenia, Ioppose the acknowledged association between the increased militarization and
less stratification.50 Instead, I consent to Hewedy’s (1989) and Bowman’s (2002) assertion
that if a country wants to grow democratically, protect its citizens’ well-being, and restore
equity, it should minimize its armed forces and decrease nationalist sentiments. Similarly, my
hypothesis argues that a militarized form of democracy defeats strong social movements that
press for socio-economic equity and demand political inclusion. A strong, coercive apparatus
enhances incumbent’s capacity to repress opponents. The greater the incumbents’ capacity to
50

The major theories of political power, state militarization and militarism, which suggest that militarization
decreases social stratification,were discussed in Chapter Two.
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crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in the first place, the greater
are the prospects for stable authoritarianism (Way, 2006:9). Stable authoritarianism in its turn
exhibits prolonged exclusive, unaccountable and arbitrary power against potential
challengers, therefore closing opportunities for those who are excluded and making social
exclusion durable.
Employing the military, not only serves the purpose of repressing oppositions, but as
many prominent authors have observed, military and police forces are the key instruments of
state power in general (Katzenstein 1996, Bowman 2002, Way 2006). This is the case of
post-Soviet Armenia, especially after the end of the Karabakh war. According to Richard
Giragosian, “the Armenian military is more than a fundamental pillar of the state; it has
become a foundational agent of the state” (Giragosian, 2005:13).
Janowitz's (1977) argument that paramilitary forces have been developing quickly in
the Third World countries and that their rapid growth has contributed to “the regimes’
stability, that is, their ability to maintain themselves in power” contributes to a fundamental
part of my dissertation, regarding the hegemonic power of the state-military elite networking
and merger in Armenia (Janowitz 1977:5). Military elites and Karabkah war commanders, as
well as other representatives of security forces including national police forces and militia
personnel rose not only to the domestic political arena, but also became actively involved in
the economic realm during the state reformation of post-Soviet Armenia. This has been
mutually beneficial to both state leaders and militaries, because while the former have
secured political and economic resources for the military leaders, the latter have provided
coercive instruments and power for the incumbent governments’ security. In this way,
military choices have been vehicles of popular politics throughout the democratization of
Armenia after the Karabakh war’s cease-fire.
The Karabakh war and the strong coercive power of the Armenian state gained due to
the war enabled Armenian state elites to contain mass protests against mounting
socioeconomic and political exclusion, as a result contributing to the perpetuation of high
levels of social exclusion. In successive waves of mobilization, protesters framed their
struggle in terms of inclusion, redistribution, and recognition. Indeed, Armenia experienced
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a higher degree of social exclusion, and consequently a higher degree of social mobilizatio n
than other post-Soviet countries that passed through similar processes of economic and
political transformation. Here, research suggests that despite waves of well-structured and
strong mobilization and demonstrations, Armenian social movements have failed to achieve
changes of regime or increase in social inclusion, which other post-Soviet countries have
managed to achieve in some degrees. 51
Through comparison of five post-Soviet countries – Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Azerbaijan and Armenia – I show that only Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have had the
most mobilized opposition movements (even in absolute terms), have been unable to achieve
change. As a result of social movements, the other three cases experienced "colorful
revolutions", that is, effective transfers of state power to new state actors (Tarrow, 1998:157).
In other words, the Armenian and Azeri waves of social movements have been futile as
compared to the Ukrainian, Georgian and Kyrgyz movements (Way 2006; Beachain and
Polese 2010). The reason for this lies in the success with which states break down
oppositions, a major characterization of modern state militarization. The type of relations and
coalitions that may be established between the state, the army and the society is largely
dependent on the strength of the military. If a state is founded on a powerful army, which is
well-funded by the state, then army may potentially become an agent of socio-economic
change. Further, I argue that the success of opposition repression in the case of the mentioned
five cases depend on the fact whether the country has recently been involved in an external
war or not. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were engaged in an interstate war, the Karabakh
war, and regardless of the war outcome, both states have used the war outcome for promoting
military prerogatives and for strengthening their coercive apparatus. 52

51

A change of regime does not necessarily cause a positive change in social inclusion, but it brings new
political forces and discourses, which allow for more social participation in economic and/or political dec isionmaking process.
52 Though the war ended with Armenia’s victory with the signing of a cease-fire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan and the de facto independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Azerbaijani leadership has
repeatedly threatened to restart hostilities to retake the region. Since the cease -fire, the territorial question has
been skillfully used by the Azeri authorities as part of their campaign. As Cheterian (2010) reports, they
increased their militaristic declarations and emphasized the need to reinforce the Azerbaijani army. They insist
that they will seek a military solution in case diplomatic negotiations with Armenia do not work.
Meanwhile, Armenian authorities, backed by nationalist sentiments in the country, also worked on
strengthening military ideology, as well as the state budget spent on military. In the absence of war, the ruling
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According to Arman Grgoryan, the monopolization of resources in favor of a few had
chiefly to do with war and the war economy both during the war and after it. 53 War affected
the unhealthy distortions of economic behavior in Armenia by several ways. The first reason,
Grigoryan mentions in his interview, is similar to that mentioned in the classical
militarization literature. War in general tends to strengthen states, tends to lead to more
centralization, tends to lead to more control. This is the universal logic of the war that was
introduced in the Armenian economy. “Particularly, when you have a country at war that
does not have a central budget, to speak of, it has to be very concerned about controlling as
much as it can to finance the war. And this led to the concentration of economic power in the
hands of the few” (Grigoryan, interviewed on 03.24.2010). 54
The second avenue by which Grigoryan finds the war affected the economic behavior
of the country concerns the fact that it was not the best economic actors that gained access to
economic means but those that were connected to the war effort. For example, the most
important economic ministry in Armenia in mid 1990s was the Defense Ministry. It was not a
well-publicized, nonetheless, a well-known fact that certain imports essentially were
monopolies of the Defense Ministry and connected businessmen.
Finally, another reason why military leaders were fairly or unfairly rewarded with
economic assets was the victory of Armenia in the war. The first stage of the privatization
process of state properties coincided with the immediate period after the war in Armenia, and
certain military actors were awarded economic resources. Very few in Armenia dispute that
elites of both countries thus strengthened their coercive apparatus. The Armenian political system in this way
has also gravitated towards an openly authoritarian regime, similar to the Azerbaijani political structure.
53 With a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and the MA in International Relations from
University of Chicago, Arman Grigoryan is currently an assistant professor of International Relations
department at the Lehigh University. He is the main oppositional political party “Hayoc Azgayin Kongress”
(Armenian National Congress) representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).
Grigoryan has previously worked as an analyst in the Department of Research and Analysis of President’s
Office in Armenia (1991-1993) and later as Second Secretary in the Middle East Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Armenia.
The interview with Grigoryan was conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on March 24, 2010.
54 When the war broke out, Armenia was already facing tremendous constraints: the consequences of the 1988
earthquake that destroyed more than 30% of Armenia’s industrial capacity, the seces sion from the USSR and
the first generation structural reforms, the widespread poverty, weak institutions and energy crisis. “The
problems were staggering, and the expectations of what the first administration could have done to be match ed
to the constraints are typically not discussed in the Armenian political discourse or even in some studies of the
origins of corruption, poverty, social exclusion and economic distortions” (cited from the interview with Arman
Grigoryan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010).

96

the military should have been rewarded for their efforts and victory in the fight for the
homeland, but since the country did not have adequate resources at the time, it was done by
awards to these people through non-transparent privatization auctions.
Thus, it can be said that the economic dimension of social exclusion started during
the Karabakh war. The leadership that came after the first president of post-Soviet Armenia,
Levon Ter-Petrossian, further used the economic distortions that resulted as a consequence of
war and relied on the existing system to strengthen the coercive capacity of the state. “Robert
Kocharyan’s administration saw it as an opportunity, not a problem; they in fact exploited
this opportunity for more centralization, for dolling out benefits to themselves and to strong
militaries and pliant businessmen, who would economically as well as politically support
them”55
To conclude the discussion of the state militarization hypothesis, it is imperative to
stress that the Armenian state militarization, contrary to the conventional view of
militarization presented in Chapter Two, was established and enhanced by the field
commanders of the Karabakh war, rather than professional militaries. Based on the
etymology of the term, military spelled as militaris in Latin and meaning “soldier” implies
that militarization can be organized by individuals, who are skilled in arms, engaged in
military service or in warfare. Subsequently, in most literature of state militarization, the
discussion develops around control of politics by a professional army that is engaged in no
other profession than preparing for and engaging in warfare.Opposite to this traditional view,
the post-Soviet Armenian government has had several high ranking military officers who
have not been trained as professional soldiers. During the Soviet times, Armenia did not have
a purely Armenian or an autonomous Armenian army.The first post-Soviet Armenian army,
that is the army that fought during the Karabakh war, was formed and developed by mainly
civilians or field commanders, who became “militaries or militarized” due to their
participation in the Karabakh conflict.
As Libaridian recollects, “the military in Armenia, had at that time, and to some
extent continues to have, the Soviet model of non-intervention in political affairs; by and
55 Cited

from the interview with Arman Grigoryan in Ann Arbor, Michicgan, March24, 2010.
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large, the military officer corps has stayed aloof” (italics added).56 According to him, it was
not the traditional officers of the military, but ordinary civilians, who got involved in the war,
became field commanders and then ended up dominating the economy and politics of
Armenia. Indeed, during and after the war, Armenia has had Defense Ministers, Generals,
Heads of Police and other high ranking military officials, who were not military officers with
any military training. Examples include Vazgen Sargsyan, Manvel Grigoryan, Seyran
Saroyan in Armenia, Samvel Babayan in Karabakh, and Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan
both in Karabakh and Armenia57 .
4.4 Operationalization of Important Concepts
The literature on social exclusion and inequality typically mentions bounded
categories, such as black/white, male/female, Muslim/Christian, peasant/landlord, etc.
Authors that include developing countries in their analysis mostly discuss social exclusion in
terms of the categorically bounded groups with different ethnicity and culture (Stewart,
Brown and Langer 2008), caste and religion (Thorat, Attewell and Rizvi 2009), age and
gender (Gomes da Conceição 2002), rural-urban residence, disabilities, etc. Although one
may not deny the fact that in Armenia there exist certain inequalities in terms of categorically
bounded groups, such as females versus males, people with urban residence versus those
with rural residence, or groups with disabilities versus those without, the focus of social
exclusion in this study is not based on any of these categories. The exclusion examined in
this study concerns a group of people that may represent, for example, a female or in the
same way a male category, a person with urban or rural residence; exclusion is studied
through what Sen (1998) calls “relational roots of deprivation” and not through bounded or
categorical groups of excluded people. The political processes and power relations described
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Gerard J. Libaridian is an outstanding Armenian American historian and politician. From 2007- 2011, Dr.
Libaridian was the director of the Armenian Studies Program and the Alex Manoogian Chair in Modern
Armenian History at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Libaridian taught previously at a number of
universities, and has lectured and written extensively. From 1991 to 1997, Libaridian served as adviser, an d
then senior adviser to the former President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, as First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs (1993-1994). His role was invaluable in the state-making of the independent Armenia, as well
as the Karabakh peace negotiations during the presidency of Levon Ter-Petrossian. Gerard Libaridian is the
founder of the Zoryan Institute (1982) http://zoryaninstitute.org/.
The interview with Dr. Libaridian was conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan on April 14, 2010.
57 These individuals' professional backgrounds and their relation to Armenian state militarizat ion will be
addressed in detail in Chapter Seven, State Militarization and Social Exclusion.
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in the study, although affecting social exclusion in both urban and rural areas, are particularly
relevant to the urban category.
Durable social exclusion in this study is measured by the Gini coefficient, wage
distribution, unemployment rates over a period of around 20 years. 58 Other indicators, such
as government expenditures on health, education, housing and welfare, which have
deteriorated, are evaluated, as well. 59 While standardized inequality indicators, such as the
Gini coefficient, distribution of income, access to social goods and employability, are
measurable outcomes of social status, they are unable to uncover the popular perceptions of
how inequality and exclusion are created and inherited from cohort to cohort. Hence, it is
important to present not only those indicators, but also public reaction that plainly captures
the transitional exclusion of Armenian people. This is done through surveying a group of
students, as a representative cluster of the society. Three hundred students participated in the
survey.60
With respect to privatization, the opaque process by which public assets were sold to
certain individuals is analyzed. State administrators allowed friends and relatives to buy
lucrative companies. A discussion concerning the huge amount of industries held by
individuals close to the state elites is developed. The generation of oligarchic strata, as a
social class prone to social closure and opportunity hoarding, is a core investigation of the
chapter examining the impact of privatization on social exclusion. I also discuss the social
impact of privatization of the energy and telecommunications sectors. Furthermore,
administrative barriers to foreign investment are emphasized.
Because there are no sound and complete studies on militarization in the post-Soviet
region (except, perhaps Way and Levitsky 2006 and 2010; and Ó Beacháin, Donnacha and
58

Because there is a shortage or unavailability of data on these indicators in post-Soviet Armenia as in most of
the post-Soviet countries, it was impossible to compile a consistent and up -to-date presentation of economic
inequality based on only these indicators. Specifically, it was very difficult to find data on the Gini coefficient
in post-Soviet Armenia for different years. Therefore, I have tried to include the best available data related t o
these indicators, most of which were found and retrieved from the World Bank, IMF and UN publications and
reports.
59 The complete list of social exclusion indicators used in this study was presented at the end of Chapter Two,
when I discussed measuring social exclusion.
60 The survey and a more detailed discussion around it can be found in the Appendix and in Chapter Four,
"Public Perceptions of Social Exclusion”.
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Abel Polese 2010), the operationalization of the phenomenon in this dissertation is anchored
in some of the popular theories of militarism and militarization (Andreski 1954 and 1968,
Janowitz 1964 and 1977, Eide and Thee 1980, Mann 1987, Dunne and Smith 1990 ), as well
as studies of militarization in Latin America and Middle East (Hurewitz 1969, Hewdey 1989,
Bowman 2002).
State militarization in this study is defined as: a) state’s readiness for war, increase in
military budgets and military participation ratios due to war, and b) a continued extension of
unfavorable state influence in civilian spheres, including economic and socio-political life,
by use of coercion via the security sector. While the first part of this definition may not
always result in social exclusion, and thus is not as central in explaining it, the second part of
the definition treats state militarization as fundamental for authoritarian stability, and
therefore, also for alterations in the distribution of power.
State militarization is measured on two levels, based on the above-provided
definition. First, the conventional definition of militarization would include indicators such
as military expenditures as a percentage of overall GDP; military expenditures as a
percentage of overall public expenditures; and armed manpower ratios, otherwise called
military participation ratios.61 Most of these data are available in Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database. Second, the security
sector and state coercion will be measured by the number of regular military and paramilitary
Karabakh war leaders in government (the National Assembly of Armenia and Ministries);
and the level of state repression used against oppositional movements, specifically their
leaders, in terms of the number of political arrests and physical or political intimidation. 62
Finally I draw freely from a rich literature on contentious politics (Tilly 1978, 2001,
2004, 2007; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald
1996), discussed at length in Chapter 2, because the latter fits well with the collective action
process that has gripped Armenia since the transition from socialism. Social mobilization, its
61

Data on military expenditures can be found in the comparative chapter on soc ial movements and revolutions,
Chapter 5.
62 As defined by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the security sector in this study
includes armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; intelligence and security services (both military and c ivilian);
customs authorities.
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organization, and the intensity of discontent is measured by the number of demonstrations
and the number of demonstrators during the 1996, 2004 and 2008 movements. I also discuss
the

repertoire

of contention expressed

during those movements.

Most often,

the

demonstrators did not violate limits and respected norms, but there have been cases when
they sought to enact disruption and transgression. In addition, I investigate the linkage
between demands of social movement organizations and economic and political exclusion. It
supports the hypothesis that sociopolitical exclusion contributed to mobilization. The
strength of social mobilization will also be assessed according to the formation of horizontal
linkages among diverse social movement organizations and between these and opposition
political parties.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter was divided into three main parts. The first part dealt with the research
method and design of this dissertation. It is an exploratory case study, based on a historical
analysis, state elite interviews, a quantitative analysis of a student survey, and newspaper
content analysis.
The second part was concerned with the main hypotheses and their concise
analysis.The main contention of the first hypothesis in the second part of this chapter is that
privatization negatively affected the economic, political and social sphere in Armenia,
generating continued waves of social mobilization. The consequences of the privatization
process, as an element of the neoliberal restructuring in post-Soviet Armenia, were
particularly harmful in the economic sphere, chiefly in the labor market. It created massive
unemployment, low-wage employment, and income and wealth inequality. As a consequence
of the privatization process, the emergence of a new class of oligarchs and the accumulation
of capital in their hands occurred. The new wealthy, practically the new class of oligarchs,
aggravate social polarization by assuring the maintenance of their newly acquired resources
and power.
In regard to the state militarization hypothesis, this part concluded that the peculiar
distinction of the Armenian state militarization is not merely the state’s readiness or strength
to protect the country in case of external war, but also the state's readiness to rely on the
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coercive apparatus to repress social protests. The militarization process started as a
consequence of Armenia’s active involvement in the Karabakh war, but it continued after the
war in a different way. Exercising supremacy in military policy and decision making, as well
as a tight control of army and in general the security sector by the state elites at the end of
1990s, turned into a ‘militarization for internal matters’, when the leaders of the Karabakh
movement weakened and the state power passed into the hands of the leaders of the Karabkh
Party. In this case, the armed forces became concentrated on internal order and often were
used to prey on the society rather than to protect it.
The third partof the chapter operationalized the important concepts of the study,
describing how these concepts were measured.
The specific steps described in this chapter are the roadmap for the following four
chapters, which center on the examination of the public perceptions of social exclusion in
Armenia; the comparative strength of the Armenian state to repress social discontent
(expressed through the comparison of success and failure of social revolutions in five postSoviet states); the processes that made the Armenian state militarized and exclusive; and
finally the thorough evaluation of the privatization process.
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CHAPTER 5
Public Perceptions of Exclusion
Not everything that can be counted counts,
and not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
5.1 Introduction
It is a difficult task to measure the magnitude of social exclusion due to the inherently
complicated nature of the phenomenon and its dynamic character. Social exclusion can be
measured and evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively. In both cases, it is very complicated
to document evidence of links between levels and depth of exclusion and factors assumed to
be affecting it. Most of the literature on inequality and exclusion has focused on Gini
coefficient, income and wage differences across social classes, and finally the difference of
the richest and poorest quintiles of the society. However, national or cross-sectional surveys
that capture people's feelings about inequality and exclusion are not widely available.
One of the first instances to measure social polarization in the South Caucasus region
and to suggest recommendations is Nazim Habibov's (2011) "Self-perceived social
stratification in low-income transitional countries: Examining the multi-country survey in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia". Based on the latest comparative survey conducted in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Habibov (2011) examines the factors explaining selfperceived stratification in South Caucasus. Whereas Habibov examines social polarization
and exclusion based on merely the self-perceived standpoint, in the analysis of the problem
this dissertation incorporates both public perceptions of exclusion and a reasonably factual
presentation of social exclusion based on both quantitative and qualitative measures (beyond
public perceptions). The author'smost significant finding is that the majority of the people in
the examined region consider themselves as middle class, although a substantial share of the
population are in fact at the lowest level of society. Another essential conclusion of
Habibov's study is that self-perceived social stratification in those three countries can largely
be explained by a set of factors within the direct social policy domain and that the problem
can be mitigated by promotion of job-intensive economic growth, supporting small

103

businesses, improving effectiveness of social protection policies, affordability of healthcare
and education, and active integration of migrants and investment in public infrastructure.
Most of theabove-prescribed policy improvements are orthodox recommendations for
the problem of poverty, social exclusion and stratification promoted by the western analysts.
Contrary to those prescriptions, several programs aimed at the above-advocated
recommendations, such as programs of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in Armenia,
have not been successful in alleviating the problem.63 They are designed well, but do not
always perform effectively in developing countries. This inefficiency may have resulted from
the nature of non-egalitarian and non-democratic states, as well as ineffectiveness of the
institutions designed to regulate the functions of the state. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyze the self-perceived social exclusion inpost-SovietArmenia and to find out factors,
beyond the mentioned policy-related fields, that Armenian students, a representative cluster
of the Armenian society, believe are essential in explaining their exclusion from certain
resources and activities.
In a brief section, I first specify the method and objectives of the survey, mentioning
the number of respondents and the city of their residence. Here, I also explain why
descriptive and regression analyses were chosen. Further, I discuss the dependent and
independent variables. This section is followed by the analysis of the descriptive and
regression statistics, main findings and implications. First, a significant number of student
respondents in all the three cities, more than 80%, believe that there is a high degree of social
exclusion in Armenia. Around 70% of them perceive social exclusion to be a combination of
economic, social and political exclusion. The majority of the 80%, who agree that there is
social exclusion in Armenia, think that the main cause of social exclusion is the deficiency of
the labor market.The respondents' estimation that their family's socio-economic status and
well-being have not improved much over the last 10 years shows the durability of the
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The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a bilateral United States foreign aid agency, which was
established by Congress in 2004. It is separate from the State Department, as well as the US Agency for
International Development (USAID). In spring of 2004, Armenia was chosen to be among a select group of 16
countries eligible for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding. Other low-income countries with a strong
commitment toward good governance and economic growth and reform were Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde,
Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, and Vanuatu.
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surveyed students' self-perceived exclusion. Their high level of demonstration participation
also indicates strong public aggravation due to economic, social and political exclusion.
Finally, the survey results lead to the conclusion that the type and nature of state elites
are fundamental for the explanation of self-perceived social exclusion in Armenia,because
among several factors, ‘the President’ and ‘the National Assembly (NA) of Armenia’ hold
the first positions, with an equal, about 22%, participant reply rate. Another 13%indicates
‘the domestic security system’ as important in causing social exclusion.
In the concluding section, I focus on the limitations and shortcomings of the student
survey process and results. The conclusion stresses that, although this survey managed to
confirm that Armenians feel socially, economically and politically excluded, it failed to find
valid evidence of the hypothesized affect of the privatization process and state militarization
on social exclusion.64
5.2 The Objective and Methodology of Student Surveys
In order to capture public perceptions of durability of exclusion, I have compiled an
original dataset through on-site student surveys on social exclusion conducted in the period
of February-April 2009. The surveys were conducted by me in the three main cities of
Armenia: the capital city Yerevan as the center where most repressive acts by the state and
military elites have been carried out and in two other cities of Armenia, Vanadzor and
Gyumri, cities with high levels of poverty, crime and political apathy.65 The number of
observations is 300; those are individuals aged 18 and higher. 108 students represent
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This failure is an indication for me as the author of the survey that design of the survey questions was
incomplete and could not lead to definitive correlations between the hypothesized indirect and direct variables.
In fact, initially when designing the survey questions, I did not have an intention to measure this relationship.
However, after collecting the filled questionnaires , it turned out that if I had incorporated more specific
questions, the public perceptions could also lead to evidence or denial of the hypothesized relationship. In the
future, a more adequately designed questionnaire can possibly help me find evidence to confirm or disconfirm
the relationship of the independent and dependent variables.
65 In Yerevan and Gyumri, the student surveys were conducted with the help of student friends and relatives,
who distributed the survey questionnaires among their student circles and returned the filled questionnaires to
me. As a former student of Vanadzor State Teachers' Training Institute (VSTTI), in the distribution and
collection of the student surveys I got invaluable help from professors of the department of Foreign Langua ges,
English Faculty of VSSTI.
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Yerevan, 98 students represent Gyumri, and 94 students represent Vanadzor. These three
cities represent different marzes of the Republic of Armenia. 66
The quantitative analysis first of all tackles the descriptive statistics of student
perceptions of social exclusion through contingency tables. Further, the research
methodology of the analysis utilizes logistic regression, since both the dependent and the
main seven independent variables are categorical in nature. In regards to the regression
analysis, we should note that the results are presented in odds ratios. There are two models
constructed, one model tests the association of the dependent variable with the primary
independent variables alone. The second model incorporates two socio-demographic control
variables to find if the influence of the latter can change results obtained in the first model.
The dependent variable of the study is perception of [existence of] social exclusion in
Armenia. The independent variables of the study are constructed based on questions the
answers to which are related to all three aspects of social exclusion discussed in the second
chapter of this dissertation: economic aspect, social aspect and the political. Perceptions of
economic exclusion are based on respondents’ (1) parents’ employment status, (2) own
employment status, and (3) relative poverty level of household. Perceptions of social and
political exclusion are based on respondents’ answers to a question that asks: (4) “Have you
or a family member currently or in recent years been (actively) involved in civil and political
activities or organizations, such as, for example, labor unions, social clubs, a political party
or parties, pre-election campaign, women’s organizations?” The measurement of those two
aspects of social exclusion (social and political) becomes more complete if we also analyze
patterns of (5) respondents’ demonstration participation (or inaction), and(6) demonstrators’
socio-economic status improvement within the last 10 years due to socio-political events. (7)
The perception of self-exclusion is a combination variable measuring the economic, social
and political perceptions of exclusion.
The control variables are (1) age and (2) residence. All of those variables might not
match the real picture of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia; this part of the study,

66

In Armenia, marz is a territorial-administrative subdivision equaling a region: there are 11 marzes, including
the city of Yerevan with its outskirts. Marzes are sometimes also called regions.
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however, is more concerned with the public perceptions of social exclusion and not actual
social exclusion.
“Perceptions of [existence] of social exclusion”, a dummy variable, is constructed
based on the answers to the question: “Do you think there is social exclusion in
Armenia?”For answers “yes”, the variable is coded as 0, and for answers “no”, it is coded as
1.
The independent variable “relative poverty level of household” is coded in the
following manner: answer ‘considerably above’ is coded as 1, ‘a little above’ is coded as 2,
‘about the same’ is coded as 3, ‘a little below’ as 4, ‘considerably below’ is coded as 5, and
‘don’t know’ as 6. The variable “parent employment status” is coded 0 for the answer ‘yes’
and 1 for the answer ‘no’. The variable “own employment status” is coded likewise. Variable
“self-exclusion” is coded 1 for the answer ‘yes’ and 0 for the answers ‘no’.
The independent variable highlighting the socio-political aspect of exclusion, “socioeconomic status improvement” is coded 0 for answers ‘no' and 1 for answers ‘yes’. The
variable “demonstration participation” is coded 0 for answers ‘yes” and 1 for answers ‘no'.
In the regression analysis, the variable “cannot answer” is coded 0 ('yes'), meaning that those
students, who could not or did not want to answer to this question, participated in a
demonstration.67
The variable “change needed to make Armenia more inclusive and egalitarian” is
coded as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The President (1)
The National Assembly of Armenia (2)
The domestic security system (3)
Political parties (4)
Mass media (5)

67

A student has either participated or has not participated in a d emonstration. A "cannot answer" reply does not
seem to be applicable to this type of question, therefore, I tend to assume that the students who provideda
“cannot answer”reply to this question participated in at least one demonstration. As it is typical of surveys,
anonymity does not often help the surveyor to obtain either objective or true data from respondents, becaus e of
respondents’ fear of bearing responsibility for their answers, because of their emotions and judgments at t he
moment of taking the survey, etc. More on the illusive nature of the public opinion can be found in John
Zaller’s “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion"(Cambridge, 1992).
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f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman (6)
Local NGOs (7)
The international NGOs (8)
Diaspora Armenians (9)
Market relations/businesses (10)
Other (11)
N/A (12)

5.3 Descriptive and Regression Statistics, Findings and Implications
The overall descriptive statistics of the variables are listed in Table 5.1 below. Each
of the included variables is also presented in a separate contingency table, where the variable
is summarized based on the category of residence. This additionally helps us discern patterns
of social exclusion through the urban-rural category, although the analysis of social exclusion
based on the urban-rural category is not the main purpose of this survey. As it was expected,
we can see that 83% of the respondents think that there is social exclusion in Armenia. This
is a significantly high number.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics (in percents, unless noted otherwise)
Perception of (existence) of Social Exclusion in Armenia
Think there is social exclusion in Armenia
Perception of Economic Exclusion
Household poverty level is about the same or considerably below relative poverty
level
Respondents are employed
Respondents’ parents are employed
Perception of Social and Political Exclusion
Think their (their households’) socio-economic status improved in the last 10 years
Participated in a demonstration / cannot answer if participated in a demonstration
Perception of overall Self-Exclusion
Think they are excluded of having or doing something they deserve to have or to do
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age of the respondent (mean)
Age of respondent by categories
18-20
20-25
25 and older
Residence of the respondent
1= Vanadzor
2= Yerevan
3= Gyumri

83

17
10
31
18
26 /35
71
20
69
27
5
31
36
33

Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.
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Table 5.2 also shows that there is not much difference of public attitudes concerning
social exclusion between urban and rural residence.68 In all three cities, around 80% of
students accept that there is social exclusion.
Table 5.2: Perception of Armenian students on social exclusion existence in Armenia
Perception of
Residence
Exclusion Existence
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Total
Percent
Yes
86
79
83
248
82.67
No
12
15
25
52
17.33
Total
98
94
108
300
100.00
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

There was no explanation or definition of social exclusion provided in the survey for
the respondents, which makes us wonder whether the respondents have understood correctly
what social exclusion is. Although there was no definition of social exclusion provided, the
survey very explicitly focused on all elements of social exclusion in the provided multiple
choice answers for the second question. Hence, 72% of the students understand social
exclusion as the combination of economic, social and political exclusion, which means that
the majority of the students have a correct perception of what social exclusion is as defined in
this study (Table 5.3). But it is important not only to assure that the respondents understand
what we mean by ‘social exclusion’ in this project and to find out what portion of
respondents in fact have evaluated social exclusion exactly the same way as we have defined
in the study, but at the same time to discover which aspect of social exclusion perception is
more appealing among the respondents.

68 Yerevan

is considered the only urban residence in Armenia. Although Gyumri and Vanadzo r are the second
and third biggest cities, they are considered to be rural. Employment opportunities, as well as cultural, political
and intellectual events and opportunities are centered in the capital city Yerevan.
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Table 5.3: What is social exclusion according to Armenian students?
Understanding of
Social Exclusion
Frequencies
Labor Market Exclusion
35
Service Exclusion
15
Political Incapacity /Passiveness
19
Exclusion from social relationships and networks
7
All of the above
215
First and second
4
First and third
4
First, second and third
1
Total
300
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

Percent
11.67
5.00
6.33
2.33
1.67
1.33
1.33
0.33
100.00

As we can see from Table 5.3, those respondents that do not think social exclusion is
the combination of economic, social and political exclusion can be classified into three
groups: a) those who acknowledge social exclusion to be mainly economic exclusion or
deprivation from job market, b) those who believe social exclusion to be a result of only
service exclusion and exclusion from social relationships and networking, and c) those who
understand social exclusion as exclusion only from political activity, as well as decision and
policy making. About 12% believe that the labor market is the most significant force for
creating social exclusion; more than 6% think that political exclusion creates social
exclusion; and 5% think that social exclusion results from lack of services or unequal
opportunities for services. Surprisingly, only 2%, respectively 7 people among 300
respondents, gave some importance to the phenomenon of social networks. My speculation
for this low number is that Armenians, as it is typical of many collectivist cultures, tend to
view themselves as members of groups, such as family, a religious group, or a work
unit/collective, and usually consider the needs of the group to be more important than the
needs of individuals. This trend is slowly changing with the country’s transition to capitalism
and to a more individualist culture; yet, Armenian culture is still highly collectivist and
highlights public and collective interests, thus there is less fear of being excluded from social
networks.
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Table 5.4: Opinion or attitudes of Armenian students on self-exclusion
Opinion on
Residence
Self-exclusion
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Total
Yes
66
68
79
213
No
32
26
29
87
Total
98
94
108
300

Percent
71.00
29.00
100.00

Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

It is interesting to note that while the majority of the respondents (83%) find social
exclusion a serious problem in the country (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) and 71% mentions that
they feel they are excluded of doing or having something they deserve to do or to have
(Table 5.4), only 13% acknowledged that their own household poverty level is about the
same or below the overall poverty level (Table 5.5).69 This has couple of implications. The
first and most important implication is that students do not identify social exclusion as
poverty alone. The second implication is that respondents have not presented their household
poverty level correctly. Further, if they did present the latter correctly, then it means that
economic exclusion, measured as overall poverty level, is not the most important aspect of
social exclusion for the surveyed students. Third, we can assume that students have evaluated
the country’s situation in regard to social exclusion (at least economic exclusion) fairly and
without a bias based on merely their own household’s poverty level. While for many other
variables the experiences of the students’ families or their own experiences of deprivation
drives students’ perception of the existence and nature of social exclusion, it seems like their
own households’ poverty/prosperity level has not mattered much.
Table 5.5: Overall poverty level of their households based on Armenian students’ estimates
Overall Poverty
Residence
Level of Households
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Total
Percent
Considerably above
51
42
68
161
53.67
A little above
32
34
22
88
29.33
About the same
8
10
11
29
9.67
A little below
1
1
1
3
1.00
Considerably below
0
2
4
6
2.00
Don’t know
6
5
2
13
4.33
Total
98
94
108
300
100.00
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.
In Table 5.5, I have added the percentages of 4 answers (“about the same” - 9.67%, “a little below” - 1%, and
“considerably below” - 2%) to get the 13%.
69
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The picture changes when we look at the employment numbers (Table 5.6). 10% of
the surveyed students are employed. This seems to be a small number, but it was expected
and is not surprising. In Armenia, all students are enrolled full-time and their main
responsibility is studying. Most of them do not worry about their tuition or living expenses as
it is considered to be the parents’ ‘duty’. Also, some percentage of university students is
state-funded and receives stipends.70 Therefore, we find the 10% student employment to be
quite a high number. In contrast, only 31% of the parents are employed and 69% are
unemployed. This is a very high unemployment percent and coincides with the soaring
unemployment situation recorded in Chapter Two.
Table 5.6: Employment status of respondent students
Employment
Residence
Status
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Yes
9
6
15
No
89
88
93
Total
98
94
108

Total
30
270
300

Percent
10
90
100.00

Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

While the economic aspect of exclusion, specifically labor market exclusion, in our
respondent answers was most frequently noted to be equal to social exclusion, the analysis
ofperception of social and political exclusion based on their estimation of own socioeconomic status improvement and demonstration participation shows that there is also strong
public aggravation due to lack of political opportunities and social advancement (Table 5.7
and Table 5.8).
Table 5.7: Students’ (households’)status change (in terms of improvement) in 10 years
Status
Residence
improved
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Total
Percent
Yes
18
8
28
54
18.00
No
80
86
80
246
82.00
Total
98
94
108
300
100.00
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

Both in Gyumri and Yerevan, 80 people, which is about 75% of the Yerevan sample
and about 82% of the Gyumri sample, state that their families members’ socio-political
70

Exact data for current percentage of state-funded university students are unavailable, but during 1990s, 2025% of the top students (with best university admission exam grades) in each group were state-funded.
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situation has not improved in the last 10 years. In Vanadzor, the socio-political situation is
even worse, since more than 90% of respondents complained about improvement
opportunities in this realm. Only 8 people out of 94 respondents have noted that their
households’ status in terms of socio-economic well-being has improved in the last 10 years
(Table 5.7).
This strong sense of exclusion in terms of social and particularly economic and
political comfort and security acknowledged by the student sample may rationally propel a
common logic of grievance. If exclusion is soaring, the frustration of the excluded becomes
unbearable, and the urge for action vital. This, as expected, is the case among the surveyed
students in Armenia. The percent of people who have participated in demonstrations during
recent years seems to be high, around 26% (Table 5.8).71
Table 5.8: Demonstration participation by Armenian students
Demonstration
Residence
Participation
Gyumri
Vanadzor
Yerevan
Yes
17
26
36
No
76
59
60
Don't want to answer
5
9
12
Total
98
94
108

Total
79
195
26
300

Percent
26.33
65.00
8.67
100.00

Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.

Since demonstration participation is a sensitive topic, I have included a “don’t want to
answer” choice together with “yes” and “no” answers. If we exclude the “don’t want to
answer” option from our analysis, only 26% of the students have participated in any
demonstration. 65% mentioned that they have never participated in any demonstration. These
numbers reveal that although more people are angry about their situation, they still do not go
out to the streets for demands of greater inclusion; this may be due to fear of being ignored
and/or fear of being repressed. Nevertheless, assuming that the students who have replied
“don’t want to answer” have participated in one or more demonstrations, but are scared to be
identified as anti-government or oppositional constituents, we can say that 35% (26% + 9%
in Table 4.8) of the respondents have been demonstration participants. In this case, we get
one third of the sample, which is a big percentage. Therefore, while initially the observation
71

The expectation was to get even higher percentages of demonstration participation, based on the extremely
large percentage of self-perception of exclusion, around 72%.
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of the Table 5.8 data does not seem to imply very high demonstration participation, a closer
examination of the numbers reveals the opposite. 72
Reactions have been mixed among the surveyed population concerning what/who
they would change in order to make Armenia economically, politically and socially a more
egalitarian country to live in. Among the options for a potential change in the country
mentioned in Table 5.9, ‘the President’ and ‘the National Assembly (NA) of Armenia’ hold
the first positions, with an equal, about 22%, participant reply rate. 15% of the respondents
think that many factors are essential in building a more inclusive and egalitarian homeland ;
among those ‘own lifestyle’, the ‘president of the country’, the ‘NA of Armenia’, ‘domestic
security system’, ‘political parties’, ‘mass media’, ‘human rights organizations’, ‘local
nongovernmental organizations’ and the ‘international approach to Armenia’. Finally, the
next highest percentage of answers, 13%, indicates that another factor to blame for the
exclusionary nature of the Armenia state is the ‘domestic security system’. The rest of the
factors counts for 1% -7% of the sample response.
Table 5.9: Change needed in order to make Armenia economically, politically and socially
more egalitarian/inclusive society
Change for Greater
Inclusion
Frequencies
Percent
Own lifestyle
5
1.67
The President
66
22.00
National Assembly of Armenia
67
22.33
Domestic security system
39
13.00
Political Parties
22
7.33
Mass Media
3
1.00
Human Rights Organizations
12
4.00
Local NGOs
9
3.00
The International Approach to Armenia
7
2.33
All of the above
46
15.33
Other
9
3.00
N/A
15
5.00
Total
300
100.00
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009.
is a typical trend in surveys, called Social Desirability Bias – a tendencyfor respondents to reply in a
manner that they feel will be viewed favorably by others. See also, John Zaller’s “ The Nature and Origins of
Mass Opinion”, where Zaller argues that public opinion on issues is unreliable, primarily because elite sources
of information provide competing or multiple considerations causing public opinion polls to measure whateve r
recent elite message an individual has stored in their short term memory.
72 This
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The relatively high rates of students identifying the President, the Parliament and the
domestic security system as main causes of self-perceived exclusion by the surveyed
Armenians imply that we should particularly concentrate on these three branches of the
Armenian state apparatus in the explanation of the durable social exclusion in Armenia.
Based on the theoretical framework of this study presented earlier, the privatization and the
state militarization increased social exclusion in Armenia through inequitable power and
opportunity distribution practiced by the Armenian state elites. Following the same
framework, the President, the National Assembly, and the security system of the Armenian
state are the central forces in these unfair power distribution processes, and their role in
generating social exclusion is critical.Therefore, the above-mentionedfinding of the survey is
not unexpected.
Based on not only the descriptive, but also the regression results, one can make an
assumption that the factors affecting student perceptions of social exclusion are obviously
related to the labor markets, altered after the privatization process, as well as the nature of
state elites and institutions.
Before presenting the findings of the statistical models, it is important to mention that
the independent variables are notably inter-correlated. As a result, statistical tests were
conducted to determine if multi-collinearity is a problem for the data. After reviewing the
collinearity diagnostics, none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) was over ten.
Consequently, it was concluded that collinearity amongst the independent variables should
not be a problem amongst this data.
Only the second model, which takes into consideration also the control independent
variables of age and residence, will be discussed because there is no difference in statistical
and very little difference in substantive significance between the independent and dependent
variables for both models. Specifically statistical significance does not change. There is
statistical significance between only four of the independent primary variables and the
dependent variable. Those variables are ‘household’s overall poverty level’, ‘parents’
employment status’, ‘status change in recent years politically, socially or economically’and
‘whether the student feels he/she is excluded of having or doing something that he/she
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deserves to have or to do’. Obviously, these variables relate to all three aspects of social
exclusion: economic, political and social.
Statistically, there is no association between the variables of ‘student employment’,
‘demonstration participation’ and the perception of social exclusion. While it is expected to
find no statistical significance for the variable of ‘student employment’ due to the fact that as
a general rule Armenian students do not work during their student years, it is astonishing to
find absence of association between ‘demonstration participation’and‘perception of social
exclusion’. Assumingly, the lack of statistical significance in this case is due to the fact that
the answers regarding demonstration participation by the students do not represent the
reality.73 Another possible explanation to the absence of relationship between these two
variables, noted by one of the reviewers of this dissertation, may be the fact that those who
feel social exclusion is a serious problem also believe that they are powerless to change
anything, so they do not participate in demonstrations.
Unpredictably, both of the control variables, which are age and residence, have no
influence on the perception of social exclusion. Since the surveyed population consists of
only students, the age range varies mainly from 17-22 years. Obviously, the surveyed
population does not consist of different generations, and unfortunately, we cannot observe
any differences of mentality and attitudes towards economic, political and social
developments and phenomena.74 The absence of statistical significance for the ‘age’ variable,
thus, is natural.
Social exclusion is often characterized by the dimension of urban-rural residence. It is
popular to assume that inequality appears to arise largely from the absence of opportunitie s
for large segments of the population residing in rural areas. The statistical evidence in the
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This issue has been discussed more in detail in the descriptive part of the survey analysis.
As compared to many western countries, particularly the United States, where university student age varies
widely, in most post-Soviet countries the typical student age is 17-22. Some exceptional cases are when a
person serves in the army and continues education after the army or when a person pursues a second or third
education. Even in those cases the student age will not exceed 30 years.
It is a very recent, nonetheless infrequent, phenomenon to find 40-50 year old students in Armenian
universities. Those are generally public officials, such as for example, a parliamentary deputy, who after
gaining high ranks and/or government positions, aim to attach a certain ed ucation to their resume/profile. In any
case, their studentship is not a formal one; most often they hardly ever attend classes.
74
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case of post-Soviet Armenia, based on this student survey, does not validate this popular
assumption. Through this point one can detect the demarcation between poverty and social
exclusion. Although poverty level is much higher in rural areas of Armenia, there is not
much difference in the perceptions of social exclusion between rural and urban populations.
It is not as much poverty that matters to people, as the absence of power, voice and
independence, and vulnerability to exploitation and humiliation. The absence of statistical
significance between variables ‘residence’ and ‘perceptions of social exclusion’ highlights
the importance of social inclusion for poor people, the importance of securing respect and
dignity for themselves, irrespective of residence.
The regression results are not much different in the two models; the control variables
do not change either the statistical or the substantive strength of the relationships tested. To
better understand the estimated substantive impact of the variables of interest, I have
interpreted the results of the second model with socio-demographic characteristics (Table
5.10):
1. The odds that a person, whose household poverty level is a little below the overall
poverty level, will think there exists social exclusion as a serious problems in Armenia
decreases by 41 percent on average as compared to that of a person, whose household
poverty level is considerably below the overall poverty level, holding all other variables
constant.
2. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in
Armenia decreases by 95 percent on average, if a person’s parents are employed, holding
all other variables constant.
3. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in
Armenia increases by 237 percent on average, if the person’s household’s status has not
improved (economically, socially and/or politically) within the last 10 years, holding all
other variables constant.
4. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in
Armenia increases by 1761 percent on average, if a person feels that he is excluded of
having and/or doing something that he deserves to have or to do.
While in earlier chapters of this dissertation, social exclusion in Armenia had
discussed in terms high Gini coefficient rates throughout different years, persistent problems
in health care, and education, growing rates of homelessness, crime rates and migration rates,
the above statements clearly come to add further evidence that social exclusion exists in
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Armenia as a multifaceted problem consisting of social, political and economic elimination.
Indeed, students’ perceptions of social exclusion are highly affected by their families’
poverty level, their parents’ employment level, their household levels’ stagnant situation over
a long period of time, such as 10 years, and finally their own exclusion of having and/or
doing something that they deserve to have or to do. This coincidence of public grievances
regarding exclusion and factual substantiation mentioned earlier in this paragraph increases
confidence in claiming that social exclusion subsists and is an acute problem in post-Soviet
Armenia.
Table 5.10: Odds ratios of logistic regression of considering the existence of social exclusion
as a serious problem in Armenia on indicators of perception of economic, social and political
exclusion, perception of self-exclusion, and socio-demographic indicators
Model 1 Model 2
Perception of economic exclusion
Household’s overall poverty level
39.8*
40.7*
Student’s employment status
303.2
194.1
Parents’ employment status
95.1*
95.0*
Perception of social and political exclusion
Status change in recent years politically, socially or economically
241.1*
236.6*
Demonstration participation
24.5
27.9
Perception of self-exclusion
Student’s perception of self-exclusion
1667.2*
1761.3*
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age of the respondent
36.2
Residence of the respondent
20.5
N of cases
300
300
R square
895.0**
814.8**
Significance level: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter developed a quantitative analysis of a survey conducted with students of
Armenian universities about social exclusion, factors affecting social exclusion and social
movements. The public perceptions primarily coincide with other accounts of poverty and
inequality, increasingly deteriorating socio-economic conditions for the middle and poor
classes, amplified sense of helplessness and despair felt by people due to their inactiveness in
politics, lack of employment and income to sustain themselves and their households.
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Some limitations of the results of this survey research should be acknowledged. The
dependent variable cannot be considered as a very accurate and reliable measure or an
indicator of actual social exclusion in Armenia; it is a perceptual measure and has been
defined as such in this part of the paper. In any case, it may not reflect the actual extent of
social exclusion in the country; the latter may be more or less pervasive than actually
observed based on the survey answers, depending on the bias, trust, mood and some other
characteristics of the surveyed individuals during the time of taking the surveys.
Another shortcoming of this survey is that the data may be subject to bias and error
due to the fact that a statistically random sample of the Armenian population was not utilized
because of scarce time and resources during my field trips in Armenia. As a sample of
student population, the surveyed groupwasan opportunistic sample.
Yet another limitation originates from the chosen sample of our survey. It would have
been very interesting and important to provide statistical evidence confirming the two
hypotheses of the study concerning the privatization and state militarization explaining
durable social exclusion in Armenia. But because privatization of firms and services started
in 1994-1995 in Armenia, our respondents would have no or very limited knowledge on
whether and/or how privatization of firms has affected the emergence of social exclusion.
The majority of the surveyed students were between 4-8 years old, when the privatization
process started in the country. Similarly, the Karabakh war started in 1991 and state
militarization process was initiated during the same period. In this case again, the surveyed
population was too young to remember much and would be incompetent to provide correct
information and enlightening answers regarding how those two variables explain the
emergence of social exclusion.
The next limitation is closely related to the one detected in the above paragraph.
Authors often rely on the feelings of older generations to conclude that inequality,
particularly its economic dimension, was lower during Soviet times. At the same time, the
younger generation, who has not experienced the Soviet lifestyle may not properly comment
on the difference. To make things more complicated, statistics and consistent data related to
Gini coefficients, wage equality, and unemployment rates prior and after socialism are rare,
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and it is difficult to find a benchmark for comparison of social exclusion and inequality
before and after the USSR based on this survey. A larger survey, that can be carried out for
several years and between different generations (particularly the generation of 1960s and
1970s, who experienced both the socialist and the capitalist systems) wouldmore sufficiently
address this gap.
Also it is recognizes that the dependent and some of the independent variables of the
survey regression are quite interrelated and the causal direction of influence may be contrary
than the assumed one. This is true particularly for the ‘demonstration participation’ and
‘perception of social exclusion’ variables; a person’s perception of exclusion may be
affecting his/her participation in demonstrations, and not the opposite.
Clearly, a future study needs to examine the longitudinal nature of these relationships
in order to verify causality. Moreover, while a student survey is helpful, students’ knowledge
on social exclusion is incomplete and limited. The causes of social exclusion, which may be
important from the point of a student, for example, may not be relevant from the point of
view of a housewife, a teacher, a retired politician, or a businessman. The selection of
respondents from more diverse backgrounds and of a wider outlook may foster new insights
and theories of social exclusion.
Despite these limitations, this survey analysis makes some important contributions to
the social exclusion literature in Armenia. First, it concludes that social exclusion exists in
Armenia as a serious problem, and that the problem is expressed not only by high Gini
coefficient rates, as well as statistics showing the shrinkage of labor market and increased
unemployment, the growing levels of crime, migration, homelessness, human trafficking,
human rights abuse and political arrests, lack of access to education and health services, but
also that it is a problem intensely acknowledged by ordinary citizens. The public judgment
about unemployment, poverty, family status improvement, political participation and
exclusion from certain things and activities tells us a plain story of social exclusion; it tells
the story even more lucidly than the numbers illustrated in previous chapters.
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Secondly, based on the results of this survey, I could assert that Armenian people are
mostly discontent with the presidency, the parliament, and the security sector of their
country, more than any other institution or factor, local or international. The survey
demonstrates that the exclusionary policies of these institutions create frustration and a need
to protest among people, and that the majority of the people indeed go out to the streets with
demands of greater inclusion in the economic, political and cultural live of the country. The
goal of examining the power of the elites representing those institutionsand uncovering
relations between them and the rest of the society will be the major task of the following
three chapters, which are qualitative in nature.
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CHAPTER 6
Power, Contentious Politics, and Repressive Capacity of the State
“Revolution is the sex of politics: All the governments that we know today owe their
origin to it.”
– Henry Louis Mencken
“Post-socialist revolutions stemmed from people’s desire for fair and equal income
distribution and the growing disparity in real income.”
– Grzegorz Kołodko
“A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense
than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.”
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
6.1 Introduction
With the breakdown of the USSR’s communist regime, political scientists started
producing a plethora of theories concerning the consequences of this breakdown. Among
those theories a prevalent one was concerning the diversity of post-Soviet trajectories and
why some post-Soviet states were more democratic than others. While many scholars still
meditated over the issue in efforts to find causes of democratization in those countries, the
post-Soviet space experienced a couple of “colored revolutions”: the “Rose Revolution” in
Georgia in 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, and then, most surprisingl y,
the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, a stronghold of post-communist
authoritarianism in Central Asia. People inother post-Soviet republics, such as Armenia and
Azerbaijan, were steadily struggling to accomplish a peaceful revolution. In these countries,
as in most of the post-Soviet republics, the initial hopes of freedom, democracy and
development nurtured after the fall of communism and the collapse of the USSR remained
hopes merely; they did not turn into a reality. With the promised democracy the neoliberal
order provided freedom without opportunity, a devil’s gift. Along with this, the need and
efforts of “the society [to] protect itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market
system” was gradually mounting (Polanyi 1957:76).
As an expression of their anger and desperation, crowds of angry citizens in different
post-Soviet countries took to the streets of their respective capital cities to protest against
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their incumbent governments. Ordinary people, tired of waiting for economic benefits and
new opportunities promised through privatization, called for political candidates and policies
that promised a return to traditional social democratic values and enhanced social welfare. In
this headway of resentment and contestation, groups of rioters have stormed parliament
buildings, blocked central roads, organized marches, strikes and sit-ins for days and nights.
These collective actions carried a continued character in several of the cases, turning into a
wave of conflict, complaint and contention. Some of the movements were violent and
disruptive riots, whiel others have been peaceful demonstrations and marches. Some of them
succeeded in producing revolutions and changing the ruling regimes, yet others failed and
have continued to insurrect.
While the emergence, organization and outcome of these movements considerably
varied in post-Soviet societies, they possessed something in common in their nature; most of
those movements challenged transformational processes and relationships within the state
and society that inhibit social inclusion. In particular, they demanded for equal social
inclusion and equal access to opportunity and resources, new distribution of income and
wealth. Although some scholars, such as Henry E. Hale (2005), argue that those revolutions
“are not democratic breakthroughs”, there is an extensive literature speculating about a new
democratic ascendancy and suggesting that those events are democratic breakthroughs. 75
According to Hale, "colored revolutions" are “contestation phases in regime cycles where the
opposition wins” (Hale 2005:134). Nonetheless, treating those movementsas contestation
phases does not curtail the democratization drive in which they are embedded.
This chapter observes "colored revolutions" as democratic breakthroughs, because the
importance of public opinion in deciding whether the opposition wins and whether there is a
turndown of an ineffective government isa critical element of political inclusion and
deliberative democracy. Based on the success or failure of revolutionary attempts in the postSoviet states, one can also look at how the power of individuals and groups is affected by the
social and historical context in which they are embedded. Those countries that witnessed

75 See

Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Communism," Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005); Adrian
Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs (March-April 2005); and Vitali Silitski, "Beware
the People," Transitions Online, March 21, 2005
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revolutionary outcomes (through peaceful means andtactics) versus only revolutionary
situations may be considered less autocratic and sociallymore inclusive.
The success of "colored revolutions" is closely related with and is examined here
through the phenomenon of political power and state militarization. As mentioned in earlier
chapters, political power is an essential element of state militarization. The issue of power
and how certain states manage to exercise power is a central theme of this chapter. The
chapter focuses on the social implication of militarization, namely: the reproduction of social
inequalities based on the repressive capacity of the state. “When a dominant group is able
effectively to convert its legitimately established privileged position in the military into
social dominance outside the military, the military is functioning as a state mechanism
involved in the reproduction of inequality. … Militarism and social inequalities are then
structurally binding.” (Yagil 1998:874)
Due to the absence and shortcomings of appropriate power measurements, I do not try
to quantify state's repressive power in this dissertation. It is evaluated here mainly
qualitatively based on the assessment of political events, socio-political context and the
relationships of state elites, oppositional elites and other societal actors. The next chapter is a
detailed account of those events in post-Soviet Armenia. The current chapter is an effort to
provide a comparative power of the state, considering the strength of protest repressions in a
five post-Soviet states. Power, therefore, is based on the level and intensity of militarization
of a state. The argument is that the more militarized a state is, the more powerful its coercive
strength is and the more easily it restrains mass protests and challenging oppositions.
In order to provide evidence of the Armenian state militarization comparatively, I
proceed in two directions. First, I display a brief quantitative analysis of military budgets and
manpower ratios in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Those are postSoviet states that have experienced strong social movements, as a result of public reaction to
social exclusion and opposition to electoral fraud. The statistics related to the militarization
of those countries indicate that Armenia along with Azerbaijan lead the list in terms of very
high military budgets, as well as manpower ratios.
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Secondly, I conduct a comparative analysis of revolutionary situations and outcomes
in the mentioned countries, concluding that those countries with more exclusionary states
based on strong security sectors have been more successful in containing social protest, and
therefore less inclined towards greater social inclusion. The comparative examination of the
five post-Soviet countries yet again confirm that Armenia and Azerbaijan are more
militarized than Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because they had warred against an
external enemy. Due this feature, the former two have successfully defeated repeated waves
of social protests, whereas the latter three have not been able to do so.On the contrary,
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan experienced revolutionary outcomes, the Rose Revolution,
The Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution. 76 Throughout the chapter, my main
contention is that those states that are more repressive and militarized, restrain mass
movements more easily, relatively irrespective of other national or international factors.
6.2 A Comparative Analysis of Conventional Military Power
I use the state-centrist approach of power (Skocpol 1979; Parsa 2000; Goodwin 2001)
coupled with Tilly’s (1978) revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes discussed
thoroughly in the theoretical framework of this dissertation to explain the differences of
Georgian, Ukrainian, Kyrgyz, Azeri and Armenian movements and revolutions, focusing
specifically on the repressive capacity of the government/state. As mentioned earlier in the
chapter, the differences of repressive (in)capacity of the governments of the compared
countries will be studied through the degree of their state militarization.

76 Here,

one can argue that Georgia has passed through privatization and had a war, but is contrasted to Armenia
in this study as a case with less social exclusion. The counterargument is the following: 1) While Armenia’s war
(1991-1994) was against external enemy Azerbaijan, Georgia’s wars of 1988-1992 and 1992-1993 are
considered as civil wars consisting of inter-ethnic and intra-national conflicts in the regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; 2) While both these ethnic conflicts in Georgia occurred before 2008, the Georgian -Russian war
of 2008 falls out of this research time span. If it occurred during the period covered in this dissertation, I assume
research could find evidence that Georgia would become a similar case to Armenia and Azerbaijan in regards to
state militarization and social exclusion. Perhaps, further research can focus on whether the consequences of
this war (against Russia as an external enemy), such as, for instance increased military budgets and military
participation ratios have changed or will soon be changing power relations domestically in Georgia
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Figure 6.1: Opposition Mobilization in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and
Ukraine, 1992-2006

Source: Lucan Way, CDDRL Working Paper, June 2006, page 10.
Comparing Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia on the above figure of opposition
mobilization during 1992-2006 among the post-Soviet countries (Figure 6.1), we see that
Armenia has had the most mobilized opposition(Way 2006). 77 Kyrgyz opposition
demonstrations are not illustrated in the figure, but the reason for this could be the fact that it
did not include a big number of demonstrators. Sources mention about tens of thousands of
Kyrgyz opposition demonstrators. Mcglinchey (2003) mentions of some 5000-10000 crowds.
The Azeri protests are not displayed either, but sources mention of 20,000 -25,000 people.
Military power of the states, first of all, stemming from the traditional definitions of
state militarization, is compared based on their military budgets. 78 Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute’s time series on military expenditure for the years of 1988 to 2006
shows that, as expected, Armenia’s military budget as a share % of GDP is very stable and
77

Based on Figure 6.1, between 1992 and 2006, the occurrence of demonstrations was more frequent in
Armenia than in any of the selected countries in the figure. Even in absolute terms, Armenia has had the mo st
mobilized opposition. Per capita number of demonstrators is the most in Armenia (Way 2006).
78 The SIPRI definition of military expenditure is as follows and where possible, SIPRI military expenditures
include all current and capital expenditure on:
 the armed forces, including peace keeping forces
 defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects
 paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations
 military space activities
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higher in most years than in Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, which similar to Armenia, have
faced prolonged oppositions towards their ruling elites (Figure 6.2).79 The average military
expenditures in Armenia for the observed years are 3.1%, in Georgia they are 1.3%, in
Kyrgyzstan 2.6%, in Ukraine 2.8%, and in Azerbaijan 2.7%.
Table 6.1: Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP: Armenia, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, 1992-2007
Azerbaijana
Armeniab
Georgiac
Kyrgyzstan
Ukraine d
1992
[2.5]
2.2
..
1.6
..
1993
[4.9]
2.3
..
1.5
.5
1994
[3.7]
..
..
2.6
2.5
1995
[2.7]
4.1
..
3.5
2.8
1996
[2.3]
3.1
2.2
3
3.3
1997
[2.3]
3.9
[1.3]
3.1
4.1
1998
[2.4]
3.5
[1.1]
2.7
3.4
1999
[2.6]
3.7
[.9]
2.6
3
2000
[2.3]
3.6
[.6]
2.9
3.6
2001
[2.3]
3.1
[.7]
2.3
2.9
2002
[2.2]
2.7
1
2.7
2.8
2003
[2.4]
2.7
1.1
2.9
2.8
2004
[2.6]
2.7
1.4
2.8
2.6
2005
[2.3]
2.7
3.5
3.1
[2.4]
2006
3.4
2.9
5.2
3.2
2.8
2007
..
3
9.2
3.1
2.9
Average
2.7
3.1
1.3
2.6
2.8
a Azerbaijan

changed or redenominated its currency during the period; all current price local currency
figures have been converted to the latest currency.
b Figures for Armenia do not include military pensions. For 2004-2006 these amounted to 9979, 1113
and 12440 b. drams respectively.
c Figures for Georgia from 2002 are for the budgeted expenditure. The budget figure for 2003 is
believed to be an underestimation of actual spending because of the political turmoil during the ye ar.
dFigures for Ukraine are for the adopted budget for the Ministry of Defense, military pensions and
paramilitary forces. Actual expenditure was reportedly 95-99% of that budgeted for 1996-99.

Note:US$ m. = Million US dollars; - = Empty cell; ... = Data not available or not
applicable; ( ) = Uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate
Source:Updated from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Another source comparing only the South Caucasus three republics’ public spending
confirms that in the year of 2000, Armenia’s military spending is the highest.

79

Pay attention to the fact that figures for Armenian expenditures do not even include military pensions.
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Table 6.2: Public Spending (education, health and military) in Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, 1995-2000
1.3 Public Spending
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Public expenditures
Education (% of GNP), 1985-1987
..
5.8
..
Education (% of GNP), 1995-1997
2
3
5.2I
Health (% of GNP), 1990
..
2.7
3
Health (% of GNP), 1999
4
1
0.8
Military (% of GDP), 1990
..
..
..
Military (% of GDP), 2000
4.4
2.7
0.9
Total debt service (% of DGP), 1990
..
..
..
Total debt service (% of DGP), 2000
2.2
3.4
3.9
Notes: I Data refer to a year or period other than that specified

Source: United Nations, “Republic of Armenia: Public Administration Country Profile”,
January 2004.
As a percentage of GDP Armenian military spending is 4.4, while Azerbaijan’s is 2.7
(the opponent country that similarly needs strong military in case of war to restart with
Armenia) and Georgia’s is 0.9. Not only is the Armenian military spending highest among
the three republics, it is also highest as compared to other public expenditures within the
country, such as health and education.
The World Bank’s indicators on Defense and Arms (Figure 6.2 - Figure 6.6) also
show that average armed forces personnel as the percentage of total labor force is highest in
Armenia for the observed years.80 Azerbaijan follows. In Armenia it is 2.6%, in Azerbaijan it
is 2%, in Georgia it is 1.4-1.5%, in Kyrgyzstan it is 1%, and in Ukraine it is 0.9%.

80

Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training,
organization, equipment, and control sugges t they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labor Organization's definition of the
economically active population.
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Figure 6.2: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Armenia, 19922008

Figure 6.3: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Azerbaijan,
1992-2008

Figure 6.4: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Georgia, 19922008

Figure 6.5: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Kyrgyzstan,
1992-2008
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Figure 6.6: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Ukraine, 19922008

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/armenia/armed-forces-personnel-total-wbdata.html
6.3 A Comparative Analysis of Contentious Politics and Coercive States
After presenting a comparative evidence of the strong military capacity of the
Armenian state in the previous section, this section tries to argue that more military and
repressive regimes are triumphant at hampering the development of human rights,
fundamental elements of social exclusion, in their respective societies by suppressing social
protest. While some autocratic regimes, being quite weak, collapse in case of even minimal
social movement, others are based on more solid foundations and can simply crack down
oppositional movements. As Lucan Way writes, “backed by well financed states, strong
coercive apparatuses, and/or cohesive ruling parties, such regimes have either survived
serious opposition challenges or successfully beat back serious opposition before it could
emerge” (Way 2006:8). For example, discussed further in the chapter, in 2003 Georgian
President Shevardnadze was displaced in the face of “undersized” crowds, mainly because he
“no longer controlled the military and security forces” and, thus, was “too politically weak”
to repress the crowds (Mitchell 2004:345-348). The explosion of a movement into a
revolution protest in the examined countries for the studied period was possible only in cases
where the regimes under threat did not resort to machine guns or tanks. Illustrated in this
section, Armenian elites always resorted to guns and tanks. As we can observe in Table 6.3
and Table 6.4, only in the absence of tough authoritarianism and a militarized state (after an
interstate war), was a revolution possible.
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Table 6.3: "Color revolutions" accomplished and attempted, 2000-2008
State
Success Period
Elections
Crowd
Victims
Armenia

No

April 12, 2004
__________
20-February-02
March, 2008
Azerbaijan
No
16 September- 20
October, 2003
___________
08 Aug -26 Nov,
2005
Georgia
Yes
15-23 November,
2003
Ukraine
Yes
22 November- 04
December, 2004
Kyrgyzstan Yes
18-24 March,
2005
Source: Adapted from Baev, 2010.

Feb, 2003
_________
19 February,
2008
15 October,
2003
__________
06 Nov.,
2005
02 Nov.,
2003
21 Nov.,
2004
13 March,
2005

25,000
Few

War81
1991-94
(Yes)

100,000
25,000

Few

1991-94
(Yes)

20,000

Few

100,000

None

No

500,000

None

No

25,000

Few

No

Table6.4: State Militarization Levels and Failure/Success of Social Movements, 2000-2008
State
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
Military budgets
Very high
Ratio of manpower
Very high
(Threat of) External war
yes
Authoritarian state
yes
Revolution occurred
no
Source: Created by the author.

High
High
yes
yes
no

Low
Low
no
partly
yes

High
Very low
no
partly
yes

High
Low
no
yes
yes

6.3.1. Georgia:November 23, 2003 was a noteworthy day in the history of Georgia. For the
first time in Georgian history a revolution exploded in Georgia, the first non-violent change
of regime in the Caucasus. This was an event not predicted by scholars, as many were
anticipating a more violent turn of events in this small post-Soviet country.
On November 2, 2003, Georgia held parliamentary elections. As in other cases
studied in this chapter, the election was controlled by the incumbent, President Eduard
Shevardnadze. Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Tbilisi, the capital

Baev (2010) included only ‘civil war’ in the table. I have changed the author’s mentioning of civil war with
external war, because in this dissertation Armenian state militarizat ion started after the Karabakh war (not a
civil war), which Baev categorized as a civil war. Therefore, I am more interested to see th e affect of external
wars on post-war state militarizat ion and a state’s ability to crack down potential revolutions/potential civil wars
during 2000-2008.
81
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city, to protest against the flawed results of a parliamentary election in Georgia. They
demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation. Peaceful protests lasted for 20 days. The
demonstrations were in full swing for three days on November 20, 21 and 22. After Mikheil
Saakashvili’s public announcement that all negotiations with the President were halted
because the President did not accept the protestors’ demands, people grew more aggravated
and filled the streets.82 On the morning of November 23 the demonstrations became larger.
Protestors came from different classes and different social groups, of different ages and
ideologies: students, teachers and professors, workers, young people and the elderly.
As typical of threatened governments, the government ordered the security forces to
defend constitutional order. Shevardnadze deployed soldiers in the streets, but did not dare to
order for violence. He refused to order his troops to shoot the people. Meanwhile, protestors,
the majority of them students, distributed red roses to the soldiers. The latter chose not to use
their guns. State efforts to contain mass mobilization were unsuccessful. On November 24,
Shevardnadze’s regime was brought down by about 100,000 people. Shevardnadze left his
office peacefully, similar to Armenia's President Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation in
1998.83 According to Cohen (2004), "a wise man", Shevardnadze, who led Georgia, "on and
off, for 31 years decided to bow out gracefully." He "was not ready for the role of a Slobodan
Milosevic or a Nicolae Ceausescu". The opposition came to power and in January 2004, one
of the opposition leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili was elected as president of Georgia.
The success of the 2004 Georgian movement can be credited to a couple of factors. A
most vital circumstance was the pressure from below. An important factor for the movement
to start was the economic situation of the country, more specifically the uneven distribution
of wealth between the society’s different groups. Although Georgia witnessed economic
growth during Shevardnadze’s years, most of the population still lived in poverty and social
problems were become quite severe. Corruption and bribery were widespread. The state,
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Saakashvili is a Georgian politician, the founder and leader of the United National Movement Party . He
became the third President of Georgia in January 2004 and has led Georgia till November 2013.
83 The similarity of regime change in Armenia in 1998 and in Georgia in 2003 is that in both cases the
incumbents left their office as Presidents. Nonetheless , there is a significant difference: in the Armenian case,
the president resigned because of pure political pressure and this happened approximately two years after t he
1996 post-electoral mass protests, while in the Georgian case Shevardnadze gave up because of public pressure
and under people’s power.
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instead of feeding its people, was more interested in enriching its oligarchs. The level of
social exclusion in all its dimensions was becoming very high, and people needed to express
their frustration. This expression of public aggravation burst into mass protests after the 2003
parliamentary elections.
The input of “Kmara”, a civic resistance movement created by Georgian university
students, was enormous in undermining the government. 84 The literature on Rose revolution
repeatedly highlights that Kmara led the demonstrations. Kmara is quoted to have been
supported, financed and trained by several Western organizations and foundations, such as
Goorge Soros’s “Open Society - Georgia Foundation”, Freedom House, the National
Democratic Institute, European Union, USAID, National Endowment for Democracy,
International Republican Institute, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and
the Council of Europe.
The success of the Rose Revolution ignited a debate about the importance of the
international actors, such as diplomatic, financial and other forms of support from the West,
specifically from the USA, in transforming local politics in developing countries. The
November 24, 2003 Wall Street Journal acclaims the breakdown of the old regime to the
non-governmental sector in the country, supported by Western and particularly American
foundations. NGOs had “spawned a class of young, English-speaking intellectuals hungry for
pro-Western reforms", who organized a peaceful coup. While many scholars overestimate the
international factor in Georgia’s, likewise in Ukraine’s revolutions, Kandelaki argues that
“foreign actors played a limited role because they lacked information or were overly cautious
about fostering significant political change” (Kandelaki 2006:2). He contends that most of
the civil society organizations in Georgia were constrained by the priorities and requireme nts
of foreign donors and ‘their own elitism’.
Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution are very similar in
many aspects. Like the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution did not experience any
violence from either the protestors or the state authorities. Three key reasons lie behind the

“Kmara” was the Georgian version of the Serbian "OTPOR" and the Ukrainian “Pora”. Translation of
“Kmara” into English is “Enough”.
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logic of non-violence from Georgian security forces. The first reason is that the armed forces
were not supporting the autocratic regime and they made clear that they would defend the
protestors; in fact they joined the demonstrators in Georgia. The second reason for the
absence of violence was due to a divided ruling elite. Finally, a third factor widely acclaimed
to have driven the security forces not to exercise use of power was the opposition’s strong
efforts to develop “sympathy for their cause while downplaying the threat posed by political
change” (Kandelaki 2006:3).
6.3.2. Ukraine:After the breakdown of the USSR, there occurred tens of protests,
demonstrations and attempts of "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s
Orange Revolutions in November-December of 2004 was the second revolution after the
popular Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003. The two revolutions had many similar aspects,
but Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was much larger than Georgia’s Rose Revolution, which
caused analysts and scholars to treat Ukraine’s case as a new trend-setter, “a new landmark in
the post-communist history of Eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of
the region” (Karatnycky 2005: 1). As Andrew Wilson observes:
“It took real people power to challenge the Ukrainian system, which was much stronger than
the eleven-year Shevardnadze regime. There was certainly no bloodbath, no Terror, no setpiece storming of buildings, though revolutions often have to be non-revolutionary in order to
succeed. Ukraine’s negotiated path to peaceful settlement stood in marked contrast to
Kyrgyzstan or even Georgia, certainly in contrast to the bloody events and suppression of
protests in Uzbekistan”. (Wilson 2005:198)

The Orange revolution, as all the revolutions and revolutionary situations examined in
this chapter, was initiated as a post-election reaction. However, while all the other cases of
mobilization were caused not only by flawed elections and political exclusion and they
embraced also economic and social exclusion, Ukraine was the only country that had a strong
economy. In Ukraine’s case it was not economic stagnation and socio-economic exclusion
that led the masses to the revolution. Although Kuzio (2006) mentions about “popular
perceptions of unjust privatizations and the rise of Ukrainian’s oligarchic class,” “a growing
gulf between the ruling elite and society,”“economic growth was not felt by the population,”
and that “most Ukrainians looked negatively at the 1990s as a decade of the “primitive
accumulation of capital” (Bandit Capitalism),” he still believes that economic issues as such
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did not play a major role in the 2004 elections and post-election events in Ukraine (Kuzio
2006, pp 45-49).
Åslund likewise points out that the Ukrainian revolution did not seem to have any
class identity at all. “Hardly any names of businesses, parties, or organizations were to be
seen. No one talked of social or economic issues. This was pure politics” (Åslund 2007:175).
Therefore, this is the only country where the phenomenon of durable social exclusion does
not apply; here we talk about only the political exclusio n aspect of social exclusion.
The Ukrainian presidential elections of November, 2004 witnessed a massive
mobilization against the incumbent President Kuchma. Kuchma was considered a corrupt and
authoritarian leader with oligarchic ties. Under his government, the judiciary was malleable,
mass media controlled to the level that defiant or investigative reporters could have been
murdered. The massive uprising of the 2004 in Ukraine was in support of Viktor
Yushchenko, the main oppositional candidate against Viktor Yanukovich, the presidential
candidate who was widely known as handpicked by the incumbent president Kuchma.
Election fraud and vote rigging served as an opportunity window for the public outrage to
burst leading to the Orange Revolution.
The demonstrations included about 40,000 university students with a sea of orange
flags, hundreds of Ukrainians who arrived from other cities of the country to Kyiv, the
capital city, over one million Ukrainian citizens who went out to the streets in support of
their candidate.
C. J. Chivers of the New York Times reveals that as the protesters gained momentum,
Ukraine’s military and security services began to fragment. Although state elites demanded
to use force to disperse the demonstrations, the authorities did not dare to intervene with the
military and the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine). Ukrainian security agencies played an
instrumental role in the Orange Revolution, as they provided support to the political
opposition. According to Chivers (2005), after the Interior Ministry marshaled troops to
attack the protestors, SBU leaders proclaimed that they would use force to protect the
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protestors. Ukrainians went to vote in a re-run election on December 26, and the next day
Yushchcenko became the elected President of Ukraine.
Unlike for other countries that witnessed high levels of social mobilization, there is an
abundant literature on the causes and consequences of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
Some discuss only the domestic context, others emphasize the international context. A very
popular reason that many authors find primary is the civil society, particularly youth groups,
such as “Pora”.85 Polese (2009) argues that the crucial factor in the Orange Revolution was
the transformation of informal social networks into a formalized civil society. Others ascribe
an essential role to Ukrainian nationalism. Dominique Arel suggests that “nationalism
produced the Orange Revolution. … if Ukraine is now on the road to an open society, it is
largely thanks to the strength of its nationalism” (Arel 2005:1). Another factor that Arel finds
important is a “polarized society”.
Kuzio’s thorough assessment of the Orange Revolution indicates eight necessary
factors for this revolution: competitive authoritarian regime, preceding political crisis,
charismatic candidate, sympathetic capital city, disunited and dispirited ruling elites, united
opposition, new generation, and civic nationalism. As contributing factors that are
noteworthy, Kuzio states another set of five variables. Those are the economic factor, modern
communications, the public mood, security forces and the international involvement.
While it is necessary to mention factors that the literature finds significant for the
success of the Ukrainian social mobilization, it is not the aim of this chapter to discuss all of
these factors at length. A required task here is to discover the differences that led the
Ukrainians to a successful color revolution, that is, the removal of authoritarian leadership by
means of non-violent techniques, as compared to the Armenian case. Based on the reviewed
literature, we can assess that the necessary but missing condition for the Armenian
revolutionary situations to turn into a revolution was the international factor. But since this
dissertation does not deal with the international factor due to the fact that I am concerned
with the domestic context of social exclusion, I leave the involvement and the role of the
international community to future research.
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The basic premise shared in earlier parts of this study focuses on state militarization
as a leading factor to the failure of social movements. Now, revisiting the two cases, Ukraine
and Armenia, through the state militarization lenses, it becomes obvious that the level of
state’s repressive power has been the primary factor for the differences in outcomes.86
Similar to the Georgian case, the Ukrainian security forces remained neutral or ‘defected’.
Binnendijk and Marovic (2006) examine the explicit strategies developed by protestors in
Ukraine to increase the costs of repression and reduce the willingness of state security forces
to resort to violence. Through means of persuasion, organizers averted major repression of
their movements. However, it is contestable whether the armed forces did not intervene
because of the protestors’ persuasion skills or because the Security Service and the military
were sympathetic to Yushchenko. In a similar method, Armenian protestors have tried
extraordinary methods of attracting the Armenian armed forces, but in vain. The Armenian
military leaders are people with close ties to government authorities. Armenian military,
particularly those officials, who have been appointed after the Karabakh war and are not the
classic Soviet officers with proper military training, but civilians who turned into military
officials, are extremely subordinate to the state, because they have their stake to lose if there
is a regime overturn. State-military relationship is tightly interrelated and inter-dependent in
today's Armenia.
Another reason for the Ukrainian state’s inability to use force may be due to the fact
that Ukraine’s Interior Ministry was divided. Crucially, the Ukrainian elite was divided;
some politicians joined the main opposition candidate’s camp before the election and others
defected to Yushchenko’s camp when it was evident that the Orange victory was a likely
outcome of the post-election movement. Divided elite means a divided state. A divided state
means weaker state capacity for repression, unlike post-Soviet Armenian and Azerbaijani
cases. Armenian governing authorities during the latest two post-electoral protests have had a
very strong cohesion of state elites; there was a state elite fragmentation only during the 1996
demonstrations in Armenia, and which like in other cases of revolutions resulted in
As already mentioned in an earlier part of the dissertation, it is imperative to re-state that ‘success’ does not
explicitly refer to more social inclusion after the specific revolution. It does not refer to the reforms or
effectiveness of the post-revolutionary government. It only refers to the effective overthrow of a non democratic and illiberal regime, in as much as it is based on the desire and decision of the larger part of the
society.
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theincumbent President Ter-Petrossian’s resignation in 1998. In short, state militarization is
the main difference between the Georgian and Armenian causes that led to success in one
case, and to failure in the other.
6.3.3. Kyrgyzstan:Thepost-Soviet revolutions of colors and flowers continued with the
“Tulip Revolution” of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. For the third time in two years people overthrew
their governments in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, and for the first
time this has occurred in the post-Soviet central Asian region. The “Tulip Revolution”
happened as a reaction against rigged elections in Kyrgyzstan; its causes, however, are not
rooted only in electoral fraud, but as in many cases of mass protests, stem from social,
economic, as well as political segregation. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan was conditioned by
widespread discontent not only in the political elite, but in the wider society.
A central position and role in the Kyrgyz events carried the People’s Movement of
Kyrgyzstan (PMK). The movement included many of the opposition’s prominent figures.
Many important movements and parties joined the PMK, among those the Ata-Jurt
movement, the “For Fair Elections” bloc, Jany Bagyt, the National Movement of Kyrgyzstan
and the National Congress of Kyrgyzstan. In early November the opposition demanded that
the President sign a new constitution limiting his powers. Akaev signed it on November 9,
yet tensions between pro- and anti-government demonstrators threatened political
breakdown.
Unlike its predecessor cases, Georgia and Ukraine, the literature on the Kyrgyz caseis
limited. Authors chiefly lay out a chronology of events leading to the revolution, the
escalation of protests and a description of the Tulip Revolution itself. There are few authors
who discuss any other causes of this revolution, except the political tensions between the
government and oppositional leaders. The main focus of scholarly and policymaking
discussion revolves around its consequences, particularly regarding democratization. Many
skeptically wonder if the Kyrgyz revolution has brought any real changes for its people and
whether it has affected the consolidation of democracy in this country. Whereas a few
consider the Kyrgyz events of 2005 as “little more than a coup d’etat" (Knyazev 2005), or an
event "orchestrated by external forces, primarily the US" (Peters 2005)", many analysts
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mention that, the international community had little influence and was not a primary driver of
the regime change for the Tulip Revolution (Saidazimova 2005; Radnitz 2006; Lewis 2010).
According to Marat (2006) the rise of political violence is one of several negative
repercussions resulting from this sudden transformation. Based on her accounts, postrevolutionary Kyrgyzstan has been experiencing violent activity of organized criminal groups
and widespread corruption in the public and economic sectors. But as Martha Brill Olcott
believes, the consequences of the “Tulip Revolution” can still lead to the development of a
democratic political system in Kyrgyzstan, “something that was unlikely to have been the
case had Askar Akayev been allowed to complete his term of office” (Olcott, 2005).
A very good analysis of the Tulip Revolution is presented by Radnitz (2006), who
argues that the overthrow of the government was possible due to an “improvised alliance of
opposition leaders and business elites”. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine’s revolutions, as well as
contained mass mobilizations in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Kyrgyzstan civil society
networks, students, and urban residents played a minimal role. Informal ties have been vital.
For the sake of the militarization argument put forward in the introduction of this
chapter, a point that is worth underscoring is that similar to Georgia and Ukraine, Kyrgyz
armed forces also joined the protestors. Otunbaeva said that police officers had joined the
opposition team in massive numbers. "Policemen, including high-ranking officers, took off
their uniforms, changed into civilian clothes and joined our ranks. So we have substantial
support" (Saidazimova, 2005). Lewis (2010) also contends that it was not very difficult for
the mobilization to defeat the state, because Akaev refused to order the security forces to use
force, and the latter were reluctant to exercise force. Thus, the regime had limited ability to
oppose the mobilization. “In fact, there was no cost attached to participation in
demonstrations, and much greater costs in some communities (social ostracism, loss of
access to local leaders) associated with opposing anti-government protests” (Lewis 2010:59).
6.3.4. Armenia:After its independence from the USSR, the Armenian Republic has witnessed
repeated cycles of demonstrations. Except for the year of 1988 that was marked with
demonstrations for the liberation and reunification of Karabakh with Armenia (widely known
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as “Karabakh” or “National” movement), all the subsequent small or major demonstrations
and insurgencies throughout 1998-2008 were directed towards state elites on economic,
political and ideological grounds.87 Most typically, thelatter demonstrations were followed
with hundreds of troops in Armenia’s capital and clashes between opposition activists and
government forces. Those, therefore, have been failed efforts of contentious politics and
revolutionary outcomes by the demonstrators.
The 1995 parliamentary elections were announced by the UN and other observers to
be free but not fair. These elections were followed by the presidential elections in 1996 that
were also disputed to beunfair. Official results announced that incumbent Levon TerPetrossian received 51.75% of the votes and his main opponent, Vazgen Manukyan received
41.29%. International observers’ assessments mentioned irregularities, procedural violations
and breaches of the election law.88 According to Manukyan’s supporters their candidate had
gained 60% of the votes, so the opposition rejected the official results. Mass protests
followed.
The protestors used violence, and breaking through police lines, entered the
government building. They took hostage Babken Ararktsyan, the speaker of the Parliament,
and beat up his two deputies. Because of this violence on behalf of the protestors and the
government’s assumption that the demonstrators attempted to seize a government building,
the riot was dispersed by the police. Zolyan (2010) argues that the post-election protests of
1996 in Armenia had the characteristics of “the "color revolutions"”: claimed fraudulent
elections, mass protests, and an attempt to overthrow the government. “The events of 1996
proved to be a pattern that in the years to come repeated itself in different post-socialist
countries, albeit though with different outcomes” (Zolyan 2010:89).
The next major state repression scene repeated in February of 2003 when
Kocharyan’s re-election as president (elected in 1998 after Ter-Petrossian's resignation) was
followed by widespread allegations of voter bribery and ballot-rigging. The opposition
campaign peaked into a massive, yet peaceful, protest on April 12, 2004. Some sources
87
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estimate the number of protestors to around 10-15,000 (Eurasia Insight, 13 April, 2004),
others to about 25,000 (Karapetyan, 15 April, 2004). The Rose Revolutions had just occurred
in Georgia, and the Armenian opposition, inspired by the neighboring country’s success,
tried to imitate the Georgian revolutionary tactics, among those peaceful mass protests and
rallies, blocking government buildings and streets. Although the demonstrators were
peaceful, the protest was dispersed by use of excessive force and in a very brutal way
(Human Rights Watch 2005). There were more than 200 arrests, among those ordinary
protestors, opposition leaders, and even three members of the National Assembly.
Although opposition tactics and organization have been similar in Armenia and
Georgia in 2003-2004, the state’s reaction has been totally different. While the Georgian
incumbent President, Eduard Shevardnadze, showed an excessively mild attitude towards
demonstrators and did not resort to repressive methods, the Armenian government under the
guidance of President Kocharyan has used violence and suppression to crush down any
challenges against the Executive, both in the parliament and on the streets.
The Parliamentary elections of May 2007 and specifically the Presidential elections
of February 2008 have also been a sharp example of political exclusion. 89 The alleged
electoral violations and fraud proceeded with mass protests in the capital city Yerevan. This
time again, the protestors were extremely peaceful and no violence was used as a social
movement tactic. People began the demonstrations on February 20in the Liberty Square of
Yerevan, and continued their demands of inclusion, equal rights, and fair political
participation. Approximately 25,000 opposition supporters were reportedly present on the
first days of the protest. Some hundreds of people were protesting in the Square even
overnight.
During the 2008 protests, the demonstratorsdid not seek to enact disruption and
transgression. In general, the protests of the 2008 were considered to be non-violent from the
side of the protesting people. Demonstrations consisted of several groups and interests, such
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as youth movements HIMA and SKSELA which were greatly frustrated. 90 There were elderly
people in the streets, students and teenagers, intellectuals, and finally, the political
opposition. There was also a new force: the Armenian workers of Russia, who losing their
jobs in Russia, had returned home. This is significant because they returned to Armenia
unemployed and weredisappointed with the economic opportunities in the homeland.
Despite government urges to go home, the angry, discontented crowds continued their
only way towards building a more inclusive homeland, demanding a new government that in
their beliefs would be more inclined to meeting their needs; economic, political and societal.
Their demands, however, were soon crushed. On the morning of March 1, police and army
units dispersed the 700-1000 persons who had camped overnight, beating them with
truncheons and electric-shock devices.91 Eight protestors died during those clashes, dozens
were injured.
Zharangutyun (Heritage) party’s leader Raffi Hovhannisyan’s statement on the postelection situation in the country mentioned that "the schism between the Armenian people
and its government continues to expand". Zharangutyun, which was then the only opposition
party represented in the National Assembly, believed that the presidential election was
fraudulent, and that Armenian people had a legitimate right to dispute its official results in
demonstrations. Hovhannisyan’s statement continued: “The unconscionability displayed on
February 19 and the brutality used to protect it on March 1 remain unresolved issues. No
state of emergency, accompanied as it is by an aggressive, one-sided ‘public information’
vertical which deepens the public divide rather than healing it, will succeed in securing the
collective amnesia of state and society.”92
According to state elites, the events of March, 2008, were efforts to overthrow the
government, an attempt of coup d'état. 93 Hundreds of the supporters of the main opposition
candidate Levon Ter-Petrossian were arrested and jailed on charges of attempts to seize the
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government. Sources estimate over 400 hundred citizens’ arrest following March 1. The
National assembly, controlled and governed by the President, stripped four deputies allied to
Ter-Petrossian of their legal immunity from prosecution. While three of them were detained
by the police, the fourth was able to hide and for the following couple of years remained on
the run.94
Several local and international media sources and reports have exposed and
condemned the state violence exercised by the Armenian state in the aftermath of the 2008
elections. They have mentioned about beatings during the protests by the police and army
representatives, illegal political arrests, police brutality against the detainees, and
discrimination of political elites who supported the opposition candidate.
The 2008 post-election crisis and the state of emergency announced in Armenia as the
state elite’s reaction to thousands of protestors obviously supports the main argument of this
dissertation that coercive state apparatus merged with its military high rank authorities is a
significant factor in creating political exclusion of large masses. The President’s imposition
of a state of emergency complete with bans on the freedoms of assembly and speech coupled
with sweeping media censorship, in response to an internal political crisis that has cost at
least eight lives is a combination of most of the elements mentioned in the political exclusion
indicators in earlier chapters of this study.
Zolyan’s (2010) research on the Armenian caseevaluates the capacity of a few factors
commonly associated with the effectiveness of social movements in Armenia and
acknowledges only one of them,an openly authoritarian and militarized regime, as a truly
significant factor in breeding revolutionary situations. For instance, although many would
think that leaders of the opposition and their ideology are a key determinant of the social
movements’ success, he suggests that the oppositional discourse does not matter much in
Armenia. Zolyan also argues that the rivalry between the West and Russia as wellis not an
essential cause of the political crises that could have led to a color revolution in Armenia.
Next, in spite of the fact that the international community’s engagement is instrumental for
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the success of a social movement to become a revolution,international engagement cannot be
considered a necessary and a sufficient cause for the emergence of a political situation in
which a color revolution may occur. The most significant factor determining the failure
and/or success of a social movement is an “openly authoritarian regime”, a regime that
“strives to ensure stability at the expense of pluralism and liberty ..., which might be the
preferred outcome for some members of the ruling elites in Armenia, who tend to equate
‘stability’ with maintaining their grip on power, but it can prove disastrous for the country in
the long run” (Zolyan 2010:97-98).
In the case of Armenia, variables such as 1) opposition leadership and a leader’s
ideology, 2) organization and structure of a social movement, as well as 3) the international
factor are not as important in determining the success of a social movement, as 4) the
authoritarian mechanisms of the state’s decision-making and a state’s organizational base.
Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn (2008:19) likewise mention that the Armenian state holds a strong,
well-established and unchallenged monopoly on violence throughout the country.
6.3.5. Azerbaijan:There was a phenomenal growth of economy in 2005 in Azerbaijan.
Butsimilar to Armenia, Azerbaijan has experienced a high degree of inequality, and over 40
percent of the population was estimated to live in poverty (Alieva 2006). As a product of
industrialization, there was a sudden rise of clans, and a radical change of social structure.
The opportunities among different classes changed, leaving the poorest in poverty and
socially vulnerable. There have been many efforts in Azerbaijan to overthrow the regime,
such as in 2003 and in 2005; however none was successful. 95 Armenia and Azerbaijan are the
only countries among the chosen cases that have had very mobilized social movements but at
the same time the respective states contained those movements, shutting down protestors.
The presidential elections of 2003 have been considered not fair; the results of votes
confirmed that Ilham Aliyev, the son of President Heydar Aliyev, was the ‘elected’ President,
a successor to his father. This election was condemned by the OSCE, yet it was accepted
internationally. The international observers and Western diplomats criticized human rights
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violations and voting manipulation by the government but still advised opposition leaders to
stop their protests. International refusal to acknowledge the unfair elections left Azeri people
disillusioned. As a result, only 50% of the electorate turned out to vote in the parliamentary
elections of November 2005 in Azerbaijan.
Similar to Georgia and Ukraine, several youth movements such as Yox, Yeni Fekir,
Magam and Dalga, were created in Azerbaijan. 96 Many of those groups used the same tactics
as the Ukrainian Pora and Georgian Kmara. The Yox movement chose green as its color,
similar to Ukrainian revolution’s orange color. In November 2005, thousands of young
people took to the streets. On 26 November, the police cracked down demonstrations that had
high promises and potential of becoming a color revolution. The police used teargas and
water cannons; dozens of protesters were injured.
In Azerbaijan, there was a lack of international community support to affect the
realization of a color revolution. There was no critical action and active involvement on their
behalf towards changing the autocratic regime of Aliyev, because they were not committed to
a regime change due to the existing business arrangements regarding Azerbaijani oil. Sources
even mention that Western governments and non-governmental organizations in some cases
were even opposed to the regime change. “Arguing that Azerbaijan needed “evolutionary”
rather than revolutionary change, they put other, higher priority interests above
democratization in Azerbaijan.” (Bunce and Volchik 2008:4) Azerbaijan lacked the external
influences that weakened autocrats in other post-Soviet countries through effective
revolutions.
In the analysis of "color revolutions", the greatest threat to the stability of autocratic
regimes lies not in the organization of the political opposition or the socio-economic
challenge from below, but more significantly in the informal mechanisms by which the
leader maintains cohesion within the ruling coalition and in the means of sustaining the
armed forces. In Azerbaijan, oil revenues allowed the regime to provide benefits to its
supporters at both domestic and international levels and maintain elite cohesion. There was a

In this case again, the youth groups named themselves very symbolically; for example, “Yox” means “no!”,
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failure of the business community to support the opposition, because it was not independent
of the regime. There was also unwillingness from the external community to intervene for the
same reason (dependence on the Azeri state leaders based on oil interests).
On the other hand, like in post-war Armenia, the post-war Azeri state was able to
keep a strong grip on political power due to the existence of external threat from Armenia.
The security forces remained loyal to the regime and followed orders to use force against
protesters, rather than defect to the opposition as they did in Georgia and Ukraine. Thus, the
government control of the business elites, as well as the security forces, insulated Aliyev’s
regime from being overthrown. Several times during demonstration riots, the Azeri state did
not hesitate to defend its interests with force.
6.4 Conclusion
The body of literature on democratization stresses how economic crises inevitably
lead to general crisis in a regime and the ouster of the ruling elite. Many of the countries,
where people were driven to break down authoritarian or quasi-democratic governments, had
suffered acute economic depression and loss of political power for the majority of their
citizens. And although in my assessment the "color revolutions" are not true social
revolutions, famously defined by Skocpol as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state
and class structures … accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from
below”, the "color revolutions" have been aimed at more inclusion and a fairer share of
opportunities between social classes. Timothy Garton Ash has accurately coined the term
‘refolution’ to describe the hybrid form of change that had taken place in the post-Soviet
space, a mix of reform and revolution. Be they revolution or 'refolution', those do bring hopes
for ordinary people to defeat violent states and to some extent transform their societies.
Every color revolution is indeed unique with its specific trajectory and its particular
emotional catharsis. The discussed post-Soviet revolutions and attempts of revolutions have
several characteristic features. I have already mentioned some of those similar features,
among which international involvement is of utmost importance in most of the “color
revolution” literature. Baev (2010) for example, highlights the international factor, in
particular posing that the unconditional support by either Russia or the West to leaders
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seeking to face down potential “color revolutionaries” is the main determinant of a color
revolution. While international involvement has been relatively important in some cases,
such as Georgia, Ukraine, and perhaps in Azerbaijan because of the interests in its large oil
and gas supplies, in Armenia and to a lesser degree in Kyrgyzstan, its role was minimal. 97 A
most prominently stood out feature in containing social movements was the level of violence
used by the state. As shown in previous sections of this chapter, the Armenian state along
with its neighbor Azerbaijan has excelled at it.
This chapter focused on the importance of the coercive power of the state in the
failure of revolutionary attempts. With a comparative chapter on the military statistics,
history of social movements of the studied countries and the respective states' repressive
power for the period of 2000-2008, I intended to re-emphasize the military power of Armenia
and Azerbaijan as compared to other similar post-Sovietstates. Before a more systematic
examination of the post-Soviet Armenian state militarization beyond the conventional
perspective, there is a need to mention that the course of the militarization of the Armenian
state is chiefly rooted in Armenian history, which was heavily influenced by the tragic fate of
the nation as a perpetual victim. This historic legacy only fostered a vibrant and militant
nationalism among the nation. The Armenian military in later years gained more power from
the outbreak of the Karabakh conflict and the ascendance of a newly dynamic militant
nationalism, which actually preceded the birth of the modern post-Soviet Armenian
independent state. These historical narratives will be the main discussion of the following
chapter, with a substantial focus on the Karabakh conflict, and its consequences on the
Armenian democratization, peace prospects, economic development, andsocial inclusion.
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CHAPTER 7
State Militarization and Social Exclusion
War is the engine of state building, but it is also good for business.
Historically, the three have often amounted to the same thing. The consolidation
of national states in Western Europe was in part a function of the interests
of royal leaders in securing sufficient revenue for war making. In turn, costly
military engagements were highly profitable enterprises for the suppliers of men,
ships, and weaponry. …
The distinction between freebooter and founding father, privateer and president,
has often been far murkier in fact than national mythmaking normally allows.
Charles King
7.1 Introduction
In “Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, Charles
King argues that there is a political economy to warfare that produces positive externalities
for its perpetrators. Wars and post-war aggression in many of Eurasia’s separatist states,
similar to perpetual violence in Sierra Leone, Myanmar, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia,
Colombia and elsewhere in the world, have less to do with social or institutional anarchy than
with the rational calculations of elites about the use of violence as a tool for extracting and
redistributing resources. “Conflicts, in this sense, may not “burn themselves out”, precisely
because it is in the interests of their makers, on all sides, to stoke them” (King 2001:528). At
the same time, conflicts may continue for reasons that are different than those that started it,
and with actors who were relevant at the time the conflict started. In this sense, while the
Karabakh war (1991-1994) was inevitable between the Armenian and Azeri people in 1991,
the long-lasting non-resolution of the conflict could have been avoided if Armenian political
elites had the will and ability to find a compromise solution.
This chapter evaluates Armenian citizens' social exclusion with its multidimensional
nature and dynamic process of "being shut out, fully or partially, from social, economic,
political and cultural systems that determine the social integration of a person in a society",
by primarily analyzing the promotion of nationalist policies that deprived Armenia of
economic development and Armenians of employment opportunities; the weakening of civil
society and participatory politics by the breakdown of peaceful opposition and
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demonstrations; and unfair exercise of power by the governing leaders. It argues that the
militarization of the Armenian state through the Karabakh war led to the social and political
exclusion of the wider Armenian society by forcefully eliminating political opposition,
suppressingindependent judiciary and curtailing the independence of the media. The prospect
of free and competitive elections that would result in fair and peaceful rotation of power and
accountability clearly failed. These processes have further polarized the wealthy and the
poor, increasing economic exclusion of the latter. A vicious circle of economic, political and
social dimensions of exclusion was conceived.
Furthermore, a long-lasting absence of peace resolution over the Karabakh conflict
maintained by a nationalist ideology that was reinforced during the Kocharyan administratio n
undermined the formation of peaceful foreign policy and security, market reform,
democracy, and social inclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The frozen state of the Karabakh
conflict has led to certain distortions in the post-Soviet Armenian political system. It was a
springboard for the post-war state militarization in Armenia. Prolonging the dispute and
shunning a final settlement by central policy elites since and during the presidency of Robert
Kocharyan has also prolonged the durability of social exclusion in the Armenian society. Key
elites got major benefits from stalemate, and had an incentive to prolong it. A final settlement
for the Karabakh conflict has become an outcome from which ordinary people would greatly
benefit, but which entails much sacrifice from elites who maintain not only control over
armed forces, but also accrue resources through political support and financial assistance of
the international community as long as they prolong a resolution. Meanwhile, Armenia is in a
"form of self-imposed isolation, an isolation that is leading to economic, political, and
strategic strangulation" (Libaridian 2007:301).
The analysis of social exclusion through state militarization is examined through four
main events in post-Soviet Armenia: 1) TheKarabakh war of 1991-1994; 2) the resignation of
first President of the Republic of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, in 1998; 3) the 1999
Parliament shooting, and 4) 2008 March repression of post-electoral protests. These events,
characterized with many elements of militarization discussed in the definition and
theorization of the term in Chapter Four, are rooted in militarization and routed to social
exclusion. Particularly, the three post-war events – Ter-Petrossian’s resignation; the 1999
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Parliament murders; and the March 1, 2008 post-electoral turmoil – were infamous events
that impacted the Armenian state militarization and its effect on social decay.
This chapter interprets the above-mentioned three political events as significant
junctures in post-Soviet Armenian politics and relates them to the non-conventional
development of state militarization in Armenia. 98 In this regard, all three of these events were
allegedly initiated and pressured by politicians, who had been seriously involved in the
martial activities of Karabakh war, were considered as some of the most revered military
figures for Armenians, and had afterwards gained control over the armed forces. Being
related to the Karabakh war and having some 'military' background, 99 Armenian high-ranking
political elites influenced military leaders to support them in maintaining their political
hegemony through containing mass mobilizations, repression of opposition, election fraud,
and other human rights violations. Their regimes heavily depended on the loyalty of the army
and police and employed rigid authoritarianism and a constant need for coercion or its threat.
In exchange to the services of the military, certain individuals in the military were rewarded
with higher ranks, higher positions and other resources. 100
Most of the politicians I have interviewed for this dissertation agree that post-war
Armenia is a militarized state, and that the state militarization adversely impacted a
beneficial foreign policy that would positively affect Armenia's socio-economic
development. They also agree that this type of regime has continuously closed opportunities
of political power and policy-making for oppositional politicians and has excluded the
majority of Armenian citizens from political participation. Only one of the interviewees,
98

In the conventional militarization sense, only the Karabakh war can be considered an element of true state
militarizat ion. But as stressed in the state militarization literature discussed earlier in this dissertation, any other
political event that intervenes with domestic politics through the use of military affairs or armed tactics may be
characterized as state militarization.
99 We should emphasize that ‘military’ here denotes a field commander, rather than a traditional combatant with
military training background. Field commanders during the Karabakh war were similar to fedayees (Ֆիդայի),
also known as the Armenian irregular units or Armenian militia, who were civilians that voluntarily left their
families to form self-defense armed units against the enemy.
100 Gabrielyan (2011) describes a process of clientelistic relationship between the Kocharyan administration and
the military, which strongly resembles the “feudalization of the state” in the military realm. Kocharyan, for
example, formed a loyal army team by granting titles of “General” to several soldiers. Later they were
appointed to various positions in the Armed Forces (Gabrielyan 2011). Since 2000, position appointments and
sponsorship entitlements in the Armed Forces became increasingly popular. “Huge amounts of money to
expend from the Army, not targeted funds, profits from the abuse, became common practice during their
[Kocharyan-Sargsyan] government” (ibid).
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Chairman of the Armenian Constitutional Legal Protection Centre (ACPRC)Gevorg
Manoukyan rejected the idea that post-war Armenia has been militarized.101 According to
him, after every war, even after World War II, during Stalin’s dictatorial regime, war
soldiers/heroes or so called frontaviks earned great respect and gained much authority.
Manoukyan claimed that it was normal for Armenian warriors of Karabakh war to enjoy
respect and more resources than other citizens, because they put their lives at danger during
war for the safety and security of the Armenian nation. But Manoukyan, as most of the other
interviewed politicians and analysts, think that war leaders, such as Samvel Babayan, for
example have gone too far by acquiring too much power, wealth and violence. 102
Stepan Safaryan and Gerard Libaridian confirmed that there is state militarization but
both stressed that the power is, by and large, not the military itself but the top-rank officers,
mostly "field commanders", not the professional officers. 103 Libaridian brought the examples
of Vazgen Sargsyan joining Kocharyan in the critical period of Ter-Petrossian’s resignation,
Samvel Babayan of Karabakh, Manvel Grigoryan of Ejmiatsin, calling the latter two
“disastrous and cruel characters”. Libaridian also added that it was a conscious decision to
do special favors to the Yerkrapah fighters during the privatization of small industries. “I
remember Vazgen [Sargsyan] saying “we need to do something for these boys, they gave
their youth…” So, there was, I’d say, a privileged treatment of the Yerkrapah. But I don’t
know if they benefitted in the privatization of the big industry.”104
Jirair Sefilyan agreed with Safaryan and Libaridian by focusing on corrupt generals
("field commanders") hailing from Karabakh war, who want to control the power system of
the country.105 He, however, stressed that there does not exists a “Mussolini-type system” in
Armenia, because current Armenian militiamen do not possess adequate ideology and ideas
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Gevork Manoukyan, Personal interview with author, Vanadzor, Armenia, May 20, 2009.
Many of the interviewees mentioned Samvel Babayan when discussing state militarization in Karabakh. The
following sections of this chapter will dwell more extensively on his role on the relation of post-war
militarizat ion and social exclusion.
103 Stepan Safaryan, Personal interview with author, Yerevan, Armenia, September 6, 2011;
Gerard Libaridian, Personal interview with author, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 14, 2010.
104 The quote is derived from the author’s interview with Libaridian, Ann Arbor, Michigan , April 14, 2010.
105 Jirayr Sefilyan, Personal interview with author, Yerevan, Armenia, August17, 2011.
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as Mussolini and similar dictators employed in controlling the system. 106 Instead, the
Armenian elites excel at using force.
According to Arman Grigoryan and Armen Darbinian, after the Karabakh war,
certain actors were rewarded with economic assets. This was not done through auctions as a
normal way of privatizing certain assets; the state simply gave those rewards to people that
had been connected to the war, that had to be rewarded.107 The resources for rewarding them
were extremely scarce at the time (in mid 1990s). All those things introduced terribly
unhealthy distortions in the economy and created economic exclusio n for the rest of the
society. Grigoryan emphasized that it was not the most meritorious economic actors that
gained access to economic means but those that were connected to the war effort. This is how
war affected centralization of assets into a few hands and increased economic exclusion.
Paruyr Hayrikyan indicated that, if we characterize Armenia as militarized due to the
activities of the Yerkrapah and several field commanders who later turned into corrupt and
authoritarian politicians, he would substitute the term “state militarization” with the term
“state criminalization.”108 To explain his reasoning, Hayrikyan opposed the example of Israel
as a militarized state to the case of Armenia as an extremely authoritarian country or
dictatorship. I argue, however, that authoritarianism turns into militarism, when the leaders of

106 Benito

Mussolini was an Italian politician, considered to be a central figure in the creation of fascism.
Mussolini is said to have had major influence on Adolf Hitler, and was a close ally of Hitler’s during World
War II. He led the National Fascist Party of Italy, ruling the country from 1922 to 1943. He was able to destroy
all political opposition and transform the country into a one-party dictatorship. Mussolini was executed in 1945
by Italian partisans.
107 Armen Darbinian was the 7th Prime Minister of post-independent Armenia in 1998-1999. An economics
graduate from Moscow State University, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Armenian Central
Bank in 1994 and Minister of Finance in 1997. Since 2001, Darbinian has been the President of the Russian Armenian Slavonic University. In 2005, the World Economic Forum awarded him the title of Young Global
Leader. Currently Darbinian is on board of several thinks tanks and research organizations. The interview with
Darbinian was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, September 3, 2011;
Arman Grigoryan, personal interview with author, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010.
108 Paruyr Hayrikyan was one of the founders and most active leaders of the democratic movement in the Soviet
Union. Since 1987, Hayrikyan established the Union for National Self-Determination (UNSD) party, which was
the first openly operating democratic organization within the territory of the former USSR. During the Soviet
rule, Mr. Hayrikyan spent 17 years in prisons, labor camps, and exile for his political activities and eventually
was stripped of Soviet citizenship and exiled to Ethiopia. In 1990, following pressure of a group of United
States senators led by Bob Dole, Mikhail Gorbachev restored Hayrikyan’s citizenship and allowed him to return
to Armenia. Since then Hayrikyan has taken an active part in Armenian political life. He was twice elected into
the Armenian National Assembly, ran for presidency, and served as a human rights ombudsman. The interview
with Hayrikyan was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, August 8, 2011.
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an authoritarian state, who have fought in a war of critical significance for the country’s
security, use their authority, military networks, weaponry, and above all the armed forces to
control internal politics. Then the country becomes militarized, as it happened with the
Armenian state.109
It is indisputable that the Karabakh war, although won by Armenians, had a
tremendously adverse impact on the Armenian people’s lives. Besides creating poverty and
deprivation, the war produced a generation of a new type of military class – the army of field
commanders of war – who after the war became the Armenian state elites and political
leaders. During their service in the Armenian government, those politicians had a tendency of
exploiting their military networks and authority gained during war, as well as power to use
armed forces for local politics, specifically during times of elections. It can be said that the
victory in war and its political circumstances shaped a militarized state.
The summary of Karabakh war and negotiations for peace after war, examination of
President Ter-Petrossian’s resignation in 1998, the analysis of the 2001 Parliament shooting,
and 2008 post-electoral violence in Armenia show that the fate of political regimes in
democratizing and changing states ultimately rests with people who bear arms. As Zoltan
Barany (2011) argues, the military is the most important state institution in transitioning
states because democracy cannot be consolidated if military elites do not support democracy.
“No institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no revolution within a
state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces”
(Barany 2011:28). This is true particularly for the post-communist regimes. Therefore,
examining politics and political exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia will be problematic if
military-related people and their activities are extracted from politics.
7.2 The Karabakh Conflict: Origins, Dynamics, and Perceptions
7.2.1. Pre-Soviet Historical context of the Karabakh conflict
Karabakh is a landlocked region in the South Caucasus with a population of 140,000.
The total size of Karabakh is 4,800 square kilometers and it is only 1.5 times bigger than the
109

Since these individuals have fought in the war, whether with or without military training, military education
or occupation, they become soldiers. They are not simply civilian leaders any more.
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state of Rhode Island (Croissant, 1998:10). It is separated by 3.726 miles from the southeastern border of Armenia. Armenians have lived in the Karabakh region since Roman times.
In the early Middle Ages the native Albanian population of upper (mountainous) Karabakh
merged into the Armenian population, and after 1300, Islamic Turks moved into the steppes
of lower Karabakh (Ruthland 1994:841).
This tiny territory has a symbolic importance for both Armenians and Azeris.
Although Karabakh has been under the reign of Muslim invaders for centuries, it has
managed to maintain its remarkable Christian cultural heritage. 110 Karabakh symbolizes
freedom and independence for Armenians (Hunter, 1994:97). For Azeris, Karabakh became
culturally and nationalistically significant in the 19th century. It occupied a special place in
the Azerbaijani national consciousness (ibid). Nowadays, Armenians reject Azerbaijan's
authority and control over Karabakh. Both peoples accept this region as an essential
historical site intrinsic of ethno-cultural identity. Whereas the Karabakh conflict has an old
history, it resurfaced at the end of 1980s, turning into the Karabakh war in 1991. Since the
end of the Karabakh war in 1994, Karabakh is a de facto independent state, governed by the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
There is ample coverage of the Karabakh conflict focusing on its historical, territorial,
demographic, ethno-religious, socio-economic and political dimensions.111 Whereas most of
the literature focuses on the sudden explosion of the conflict, it should be noted that there
was very little that could be considered sudden about this conflict. 112 Saparov (2012), for
example, contends that while the Western literature addresses the Karabakh conflict based on
the events of the post-Stalinist period, there is a need to venture as far back as the period of
civil war of 1918-1921. He argues that vast amount of literature ignores the examination of
Bolsheviks decision to grant autonomous status to Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, "it has
110

The genesis of the Karabakh conflict has decades of history. For a very detailed chronology of events
referring to the history of autonomous region of Mountainous (Nagorno -) Karabakh, see Libaridian's (1988) The
Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabagh 1918-1988 (pages 145154).Libarid ian presents documents and facts on the topic beginning with the 7th century A.D.
111 The list of authors on the Karabakh conflict is exhaustive. For most popular and serious examinations of the
Karabakh conflict, please see (Hovannisian 1997; Yamskov 1991, 1992; Altstadt 1992; Hunter 1993; Suny
1996, 1999-2000; MacFarlane, & Minear 1997;Laitin and Suny 1999; Libaridian 1999 & 2004; Mooradian &
Druckman 1999; Cornell 2001; Papazian 2001; De Waal 2003).
112 Acknowledging that the origins of the conflict date back to the pre-Sovietization of the region, I primarily
concentrate on its history and roots after the Sovietization of the region.
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become almost a cliche´ to blame the creation of the ethnic Armenian autonomy within
Azerbaijan on Stalin, who by doing this created leverage against both republics" (Saparov
2012:282).
Whereas the historical battle of Armenians of Karabakh against Muslim invaders and
the struggle for national liberation has an older history, the genuine roots of the Karabakh
conflict may be traced back to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the fragmentation of
the South Caucasus (Saparov 2012). The conflict complicated further with the application of
Leninist nationality policy and Stalin's "principle of divide-and-rule" (which is also called
"combine-and-rule") in the Transcaucasus region inthe beginning of the 20th century
(Croissant 1998:19).113 As a result of strategic and economic calculations of Soviet
authorities, this policy contained several anomalies, one of which was the attachment of
Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous region to Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by Joseph
Stalin in 1921.114
Karabakh was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century, invaded by Seljuk Turks in the
11th century and overtaken by Mongols from the 13-15th centuries. The Mongol rule of the
region was terminated in the 16th century, when the Ottoman Turks conquered the region.
Early in the 16th century, Armenians initiated tentative ineffective steps towards liberation.
In 1639, the Armenian Plateau was divided between Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Persia.
Persia andthe Ottoman Empire agreed to cede Karabakh to the Khanate of Ganja, a tributary
of Persia (Libaridian 1988:145-146). It was during this period when Armenians were granted
greater privileges by Persian rulers. Karabakh was the only Armenian-populated territory that
113

The ultimate goal of the Soviet nationality policies was to maintain a multi-ethnic Soviet empire. Soviet
nationality policies were characterized by three key objectives: (1) nation -building through institutionalization
of territorialized ethno-cultural identity, (2) homogenization through Russification, and (3) nation-destroying
through demographic manipulations and carving of territorial-administrative units cutting across ethno-cultural
lines (Harutyunyan 2010:135). These policies fundamentally defined inter-ethnic relations in the Soviet region.
Even after the breakup of the USSR, the legacy of Soviet nationality policies, continues to affect the ethnoterritorial tensions in post-Soviet republics. The case of the Karabakh conflict is a good example.
114 "The great irony of Soviet nationality policy was that a program that was intended to eradicate nationalism,
eventually meld all these ethnicities into a single " Soviet people," and reduce the political salience of
nationlaity, in fact embedded ethnicity into politics, granting advantag es to some and disabilities to others"
(Laitin and Suny, 1999:149). The USSR, in this way, became a ‘prison house of nations', with inherently
inequitable political relations between the center and the republics. There were inequalities also within the
republics, which increasingly became intolerable. At the end of 1980s, the anomalies of the Leninist -Stalinist
nationality policy have grown into nationalist activities as soon as the Soviet Republics attained the opportunity
of self-development (Suny 1993b).
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was independent while the rest of Armenia was under the Iranian rule in pre-Soviet era. In
1603, Shah Abbas the Great of Persia allowed local Armenian rule in Karabakh under five
meliks.115 These five kinglets later joined – but not supplanted – by a Muslim khanate,
survived until the Russian conquest of Karabakh (ibid). With Russian Empire's annexation of
the region in 1805, Armenian meliks of Karabakh lost their autonomy and power that was
granted to them by the Persian Shah (Bournatian, 2002). In 1813, Persia and Russia signed
the Treaty of Gulistan, as a result of which Karabakh as well as most of the territories of
Azerbaijan were ceded to Tsarist Russia (Libaridian 1988:146).
Until 1905 there were no reports of Armeno-Tatar mass clashes. Since 1880s, Russian
"fondness" of Armenians had begun to decrease 116 and the new Russian policy of seeking to
avoid conflict with the Ottoman Empire favored the Tatars of Transcaucasia as opposed to
the Armenians.117 The anti-Armenian policy, particularly the confiscation of the property of
the Armenian Church and the closing of Armenian schools, provoked Armenian anger and
uprisings. In the period of 1905-1907, clashes between Armenians and Tatars or "Azeris"
broke out throughout Transcaucasia, Karabakh being one of the bloodiestscenes of fighting.
Tsarist authorities did not intervene in order to curb Armenian activism, and Armenians were
massacred in areas where Tatars outnumbered Armenians (Libaridian 1988:146).
Following the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the situation in Transcaucasia
was further complicated by the involvement of several great powers – the Ottoman Empire,
Great Britain, Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. These powers pursued their own goals in
the region; however, they did not always possess sufficient power to impose their will in an
unconditional manner. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan accordingly cooperated with this or
the other major actor in order to advance their own goals and territorial claims (Saparov
2010). In March of 1918 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia formed the Transcaucasian
Confederation as an independent multiethnic republic. The Confederation dissolved in May
of the same year due to conflicting interests. The Republic of Georgia declared its

115 The

word "melik" in Arabic means "ruler." In this case, the title "melik" de facto referred to the equivalent of
princes or local overlords, leftovers from the medieval Armenian feudal system.
116 One of the reasons for this was the dismissal of the liberal Chief Minister Lorris -Melikov after the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.
117 Azeris were generally referred to as Tatars or Tartars in Czarist Russia.
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independence on May 26, 1918. The Republic of Azerbaijan declared independence on May
27, 1918. Despite Armenian fears of Ottoman Turkey's eastward expansion, Armenia
declared its independence on May 28, 1918. 118 The Armenian fear of Ottoman Turkey
became real, when the Ottoman Turkish army invaded most of the Eastern Armenian
territories. On June 4, 1918, the Turko-Armenian Treaty of Batum was signed, as a result of
which Armenia was compelled to cede large territories to Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Armenian territory decreased to 4,500 square miles. Karabakh then obtained the status of
autonomous district under the protectorate of Azerbaijan (Saparov 2010).
In September of 1918, Turks and Azerbaijanis launched systematic massacres of the
Armenian population. 15,000 - 20,000 Armenians were killed (Walker 1980, Libaridian
1988, Payaslian 2007). In October, Turkish massacres intensified in Karabakh (Libaridian
1988). Armenians, initially resisting Turko-Tartar attackers, eventually surrendered
(Harutunyan 2009). Armenian compliance was due to the intervention of the British High
Commander of Caucasus, General Thomspon, who promised Armenians that the problem
would be mediated in the Paris Peace Conference (Libaridian 1988). British intervention was
then irresistable, because following the surrender of Central Powers after the World War I,
the British Empire had emerged as the dominant player in the region. 119 Despite British
assurances and despite strong resistance by Armenians, the final decision was to leave
Karabakh and Zangezur as autonomous regions within Azerbaijani jurisdiction. 120 In August
of 1919, Armenians were forced to accept Azerbaijani authority over Karabakh.
After the British left the region failing to impose a settlement, Bolsheviks became the
imperial arbiters in the Transcaucasus, as a result of which Armenia had to accept a
“temporary” Bolshevik occupation of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan on August 10,
118

With this independence, the First Republic of Armenia was established. Armenia's first statehood lasted very
short, only two years, before Armenia became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920.
119 The Central Powers were one of the two warring factions in World War I (1914-1918), composed of the
German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.
120 Armenia and Azerbaijan historically have had three disputed regions: Zangezur, Nakhijevan, and Karabakh.
Zangezur and Nakhijevan had mixed populations. Karabakh, on the contrary, has always been predominantly
and overwhelmingly Armenian populated. As a result of the Treaty of Kars in 1921 and the Soviet-Turkish
Treaty in 1921, Nakhijevan – an exclave bordered by Armenia, Iran and a 6.21-mile (7-km) frontier with
Turkey – was granted the status of an Autonomous Soviet Republic within Azerbaijan in 1924. Karabakh was
made an Autonomous Oblast (region) of Azerbaijan in July 1923. Zangezur, which separates mainland
Azerbaijan from Nakhijevan, was returned to the Armenian SSR (Harutyunyan 2009).
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1920. The same day, the Treaty of Sevres was signed, according to which Turkey would
recognize Armenia as a free and independent state. The Treaty of Sevres stipulated that the
President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, would determine the boundaries of the
proposed Armenian state. Wilson designed a state which would include portions of Eastern
Anatolia, or what Armenians call Western Armenia. Moreover, it was designed to include
Nakhijevan, despite its predominantly Turkic population, as well as most of Karabakh's
territory. According to the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey would renounce any claim to the ceded
land (Hovannisian 1967; 1997; Walker 1980). However, “Wilsonian Armenia” was never
realized, since neither European powers nor the United States had enough political will to
commit to this task against the Ottoman Empire.121
The Treaty of Sevres ignited a strong wave of Turkish nationalism. Turks, ensuring
the support of Bolsheviks through a secret pact signed between the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey and Soviet Russia in August 1920, attacked Armenians in the autumn of 1920. 122
To avoid the potential annihilation of Eastern Armenians, the government of the Republic of
Armenia decided to relinquish power to the Bolsheviks. For the next seventy years, Armenia
was a Soviet Socialist Republic.
7.2.2. Karabakh conflict during the Soviet Period
After Sovietization, the Bolshevik position in Azerbaijan was weak and in order to
gain stronger control in Azerbaijan, Bolsheviks had to support Azerbaijani territorial claims.
They supported Azerbaijani claims to the disputed regions of Karabakh, Zangezur and
Nakhijevan until December 1920, when the Bolsheviks, trying to facilita te the Sovietization
of Armenia, forced Azerbaijan to renounce its claim on the disputed territories (Saparov
2012:320-321). But due to the slow reaction of the Armenian Bolsheviks, Armenians failed
to use this opportunity to extend their rule to Karabakh (ibid). On December 3, 1920,
Armenia signed another peace treaty, the Treaty of Alexandrapol, which obliged Armenia to
renounce the Treaty of Sevres, surrender Western Armenian territories, the province of Kars
in Eastern Armenia, and accept temporary Turkish jurisdiction over Nakhijevan
121

The Treaty of Sevres was annulled when the Turkish government and Entente Powers ratified the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923.
122 The conflict between the First Republic of Armenia and the Turkish nationalists following the s igning of the
Treaty of Sevres is often referred to as Turkish-Armenian War.
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(Hovannisian 1967, 1997; Walker 1980).123 Four months later, the pendulum that initially
favored Armenians, swung back again. In March, 1921, the "Treaty of Brotherhood and
Friendship" between the Soviet Union and republican Turkey included a provision that both
Nakhijevan and Karabakh were to be placed under the control of the Azerbaijani SSR
(Cornell 1999:8). Azerbaijan, therefore, continued to remain in control of Karabakh (Saparov
2012).124
Bolshevik policy changed after the complete conquest of the South Caucasus. In May
1921, Moscow was once again intending to grant Karabakh to Armenia, and on July 3, 1921,
a decision was made by Stalin to assign Karabakh to Soviet Armenia. Two days later, on July
5, 1921, Stalin and Kavburo once again reversed their decision, agreeing to Karabakh’s
remaining in the Azerbaijani SSR (Cornell 1999; Saparov 2012). "To sweeten the pill for
Armenians, Karabakh was to receive autonomy" (Saparov 2012:321).
The placement of Karabakh in Azerbaijan altered the boundaries of Karabakh.
Autonomous Karabakh was separated from Armenia by a six-mile swath of land, called the
Lachin corridor.125 As a result of the Soviet authoritative decision, Lachin became part of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, thus Armenia had no contiguous border with Karabakh (Laitin and
Suny 1999). Karabakh also became subservient to Azerbaijan. On July 7, 1923, a decision
was made to give the region the status of an autonomous Oblast. Nagorny Karabakh
Autonomous Region (NKAO), which included the mountainous part of Karabakh, was
created within Azerbaijan, with an overwhelming Armenian population of 94% of the total
population. In 1924, NKAO was officially declared as a constituent part of the Azerbaija ni
SSR.

123 The

Treaty of Alexandrapol was never ratified and was replaced by the Treaty of Kars in October, 1921.
is considered that Stalin's decision was, one on hand, a concession to the newly -founded Turkish republic
and its leader Kemal Atatürk, whom Stalin regarded as a potential ally at the time and who was hostile to a ny
territorial arrangements favoring Soviet Armenia. On the other hand, given Stalin's tendency to divide the
Caucasian people in order to control them easily, separation of the Armenian republic and Karabakh, was an
element of his divide-and-rule policy (Cornell 1999).
125 The fate of the Lachin corridor has become one of the significant issues during the OSCE Minks Groups'
negotiations over the Karabakh peace settlement. More details on the territory of Lachin will be presented in the
analysis of those negotiations.
124 It
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The decision to assign Karabakh to Azerbaijan has been justified by the Soviets on
the grounds of acknowledging Karabakh’s economic ties to Azerbaijan, and reportedly to
please Turkey. Others also mention a justification referring to the necessity to create
harmony and advancing peace between Muslims and Armenians for the “Sovietconstruction”
(Altstadt 1992:117; Suny 1993). But as mentioned before, the attachment of Karabakh to
Azerbaijan had anomalies that the Soviet authorities had ignored. Harutunyan (2009) mentions
that NKAO was an anomalous arrangement within the Soviet ethno-territorial politics. “It
was the only case in the USSR where a national group (i.e., Armenian ethnic group) was
endowed with both a republic (i.e., Armenian SSR) and an autonomous region (i.e., NKAO)
in another republic (i.e., Azerbaijani SSR). As a general rule commonly practiced in Soviet
ethno-territorial federalism, only minority groups without a titular republic were given
autonomous status either in a form of republic, region (oblast), or area (okrug)” (Harutunyan
2009:134). Suny writes, it was “the only autonomous national region with a majority that was
of the same ethnicity as a neighboring Soviet republic [Armenia] yet was not permitted to
join that republic” (Suny 1993:194).126 De Waal (2003) has also indicated that the abovementioned 1921 arrangement made by Stalin turned the NKAO into one of the only two
instances in the Soviet system of an autonomous province inside one republic that had a
strong affiliation to another republic.127
Since Stalin's above-mentioned decision in 1921, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has
been intensely disputed. Armenians viewed the incorporation of the mainly Armenian
populated region into Soviet Azerbaijan as unjust and never accepted the 1921 decision.
They used every opportunity to challenge the status quo. Protests against it were made
several times, first in 1945 and later after Stalin’s death in 1963, 1965 and 1977 (Libaridian
1988; Fraser et al., 1990; Suny 1993; Hunter 1994; DeWaal 2003). Armenians have
continuously and persistently requested the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia. The
requests were sent to Moscow particularly during Krushchev’s “destalinization” era with

126

Another anomaly, albeit of a different type, is the Ossetian case. Ossetians were not granted with a titular
republic, but were divided into two political units between two different titular republics: an
AutonomousRepublic in Russia and an Autonomous Region in Georgia. Finally, another odd arrangement was
the creation of Nakhijevan’s AutonomousRepublic within Azerbaijani SSR. As a result, Armenia is positioned
in the middle of the mainland and the Nakhijevan exclave since 1924.
127 The other instance, Russian-majority Crimea, though also unstable, has proved a less divisive case.
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aims to revisit the status of Karabakh. The 'matrimony' of Karabakh with Azerbaijan has
been a point of contention throughout the Cold War era. This 'matrimony' could not last long
due to several differences between the two ethnic groups, and grievances began to emerge in
1988 with the epoch of perestroika (restructuring) in the USSR.128
7.2.3. The Karabakh Movement and the Post-Soviet Dynamics of the Conflict
Before proceeding to the analysis of the post-Soviet context of the conflict, it is
important to present a brief description of the causes of the conflict, highlighting those that
were prevalent during the Soviet period. The history of the Karbakh conflict demonstrates
that it has passed through different stages, and was exacerbated by territorial, economic,
linguistic, and national-cultural causes. The most significant source of the Karabakh conflict
revolves around territorial demands, as well as state-administrative affiliation of Karabakh.
The economic roots of the conflict are believed to be reflected by the real and
perceived differences of living standards and socio-economic conditions of Armenian and
Azeri populations residing in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan
respectively (Yamskov 1991:640; Yamskov 1992:134). According to Yamskov, the most
fundamental economic cause underlying the conflict was the "significant lag in the standard
of living or quality of life in Azerbaijan relative to that in Armenia" coupled with the fact that
the population of Nagorno-Karabakh "enjoy[ed] a level of social and economic development
that is somewhat higher than that of the general population of Azerbaijan" (Yamskov
1991:640).Nonetheless, the Armenians in Karabakh, aware that life in Armenia is even
better, felt "dissatisfied with the deliberate policies of the Azerbaijani government, which
controlled the economy ... of their oblast." Meanwhile, the Azbaijani government, concluding
that the quality of life was better in Karabakh than in other backward regions of Azerbaijan,
directed funds received from businesses in Karabakh to the development of other poorer
regions of Azerbaijan (Yamskov 1991).

128 Soviet

nationality policies contributed to the institutionalization of ethnic identities both in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Both republics also developed a strong sense of territorial ownership and entitlements over
Karabakh. Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh never settled for Soviet colonial cartography. Azeris, on the
other hand, strongly believe Karabakh was an integral part of Azerbaijan since ancient times. (Harutyunyan
2009:152).

161

Another significant cause was a national-cultural cause. According to Yamskov
(1991) there is a clear difference in the perception of modern urban culture and lifestyle
priorities by the two peoples. Whereas Armenians along with Georgians are considered to be
the most "Europeanized" in the Transcaucasus region, the Azeris are the least (Yamskov
1991:657). In terms of values and behavioral stereotypes, modem Armenians and Azeris
differ significantly. The education level of Soviet Armenian population was also much
higher. They had better knowledge of the Russian language, which provided them with
greater mobility (Yamskov 1991:647; Yamskov 1992:135).
Besides cultural and educational differences, the linguistic issue was of major concern
to the Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan. The use of the Armenian language was allowed in
Soviet Azerbaijan, however education in the Armenian language was not available.
Moreover, Armenian mass media, particularly TV channels were limited. Armenian history
was excluded from the school curriculum (Yamskov 1991:643; Kaufman 2001:58).
Surprisingly, religion and struggle for faith has not been a significant factor in
aggravating the Karabakh conflict.129 Although an overwhelming majority of Armenians are
Christian, and Azeris are Muslim, slogans of religious intolerance have rarely been advocated
by either ethnic group during the conflict. Moreover, Muslim Kurds continue to live
undisturbed in Armenia after the expulsion of the Muslim Azeris during the Karabakh war,
and Christian Udins remain in Azerbaijan (Yamskov 1991)130 .
An alarming issue for Armenians was also the ethnographic shift in population of
Nagorno-Karabakh. “The size and share of Armenians in the total population decreased from
124,100 persons (96%) to 123,000 persons (76%) between 1921 and 1979, while the
Azerbaijani population at the same period increased from 7,400 persons (6%) to 37,000
persons (23%)” (Yamskov 1992:135). One of the reasons for this ethnographic shift was due
to qualitative differences of the two ethnic groups; Azerbaijanis were mostly peasants, while
129

The international media often made statements about the Karabakh conflict stressing that it is a conflict
being between ‘Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan’. This is a false characterization, because, as was
already illustrated briefly in this dissertation, the roots of the conflict are far more complex.
130 The Udins are a small ethnic and linguistic group with Armenian names that belong to the Armenian
Gregorian faith.
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Armenians were more urban (Fraser et al. 1990:655). Another reason was due to central
government policies. In any case, if the tendency of decreasing Armenian population would
continue, the overwhelming Armenian predominance in Nagorno-Karabakh would swiftly
disappear. With an insignificant percentage of Armenian population, Karabakh Armenians'
grounds for uniting with Armenian SSR would diminish as well.
Given all those differences between the two peoples and the strong belief held by
both sides that Karabakh belongs to them, the Karabakh issue needed a trigger to resurface.
Glasnost and perestroika ("liberalization/openness" and "restructuring")advocated by
Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s became a window of opportunity for Armenians to once
again address the “territorial ‘injustice’ imposed by Stalin” and claim their demands for
Karabakh’s reunification with Armenia (Croissant 1998:26). It was safer to express demands
in the new, more open atmosphere of a weakening Soviet Union. In August of 1987, a
petition for annexation of Karabakh to be annexed to Armenia was signed by 100.000
Armenians. Other sources mention 75,000-400,000 (Libaridian 1988:152).
On February 20, 1988, the Nagorno-KarabakhSoviet voted to request the Soviet
government to allow Karabakh to leave Soviet Azerbaijan and become part of Soviet
Armenia (Libaridian 1999:5; MacFarlane & Minear 1997:13). Karabakh’s request to be
united with Armenia was supported in Armenia. Most importantly, the Armenian intellect ual
elite played a central role in appealing to Moscow to unite Karabakh with Armenia
(Kaufman, 2001:61). Despite Gorbachev's negative stance towards Soviet policy of
nationalities and his campaign for free development of national cultures, the Politburo
decided not to return Karabakh to Armenia. A movement started with a chain of
demonstrations and massive rallies in Armenia. “Unusual in their character and sheer
volume, these demonstrations received worldwide attention. They were, in fact, the first such
movement by a people in what was then the Soviet bloc” (Libaridian 1999:6). Among all of
the Soviet republics, Armenia was the first to see the emergence of the first and most
widespread mass movement for democratization (Ruthland 1994:839). The events that
followed these mass rallies are characterized by Gerard Libaridian (1999) as a “political
earthquake” (p. 5).
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The Soviet leadership was not then ready to deal with separate demands of the USSR
republics, and it was taken aback by the audacious demand of Armenians. Meanwhile,
Azerbaijan was outraged. Within hours, violence between the two ethnic groups began both
in Armenia and Azerbaijan. “In the wake of the February 1988 demonstrations, Armenian
and Azeri residents engaged in communal violence, characterized by individual attacks
‘mainly at night, aimed at destroying livestock and harassing people’” (Human Rights
Watch, 1994:3). Violent clashes occurred in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, namely the
Azeri town of Aghdam and the Armenian town of Askeran (Kaufman 2001:63; NadeinRaevski 1992:120).
On February 27-28 of 1988, Azeris launched deadly violence against the Armenian
population of the Azeri industrial city of Sumgait, a city north of Baku (Nadein-Raevski
1992:120). Soviet authorities did not prevent the Azeri pogroms. Dozens of Armenians were
killed.131 "The tragic events of Sumgait instantaneously evoked existential concerns and fears
among many Armenians who drew parallels between Sumgait and the 1915 Genocide"
(Harutyunyan 1999:156). Following Sumgait, there were killings of Azeris in some villages
and towns of Armenia.
The events of 1988 can be considered the first serious nationalist clash in the late
Soviet era, and the Karabakh conflict the “most predominant” of all of the Soviet disputes.
“More than any others in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, the conflict was all but inevitable
because its causes lay in the 'deep structure' of the relationship between its two parties in late
Communist times. Four elements – divergent national narratives, a disputed territorial
boundary, an unstable security arrangement and lack of dialogue between the two parties –
had made fissures that would break Armenia and Azerbaijan apart, as soon as trouble began.
Yet because the problem was both so new and so profound, no mechanism was found – or
has yet been found – to repair the damage” (De Waal 2005:12).132

131 Tass

reported 31 people dead (Libaridian 1988:154). Other mass media sources estimated the number of
murdered Armenians up to 53.
132 As the history of Karabakh conflict demonstrates, the breakup of the conflict was neither new nor
unexpected. However, most of the western literature considers the problem as new and unpredictable.
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The Armenian dispute was an unprecedented move in the Soviet hierarchical political
atmosphere; Soviet authorities were startled by the Armenian challenge. The Soviet
authorities' inability to deal with the movement amplified the latter's inspiration, strength and
volume. Massive in volume, the Karabakh movement had an extraordinarily non-violent and
peaceful character. The movement of Karabakh very quickly became the most essential
political issue for the Armenians over the globe. Diaspora Armenians joined their brethren in
Armenia and Karabakh by organizing demonstrations across the world requesting Soviet
authorities to redress the historical injustice.
In Karabakh, the movement was called Krunk ("Crane") and led by Robert
Kocharyan. Krunk’s main interest and concentration was Karabakh’s unification with
Armenia. In Armenia, the movement was called the Karabakh movement. It was led by the
“Karabakh Committee”, consisting of mainly popular Soviet Armenian intellectuals, such as
Zori Balayan (a journalist) and Silva Kaputikyan (a poetess), whose main agenda was
similarly the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. Late in 1988, the “Karabakh
Committee” underwent ideological restructuring and replacement. The original group was
replaced by new, less well-known members: Levon Ter-Petrossian (a philologist and
historian); Vazgen Manukyan and Babken Ararktsyan (professors of mathematics at the
Yerevan State University); David Vardanyan (a biologist); Ashot Manucharyan (a teacher and
vice-principal of a high-school as well as a Communist Party Youth activist); Raphael
Ghazaryan (a physicist); Hambartsum Galstyan (an ethnologist, who before his assassination
in 1994 had become the Mayor of Yerevan); Vano Siradeghyan (a writer); Samvel Gevorgyan (a journalist); Alexan Hakobian (a historian); and Samson Ghazaryan (a history teacher).
The reformed committee did not have a single leader. The agenda of this reformed Karabakh
Committee was not merely the Karabakh issue, but also, and more importantly, democratic
reforms and independence of Armenia133 .

133

The Karabakh Committee had a strong democratic structure, where ideas not only were a result of common
deliberation but also required an approval of all members. It was due to this democratic nature that the
Committee was able to appeal to tens of thousands of people to demonstrate peacefully from 1988 to 1990 in
Armenia. Leaders and people were in a continuous exchange of ideas; in this participatory democracy, public
deliberation was an essential component for resolving issues. Popular opinions and suggestions were vital in the
Karabakh Committe's tactics. One of the illustrative examples was the decision to open a “table of sug gestions”,
where people could submit their ideas for future actions. Several observers from the Baltic States and other
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In December of 1988, a notorious earthquake devastated Armenia, resulting with
more than 25,000 deaths, thousands of homeless and a complete destruction of industry and
production. Soviet authorities, taking advantage of the disaster and chaos in Armenia,
managed to arrest Karabakh Committee members. Those members were shortly released
under international pressure, and in 1989, the Karabakh Committee institutionalized its
activities under the name of Armenian National Movement (ANM). 134
The inter-ethnic fight between Armenians and Azeris soon worsened. By the end of
1989, most Armenians residing in Azerbaijan and Azeris residing in Armenia had fled their
homes in Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. “Armenians were expelled en masse from
Azerbaijan and vice versa” (MacFarlane & Minear 1997:14). The situation was so dramatic,
that in January of 1989, Soviet authorities decided to take control of the region by deploying
their Interior Ministry and army troops. In September, Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF)
leaders initiated a railway blockade against Armenia and Karabakh, successfully
degenerating Armenia’s economy.135
In January 1990, Azeris waged another slaughter of Armenians in the capital city of
Azerbaijan. The attacks towards Armenians continued for three days, and local police or
Soviet troops did not intervene. Similar to Sumgait's violence, killings of defenseless
Armenians in Baku were considered by Armenians to be a “new act of genocide against the
Armenian people, planned and organized by the Azerbaijani state and party leaders”
(Nadein-Raevski 1992:120). After about a week of violence, Russian authorities declared a
state of emergency. Soviet troops finally entered Baku on January 19th in order to stop the
violence. It is argued that the real objective of the Soviet authorities was not to prevent Azeri
violence against Armenians. Instead, they intended to punish Azeris, who passed a law on
sovereignty in September of 1989, for their anti-Soviet actions.136 Violent clashes started
Soviet republics admired the non-violent, constitutional, democratic nature of these demonstrations led by the
Karabakh Committee and were hoping that this method of social movement would set a precedent in other
Soviet republics (Harutyunyan, 1999:155).
134 Armenian National Movement (ANM) is the English translation of the movement's name. In Armenian, the
name of the movement is Hayoc Hamazgayin Sharzhum (HHSh) – ՀայոցՀամազգայինՇարժում .
135 85% of cargo and goods arrived to Armenia by means of railway.
136 Soviet authorities similarly crashed protesters in Tbilisi, Georgia, 1990, where hundreds of people were killed.
They also intended to curb Armenian disobedience since February 1988. With a pretext to 'restore order' in
Armenia, Soviet troops were deployed to Armenia in July and later in November, 1988. Thousands of Armenian
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between the Russian troops and Azerbaijani fighters; about 130 people were killed. 137 January
19, 1990 is known in Azerbaijan as “Black January”. Soviet's ruthless punishment of Azeri
masses completely destructed Azeri public's trust towards the Soviet regime and made
relations between Moscow and Azerbaijan very tense (De Waal 2003).
Meanwhile, the movement for Karabakh in Armenia had transformed into a
movement for independence. Armenia started its transition to statehood, as the Communist
Party of Armenia relatively peacefully surrendered power to the Armenian National
Movement. By the summer of 1990, ANM was elected to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia. In
July 1990, Levon Ter-Petrossian became elected President of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet.
Despite many efforts, the Soviet government was unable to oppose Armenia’s independence,
and on September 21 of 1991, Armenia enthusiastically declared its independence. In
October 1991, Levon Ter-Petrossian was elected as the first executive-style President of
independent Armenia. On September 2 of 1991, Karabakh had announced its secession from
Azerbaijan and, therefore, its independence. Azerbaijan nullified Karabakh’s autonomous
status and declared direct rule on November 26, 1991. On December 10, 1991, Karabakh
chose independence through a referendum. Karabakh officially declared independence on
January 6, 1992, although this independence remains unrecognized by the international
community, including Armenia. President Ter-Petrossian refrained from recognizing
Karabakh's declaration of independence, arguing that "a permanent and durable solution
would require reaching a solution through negotiations based necessarily on compromises on
both sides, that Armenia's recognition of Karabakh's independence would foreclose all
negotiations and the problem would remain unresolved" (Libaridian 1999:30). Karabakh
leaders, nonetheless, insist that statehood is conferred by history and not by international
resolutions (de Waal 2013:256).

protesters gathered at Yerevan's International Zvartnots Airport to block the entrance of the Soviet troops in
July. As a result of provocations, a clash occurred between the Soviet troops and the demonstrators at the airport
on July 5. The security forces opened fire killing one person and injuring several people (Galstyan 2002).
137 Some sources mention the number of killed Azeris up to 200.
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7.3 The Karabakh War, Social Change, and Peace Mediation
7.3.1. The War (1991-1994)
What had started as a peaceful political upheaval quickly transformed into ethnic
violence. "A local political conflict quickly turned brutal and was soon militarized,
nationalized, regionalized, and internationalized" (Libaridian 1999:92). By early 1992, with
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the formerly Soviet forces, the
Karabakh movement increasingly escalated into an undeclared, full- fledged war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. In February 1992, Armenians had already conquered and evicted
the populations of Azeri villages Malybeili, Karadagly, and Agdaban (Cornell 1999:31). On
27 February, Armenian forces seized the small but strategically important town of Khojaly
(Khojalu), on the Agdam-Stepanakert road (Walker 1996:109).138 Khojaly was the second
largest Azeri town in Karabakh, which had the only airport of the region. Khojaly was also
important, as it served at the time as an artillery base, where Armenian and Russian units
were kept. As a result of the capture of Khojaly, hundreds of Azeri civilians were mutilated
and killed, and thousands were forced to flee their homes. "As is the case in most instances of
ethnic cleansing, the atrocities carried out by the aggressor served a double purpose: to force
the population to flee and never to come back, but also to intimidate other inhabitants of
nearby villages to leave their homes, fearing similar actions." (Cornell 1999:32) Whereas
Armenians tend to understate the number of Azeri deaths during the Khojaly atrocities, Azeri
sources estimate the number of death to be over 600 (Pope 1992). Human Rights Watch has
estimated the figure of killed to be between 200 and 1000. 139
In May 1992, Armenians captured the towns of Shushi/Shusha and Lachin, creating a
corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.140 Before their conquest by Armenians, Shushi and
Lachin, dominated by Azeri military presence, used to separate Karabakh from Armenia,
making it difficult for Armenian supplies to reach Karabakh (Human Rights Watch, 1994:5;
For more details on the capture of Khojaly by Armenians, please see Hugh Pop e, ”600 Azerbaijanis slain at
Khojaly, investigator says”, in The Los Angeles Times, 12 June1992; Thomas Goltz, ”Armenian Soldiers
Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing Families”, The Sunday Times, 1 March, 1992; Anatol Lieven, ”Corpses Litter
Hills in Karabakh”, The Times, 2 March 1992; ”The Face of a Massacre”, Newsweek , 16 March 1992;
”Massacre by Armenians”, The New York Times, 3 March 1992; The Age, (Melbourne), 6 March 1992.
139 See Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994.
140 Shushi/Shusha was the last Azeri town in Karabakh.
138
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Cornell 1999:33). The capture of Shushi and Lachin was militarily, politically and
logistically of utmost importance for the future development of war; Armenians now could
prevent any possibility by Azeris to open the road linking the region to Armenia, and
Karabakh could now be integrated into Armenia.141 The Armenian control of Shushi and
Lachin aggravated a crisis within political circles in Azerbaijan leading to government
changes. The fall of Lachin was a severe blow to the Azerbaijani president Ayaz Mutalibov’s
regime. The Khojaly events and the capture of Lachin generated Azeri public outrage leading
to the dismissal of President Mutalibov. In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey became the
president of Azerbaijan, and many political leaders representing the Azerbaijani Popular
Front Party (APF) were elected into the Parliament.
The capture of the above-mentioned Azeri territories by Armenians provoked the
neighboring countries' condemnation towards Armenia. Mainly, neighboring Muslim
countries such as Iran, Turkey and Chechnya tried to support Azerbaijan. Iran condemned
Armenia, calling Armenians as aggressors. As a loyal neighbor and ally of Azerbaijan,
Turkey defended the Azerbaijani position. Turks also denounced the Armenian aggression.
Turkey did not intervene militarily, such as providing troops, but it provided military aid to
Azerbaijan. It has been documented that Chechens as well provided invaluable assistance to
Azerbaijan, basically supplying Azeris with Chechen fighters in battles. Chechens later
withdrew realizing that the Karabakh war is not around religion, but around territorial dispute
and nationalism (Bodansky 2008).142 Another key mediator has been Russia. In1992, Russia
issued a warning to Western nations, particularly, the United States, not to interfere with the
conflict, highlighting that it would possibly turn into the third world war (Croissant 1998).
In June 1992, Azeris recaptured Agdere/Mardakert, as well as the Shahumia n region
in the North of Karabakh (Cornell 1999:33). However, the Azeri counter-offensive was
141

Internationally, this integration is still not accepted. According to Cornell (1999), the refusal of Armenian
representatives to even dis cuss renouncing the Lachin area in international negotiations implies the critical
significance of the issue for the Armenian side.
142 In an interview to Azeri ANS TV company, Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev (a militant Islamist
and the leader of the Chechen rebel movement) stated that there were rare officers in the Azeri army, especially
among the top leadership, who he could trust. Basayev also declared that "the Armenians were prepared bette r
for the war". According to the commander, the fall of Shushi occurred due to the ineffective organization of the
Azeri troops. Basayev added that he decided to withdraw from Karabakh his fighters due to the above mentioned reasons. (http://www.panarmenian.net, 2000).
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short-lived. In February 1993, Armenians once again captured most of the Agdere/Mardakert
region lost in June 1992. Together with Agdere/Mardakert, the eastern part of the Kelbajar
region of the Azerbaijani republic was captured. 143 In April 1993, Armenian forces initiated
yet another major offensive, gaining control over Kelbajar province, with a mixed population
of around 60,000 Azeris and Kurds (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:17). The population of the
province was forced to flee (Human Rights Watch 1994:9). The capture of Kelbajar was
followed by the capture of Fizuli, another homogeneously Azeri area to the Southeast of
Karabakh. Fizuli as well was cleansed from its Azeri population in a few days (Cornell
1999:33).
At this stage, a negative reaction of the larger international community was emerging.
Even Russians, that typically used to be on Armenia's side, thought that Armenians had gone
too far. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 822 that demanded
withdrawal of forces from Kelbajar province (Cornell 1999; Tadevosyan 2010). Despite the
international condemnation, Armenian forces, taking advantage of the internal political
turmoil in Azerbaijan, gained control of Aghdam at the eastern border of Karabakh. The
Armenian side continued its impressive military victories until an official cease-fire was
signed on April 16, 1994. But as Druckman and Lyons point out, thiscease-fire between
Armenia and Azerbaijan was a “backward-looking cease-fire”, because it stopped the
immediate military action but failed to address the root causes of the hostilities (Druckman &
Lyons, 2005:267).144 Before the cease-fire was announced, the UN Security Council issued
two other Resolutions – Resolutions 853 and 884 – condemning the hostilities and the
military actions. Similar to Resolution 822, these Resolutions did not affect the warring
parties and failed to produce any positive results (UNSC 1993a; UNSC 1993b). Armenians
managed to de facto alter "internationally recognized borders" by force. "In this sense, the
Armenian campaign was a clear-cut success" (Cornell 1999:42).
Many were surprised by the victory of Armenians in the Karabakh war. Armenia and
Karabakh together had less military personnel and even less weaponry than Azerbaijan.

143

In fact, Kelbajar was outside Karabakh's territory.
There will be more details about why this cease-fire is considered a "backward-looking cease-fire" in the
following sections of the dissertation.
144
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Azeris not only possessed more manpower and more arms, they were also economically in a
better situation; yet Armenians turned out to be stronger with their comparatively fewer
troops and less weaponry. One of the reasons for the Armenian success was due to the fact
that Armenian state authorities, specifically the members of the Karabakh Committee,
successfully managed to turn the issue of Karabakh into a matter of national pride and
politics, into the rebirth of the Armenian state. Armenians, both volunteer fighters from
Armenia and local residents fromKarabakh, were ready to fight and die for Karabakh. Andrei
Sakharov claimed that “for Azerbaijan the issue of Karabakh is a matter of ambition, for the
Armenians of Karabakh, it is a matter of life and death” (Chorbajian 2001:161). For the
Armenians from Armenia it was a matter of national identity and the establishment of the
Armenian state.
7.3.2. Socio-Economic Consequences of the Karabakh War
Armenia came out of the war with a military victory, taking control over Karabakh
and the Lachin corridor connecting it to mainland Armenia. In the course of the war,
Armenia also occupied seven Azeri districts (about 20% of Azeri territory) surrounding
Karabakh145 . But the Armenian victory put Armenia in an economically disadvantageous
position. The country was paralyzed by refugee flows and energy crises. Isolations and war
consequences devastated urban and industrial infrastructure. Between 1991 and 1994, the
economy decreased 61% (Sarian 1996). By 1994, the GDP had fallen nearly 60% from its
1989 level. The war in Karbakh had brought little material benefit to Armenia(Laitin and
Suny 1999).
The Nagorno-Karabakhwar was the most destructive ethnic conflict in terms of lives
and property in the post-Soviet region. Nonetheless, it is 'less well-known' among other
similar conflicts in the world. The effect of the conflict in terms of damage was huge; equal
or “greater than [it was] in and around Kosovo” (Kazimirov 1999:93). Furman and Åsenius
(1996) mention that the “Karabakh conflict, comparable to that in Yugoslavia in the scale of
military action and the number of victims, has drawn much less attention from the world than
it deserves" (p. 139).

145

Those seven districts are Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Zangelan, Jebrail, Fizuli, and Aghdam.
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The Karabakh conflict resulted in an estimated 25,000-30,000 casualties and more
than one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) on both sides (Human
Rights Watch 1994:vii; MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:1). According to MacFarlane &
Minear's (1997) estimates the war caused around 25,000 deaths and the uprooting of around
1,250,000 -1,500,000 refugees and IDPs. "Approximate figures include 350,000–400,000
refugees in Armenia; 600,000–650,000 IDPs and 200,000 refugees in Azerbaijan; and 15,000
IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh” (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:20). Laitin and Suny mention
233,700 refugees along with 251,000IDPs (Laitin and Suny 1999:153). After the Sumgait
and Baku pogroms alone about 300,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan (Libaridian 1999:7). In
response to the anti-Armenian aggression in Sumgait and Baku, violence against Azeris
broke out in Armenia, and as a result, around 160,000 mostly rural Azerbaijanis left their
homes in Armenia (Kaufman 2001:67; Libaridian 1999:7). Azeri attacks against the
Armenian population in early summer of 1992 created “40,000 Armenian IDPs who
remained in Nagorno-Karabakh and refugees who fled to Armenia” (MacFarlane & Minear,
1997:17). During the capture of Kelbajar in April 1993, hundreds of Azeris were forced to
flee, thus producing a huge wave of refugees from the Azeri side (Human Rights Watch
1994:9). The Armenian offensive in Agdam added approximately 50,000 to the IDP
population, most of who settled in temporary camps in Azerbaijan (MacFarlane & Minear
1997:18).
Azerbaijan currently has 600,000-1,000,000 refugees, Armenia 400,000 refugees, and
Nagorno-Karabakh 60,000 refugees (Tadevosyan 2010, IDMC 2010). Tadevosyan
demonstrates the humanitarian challenges resulting from the war in Armenia, pointing that
Armenia – a small country with less than 3 million people – was facing a real humanitarian
issue as the refugee and IDP population in the need of assistance made up more than 10% of
the population resident in Armenia (Tadevosyan 2010). Moreover, those refugees have not
fully embedded in their new societies. Their socio-economic, as well as often the political
inclusion, has frequently been neglected in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The issue of
refugees in both countries directly depends on the resolution of the conflict.
The refugees and IDPs were faced with legal, cultural, political, and socio-economic
problems, such as language barriers, limited employment opportunities, lack of
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transportation, and other problems. The Armenian legal system, being still in an infantile
developmental phase, left many refugees out of the legal framework. The refugees from
Karabakh were chiefly excluded from the new Armenian citizenship law that basically did
not give any rights to them (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:40). 146 Whereas Azerbaijan set up
refugee camps, Armenia never did so. Therefore, a large number of refugees had to rent
accommodations, live in converted shipping containers, or reside with relatives and friends in
Armenia (IMDC, 2010:8). A major obstacle was that UNHCR was not allowed to build new
homes for refugees and IDPs, defined under strict terms, as the Armenian government had
prohibited constructing homes for refugees from Karabakh proper. Similar to the case of
Armenian citizenship, people displaced from Karabakh could not be called refugees, "as that
would imply the territory was considered part of Azerbaijan, or IDPs, as that meant it wasn’t"
(Krikorian 2003). Instead, those people were referred to as Displaced Persons (DPs) (ibid). In
these circumstances, many refugees, particularly the elderly, dreamed of returning to their
former homes.
Integrating into Armenian society became a huge challenge for many refugees. "They
associate[d] their successful integration not with acquiring Armenian citizenship, but with
getting jobs and permanent housing" (Sahakyan, 2003). According to Sahakyan, international
surveys placed refugees in the ranks of the poorest in Armenian society (UNHCR, Sahakyan
2003).
In his interview Artur Sakunc, head of the “Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Vanadzor
Office", touched upon two main challenges that the refugee population experienced:
language barrier and cultural obstacles.147 According to Sakunc, the refugees, first of all,
experienced language discrimination, because living all their lives in Azerbaijan, they were

146

Refugees from Sumgait and Baku were not expected to go back to Azerbaijan (Baku and Sumgait are within
Azerbaijan's territory, Baku being its capital city), but the same expectation did not apply to Karabakhi
refugees. This ambivalence towards refugees from Karabakh, on one hand, and refugees from Azerbaijani
territories, on the other, has complicated the integration of refugees into the society in Armenia. By 2004,
however, Armenia had naturalized about 65,000 refugees. This is considered to be one of the most successful
voluntary naturalizations in the last decade (UNHCR 2004, para. 1, in Tadevosyan 2010). But at the same time,
many refugees, like thousands of other citizens, emigrated from Armenia to find better lives abroad. The
International Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC) states that in 2006, there were around 8,400 displaced
people left in Armenia (IDMC 2006, par. 1).
147 Artur Sakunc, personal interview with author, Vanadzor, Armenia, June 2, 2011.
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educated in Russian schools and spoke little or no Armenian. 148 Being forced to adapt to
living in Armenia was very difficult for refugees as Russian-speakers (Helton & Voronina,
2000:89). It was also problematic for refugees to adjust to life in urban parts of Armenia
"due to their predominantly rural background (MacFarlane & Minear 1997:40).
The director of the Sakharov Armenian Human Rights Centre, Levon Nersisyan, also
divided the problems that impeded the successful integration of Armenian refugees into two
groups – "socio-economic and cultural". The socio-economic problems included the
provision of permanent housing for refugees, employment, and access to social welfare and
health care. Among the cultural obstacles Nersisyan, similar to Sakunc, stressed the langua ge
barrier, which further narrowed refugees' employment opportunities as they could not
compete with the local population on the domestic labor. In this way, they were excluded
from adequate employment opportunities, qualifying only for low-paying jobs (UNHCR,
Sahakyan 2003).
7.3.3. An Overview of the Conflict Negotiations
Whereas several efforts were made from the early stages of the conflict to negotiate a
peace agreement, no peace agreement has been achieved by either the two governments, or
by the mediation of any other external force or great powers. 149 Laitin and Suny (1999)
summarize the failure of negotiation attempts as follows:
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Armenia was the first among other post-Soviet republics to ratify the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages in January 2002. This treaty was adopted in 1992 under the auspices of the Council of
Europe to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe. At the s ame time,
Armenia is homogenous like no other nation among post-Soviet nations. More than 97% of the population is
Armenian. This mono-ethnic feature of the Armenian people and the fact that Armenians, although fluent in
Russian, chiefly speak Armenian put the Russian-speaking refugee population at unease in Armenia.
149 The main stages of the Karabakh peace process were the following: 1991 - Zheleznovodsk (Russia)
declaration; 1992 - Minsk Group launched; 1992 - Tehran declaration; 1992 - Villa Madama (Rome, Italy) talks
commence; November 1992- April 1993 secret negotiations of Russia, Turkey, US, Armenia, Azerbaijan; 1994
- Bishkek protocol signed; 1994 - Budapest summit declaration; 1995-1996: the Guluzade-Libaridian
confidential talks;1996 - Lisbon summit statement; 1997 - Denver statement; 2001 - Key West summit; 2004 Prague process begins; 2006 - Rambouillet round held; 2007 - Madrid principles submitted; 2008 - Meiendorf
(Moscow) declaration; 2009 - L'Aquila (Italy) statement (Sanamyan 2009). For a discussion of the various
stages of the negotiations for the years of 1994-2008, see Tatul Hakobyan's "Mediator's Play Down Prospects of
Early Karabakh Settlement", the Armenian Reporter, November 22, 2008, online at www.reporter.am.Very
little is written about a few of those negotiation stages, such as the secret negotiations of the group of five
(1992-1993) and the Guluzade-Libarid ian confidential talks, but they were considered quite significant. No
details have really been made public regarding the content of these negotiation stages .
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"A close review of the negotiations convinces us that the break-down of these attempts stem
not from intractable, irresolvable differences - nor even from fear on either side that the
security of their populations would be threatened by a post-settlement regime - but rather
from contingent political factors. At first, the situation on the ground was in such flux that the
side having the military advantage was unwilling to make concessions. Then, when the
military situation stabilized, the international community was divided and sent mixed
messages to the combatants, making it difficult to structure a peace plan. Finally, once a
cease-fire was put in place and the international community unified around common
principles, its proposed solutions failed to balance the goals of territorial integrity and selfdetermination in a way that all parties could accept." (Laitin and Suny 1999:157-158)

The earliest effort of mediation was initiated by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and
Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan in September of 1991 (Mooradian & Druckman 1999;
MacFarlane & Minear, 1997). Mooradian and Druckman mention that "the personal
ambitions of these presidents, more than the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh motivated them to
intervene in the conflict".After three months of mediation, these mediators gave up their
efforts (Mooradian & Druckman 1999:710).
The Yeltsin and Nazarbaev mediation attempt was soon followed by the Iranian
mediation, which lasted from February to May, 1992. Iran's desire to maintain its historical
relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, to bolster its standing as a regional power,
and to prevent Turkey from gaining regional dominance prompted Iran to intervene
(Mooradian & Druckman 1999:710).
In June, 1992, efforts at mediation by Russia and Iran were replaced by negotiations
mediated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, CSCE at the
time) (Dehdashti 1997:464; Libaridian 1999:29; Mooradian and Druckman 1999:710; Laitin
and Suny 1999:158-159).150 OSCE involvement was justified by its status as a regional
organization in which all parties to the dispute were members, as well as by its "competence
to solve disputes and to prevent conflicts” (Freire, 2003:464). 151 In March 1992,

150 Both

Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined the CSCE after gaining independence.
France, Russia and the United States are permanent co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (the OSCE Troika).
The permanent members of the Group include the following participating states: Belarus, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, Finland and Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika
(www.osce.org). As a multinational organization that does not have a direct interest in the region, OSCE might
seem to have been an impartial mediator. Nonetheless, the individual member states of th e Minsk Group have
their own national agendas and interests that may affect the objective process of negotiations.
The United States has a direct economic interest in the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea. The US, thus, is
considered to lean towards Azerbaijan, particularly since 2000. But there is literature that considers th e US to be
151
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OSCE/CSCE planned to organize a peace conference in Minsk, Belarus in order to find a
peaceful solution to the problem of the status of the Karabakh. The conference did not take
place, but the future political framework for peace negotiatio ns is still called the Minsk
Group peace process.
In 1995, another channel of negotiations was set up between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
with the special advisors of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, Gerard Libaridian and
Vafa Guluzade as the principal negotiators (Carley 1998; De Waal 2013). According to de
Waal, Libaridian and Guluzade began to meet informally every month to work on the status
question in particular and made substantial progress" (De Waal 2013:267). The LibaridianGuluzade negotiating track ended with the Lisbon Summit of 1996. Since then, the Minsk
Group has come up with several proposals, none of which could achieve a final peace
settlement for the conflict because each side of the conflict has continuously insisted on
incompatible conditions that the other would not accept.
The Karabakh conflict refers to two competing principles of international law: the
right of self-determination on one hand and the right of territorial integrity on the other
(Hunter 1994:105). OSCE, as a mediator organization needs to respect both of those rights,
which makes the resolution of the conflict more complicated. OSCE pledges to “refrain from
making each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect
measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means
of such measures or the threat of them” (OSCE 1975:5). At the same time, OSCE states: “By
pro-Armenian due to diaspora Armenian lobbying in the US. Cutler (1998), for instance, states that the US
policy on Karabakh through much of the 1990s was dominated by politically well connected diaspora
Armenians. The Freedom Support Act, a long-term program of economic assistance to the former Soviet Union
(enacted in 1992 by the US), included a section - section 907(a) - which prohibited all US assistance to
Azerbaijan due to its blockade of Armenia. The Congress defined Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the conflict,
and legislation was passed penalizing Azerbaijan and Turkey for their bans on trade with Armenia (Cutler
1998:136; Cornell 1999:99).
France, which has historic ties with Armenia, supports the latter.
Turkey is pro-Azeri (Freire, 2003:465-466). Turkey sides with Azerbaijan on the account of the two countries'
ethno-linguistic and religious ties. It therefore militarily and diplomatically supported Azerbaijan and imp osed
an economic blockade on Armenia.
Russia, as a major power in the region, sometimes leans towards Armenia, and other times towards Azerbaijan ,
depending on its agenda in the region respectively. Similar to the US, Russia's primary objective in mainta ining
its presence in the Caucasian "Near Abroad" has been to obtain its share of the Caspian Sea oil proceeds. But
there is more than just oil for Russia's interests in the region. It has also sought to maintain military dominance
in the borders of its former Soviet republics, as it is essential to its security. Other economic incentives have
also influenced Russia's activities, such as its control of the entire energy sector of Armenia.
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virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their
political, economic, social and cultural development” (OSCE, 1975:7). It is extremely
difficult to propose a solution that would equally satisfy both Armenians and Azeris, because
in any type of resolution one of those rights should dominate.
Another obstacle for the OSCE to achieve a peace settlement is that it has no military
capabilities and functions, such as NATO does (Freire 2003:37). The OSCE’s efforts are
based on unanimous consensus, which grants equal status to all participating states.
Therefore, even if one of the participating states disagrees to a peacekeeping plan, no
peacekeeping mission can be implemented (Freire 2003:22).
7.3.4. "Package" versus "Step-by-Step" Approaches
The issues related to Karabakh were divided into two categories. The first category
was defined as the Karabakhconflict and referred to military-technical issues, such as ending
blockades and the return of refugees and IDPs on both sides; measures to strengthen the
cease-fire; the issue of hostages and prisoners of war. The second category referred to the
status of Nagorno Karabakh and was known as the problem of Karabakh (Libaridian
1999:55-56). Armenian political discourse has been strongly focused on two of the OSCE's
several proposals, called "package approach" and "step-by-step approach", that deliberated
both the Karabakhconflict and problem of Karabakh.152 The "step-by-step" approach
envisaged first negotiating and implementing one category of issues, and later undertaking
the second category of issues. It focused on eliminating the consequences of war in the first
phase. The question of the status would be negotiated after the first phase. "Step-by-step"
approach constituted the "land-for-peace" approach.153 The package proposal, on the
contrary, constituted the "land-for-status" approach", which envisaged tackling issues of both

152

The "package/step-by-step approaches" are also known as the "package /step-by-step deals, proposals,
solutions and formulas". The "step-by-step approach" is often referred to as the "phased approach". Throughout
the chapter, I may use any and all of those terms. Other, less well-known proposals include the "Common State"
and "Land Swap", also known as the "Goble plan".
153 Libaridian mentions that certainly not all occupied territories would be returned to Azerbaijan based on the
step-by-step solution (Libaridian 1999:56).
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categories simultaneously (Libaridian 1999:56). In the package proposal, occupied territories
have been considered to be "the most valuable bargaining chips to secure the status"
preferred by Armenians as winners of the war (ibid).
In 1997, the Minks Group offered three draft proposals to the parties (in May, July,
and September), the two of which (in May and July) were basically package proposals. 154 In
May 1997, the main features of the framework that would serve as a basis for renewed
negotiations, included:
1. The withdrawal of Karabakh troops from occupied territories, including the Lachin
corridor.
2. The deployment of a peacekeeping force to patrol the buffer zone between the two
armies, under a one-year renewable mandate.
3. The leasing of the Lachin corridor by Azerbaijan to the OSCE, who in turn would lease it
to Karabakh.
4. The repatriation of Azeri displaced persons (DPs) in the occupied districts;
5. An end to the blockade on Armenia and Karabakh (a commitment to which Turkey later
subscribed as well).155
6. Finally, the provision that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity would be formerly preserved,
but that Karabakh would be effectively self-governing, including a “national guard’ at the
minimum necessary level. (Tavitian, 2000:15)
Concerning the status of Karabakh, the July 1997 draft read as follows: "Nagorniy
Karabakh is a state and territorial formation within the confines of Azerbaijan." (RFE/RL,
February 2001). The May and July proposals, thus, sought to retain Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. Karabakh, at the same time, would have virtual sovereignty over its domestic
affairs. Armenia accepted the first two proposals with significant reservations as bases for
154

I will briefly demonstrate key points regarding the proposals of 1997. For a detailed summary of the three
successive proposals, please see RFE/RL Caucasus Report of February 3, 2001, Volume 4, Number 8
(http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1341889.ht ml); Tavitian (2000); Laitin and Suny (1999); Zourabian
(2006); Website of Conciliation Resources: Working for Peace at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagornykarabakh/keytexts18.php; Website the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabagh at http://www.mountainous karabakh.org; Website of the OSCE, http://www.osce.org.
155 When Armenia declared independence in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize it. The
border between the two countries was open until 1993, before Armenia occupied around 20% of the Azerbaijani
territory. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in a show of support for Azerbaijan. Although there have been
a few reconciliation efforts between the two countries, Normalization of relations and reconciliation has n ot
been established, as Turkey sets a precondition of official abandonment of Armenia’s territorial claims about
eastern Anatolia and Genocide recognition. Turkey also injects the Karabakh issue into the reconciliation
process, which makes the normalization process even more complicated.
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negotiations (Libaridian 1999). Azerbaijan accepted it, but “with such reservations that its
acceptance amounted to a rejection” (ibid). Karabakh rejected the two proposals outright. As
Ter-Petrossian’s senior advisor Gerard Libaridian notes, after the rejection of the May and
July drafts based on the "package approach", the President became certain that the "step-bystep" approach, if coupled with the necessary security guarantees for the people of Karabakh,
was the best approach (Libaridian 1999:57).
The September 1997 proposal was based on the "step-by-step" rather than the
"package" approach (RFE/RL, 2001). Based on the September draft of the proposal, the
parties would address first consequences of the war and security issues, mentioned in the
previous package deals. In the second phase of negotiations, political issues, such as
Karabakh’s final legal-political status, and the issue of the Lachin land corridor would be
negotiated or “just postponed for an indefinite period until confidence building would enable
the possibility of reaching further agreement” (Zourabian 2006:259). As compared to the
May and July drafts, the September draft contained more extensive security guarantees for
Karabakh and, most significantly, did not define the future status of Karabakh. Instead, the
three sides, "having put an end to the military aspect of the conflict, agree[d] to continue
conducting negotiations in good faith ... to speedily attain an all-encompassing regulation of
all other aspects of the conflict, including the political aspect, which include[d] defining the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and resolving the problem of Lachin, Shusha and Shaumian"
(RFE/RL, 2001).
The September 1997 draft proposal was accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia as a
basis for negotiations, with reservations by Armenia. Despite the evident advantage of the
agreement, the Karabakh government together with some high-ranking officials in Armenia
opposed the proposal.156 Karabakh rejected it probabaly because it was based on the idea that
Karabakh would remain within the boundaries of Azerbaijan. "Fearful that by giving up the
occupied lands it would lose its leverage over the status question (despite the OSCE's
granting of a veto over status to Karabakh), the Karabakh government came out once again

156

According to the "conventional wisdom", it was Ter-Petrossian's agreement to this plan that became the
critical reason for his government members' antagonism towards Ter-Petrossian, resulting in the resignation.
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for a “package” deal calling for resolution of both the status issue and the question of
withdrawals simultanously" (Laitin 1999:164).
After the failure of the negotiations in the summer and the autumn of 1997 to secure a
comprehensive agreement, a new plan was proposed in December, 1997. The new plan
chiefly corresponded to the previously proposed “package” agreement, with the following
differences:


Gradual withdrawal of the armed forces in different phases to ensure that the full
demilitarization of the region would not be abused by either side in a surprise attack;



The Lachin corridor would remain under the control of Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces;



Establishment of a joint commission between Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the final
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the remaining issues, such as the status of Lachin,
Shushi and Shahumian.157
Karabakh again rejected the proposal, justifying its rejection by the fact that the

proposal left Karabakh's status and the question of the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh
with Armenia to the indefinite future.
There have been other proposals drafted since 1997, but none of those proposals was
able to bring the sides close to agreement on status by reconciling the needs of selfdetermination with territorial integrity to the liking of all parties.158 It is argued that the
157

Minsk Group Proposal at the website of Conciliation Resources; available at: http://www.cr.org/ourwork/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts19.php
158 Since 1998, three major proposals have been discussed, those being the "Common State", the Key West, and
the Prague Process (a series of negotiations that began in May, 2002). The "Common State", presented in
November 1998, proposed a vaguely defined common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh,
featuring more or less ‘horizontal’ relations between Azerbaijan and Karabakh (Jacoby 2005:32). Based on the
"common state" proposal, Karabakh would have received de facto independence within a loose confederation
with Azerbaijan. Karabakh would have the internationally recognized status of a republic with its own
constitution, armed forces, and power to veto any legislation passed by Azerbaijani authorities (RFE/RL,
February 2001).
The provisions of the proposal discussions in Key West, Florida in April 2001, are widely believed to grant
Azerbaijan use of a land corridor across southern Armenia to link A zerbaijan with Nakhijevan. According to
Volker Jacoby, who worked as Assistant to the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman -in-Office for
the Nagorny Karabakh conflict 1998-99, "in the course of the domestic debates launched only after the talks,
Aliyev reported (and Kocharyan denied) that it [the "Goble Plan" or "Land Swap"] had involved Armenia
surrendering access to a strip of its southern district of Meghri, offering Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhijevan,
in return for accepting Armenian control over the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia" (Jacoby
2005:32). The plan was named "Goble" after a former U.S. State Department specialist on the Cauca sus, Paul
Goble, who had written a paper in 1992, proposing the idea of a territorial exchange to resolve the Karabakh
dispute.
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summer and early fall of 1997 was the moment when two of the three sides came closest to a
settlement of the Karabakh conflict, once Ter-Petrossian suggested the "step-by-step"
approach as basis for negotiations (Laitin and Suny 1999:164; Libaridian 1999). Any other
significant proposal that was close to a peace settlement has not been documented or
available to the public after 1997. As Radio Free Europe reporter Liz Fuller observes, "in
terms of the Karabakh peace process, the most fundamental change probably is that the
Minsk Group has apparently given up its attempts to craft a proposal that would be
acceptable to all three parties" (Fuller in RFE/RL, 2004).
7.4 Post-War Militarization and Social Exclusion
Strong disagreements around the above-discussed package and step-by-step
approaches in Armenia escalated into Ter-Petrossian’s resignation on February 3, 1998. The
following sections of the chapter will discuss how this divergence between the President and
his opponents became the turning point for limited prospects of Armenia's security and
economic development, as well as the beginning of a series of human and political rights
serious violations of the Armenia people. Levon Ter-Petrossian's resignation, and his
successor presidents' reluctance of concessions for a peace agreement, coupled with their
authoritarian tendencies, have created massive social, political and economic problems for
the Armenian society. In order to better understand Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, we must
consider the pre-resignation political developments, and most significantly, analyze the
rationale of "package" versus "step-by-step" supporters in greater detail.
7.4.1. Levon-Ter Petrossian’s Resignation
In addition to coping with war, independent Armenia was facing immediate tasks, the
most important ones of which were rebuilding its devastated economy and strengthening its
democratic institutions. By mid-1990s, the Armenian government headed by Levon TerPetrossian was facing mounting economic problems, including an economic blockade by
For both 1998 and 2001 cases, Baku later reneged on the tentative agreement reached (Fuller in RFL/RE, May
2009).
Finally, during the Prague Process a new method of negotiation involved "no agenda, no commitment, no
negotiation, but a free discussion, on any issue proposed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, or by the [OSCE Minsk
Group] co-chairs (German, 2005). The Prague Process culminated in Warsaw on May 15, 2005, and was
followed by the Madrid Principles.
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Azerbaijan and Turkey, an energy crisis and cold winters, and relative material deprivation of
the Armenian people. In February 1993, the first wave of demonstrations resulting from
poverty and scarcity demanded the resignation of the government. President Ter-Petrossian
formed a new cabinet with economist Hrant Bagratian as the Prime Minister, intending to
improve the country’s economy. But this was not an easy task. The war had been all
consuming, and the remaining resources in the government budget were scarce. The war and
its consequences made it very difficult to concentrate state resources on strengthening the
economy.
Meanwhile, some tensions had emerged among different government members, who
started to express conflicting political ambitions and disagreements about the course of action
of the country’s development. By the cease fire of 1994, elite fragmentation had already
taken place within the Armenian ruling circles. “The political consensus had disappeared as
soon as some major items on the agenda (independence, basic laws on political and economic
reforms) were resolved” (Libaridian 1999:10). Already between 1991 and 1993, some ANM
members joined the opposition or distanced themselves from ANM. Among those members
were Vazgen Manukyan (the first Prime Minister) and Davit Vardanyan (Head of Supreme
Soviet’s Permanent Committee on Foreign Relations), who formed the National Democratic
Union (NDU), Hambardzum Galstyan (mayor of Yerevan during the Ter-Petrossian years),
Samson Ghazaryan (a member of the Supreme Soviet), and Davit Shahnazaryan (Minister of
Security in the Ter-Petrossian government). More specifically, Vazgen Manukyan had been
an ardent critic of the Ter-Petrossian administration since 1991, when he thought to assume
the presidency instead of Levon Ter-Petrossian.
In 1994, Ter-Petrossian banned the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) – an
extremely nationalist party – on national security grounds. First, the banning of ARF was
based on the idea of terminating terroristic activities and criminal acts often organized by the
ARF. The second reason for banning the party was that the ARF had failed, despite two
warnings from the Ministry of Justice, that according to the law no party could function in
Armenia if the majority of the members of the ruling body were not citizens of Armenia and
residents of Armenia. Ter-Petrossian decreed the banning but turned it over immediately to
the Supreme Court for adjudication. (The Supreme Court was not a constitutional court.) The
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Court determined that the president was wrong to decide that criminal acts were committed
that such issues should be determined in courts of law. But the Court agreed with the
President regarding the second charge and that in that respect the banning was within the
jurisdiction of the executive as the party had failed to comply. The banning of the ARF
created a fervent opposition led by ARF against the Ter-Petrossian administration.
As already mentioned, besides ARF, President Ter-Petrossian was facing another
major opposition by once a fellow ANM member, a former Prime Minister and Armenian
Defense Minister, Vazgen Manukyan, who had created his own political party, the National
Democratic Union (NDU). By 1996, the ANM had lost its main positions of power in the
government. As Libaridian recalls, “the governing party had become complacent, arrogant,
self-confident, and careless, while the opposition had turned impatient.” (Libaridian 1999:11)
According to RFE/RL (July 05, 1994), Noyan Tapan (September 19, 1994) and
Hailour (October 21, 1994), anti-government rallies and demonstrations convened by NDU
of Vazgen Manukyan were massive and frequent in 1994. In October a demonstration of
50,000 called for the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian. Members of the Parliament were
reportedly victims of armed attacks (Balian 1995). Demonstrations continued through the
spring, organized by the main opposition parties, the ARF and the NDU.
Amidst this political and economic situation, in September of 1996, presidential
elections took place. Ter-Petrossian won the elections with 51.75% of the vote, winning over
his main opponent Vazgen Manukyan. Following the victory of Ter-Petrossian, a violent and
disorderly protest broke out in the streets of the capital city, organized by the coalition
opposition of NDU and ARF. Protestors stormed the Parliament building, physically attacked
members of the National Assembly, beat two Vice-presidents of the National Assembly, and
kidnapped the President of the National Assembly. Manukyan had determined, even before
the ballots were cast, that if he lost the elections, it could only be due to fraudulent elections.
He announced himself a winner and urged "the people" to take matters into their hands. The
tendency to resort to violence and rebellion, advocated and implemented by NDU, was
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unacceptable.159 The government had to order troops into the streets to control the crowds
(Freedom House Report 1998; Armenia This Week, September 25, 1996).
But it was not in 1996, under the pressure of his traditional antagonists, NDU or ARF,
or the impoverished masses that President Levon Ter-Petrossian resigned. It was only two
years later, in 1998, when he resigned. It was not because of Ter-Petrossian’s ‘unpopularity’
among the Armenian citizens that he resigned. It is believed that the "people" had very little
to do with Ter-Petrossian's resignation. After about a decade of leadership under the most
challenging circumstances, Ter-Petrossian managed to receive the support of about half the
voters against a united opposition (Libaridian 1999; Suny 1999). Poor socio-economic
conditions were not the key factors for the political weakness of Ter-Petrossian
administration. Neither was Ter-Petrossian's stance on the Karabakh conflict. TerPetrossian’s foreign policy, particularly his preference of the "step-by-step" approach for the
Karabakh conflict resolution, was a pretext to be used by the opposition coalition in order to
oust Ter-Petrossian.
On 26 September 1997, during a press conference, still president Levon TerPetrossian argued that Armenia should agree to the "step-by-step" peace proposal
recommended by the Minsk Group earlier that month. He based his argument by providing a
comprehensive analysis of five options available to the Armenian nation.
1. To maintain the status quo - no peace and, hopefully, no resumption of war.
2. To have Armenia recognize Karabakh as an independent state or annex NK to Armenia.
3. To renew the war to force a final settlement on Azerbaijan.
4. To return to the “package” approach.
5. To accept the “step-by-step” approach. (Sargsyan 2006)
Ter-Petrossian reasoned that it was unfeasible to preserve the status quo indefinitely,
because Armenia would not be able to survive the economic pressures of blockades imposed
159

Since 2004, the Armenian people have organized an extraordinarily powerful and massive wave of social
movements aimed against the socio-economic, political and environmental policies of the subsequent,
Kocharyan and Sargsyan, administrations. Those movements, however, as opposed to the September 1996 postelection turmoil, have been characterized by their non-violent nature. A detailed description of the FebruaryMarch 2008 demonstrations that will be presented in a following section of this chapter is a stark example of
that.
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by Azerbaijan and Turkey (the first option);160 that for Armenia to formally recognize the
independence of Karabakh would put Armenia in the risk of decades-lasting imposition of
international community's harsh sanctions (the second option). This option would be
perceived as an ultimatum to Azerbaijan and to the international community, and would
ultimately fail. He also stressed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Armenia and
Karabakh together to win a new war against Azerbaijan (the third option), as it required a
complete defeat and capitulation of Azerbaijan, which would be impossible. Ter-Petrossian
announced: "We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not
tolerate the situation around Nagorny Karabakh for a long time, since this situation represents
a threat to regional cooperation, security and the West's oil interests." More importantly, the
President asserted that the Armenian nation faced a choice to either compromise on the
Karabakh problem, or accept economic stagnation and socio-economic problems for the
Armenian people for the years to come.
"Armenia will not become a normal state. We will not live well until the Karabakh problem is
solved and the blockade is eliminated. Either - or. Or we should tell the world: move over, we
ourselves will solve our problems, we are confident in our abilities and will not go for
concessions. But in this case, no-one has the right to demand better living standards; on the
contrary, we will have to get used to the idea that living standards will decline even further.
Or, if we want to live well and develop our economy, we should have the courage to go for
serious mutual concessions." (Ter-Petrossian, 2006:610-611)

The fourth (the "package" approach) and the fifth (the "step-by-step" approach)
options for resolving the Karabakh conflict were deemed as the only two “realistic
approaches.” Outlining merits of both approaches, the President pointed out that since
Azerbaijan and Karabakh had irreconcilable disagreements regarding Karabakh's final legalpolitical status, the only realistic approach left was the step-by-step approach.161 Negotiating
160

For a more detailed analysis of Levon Ter-Petrossian's calculations of economic prospects of Armenia versus
Azerbaijan, see Arus Harutyunyan (2010:168-170). Briefly, Ter-Petrossian argued that even investments from
diaspora Armenians (at the time around $10 million annually) would not compensate for Armenia's economic
losses, let alone boost up the infrastructure, if Turkey and Azerbaijan would not end their blockade. Meanwhile,
Azerbaijan, already in 1994, attracted more than $35 billion investmen ts by international oil companies. In
1994, Azerbaijan signed the "Contract of the Century" with powerful oil companies from the US, UK, Norway,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan (ibid).
161 Despite Ter-Petrossian's unspecified reservations about the September draft, it was considerably more
advantageous to Armenia than the two preceding "package" proposals. Specifically, a) it provided enhanced
security guarantees for the population of Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan; b) it did not call for a withd rawal
of Armenian forces from the key districts of Shushi and Lachin; c) it did not explicitly insist that the final
settlement must respect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity; and d) it envisaged Karabakh's de facto independence
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the complicated issue of Karabakh's status and land simultaneously seemed to be an unlikely
prospect.
The President's arguments triggered a storm of dissent across the Armenian political
spectrum. The "step-by-step" approach of conflict resolution was unacceptable for the
Karabakh leadership and their allies in Armenia. Ter-Petrossian’s compromising stance was
termed as ‘defeatist’ by some of the governing elites. Among the most fervent antagonists of
the "phased" approach were Robert Kocharyan (Prime Minister of Armenia), Serzh Sargsyan
(Minister of Internal Affairs and Security of Armenia), Vazgen Sargsyan (Defense Minister
of Armenia), and Arkady Ghukasyan (the newly elected president of Karabakh). Karabakh’s
president Ghukasyan announced that “however badly the people live, there are holy things,
there are positions that they will never surrender under any circumstances” (De Waal
2003:260). At the same time, the opposition parties in Armenia, taking advantage of the
situation, accused the President of giving up on national ideals. Vazgen Manukyan of the
NDU, a long-time challenger and opponent of the President, announced the latter's reasoning
as "capitulation" and "treason" (RFE/RL, 1 October 1997).
Ter-Petrossian's opponents insisted on the "package" solution, strenuously avoiding
and rejecting any kind of subordination of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. "Fear is fertile ground for
nationalist politics, and Ter-Petrossian found it increasingly difficult to promote his own
more compromising line in the face of opposition from many Parliamentary parties, and even
from members of his own cabinet, such as regime strongmen Serzh Sarkissian, Vasken
Sarkissian and Robert Kotcharian" (Tavitian, 2000:11).
While Ter-Petrosian linked Armenia's future stability and economic development to
the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, his adversaries believed that Armenia could develop
politically and economically without any concessions in the Karabakh issue. Those, who
disagreed with the President, assumed that Armenia’s and particularly Karabakh’s economic
well-being would be fine even without a lifting of Turkey’s embargo, as well as the
resolution of the Karabakh issue. They were willing to wait while the international mediators

remaining unchallenged until such time as final status negotiations produced a mutually acceptable treaty
(Libaridian 1999:58; Laitin and Suny 1999:165; Fuller, 2004).

186

rethought their position (Suny 1999:169).Prime Minister Kocharyan specifically argued that
"negotiations should consolidate the victory and give Armenians time to cash in" (Libaridian
1999:66). He and his allies 'believed' that even in the case of a renewed war with Azerbaijan,
Armenia would be secure, because as the Karabakh war showed, Azeris lacked will and
ability to excel Armenians militarily and that Azeris could not retake Karabakh by force.162
Vazgen Sargsyan condemned the step-by-step approach and opposed Ter-Petrossian by
announcing: “Certain people should not be allowed to resolve the Karabakh problem on
behalf of the whole Armenian nation . . . . Armenia and the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’
should be prepared for a protracted conflict not only by rejecting concessions to Baku, but
also by annexing Shusha and Lachin in the interests of Karabakh’s security” (Croissant
1998:122; Baghdasaryan in Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, 1998; Gayane Karapetyan in
Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, 1999). According to Ter-Petrossian's opponents, Azerbaijan
would also be reluctant to start any military action against Armenia or Karabakh fearing to
make their oil assets, oil production facilities, and international business deals vulnerab le.
In response to the speculations raised by the opposition, Ter-Petrossian published an
essay titled "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness.” The essay, which was published in
most Armenian newspapers on November 1, 1997, addressed anew the benefits of the "stepby-step" approach and argued that a final resolution of the conflict was in the interests of
both Armenia and Karabakh, highlighting that the conflict should be resolved peacefully,
rather than militarily. Once again, Ter-Petrossian stressed the urgency of compromise. He
wrote:
To solve the question of Karabakh we have only one option, a compromise solution, which
does not mean that one side is the victor and the other the loser; it does mean finding an
agreement based on what is possible when the conflict has reached maturity ... The opposition
162

In her dissertation, Harutyunyan (2010) presents an excellent overview of the ethno-nationalistic discourse in
Armenia. According to Harutyunyan, the denouncement of the "step -by-step" solution was accompanied by the
rhetoric of national self-affirmation and resentment. This discourse believed that Karbakh was the first step
towards the establishment of the "United Armenia", as well as towards the restitution of historical injustices.
The ethno-nationalists denied territorial concessions based on the rhetoric of Armenia's recent military success
and the winning of war.
This nationalist assumption, as well as the rejection of concessions in the Karabakh conflict, was referred by
Ter-Petrossian and his supporters as erroneous and irrelevant respectively, arguing that winning the battle
should not be equated to winning the war. Ter-Petrossian said: “Unfortunately, Karabagh has won the battle,
not the war. A war is considered won only when the foe has been forced into capitulation. The confusion between
battle and war has brought misfortune to many.” (Ter-Petrossian, 1997, 2006)
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should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an alternative to the compromise: the
alternative to compromise is war. The rejection of compromise and maximalism (the drive to
obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the final destruction of
Karabakh and the worsening of the situation in Armenia ... That which we are rejecting today,
we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history.
We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not for long tolerate
the situation created around NagornoKarabakh because that is threatening regional
cooperation and security as well as the West’s oil interests ... Compromise is not a choice
between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise
is just a means to avoid the worst, from which parties benefit when they have become
conscious of the worst and are able to display the necessary political will and courage ... On
the issue of Karabakh’s independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present
enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve it to the extent that
our capabilities allow us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism. 163

In "War and Peace," Ter-Petrossian mentioned that by rejecting May and July 1997
"package" peace plans and later also the Minsk Group's September "step-by-step" plan, the
leadership of Karabakh had placed both Armenia and themselves in "an uncomfortable
situation."164 Ter-Petrossian was also surprised that his opponents (several of his own
ministers) interpreted his endorsement of the September 1997 "step-by-step" plan as
something new and unexpected for them. In fact, the 26 September press conference was not
the first occasion when Ter-Petrossian expressed his preference for a compromise peace
resolution, and the ministers in question had not previously argued against the issue (Fuller,
2004). Moreover, the disagreement between the President and his opponents did not center
on the relative merits of the "step-by-step" versus the "package" approaches. Instead, it
centered on methodology rather than specifics. Thus, a question remains unanswered as to
why those, who opposed the September proposal's methodology (i.e., the "step-by-step"
deal), had not tried to transform the May or July draft proposals ("package" deals) into an
acceptable basis for a peace resolution.
Ter-Petrossian's arguments during the September press conference, as well as his
logic in "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness", allegedlyfailed to persuade other state
elites that the compromise resolution of the Karabakh conflict was in the best intersts of the
Armenian Republic. On January 28, 1998, the Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan claimed
163 Levon

Ter-Petrossian, "Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Lrjanalu Pahe'"[War or Peace? Time for
Thoughtfulness], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 2, 1997; See also Ashot Sargsyan, "Yntrani: Eluytner'
Hodvatsner, Harcazruycner" [Selected Speeches, Articles, Interviews], Erevan, 2006, pages 625-639.
164 I have earlier noted in this chapter that the Karabakah leadership had practically rejected the first two draft
proposals in May and July 1997, both of which were based on the "package approach".
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that the President should adjust his Karabakh policy or else he would be ousted.165 In early
February, two of Ter Petrossian’s closest allies in government, Vano Siradeghyan and
Alexander Arzumanyan, resigned from government.
The political crisis was increasingly becoming severe, especially after the Defense
Minister Vazgen Sargsyan threatened that he would not step aside, even if asked to do so by
the President. The confrontation between Ter-Petrossian and the Kocharyan team worsened
at an Armenian Security Council meeting in February, when Kocharyan announced that he
would resign over the President’s position on Karabakh (Tavitian 2000). Whereas "the
normal course of action for subordinates who disagree with their President on substantial
issues and whom they failed to convince to change course would have been, of course, to
resign themselves" (Libaridian 1999:50), the mentioned subordinates, on the contrary,
intended to create a political crisis. In these circumstances, on February 3 of 1998, TerPetrossian resigned under pressure from “powerful members of his own cabinet” (Libaridian
1999:48).
In his resignation speech, Ter-Petrossian stated that "well-known bodies of power
demanded [his] resignation" (Walker 2011:1). He added: "Taking into account the fact that
the fulfillment of the president's constitutional duties under the current situation is fraught
with a real danger of destabilization in the country, I accept that demand and announce my
resignation” (ibid). He then called upon the Armenian people to “display restraint” (ibid). By
these words, the President was clearly indicating that he could no longer exercise his
constitutional power, particularly the right to fire his Prime Minister.
The president has a right to resign, and when he does so, the presidency passes to the
head of the National Assembly. If the latter is unable to perform the presidential duties, the
prime minister becomes the acting president. In this instance, the National Assembly voted to
accept not only Ter-Petrossian’s resignation but also the resignation of the Head of the
165

It is essential to note that only six people in Armenia and Karabakh were fully informed about the state of the
ongoing negotiations (Ter-Petrossian 1997; 2006). Kocharyan was among one of those six, but neither Serzh
Sargsyan nor Vazgen Sargsyan was. Therefore, it is possible that "either Kocharyan violated the confidentiality
of the peace process by divulging details to Sarkisian [the Minister of Internal Affairs] and Sargsian [the
Defense Minister], after which the collective decision was taken to push for Ter-Petrossian's resignation; or
alternatively, the debate about the Karabakh peace process was only tangential, or possibly even irrelevant, to
the move to oust Ter-Petrossian" (Fuller, 2004 in RFL/RE).
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National Assembly, Babken Ararktsyan, who was Ter-Petrossian’s ally. Armenia’s Prime
Minister Robert Kocharyan, thus, backed by the influential coalition of ‘power ministers’,
became acting president of Armenia "in his own right" (Laitin and Suny 1999:199). Both
Vazgen Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan 'believed' that the resignation was constitutional.
However, as Libaridian asserts "the process seems to have technically followed the
constitutional order, but doubts remain whether the spirit of the Constitution was
respected"(Libaridian 1999: 50), (italics added). The circumstances were not constitutional,
and by resigning, "Ter-Petrossian avoided a constitutional crisis and a potentially disastrous
confrontation" (Libaridian, 1999:51). Ter-Petrossian was compelled to step down, which was
essentially a "constitutional coup d'état." (Suny 1999:158)
In essence, the President's resignation was mainly about his political opponent's
desire and struggle for power. It was about a struggle, in which the winners had coercive
supremacy and not just political will for power. They had control over arms, as well as
popular authority gained during the Karabakh war. At this point, more comprehensive
observations about the people inside the power coalition and how they obtained the abovementioned coercive powers are in order. How did it happen that whereas other political
leaders such as Vazgen Manukyan, the leader of NDU, and other influential political parties,
such as ARF or less influential Communist party could not win over the ANM and its leader
Levon Ter-Petrossian, the coalition of Robert Kocharyan, Vazgen Sargsyan and Serzh
Sargsyan was able to do it? Was war or victory in war important factors in the explanation of
those politicians’ power? And are the former or their war background, experience and
political activities in any way related to the development of social exclusion in Armenia? The
brief outline of some of the war-related people that cultivated a political agenda and formed a
party, the "Party of Karabakh", is an important contribution to this part of the dissertation. 166
It highlights the power through which these individuals could make decisions affecting
important political events that have notoriously affected social, economic, and particularl y
political exclusion in the country.
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Libaridian underlines that "the best way to understand Karbakh is to look at it as a party, "the Party of
Karabagh" (Libaridian 1999:90). Within the Party, "Karabakh is at the top of the hierarchy of concerns; all else
is subject to its logic" (Libairdian 1999:94). The army, as a most powerful institution in Armenia, formed the
backbone of the "Karabakh Party" (de Waal 2003:257).
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7.4.2. The Power Coalition and the "Party of Karabakh"
Throughout the 1990s, the "Party of Karabakh" included a few strong-minded
personalities both from Karabakh and Armenia, whose position on the issue of Karabakh has
been centered on no concessions (Libaridian 1999). In Karabakh, it consisted of Robert
Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Samvel Babayan, and Arkadi Ghukasyan. Kocharyan was the
most important character among the mentioned ones in Karabakh (since 1997, also in
Armenia). In Armenia, it was Vazgen Sargsyan.
Robert Kocharyan, a native of Nagorno-Karabakh, became the President of
KarabakhDefense Committee in 1992 and by the end of the same year he became the
President of Karabakh. Levon Ter-Petrossian appointed him the Prime Minister of Armenia
in March of 1997. Some observers assume that this appointment meant a strengthening of
Karabakh’s interests and position in Armenia, because with his roots in Karabakh,
Kocharyan would never agree to concede the independence and/or territorial achievements of
Karabakh won in the war effort, in which Kocharyan himself played an important role
(Cornell 1999).
Ter-Petrossian was aware of Kocharyan's stance on Karabakh. He knew well that on
the issue of Karbakh, the difference between himself and Kocharyan concerned the type of
compromise each was willing to accept. For Ter-Petrossian, beyond the problem of
Karabakh, there was the problem of the socio-economic well-being of the Armenian people
in Armenia and in Karabakh – poverty, unemployment, low wages, etc. For Kocharyan,
above all, maintaining Karabakh's territorial achievements was significant, regardless of what
it might cost to the Armenian people (Libaridian 1999; Suny 1999; Laitin and Suny 1999).
Since the mid-1990s, specifically after the cease-fire, the divergence of thought
concerning peace, security, and economic development of Armenia and Karabakh had
increased between the two men – the leader of Armenia and the leader of Karabakh.
Kocharyan argued that the conflict and its circumstances were not the key factors explaining
Armenia's poor economic situation. Instead, he argued that Armenian government should get
rid of corruption and introduce a stronger discipline within the government. He proposed that
"with better management, more discipline, strong anti-corruption policies, a forceful effort to
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achieve unity, and the coordination of the resources of the state of Armenia and the
Diaspora", Armenia could improve its economic performance (Libaridian 1999:65).
Knowing that Kocharyan assumed anticorruption policies, coupled with strengthening the
state and the rule of law, could do as much for the Armenian economy as lifting the
blockade, Ter Petrossian, presumably, intended to put Kocharyan to the test when he invited
the latter to serve as Prime Minister of Armenia in the spring of 1997. In this way,
Kocharyan, would have authority over socio-economic issues and would have the
opportunity to prove his position (Libaridian 1999; Laitin and Suny 1999; Tavitian 2000;
Fuller 2004).
In any case, Kocharyan's position as Prime Minister and his subsequent elevation to
the presidency through a ‘palace coup’ turned out to be a challenge to Ter-Petrossian’s more
liberal position (Cornell 1999). After Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, Robert Kocharyan began
to use the authorization and power of the presidency. It is important to note here that
Kocharyan's candidacy to the Presidency was then technically illegitimate.The Armenian
Constitution explicitly forbade non-citizen Armenians (at least for ten years) from the
presidency. Article 50 of the 1999 Constitution stipulates: "Every person having attained the
age of thirty five, having been a citizen of the Republic of Armenia for the preceding ten
years, having permanently resided in the Republic for the preceding ten years, and having the
right to vote is eligible for the Presidency."167 Kocharyan was not an Armenian citizen in
March of 1998, neither had he been a permanent resident of Armenia for ten years. This
means that, then a citizen of Azerbaijan, Kocharyan became a President of Armenia illegally.
Since the first days of Kocharyan's presidency, his government reverted to a strong
traditional nationalism, which was in accord with hard-liners of the Karabakh government
and was very amiable to the Armenian Diaspora.168 It is considered that the diaspora
Armenians' support strengthened Kocharyan's hand in domestic politics.
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See the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, available online at
http://www.concourt.am/english/constitutions/index.htm#3
168 Armenians have established communities throughout the world since ancient times, creating a 2,000 year-old
Diaspora (BBC, February 2007). But the size of the Armenian communities around the world dramatically
increased since the Armenian Genocide of 1915, when the Armenians living in their ancestral homeland
(eastern Turkey, known as Western Armenia among Armenians) were systematically exterminated by Ottoman
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The Armenian diaspora is divided into two communities – those from Ottoman
Armenia or Western Armenia (the "old" Diaspora) and those who have migrated from
Armenia during the late 1980s, especially after the earthquake and after the independence of
Armenia (the "new" Diaspora).169 Feeling strong ties with their historic homeland, both
Diasporas have showed strong interest in the social, political and economic developments of
Armenia, particularly after the country's independence in 1991. The Diaspora Armenians
have been a critical part of the FDI and aid in the republic of Armenia. Particularly, the
"new" Diaspora's remittances have recently been crucial for Armenia's economy. However,
there is a difference in the nature of the "old" and "new" Dasiporas' involvement. Because the
"old" Diaspora had a very strong political identity, which was shaped by the "victim" identity
that in turn was formed by the forced emigration experience, its involvement in the homeland
has been largely political and thus the perceptions of Armenia's investment climate has been
greatly dependent upon the political realities (Chakhalyan, 2007:54). This attitude and
perceptions of the "old" Diaspora have stood in sharp contrast to the "new" Diaspora, which
has not been political, owing to a large extent to a different historical experience of migration
that has been voluntary and conditioned by economic considerations (ibid).
Due to its economic and political involvement and influence, the Diaspora has always
been an important element of the Armenian foreign policy.Specifically Kocharyan's foreign
policy, as well as economic policies, was heavily influenced by largely nationalist Armenian
Diaspora communities.The Armenian national identity was more powerfully and coherently
articulated, the images of Genocide were projected into the Karabakh conflict, and the
prospects of improved relations with Turkey closed off(Suny 1999:158-159). The new
Turks. The modern Armenian Diaspora was chiefly formed as a result of this Genocide. The survivors of the
Genocide (about 400,000) settled in Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus as well as in a number of Middle
Eastern and European countries. Required to cope with and adapt to unfamiliar environments, the resistance and
discrimination of the recipient states, "the post-Genocide diaspora adopted socio-cultural and political
peculiarities of their various host states and eventually emerged as a multi-local heterogeneous entity"
(Harutyunyan 2009:58).
Although it is an impossible task to compile an accurate count of all Armenians in the Diaspora, Armenian
worldwide population is estimated to be around 11 million, out of which about 3 million reside in Armenia,
130,000 in Karabakh and 120,000 in the region of Javakhk in Georgia.There areapproximately 8,000,000
diaspora Armenians living abroad. The largest Armenian communities are in Russia, the United States, France ,
Ukraine, Georgia, Argentina, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Canada, Ukraine, Greece, and Australia.
169 According to some historians, even if this taxonomy refers to the weaved emigration out of historic Armenia,
including present day Armenia, there are at least three diasporas: pre-Genocide, post genocide, and post
independence.
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president called for the right to self-determination for Karabakh, and pledged to support its
independence.
Soon after Kocharyan’s election, frequent cases of human rights violations in
Armenia were documented. In one of my interviews, a former Prime Minister, Hrant
Bagratyan, recollected the most notorious incident related directly to Kocharyan and his staff.
The Armenian people were legitimately alarmed, when in September 2001 a bodyguard of
then president Kocharyan attacked and killed a man in a café restroom. The victim, Poghos
Poghosyan, had reportedly addressed the president with the words, “Hi, Rob.” Witnesses
mentioned that Poghosyan was assaulted by presidential bodyguards, who thought that "Hi,
Rob" was an offensive greeting of the Armenian president. The 43-year-old Poghosyan was
found dead in the cafe’s restroom at night, shortly after Kocharyan left the place. Kocharyan
later admitted that the victim died as a result of a "scuffle" with his security service. RFE/RL
reported that state prosecutors investigating the politically embarrassing murder charged the
bodyguard with "involuntary manslaughter," a crime punishable by up to three years in
prison. They further sought an even shorter jail term by citing some "mitigating
circumstances." According to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, the bodyguard
convicted of murdering Poghosyan received a suspended sentence of two years. 170
The domestic political atmosphere started to change swiftly as well. There appeared
reports of arrests of political nature, dismissal and assassinations of several government top
officials. In August, 1998, Henrikh Khachatryan, Armenia's Prosecutor-General was
murdered in his office "in murky circumstances" (TheNew York Times, August 7, 1998).
Deputy Defense Minister Vahan Khorkhoruni was assassinated in December, 1998 (Asbarez,
December 12, 1998). Shortly, in February 1999, the Deputy Minister of Interior Artsrun
Margaryan was murdered (Asbarez, February 10, 1999). Following these mysterious political
assassinations, on October 27, 1999, Armenia witnessed a terrible tragedy - a massacre in the
Parliament. This mysterious attack was the beginning of another period of political instability
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For a more detailed account of this case, see the Institute for Peace and War Reporting, CRS Issue 649,
"Restaurant Killing Raises Broader Concerns," by Nvard Hovhannisyan, July 6, 2012, available online at:
http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenia-restaurant-killing-raises-broader-concerns; and Asbarez News, "Kocharyan
Bodyguard to be Charged Cafe Death Probe," November 28, 2001, available online at
http://asbarez.com/45848/Kocharyan-bodyguard-to-be-charged-cafe-death-probe
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in Armenia that gradually led to President Kocharyan’s becoming politica lly more powerful.
There have been assumptions and opposition charges that Robert Kocharyan and his allies
masterminded the attack in order to destroy his main opposition at the time. 171
Kocharyan further strengthened his regime by replacing former government members
with new people and forming a loyal team that included long-time allies and Karabakh war
comrades, among who was the newly appointed Defense Minister, Serzh Sargsyan. Like
many of the newly appointed government members, Sargsyan’s political career began with
the tensions over Karabakh. Sargsyan participated, organized and led a number of battles in
the Karabakh war as a field commander. Sargsyan was the chairman of Karabakh’s Self
Defense Forces Committee and he is considered to be one of the founders of Karabakh’s
armed forces. In 1990 he was elected to the Supreme Council of Armenia. Since the
independence of Armenia, he has held several cabinet positions in the Armenian government:
Minister of Defense (1993-95), Minister of Interior and National Security (1996-99),
Secretary of the National Security Council (1999-2007), Minister of Defense (2000-2007),
and Prime Minister (2007-2008). In 2008, Sargsyan was elected President of Armenia,
despite massive popular opposition and elections, which were marred with irregularities and
fraud, denounced by election observers.172
Another member of the "Party of Karabakh", who also rose to prominence during the
Karabakh conflict, was Samvel Babayan from Karabakh.173 Babayan, a car mechanic barely
out of high school, was a competent paramilitary officer. In 1991, he joined a paramilitary
unit, and quickly became a significant figure among the field commanders. He had his own
battalion and led it very courageously. He “made courageous and uncommon decisions
without any academic and military knowledge” (Shahnazaryan 2010:3). The young
commander actively participated in the capture of Shushi in 1992, one of the highest
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The Parliament massacre, which has been a crucial event in the history of post-Soviet Armenian politics,
highlights the growing supremacy of coercive powers in Armenia. The Parliament shooting and its
consequences will be detailed in further pages of the chapter.
172 The February 19, 2008 presidential elections in Armenia can be a separate subject of research regarding
political exclusion, social movements, and state violence. This presidential election will be described and
analyzed more in detail in the next chapter.
173 Samvel Babayan, among a few others, belonged to the category of non -traditional, self-taught and wardisciplined commanders (paramilitaries), who later entered into politics.
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achievements of the war by Armenians. 174 Babayan's contribution in the capture of Shushi
bestowed him with an extraordinary reputation. Despite his young age, he became the
commander of Karabakh’s army in 1992 and later in 1995 the Minister of Defense after his
predecessor Serzh Sargsyan became Armenia’s Defense Minister.
Besides the honor and image of being a capable commander, Babayan managed to
obtain the reputation of a shrewd businessman. As Lynch states, "the armed forces are
always very well protected in separatist states", and Babayan's security as a politicaleconomic actor was also well protected (Lynch 2002:842). After the ceasefire of 1994, but
with Karabakh on war footing, Babayan maintained considerable power with little oversight
from civilian authorities. Using his power, he managed to acquire huge amount of wealth,
such as industries, land, houses, as well as tax and customs privileges for himself and his
cronies (de Waal 2000). "Despite Babayan's warlordish behavior, which in a short period of
time managed to offend a large number of people, he was treated quite softly in light of his
infinite popularity stemming from his wartime leadership" (Shahanzaryan 2010:3). The
allegiance of war veterans and people of Karabakh to the acclaimed war hero, particularly of
villagers from his native village of Mysmyna, was beyond primordial loyalty to a patron.
Based on his military identity and commitment in war, Babayan concluded: "I am the very
Samvel Babayan on whose shoulders the destiny of the nation was laid down in 1992. ... My
main mistake was continuing to work with people who did not accept my views after the
cessation of military action.” (ibid)
Babayan’s exploitation of his military position became even more overt, when
Kocharyan became the Prime Minister of Armenia in 1997. Kocharyan away from Karabakh,
there was no other person strong enough to intervene with Babayan’s machinations. At the
time, Babayan was a leading importer of gasoline and tobacco products in Armenia; in fact
he secured a monopoly over these businesses (Shanazaryan 2010). It has been claimed that
he used Karabakh Army military trucks to transport the cigarette and petrol cargo. Also, he
had businesses related to the construction sector of Karabakh. Babayan and his family also
controlled most job appointments in the region (ibid). An example of Babayan’s exploitation
of his wartime achievements and abuse of his position after war has been the widely known
174

The geopolitical significance of Shushi's capture for the Armenian side has been noted earlier in this chapter.
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"Babayan Underpass" in Stepanakert, the capital city of Karabakh (Lynch 2002:842). The
"Babayan Underpass" was a major underpass, the construction of which lasted years. It was
built by military-related contractors in a location, where the traffic is not very busy and there
was no need for an underpass (ibid).
De Waal (2000) claims that Babayan was far more than a military leader; he was the
de facto overlord of the region, running the local economy (de Waal 2000). He made money
out of both war and peace. He was one of the paramilitary elites that initiated the merger of
black markets and war (Shahnazaryan 2010). Trading hostages during wartime had become a
business for this warlord. Sources mention that Babayan’s family members extorted bribes to
release from prison people who they themselves took into custody (Shahnazaryan 2010:4).
Babayan eliminated all his opponents through moral and physical threats, pressure, as well as
assassinations (ibid).
In Karabakh, Babayan's authority and power allowed him to interfere with state
affairs. He forced the Prime Minister of Karabakh, Leonard Petrosyan, to resign in June of
1998.175 Similar to many government leaders of Karabakh, Babayan intended to become a
part of the Armenian government. He did so by forming and financing two Armenian
political parties and entering into the Armenian Parliament through those parties in 1999.
Babayan’s intrusion into Armenian politics perhaps was a potential challenge to Kocharyan's
growing power in Armenia. With the support of Karabakh's President Arkadi Ghukasyan and
Armenia's Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Kocharyan managed to restrain Babayan’s
authority not only in Armenia, but also decreased his powers in Karabakh. In 1999, Babayan
was dismissed as Defense Minister of Karabakh. In 2000, he was charged with the March
2000 assassination attempt against Arkadi Ghukasyan and sentenced to 14 years
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Ironically, both Ter-Petrossian (in Armenia) and Leonard Petrosyan (in Karabakh) resigned in the same year
under the influence of former warlords, who after war were influencing the political affairs of their respective
republics.
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imprisonment.176 In 2004, however, Babayan was released from prison due to deteriorating
health.177
In accord with Kocharyan and others from the "Party of Karabakh", Babayan was an
ardent opponent of territorial concessions to Azerbaijan. As Defense Minister of Karabakh,
Babayan, argued in an interview in October 1997 that the chances of renewed war with
Azerbaijan were high, and in case of a war, Azerbaijan would have to accept military defeat.
He added that a renewed war would finally result in a decisive victory by one side or the
other (Walker 1998). According to the Armenian News Network Groong, when top officials
in Armenia were initially reluctant to openly display disloyalty to the President regarding
step-by-step proposal, they urged Babayan to challenge Ter-Petrossian's inner circle. In the
joint session of National Security Councils of Armenia and Artsakh in January 1998, it was
Babayan who most vociferously opposed Ter-Petrossian (Groong News, October 6, 2004)178 .
The Babayan phenomenon is a striking example of a wider postwar phenomenon –
postwar militarization – when victory allowed the Armenian military commanders to control
the peace (de Waal 2010). In Armenia, the Karabakh war veterans' organization the
Yerkrapah, also known as the Yerkrapah Battalion or the Union of the Yerkrapah Volunteers,
became a core element of the postwar militarization in Armenia after the cease-fire.179 The

was Arkadi Ghukasyan’s most formidable political opponent. Babayan was in power struggle with
Ghukasyan and attempted to assassinate the latter with the support of people from his inner circle.
177 Unofficial sources mentioned health issues, but the release of the former military leader was not given an
official explanation. Babayan's amnesty, thus, appears to have been an act of clemency. It is argued that
Babayan's release from prison was engineered by Kocharyan and Arkadi Ghukasyan. Babayan's release
occurred in the backdrop of a politically sensitive time for Karabakh. During the 2004 municipal elections,
public discontent burst in Karabakh concerning the pace of democratic and social-economic progress. The
election of the independent opposition candidate Eduard Aghabekyan as Mayor of Stepanakert (capital city of
Karabakh) and his defeat over the incumbent – a well-funded ruling party candidate – was an unexpected event
for both Karabakh and Armenian leaders. Aghabekyan's victory emboldened citizens of Karabakh. After Major
General Movses Hakobyan was quoted by journalists that Karabakh was not ready for full democracy as long as
war was not over, Hakobyan was obligated through a special session of the legislature to declare that he wa s
misquoted. Meanwhile, Ghukasyan and his political mentor Kocharyan were serving their la st terms in
presidential office, one in Karabakh, the other in Armenia respectively. Since Babayan had been punished
already for his oppositional attitude against Ghukasyan, and there was no "political niche" left vacant for
Babayan either in Karabakh or Armenia, Kocharyan and Ghukasyan decided to pardon Babayan. This was or
seemed to be a sound political move on their behalf, rather than being forced to do so by Babayan's support ers.
(Groong News, October 6, 2004)
178 Retreived from: http://www.groong.org/ro/ro-20041006.ht ml
179 "The “Yerkrapah” is translated as homeland protectors/defenders.
176 Babayan
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Yerkrapah was led by Vazgen Sargsyan, one of the strongest and most talented, if not the
most significant figure that rose to power out of the Karabakh conflict.
Vazgen Sargsyan’s political activity started when he joined the movement for
Karabakh. In 1990, he was elected to the Armenian Parliament, and became a member of the
Internal Affairs and State Defense Committee. He was very active during the first years of
the war, and since 1990-1992 he was commanding voluntary and paramilitary troops in
Karabakh. He inspired the “battalion of kamikazes”, a very important battalion during
battles. In 1992, Sargsyan became Defense Minister of Armenia, and from 1993-1995 he
was State Minister in charge of Defense. In 1995, during the restructuring of government
ministries, he again became Defense Minister. In 1999, President Kocharyan appointed
Sargsyan as Prime Minister.
The Ministry of Defense created the Yerkrapah in 1993, when Vazgen Sargsyan was
the Minister of Defense.180 The Yerkrapah emerged as an overtly nationalist force, directly
tied to the war rather than the Karabakh movement. "Essentially an organization of soldiers,
with limited intellectual leadership (unlike the early ANM or other parties, the Yerkrapah has
been militant in its views on national issues and Karabakh" (Panossian 2006:241). Sargsyan
had control and full authority of the organization, with over 10,000 members. While the
Yerkrapah was initially created to be a social organization with its main objective to solve
social problems of Karabakh war veterans, it later became involved in political affairs of the
country. The leadership of the organization was politicized, turning into a military political
organization implementing political functions. Since the Yerkrapah members had fought in
the war, the majority of them retained their weapons, and this granted the organization
special power. De Waal mentions that the Yerkrapah became the most powerful and a very
influential organization in the country and took over some areas of the economy (de Waal
2004:244). De Waal also calls the Yerkrapah's leader Sarsgyan the "chief generalissimo [of
the army], Armenia’s charismatic first defense minister, most prominent military leader, and
emerging feudal baron" (de Waal 2004:257).
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Some sources mention 1993 as the year Yerkrapahwas established 1993 (de Waal 2003). Libaridian
recollects that the organization started in May of 1992, during the Nakhijevan border skirmishes.
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According to Human Rights Watch, the Yerkrapah posed a serious threat to the rule
of law in Armenia. It is considered that the Yerkrapah managed to develop into a quasicriminal, quasi-political organization under the protection and support of the army. In 1995,
the Yerkrapah members allegedly attacked offices of foreign religious groups (mostly
Christian sects) in Armenia, because the latter discouraged military services. In July 1997,
the Yerkrapah also reportedly broke into a human rights library in Vanadzor and ransacked it
(Human Rights Watch 1999, US State Department Report 1997). The library break-in was
primarily aimed at control of the space rather than the activities of the center; nonetheless,
"the incident underscored the freedom of these local militias [the Yerkrapah] to act outside
the law (U.S. State Department Armenia Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1998).
Yerkrapah’s relation to these human rights violations brought even international
attention to the activities of the organization, highlighting the necessity to reduce any
patronage of the Yerkrapah on behalf of the Armenian government, specifically the Defense
Ministry. Holly Cartner, executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central
Division stated:
“Militia groups like the Yerkrapah Battalion are a threat to Armenia’s nascent civil society.
The Clinton Administration should lead the international community in sending a clear
message to the Armenian Defense Ministry: human rights abuses by vigilante groups will not
be tolerated. The Yerkrapah members should not be allowed into government security forces
or other official positions without a thorough review of each applicant’s record” (Human
Rights Watch 1998)

In the fall of 1997, the organization registered as a political party and entered
Parliament with seventeen seats. Yerkrapah merged with the Republican Party of Armenia
and became the largest group in the National Assembly in the summer of 1998. 181 Regarding
his decision to merge the Yerkrapah into the Republican Party of Armenia to establish a
political base in the Parliament, Sargsyan announced: "From the very beginning there was a
wrong impression that the Yerkrapah can do nothing – but fight, however – time has shown
that the Yerkrapah can not only perform feats on battlefields - but also have a say in peaceful
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The Republican Party of Armenia was a small nationalist party established in 1990. Its ideology was similar
to Yerkrapah's ideology and slogans (Panossian 2006). Yerkrapah adopted the name and the legal status of the
party (Jamestwon Foundation 1998; The Republican Party of Armenia).
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development."182 By 1998, the organization had become Armenia’s most influential 'political'
factor and, as it grew more representative, its political muscle started to influence the
Armenian political life. When Ter-Petrossian and his party ANM were on the verge of
weakening, many defectors from the ANM joined the Yerkrapah. At some point, the
organization had become an alternative force structure and a coercive resource in the hands
of certain political elites. Ter-Petrossian particularly paid a high a price by allowing Vazgen
Sargsyan to involve the Yerkrapah veterans in politics. Although initially supportive of TerPetrossian, the Yerkrapah had a share in ousting the former President from power and
placing Kocharyan in the presidency. It was only after Vazgen Sargsyan's death in 1999, that
the Yerkrapah weakened and ceased to pose any threat to the executive or other political
powers.
There has always been a big divergence of public attitude towards Yerkrapah and
their leader Vazgen Sargsyan in Armenia. Some consider Sargsyan as the victorious
Sparapet 183 and the most important person of post-independent Armenia's defense; whereas,
in the words of another renowned hero of the Karabakh war Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan
(nicknamed Commandos), "Vazgen’s strength continues to worry certain people or systems,
which, for some reason, continue to keep a sense of fear from the dead Vazgen" (Jebejyan
2013). Many remember Sargsyan as the founder of the modern Armenian army, as the chief
architect of the Karabakh war victory, and an outstanding soldier. 184 Yet again, many others
would agree to Ara Sanjian’s recollection that there was another side to Sargsyan. "He was
extremely ambitious and did not always shun non-democratic methods to attain his political
and personal goals” (Sanjian 1999). Hardly anybody would ever challenge or oppose Vazgen
Sargsyan. “The lack of open criticism against him was motivated not only by the genuinely
deep respect towards his achievements as Defense Minister but also by fear of his allreaching hand” (ibid). Although quite lengthy, I find it very important to quote some pieces
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Vazgen Sargsyan was cited in Asbarez news, May 10, 1999, retrieved from:
http://asbarez.com/39846/sargsyan-campaigns-stresses-veteran-benefits/
183 As a national hero of the war, Sargsyan was nicknamed "Sparapet Hayotc", which may be translated into
English as the "Armenian Commander-in-Ch ief".
184 In fact, the same type of diverging public attitude exists around the “Yerkrapah” and its role for post independent Armenia.
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of his speech during the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of the Republican Party of Armenia, in
January of 1999, almost a year after Ter-Petrossian's resignation.
My role in political developments has been grossly exaggerated. Neither under Levon TerPetrossian, nor under Robert Kocharyan, I participated in the economic policy. … I worked
with seven Prime Ministers and didn’t have personal conflict with any of them, you can ask
them. I never beat any of them; I never forced anybody out of the country. … I never
participated in the privatization, and I myself privatized nothing. I didn’t create clans and
have no intention to do so, since I regard clans as the greatest danger to this country.
As an acting Defense Minister of a belligerent country, I can’t help participating in the
political process. … The army is a component of this society, the mirror of the society, and
economic, social, political drawbacks hit the army directly. If the army shed blood for this
country, then, naturally, the army, when its destiny is concerned, must participate in these
processes. …
About my relations with Robert Kocharyan. I say, once and for all, because I don’t need
excessive blabber, we are close friends, we are combat comrades, we have common destiny. I
shall never oppose Robert Kocharyan, don’t hope for that. …
About my relations with Levon Ter-Petrossian. He is a wise and moral man and statesman.
Levon Ter-Petrossian has left and took his convictions with him, leaving the field to us. If
Levon Ter-Petrossian didn’t want to leave, no one would be able to force him out. About the
rumors that Levon Ter-Petrossian was forced out, and who forced him out. Vazgen Sargsyan?
It is absurd and ludicrous. If Levon Ter-Petrossian didn’t resign, no one could make him
resign. If he dismissed me as Defense minister, I would resign. But in this case the
responsibility would be on him. Now he resigned and we are responsible. There is a problem
of responsibility, not of dismissal of each other. I did not rise against Levon Ter-Petrossian, I
defended the idea. Our dispute was about Karabakh problem and some people in Levon TerPetrossian’s entourage.”(Vazgen Sargsyan, Fifth Extraordinary RPA Congress of 1999)

The Defense Minister’s speech reflects his influential role in Armenia's political arena
and that he strongly opposed Ter-Petrossian's policy on the problem of Karabakh. Sargsyan's
speech also expresses his change of support and collaboration to Robert Kocharyan. Whereas
there is ample anecdotal evidence that Sargsyan had strong influence in the
economy/business, and that he benefited from the privatization process, in this speech he
denied any involvement in privatization or any wealth obtained as a result of privatization.
Grigoryan, for example, states that “it was a well-known fact, if not well-publicized, that
certain imports essentially were monopolies (mainly sugar and flour) of the Defense Ministry
and connected businessmen under the patronage of then Defense Minister V. Sargsyan. And
again, this was not necessarily done for reasons of introducing corruption, for reasons of
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benefitting unfairly by the leaders of the time; it was the logic of the war that dictated such
actions and such centralization.”185
7.4.3. Foundation of Armenian Democracy and Abortion of its Consolidation
Papazian (2008) focusing on the evolution of the Armenian national identity during
perestroika, displays how claims for reforms in the nationality issue transformed into
national self determination and democratization. The Karabakh movement, initially a
contestant political movement, laid the foundation of the Armenian sovereign nation-state.
Supporters of the movements redefined the terms of the national debate around Karabakhin
purely political terms, eventually to be expressed by a sovereign national state (Papazian
2008).
After independence, the Armenian National Movement, under the leadership of TerPetrossian, enjoyed extraordinary popular support and legitimacy as the anticommunist
leader of the nation. The platform of the Armenian National Movement called for
democratization, social justice, national sovereignty, and economic reform. "Real social
change was possible and would be evident, he [Ter-Petrossian] argued, only with the gradual
buildup of institutions and economic strength, both of which would enable reformist policies
to take root" (Libaridian 1999:53). "For the first four years of its existence, ... despite the
war, blockade, and failure to repair the damage suffered in the December 1988 earthquake, ...
the government of Armenia under Levon Ter Petrosian displayed an enviable stability and an
apparently steady trajectory toward democracy and capitalism" (Suny, 1999:156). Initially it
faced little internal opposition, if any (Suny 1999).
Between 1990 and 1997, despite the adverse consequences of the Karabakh war on
the Armenian society, Armenia was steadily transitioning into a democracy. The country
followed principles of democracy without breaching its citizens’ rights and without
discriminating opportunities within its society. But with the absence of a resolution to the
Karabakh conflict, Armenia did not fully consolidate into a democratic system. "Levon TerPetrossian's resignation halted the march in that direction" (Libaridian 1999:16).
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Cited from the interview with Arman Grigoryan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010.
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Within a few years of independence, serious strains affected the government's efforts
to create a democratic state with legitimacy. Privileged elites, particularly those from the
"Party of Karabakh", resisted change, and their resistance became an obstacle for Armenia's
change to a democratic and dignified society.
The political crisis of 1998, followed by the President’s resignation in Armenia, can
be characterized by a wave of a few military and security-related developments that were
focal in the failure of the development of economic and political institutions. These events
are composed below by the ascendance of their significance.


A coalition of power ministers comprising of political elites, who all gained authority and
popularity in the Karabakh war, was formed against Levon Ter-Petrossian administration;



Vazgen Sargsyan, the leader of the paramilitary organization Yerkrapah, announced that
the Yerkrapah had switched their support from Ter-Petrossian to Kocharyan; and



Forty members of the National Assembly of Armenia reportedly quit the ruling coalition
in order to join the Yerkrapah parliamentary faction, later making it the largest
parliamentary bloc (Astourian 2001:57; Croissant 1998:123).
It can be said that Levon Ter-Petrossian’s resignation highlighted the limits of

international pressure on Armenia as a country with several autocratic elites related to war,
and stressed the dangers inherent in ignoring those limits. At the time of his resignation, TerPetrossian predicted that the ‘party of peace’ was being replaced by the ‘party of war’. It is
perhaps true that the change of political elites in 1998 cost the Armenian people the longterm absence of peace settlement, economic insecurity and democratic norms. Today on the
negotiating table are proposals, whose essence is nearly the same as the "stage-by-stage" plan
that was discussed in September, 1997. The proposals have remained almost unchanged, but
the regional balance of power has transformed much. Socio-economic matters have worsened
for ordinary citizens on the domestic scene as well. Armenia's first president's caution about
the change became obvious not too long after his resignation.
It was only a year after Kocharyan’s presidency, in October of 2000, when thousands
of people took out to streets, calling for President Kocharyan’s resignation. Despite his
pledges to fight against corruption and to boost the economy, President Kocharyan was not
displaying any intentions or actions to keep his promises. There was little, if any economic
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progress, which, however, was mainly due to remittances from abroad and foreign assistance
or, more specifically, foreign debt.186 The government had failed to improve the country’s
economy. What is more, political exclusion was aggravating. Now not only material
deprivation was widespread, but there was also an agonizing intensity of political arrests,
murders, intimidations, and other human rights violations. Since 2000, authoritarian
tendencies emerged in Armenia; restrictions on political freedom and freedom of speech
surfaced. Extensive accusations of electoral irregularities and fraud, as well as violations of
the Armenian Constitution, were common.
7.4.4. The Armenian Parliament Attack of October 27, 1999
Soon after Kocharyan's election as President, V. Sargsyan started to diverge from
Kocharyan's aspirations. Their relations quickly deteriorated. Sargsyan, whose role was
instrumental in the palace coup against Ter-Petrossian, was gradually persuaded of the
advantages of the peace deal on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict (de Waal 2013:275).
Ironically, Sargsyan found himself drawn to the resigned president's position, and seemed to
understand that peace was the key to solving much of Armenia's problems, and that the
"frozen" state of the conflict kept the country in misery, degrading the economy and fueling
corruption (Sifakis, 2001). A popular assumption circulated within media that Sargsyan
received substantial backing from both the World Bank and IMF, presumably to reinforce his
reassessment on the Karabakh conflict.187
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The economy grew by 6.2 percent in the first nine months of 1999 compared to same period of the previous
year. However, real GDP fell by 2.3 percent at the end of 1999 in the wake of political assassinations (IMF
2001). According to the IMF, at the end of 2000, Armenia's external debt amounted to $862 million, the
equivalent of the 45 percent of GDP or 194 percent of exports. From 1995 to 2000, external debt more than
doubled (IMF 2001). The latest value for external debt stocks, concessional (DOD, in US$) in Armenia was
$2,564,586,000 as of 2011. Over the past 18 years, the value for this indicator has fluctuated between
$2,564,586,000 in 2011 and $16,626,000 in 1993.
(http://www.indexmundi.co m/armenia/economy_profile.ht ml)
187 There is a street story suggesting that Vazgen Sargsyan was heavily influenced by the U.S. policy in
Armenia, advocated by then U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, Michael Lemmon. Sargsyan and Lemmon
socialized, played tennis together. Ambassador Lemmon, enthusiastic about a peace agreement (it could become
his biggest achievement as Ambassador), supposedly impacted Sargsyan's renewed position on the Karabakh
solution. The slain Minister had even recently asked Washington to mediate an improvement in the strained
Armenian-Turkish relationship (RFE/RL,Vol. 3, No. 219, November 9, 1999)
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Meanwhile, Sargsyan was continuing to reinforce his political supremacy in the
country.188 Securing political support in the Parliament through the politicization of the
Yerkrapah was followed by another strategic move, the creation of the Miasnutyun bloc.189
Petrosian (2005) points out that Sargsyan had an exceptional ability to build “most
unexpected tactical unions in order to achieve his goals" and, as a good example of this type
of tactics, he refers to the ruling “Miasnutyun” bloc. After the 1998 presidential elections,
Sargsyan, recognizing the leader of the People’s Party Karen Demirchyan’ s growing power
and popularity among people, allied with him within the "Miasnutyun" bloc. Demirchyan,
the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
and the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet (effectively the leader of Soviet Armenia)
from 1974 to 1988, had managed to garner about 40% of votes in the 1998 presidential
elections (based on official results), coming second after Kocharyan. Demirchyan became a
major potential opponent for Kocharyan after the May 1999 Parliamentary elections, where
the "Miasnutyun" electoral alliance achieved a total victory, winning the majority of
parliamentary seats with 43% of votes.190 Sargsyan, in his turn, confirmed himself as the de
facto decision-maker in Armenia.
Since the creation of the "Miasnutyun" bloc, both Demirchyan and Sargsyan were
considered more popular and more powerful than Kocharyan, despite Kocharyan’s
presidential authority. The creation of such a powerful union of two significant figures of
Armenia’s political field changed the state of affairs. Commenting on the creation of
"Miasnutyun", a distinguished political journalist, Anna Israyelyan, noted: "As for Vazgen
Sargsyan’s logic, I will have to remember a hypothesis about contradictions inside the ruling
regime, which was frequently voiced at that time. No matter how much Sargsyan assured that
there were "no problems" between him and Kocharyan, this step [the "Miasnutyun" alliance]

Kocharyan’s unprecedented rise to presidency did not deprive Vazgen Sargsyan of his extraordinary
authority and substantial power within the ruling circles. With strong links to the military and a strong political
base in the Parliament, Sargsyan then was extensively considered to be the first man to wield the political power
in Armenia. He basically controlled the military resources of the country.
189 "Miasnutyun" is translated into Armenian as "Unity" or "Merger".
190 In the chaos of post-Soviet independence, many Armenians cultivated a sense of nostalgia for their Soviet
life and experience. Demirchyan's popularity was derived to a large extent from those nostalgic feelings towards
the Soviet years and, thus, from Demirchyan's experience as a Soviet-era leader.
188
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testified the opposite." (Araratyan 2012). 191 According to many, it was due to "Miasnutyun"
bloc that Sargsyan became the Prime Minister in June of 1999. The union of these two types
of power, with Sargsyan being the hard power as the winner of the war, an experimental
Prime Minister with positive outcomes, and Demirhcyan, as the soft power, a non-military
figure, a man of long-term experience in public administration, looked as a very beneficial
channel for Sargsyan to advance to presidency.
It is substantially important to stress that recently Sargsyan’s image among people as
a hardliner was changing into a more popular leader, particularly because the short period of
his premiership was distinguished with more or less successful attempts to take the country
out of financial crisis and to fight against corruption. “All he had to do was get rid of the
image he gained during the Nagorno-Karabakh war as a guerrilla … and to prove to the
people that he was capable of governing the state” (Petrosian 2005).
With such a powerful authority and a changing image, Sargsyan, as Prime Minister,
thus, began to overshadow the new President, Kocharyan. At the same time, he was
transforming from a formerly Russian-oriented politician towards a more pro-Western leader,
distancing himself even more from Kocharyan’s explicitly Russian- inclined stance and
diplomacy. For President Kocharyan and the political circle close to him, Sargsyan’s
unexpected transformation was threatening. It was becoming obvious that while a few years
ago Sargsyan promoted Kocharyan’s way to the presidency, he could easily oppose
Kocharyan with the same manner he did the former President Ter-Petrossian. Media accounts
reported about rumors that the Prime Minister was considering forcing the resignation of
State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan, a close ally of Kocharyan (Danielian 1999;
Grigoryan 1999).
In September, 1999, the first Armenia-Diaspora conference was held in Yerevan.
Following the conference, as a new Prime Minister, Sargsyan made a visit to the United
States, during which it became clear to him that financial support from the Diaspora was
decreasing and it could not boost economic development of Armenia (de Waal 2003:263).

Please see Mediamax website, “National Assembly Elections: v1.0-v4.0”: 1999 elections" by Aram
Araratyan, April13, 2012, (http://www.mediamax.am/printpage.php?lang=en&nid=4633)
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207

Meanwhile, on October 11, 1999, Kocharyan met with the President of Azerbaijan Heydar
Aliev. It is contended that the meeting finished with a hope for a final Karabakh resolution
proposal in the imminent OSCE summit in Istanbul in November (de Waal 2003). 192
Such was the domestic political context, when on October 27, 1999, Demirchyan and
Sargsyan were assassinated in the Parliament with other senior politicians. Their
assassination happened less than six months after the 1999 Parliamentary elections. On that
tragic day, five gunmen led by a former journalist and an extreme nationalist, Nairi
Hunanyan, stormed the Armenian National Assembly and opened fire in the Assembly’s
session hall. The terrorists carried out the parliament massacre, claiming that: “The country
[was] in a catastrophic situation. People [were] hungry and the government [didn’t] offer any
way out” (Avagyan and Tadevosyan 2005). Along with the Prime Minister Sargsyan and the
National Assembly Speaker Karen Demirchyan other high ranking officials were murdered,
among them Deputy Speakers Yuri Bakhshyan and Ruben Miroyan, Minister of Emergencies
(Urgent Issues) Leonard Petrosyan, National Assembly Members Genrikh Abrahamyan,
Armenak Armenakyan and Mikael Kotanyan. Many others were wounded and injured.
The incident unfolded live on television, and upon terrorists' demands, negotiations to
speak on TV began. The security forces were put on alert, but there was no further action
taken. President Kocharyan was personally directing the security forces outside the National
Assembly during the standoff. Meanwhile, citizens seemed unclear of what was happening in
the country. As negotiations to free the hostages began, the process turned to be a daunting
task, because the terrorists' comments and demands "seemed to lack coherence." Agreeing to
the words of Armenia's Minister of Health that the gunmen seemed to be in a "state of
possession", the Russian minister for relations with former Soviet states, Leonid V.
Drachevsky, added: "It looks like a psychiatrist is needed – professional negotiators from the
192

This was the two presidents' fifth meeting in six months. According to de Waal (2003), the mood of the
meeting was friendly, and Azerbaijainis even barbecued a sheep (de Waal 2003:274). De Waal writes that
during the meeting, the two presidents reconsidered the "Goble Plan" ("land swap" plan mentioned earlier in the
chapter), despite the fact that the plan was previously not liked by either Armenian or Azerbaijani elites (ibid).
The Azerbaijani elites rejected the plan in 1999, considering it as surrender of Karabakh. Perhaps, it was over
this issue that in October 1999, three of Aliev’s most experience advisors – foreign affairs aide, Vafa Guluzade,
the head of his secretariat, Eldar Namazov, and his foreign minister, Toﬁk Zulfugarov – resigned. The “Goble
Plan” was also accepted negatively in Armenia, because by losing Meghri, Armenia would lose its southern
border with a very important neighbor, Iran.
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special services who would calm them down." (Sifakis, 2001) The members of the team were
not capable of articulating a full political position, and they named almost everyone in
Armenia as a co-conspirator. What made things even more complicated was that at the time
of negotiations, government officials had difficulty defining the political background of the
gunmen (ibid).
The leader of the gunmen, Hunanyan, told the reporters that the eight deaths of the
attack were all “innocent victims” except for the case of Sargsyan. 193 According to
Hunanyan, “Sargsyan failed the nation” ” (Avagyan and Tadevosyan 2005). Before
surrendering, Hunanyan announced: “This is a patriotic action. This shake-up is needed for
the nation to regain its senses.” When already captured, he added: “Today’s murder is going
to be a shock for people. It was intended as a warning to the rest of the government. It
doesn’t matter who’s going to replace those who died in the shootout today. From now on
they will serve the people, because they see what can happen if they don’t” (ibid).
After the gunmen surrendered the Parliament, they were carried away in a bulletproof
van. President Kocharyan promised the nation a “fair trial" of the gunmen. But the long
process of investigation and trial discovered very little about the case and it failed to find out
the real motives behind the attack. Numerous important questions that have been churning in
the media during those days and still several years afterwards have not been disclosed
concerning the case. Moreover, the trial rapidly and suddenly ended as the leader of the
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There is not much detail about the biography of the leader of the gunmen, Nairi Hunanyan. It is known that
he was born in 1965 in Yerevan, Armenia. Hunanyan, who was 34 at the time of the terrorist attack, was a
former journalist, a graduate of the Department of Philology and Journalism of Yerevan State University (AZG
Daily, April 20, 2001). Azg Daily reported that Hunanyan used to go in for various kinds of sports and had read
about 4,000 books kept in his parents’ library. When he was 22, his parents divorced. According to Azg Daily,
in 1987 Hunanyan actively participated in ecological rallies, then in 1988 in protest demonstrations for the
unification of Karabagh with Armenia. In 1988 he went to Karabakh with the Karabakh Committee leaders
Levon Ter-Petrossian, Vano Siradeghyan, Vazgen Manukyan and others and was involved in arranging the
activities of Karabagh Komsomol (Young Communists) with those of Armenia. He first met Robert Kocharyan
and Serzh Sargsyan in Stepanakert, Karabakh. He was the founder of the Horizon (translated into English as
"horizon") information agency. Since 1990, he was a member of the “Dashnakcutiun” (Armenian Revolutionary
Federation), the most radical nationalist Armenian political party, which was banned as a political party in
Armenia by Ter-Petrossian, but later reinstated in by Kocharyan (Teymurazyan, 2007). He had close contacts
with Hrayr Marukhian, the representative of the ARF Central Bureau (AZG Daily, April 20, 2001). "The party
[ARF] was a means for me to realize my plans," Hunanyan said (ibid). Hunanyan was later expelled from the
party on the grounds of stealing money, although he insisted that this story was not true. From 1994 to 1997,
Hunanyan lived in Crimea, the Ukraine, and returned to Armenia in 1997 (Teymura zyan, 2007). When in
prison, Hunanyian also denied allegations ascribed to him by the ARF that he had connections with Turkish
special services.
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group Nairi Hunanyan reportedly intended to reveal new information about the crime. By
now, many members of the terrorist group are dead; allegedly they have made suicides in
their prison cells.194 Thus, there are even fewer hopes to learn anything new about the case.
With so much doubt and confusion behind the attack and no clear reasons discovered
during the trial, the notorious attack left the nation wondering: Who might have been
responsible? Who benefitted? What would the consequences be?
Several views concerning the motives of the attack on the Armenian National
Assembly have been conceived by political researchers and analysts. Some relate it to the
potential resolution of the Karabakh issue and argue that it was organized by outside forces.
Some consider the attack as an attempted coup d’état. This, however, was never a challenge
to state authority [particularly to Kocharyan's power as President], nor was it an attempt to
seize the state. Yet a few think it was just a criminal operation undertaken on social-political
grounds, because the terrorists had emphasized “the miserable situation of our [Armenian]
people” and corruption of Armenian politicians as the main reasons for their attack. Whereas
Hunanyan was quoted as saying; “we wanted to save the Armenian people from perishing
and restore their rights”, he articulated no clear political agenda of how to do so (Koran
1999).
Though Hunanian denied any relation of their actions to the situation concerning
Karabakh, there is "a street-talk tale" that the Karabakh issue played a role in the
organization and implementation of the attack. As mentioned earlier, less than a month
before the Parliament shooting, there were closed talks between Armenian and Azeri leaders
that many hoped would lead to an agreement at the next OSCE summit in November. The
agreement was the land swap ("Goble Plan"), which was discussed earlier in this chapter.
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In 2000, Norayr Yeghiazaryan, who had sold weapons to the gang, died under unknown conditions in an
isolation cell. In 2004, Vram Galstyan (uncle of Nairi Hunanyan) committed suicide by hanging from a bed
sheet. In May, 2010, Hamlet Stepanyan, 57, died of an apparent heart attack inside Nubarshen penitentiary. He
is the third among six defendants of the controversial case who died in prison. There are also important
witnesses of the case that died under suspicious circumstances. In 2002, Tigran Naghdalyan, 36, Chairman of
the Board of the Armenian Public Television and a key witness of the case was shot dead at the doorstep of his
apartment. In 2004, National Assembly deputy Mushegh Movsisyan, 47, another key witness of the case, d ied
in a car accident. In 2004, Hasmik Abrahamyan, 45, an employee of the NA Protocol Department, who was on
the witness list, was found hanged in the NA Protocol building (Abrahamyan, 2010).
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Focusing on the prospective of a settlement, a few analysts supported the speculation that the
attack was a "bid by Russia to sabotage ongoing talks to settle the Karabakh dispute with
Azerbaijan" (Grigoryan 1999).195 Whereas the timing of the parliament attack and the abovementioned talks between Kocharyan and Aliev coincided, there was no evidence leading to
the conclusion that this version was a likely reason for the parliament assassinations. The
linkage was too indistinct.
The most widely accepted view regarding motives of the 1999 Parliament violence,
reflected in many political analysts’ articles and speeches, in numerous interviews given by
the members of the Sargsyan and Demirchyan families, in the numerous videos related to this
theme uploaded in the YouTube by oppositional groups, is that Sargsyan and Demirchyan
were simply victims of a political assassination. This version presumes that Kocharyan was
the mastermind behind the attack in efforts to get rid of his most influential political
adversaries. The latter had effectively marginalized Kocharyan and Kocharyan’s allies in the
last few months. This conviction is supported by the leader of the gunmen Nairi Hunanyan’s
statement during the trial that “by killing Prime Minister Sargsyan, he had helped restore
“constitutional order” by strengthening the position of then-President Robert Kocharyan”
(Coalson and Tamrazian 2009). Grigoryan (1999) observes that the assassination of Sargsyan
and Kocharyan would dramatically weaken the "Miasnutyun" bloc’s control of Parliament
and government, leaving Kocharyan with little potential opposition.
As it has been widely contested in media and believed by the public, Kocharyan
seemed to be a major beneficiary of the situation created from the chaos following the attack.
The speculations of many parliament members and leaders of political parties support this
motive (Abrahamyan, 2010). Here are what some of Armenian politicians have said
regarding the October 27 tragedy and the trial process:
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There were allegations accusing Russia of organizing the violence in the Armenian Parliament. Former
Federal Security Service (FSB) agent Alexander Litvinenko had blamed the Russian special services for the
Parliament attack. According to Litvinenko, “Russia's political leadership managed to prevent the signing of a
peace agreement resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”. He concluded that Russian authorities hatched the
plot to prevent a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, Litvienko provided no evidence to
support his accusation.
The Russian Embassy in Armenia immediately denied any such involvement.
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Albert Bazeyan (Republican Party; Mayor of Yerevan August 1999-January 2001):
"We have come to the conclusion that the crime was aimed at making Robert Kocharyan's
power unlimited and uncontrolled. By physically eliminating Karen Demirchyan and Vazgen
Sargsyan, its organizers wanted to create prerequisites for Kocharyan's victory in the future
presidential elections." (Martirosian and Meloyan, RFE/RL, October 2009)
Artashes Geghamyan (Law and Accord party): “I think that president Kocharyan
should have resigned when the passions died away to secure fair pre-time presidential
election. He did not do it, which was followed by strange and obscure processes. … I think
that president Kocharyan’s announcement that death penalty would not be applied in
Armenia was premature.” (Abrahamian, 2001)
Norik Petrosyan (Communist party): “I am sure that the authorities are not making
special efforts to have the crimes revealed. This makes me believe that there were people
behind this group, and I am not sure that these people will be revealed under these political
conditions.” (Abrahamian, 2001)
Aghvan Vardanian (Armenian Revolutionary Federation/ Dashnaktsutyun): “It was a
crime, directed against the foundations of our statehood. We think that the law-agencies, if
necessary, have to continue looking for who masterminded it even for decades. But it is
beyond doubt that there were people behind Hunanian and his henchmen and they must be
tracked down and punished." (Abrahamian, 2001)
Myasnik Malkhasian (Hayastan group): “It is painful to see that two years have
passed by but the crime is not discovered, and neither the politicians nor the public have any
idea about how the trial will proceed. As the assassins are known, they should have been long
ago executed; the debate whether death penalty should be applied or not seems to be quite
unnecessary. We are disappointed with the trial process. The authorities should have
undertaken quick action to reveal the organizers. The ongoing trial is keeping the public
strained giving rise to suspicions and controversial comments". (Abrahamian, 2001)
Other politicians have blamed Kocharyan for the bungled criminal investigation of
the parliament attack. Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former president, announced in 2007: “The
October [1999] massacre was the main milestone that cleared the broad way to the formation
and development of Kocharyan's regime” (Danielyan, 2007, Eurasianet). Ashot
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Manucharyan, a former member of the Karabakh Committee, accused the President
Kocharyan of "concealing from the investigation the main version of the realization of the
terrorist act of October 27 – V. Sargsyan's and K. Demirchyan's disagreement with the socalled "Goble Plan" of territorial swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan" (Mediamax,
October 26, 2000).
Prison deaths of some of the terrorists have further fuelled more allegations of a highlevel cover-up of the parliament attack. Specifically the relatives and supporters of the
murdered politicians suspected Kocharyan and then State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan
of masterminding the killings and mishandling the trial.
Amidst widespread accusations, Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan initially
found themselves in a vulnerable position. Vazgen Sargsyan's followers in both the Defense
Ministry and the "Yerkrapah" held Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan partly responsible
for the tragedy. They particularly demanded the State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan's
resignation (Sanjian 1999). But Kocharyan and Sargsyan were not the only ones at risk; the
Armenian National Assembly was in disarray. The National Assembly significantly
weakened by the assassinations and without a strong Parliamentary Speaker, was no longer
able to assume the role of a powerful political counter-balance to the president (Petrosian
2005). The governmental elite that could oppose and block the political domination of the
new president was now demolished. "Miasnutyun" was unlikely to survive the death of its
leaders; with Sargsyan and Demirchyan dead, no other party member was powerful enough
or had the political vision to maintain the coalition. For the next few months, Kocharyan
neutralized a few of his opponents, by appointing them to high positions, many of who he
later dismissed.196
After the death of the most powerful military person, Vazgen Sarsgyan, who could
have potentially challenged the new president’s power, Kocharyan’s next mission became the
formation of a new coalition, a new political team. The emphasis of the coalition was the
establishment of a strong military team, a team that could protect Kocharyan in case of
196

For example, the assassinated Prime Minister's brother Aram Sargsyan was appointed Prime Minister. But
Aram Sargasyan was dismissed by Kocharyan in May 2000, less than a year after the appointment, due to
"inability to work" with Sargsyan's cabinet.
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potential opposition and challenge to his power. In 2000, he made new appointments for
Defense Deputy Ministers (Manvel Grigoryan, Gagik Melkonyan, Yuri Khachaturov, Arthur
Aghabekyan, Michael Grigoryan). In May of the same year, in violation of the Constitution
and bypassing the government, Defense Minister Vagharshak Harutyunyan was fired.
President Kocharyan justified his decision by stating that “the Armenian army would have
found itself on the verge of collapse if he [Harutyunyan] had stayed in office for another six
months”. The president also claimed that Harutyunan “was the only general of the Armenian
army who did not spend a day at the front”, adding that he [Kocharyan] “immediately
participated in the creation of the army and could not stay indifferent to that.”197 The real
reason behind the Defense Minister's dismissal was the fact that right after the tragedy of
October 1999 (the Parliament attack), Harutyunyan had blocked all the roads to the city by
his own initiative. Kocharyan publicly condemned the Minister, announcing that the latter
didn’t have the right to take any steps without discussing it with the President. 198
Harutyunyan, consequently, was replaced with a long-time strong supporter and war-time
friend Serzh Sargsyan. Kocharyan quickly managed to attain his political power and
leadership. By the summer of 2000, he fully recovered his strength as president and
dismissed all his opponents from key posts.
The government became more authoritarian and politically exclusive, asthe use of
force to resolve economic and political issues gradually became a predominant propensity of
the Armenian state leaders. Armenia's evolution into a totalitarian regime that started with
Ter-Petrossian's resignation continued. 199 The country carried on its "slide into a semi197

For more details, please see the website www.Karabakh.org, available online at
http://www.karabakh.org/news/analysis/azerbaijans -army-and-armenias-armed-fo rces/4/).
198 The Minister acted on his own due to the extreme situation. The chairmen of the legislative and executive
branches were murdered, the whole National Assembly was occupied, and its members taken hostage by the
terrorists. Supposedly, under these circumstances, the Minister made the right decision to block the roads to the
capital city, assuming that this may be a large-scale terrorist attack against the country. There are also premises
that Harutyunyan was not able to find Kocharyan urgently (Seyranyan2008).
199 One may counter-argue here that according to my presentation, Vazgen Sargsyan was a powerful hardliner
during the last few years of Ter-Petrossian's administration and he was instrumental in Ter-Petrossian's
resignation and the demise of democratic norms in Armenia. However, I have further highlighted that Sargsyan,
soon after Ter-Petrossian's resignation, realized the genuine value of Ter-Petrossian's arguments on the
Karabakh conflict resolution and, reportedly, was gradually changing to a less nationalist leader. Whereas it is
debatable whether Sargsyan would truly change to a more popular and less autocratic leader as Prime Ministe r,
if not assassinated, it is unquestionable that his political presence, and moreover his changed attitude toward s
Kocharyan's policies, was the strongest impediment to the monopolization of politics by Kocharyan, widely
considered to be the shrewdest hardliner of the "Karabakh Party". In this sense, I agree to Israelyan's
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authoritarian state dominated by a powerful president" (Coalson and Tamrazian, 2009). Anna
Israelyan, a well-known journalist who reports for RFE/RL Armenia, wrote: "After October
27, authority in Armenia became very monolithic, with a single center" (ibid). According to
many, both in media and in political discourse, after this infamous episode president
Kocharyan solidified his grip on power, and hopes for a more politically diverse atmosphere
in the country became increasingly elusive.
Whatever the real motive behind the Parliament attack of 1999, it plunged the country
into crisis. It was an unprecedented event for Armenia, which traumatized the small
landlocked country and shocked the world. It created a situation fraught with uncertainty.
Political leaders of great powers expressed their fears that the attack would undermine
attempts to resolve the Karabakh dispute. Then US president Bill Clinton condemned the
violence and stated that "Prime Minister Sarkisyan’s death was a real blow to that country
and that region” (Marsden 1999).
The event had a major impact on the neighboring countries’ perception of Armenia’s
internal strength. It created an image of Armenia with frail and fragmented political elites.
This was specifically true on the part of Azerbaijan. The deputy chairman of the Azeri
Popular Front (APF), Ali Kerimov, stated that Armenia could not be trusted to fulfill any
conditions that might be made in a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh (Avagyan and
Tadevosyan 2005). The head of the Azeri Parliament committee of foreign affairs, Rza
Ibadov, declared the shooting was “not only a powerful blow to the image of Armenia, but
also an obvious demonstration of the inter-party political crisis in Armenia. It seems that
concrete political powers stand behind the acts of the terrorists” (ibid).
Besides creating huge shifts in Armenian local political scene and, perhaps, affecting
Armenia’s foreign affairs, the Parliament shooting negatively influenced Armenia’s
economy, specifically through a decrease in foreign investment. Ugurluyan (2001) states that
the assassinations directly impacted theforeign investmentlevel in Armenia, which dropped
92.2% from 1998 to 1999. "October 27 events adversely impacted the situation in the country

observation that Sarsgayn's assassination was critical in the establishment of a "monolithic political
atmosphere" and the expansion of political exclusion in the republic.
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in all aspects and spheres and its consequences will be felt for long, in economic, political
and social expressions" (Human Rights and Human Development Action for Progress:
Armenia 2000:15). It predicted a further decline in human development (ibid).
Iskandaryan and Cheterian (2008) contend that the Parliament massacre and
Kocharyan's capacity to outmaneuver his rivals led to the formation of a pyramid of power in
Armenia, on top of which stood the president. "All competing political forces were
eliminated, marginalized, or co-opted, creating the conditions for a pyramidal political
system" (Iskandaryan and Cheterian 2008). Yet, while Kocharyan was a strong ruler, he
lacked a popular base in Armenia. It made him rely even more on authoritarian methods,
suppressing the media and falsifying elections (ibid).
7.4.5. Post-electoral Violence of March 1, 2008
Since 2000, state coercion has been particularly harsh against people at times of
elections in Armenia. The political atmosphere during elections, specifically in the 2003 and
2008 presidential elections, was marred with intimidation. In 2003, Kocharyan was reelected
in an election that was acknowledged to be fraudulent by OSCE and international observers
(OSCE/ODHIR 2003). The 2003 presidential elections occurred through two rounds. Since
no candidate received a majority of votes in the first round of the elections held on February
19, a second round was held on March 5 200 . After the first round, the opposition expressed its
discontent by organizing large rallies in Yerevan. Police detained demonstrators and
opposition supports on February 22. Reports prepared by OSCE and Human Rights Watch
state that more than 200 people were detained and many were sentenced to 15 days of
administrative detention in efforts to ruin the opposition before the second round of elections
to be held in March (OSCE/ODHIR 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003). In March, according
to official results, Kocharyan defeated the main opposition candidate Stepan Demirchyan
with about 67% of the electoral vote.
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During the first round of elections, incumbent President Robert Kocharyan received a little less than 50% of
the vote, not being able to defeat main opposition candidate Stepan Demirchyan, assassinated Karen
Demirchyan’s son.
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The Armenian government continued to use excessive force against disgruntled
people in April of 2004, when Armenia’s political opposition and civil society united in mass
peaceful protests. People, led by major opposition forces, demanded Kocharyan’s
resignation. The cycle of state repression was repeated through violent dispersion of peaceful
demonstrators, arrests, journalist attacks, raids of political party offices, and restriction of
travel from regions to the capital city in order to prevent people from participating in
demonstrations.
After Kocharyan’s reelection as president in 2003, the Armenian Republican Party –
the main government-supported political party – consolidated its grip on Parliament.
Oppositional representation became very limited in the National Assembly. Therefore, the
political environment was void of political diversity in the eve of 2008 presidential elections.
President Kocharyan was serving his second and last term as President, and it was apparent
that Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan would become Kocharyan’s heir to presidency in the
2008 presidential elections.
The political apathy was broken on September 21 of 2007 by Ter-Petrossian, who in
his first public speech since his resignation fiercely denounced Kocharyan and criticized his
administration for the existing corruption, human rights violations, criminality and plutocracy
(RFE/RL, September 2007). Later in October, Ter-Petrossian publicly announced his
intention to run for the presidency and lead the opposition in the forthcoming elections.
Armenia’s former president’s speech increased hopes of replacing the current regime in the
upcoming presidential elections. Yet the incumbent government once again was facing the
issue of maintaining power at all costs. Ter-Petrossian’s intentions to lead the opposition in
the wake of elections leveraged the government to take exceptional steps against oppositional
challenges. The state elites’ apprehension was particularly expressed by the fact that the progovernment media, including all TV channels, were profoundly skewed in Sargsyan’s favor
before elections. They sharply criticized the opposition and its leader (RFE/RL 2007; PACE
2008; Arminfo 2008).
Sargsyan and Ter-Petrossian were the main presidential candidates among nine
candidates during the February 19, 2008 elections. According to official tallies, Prime
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Minister Sargsyan won the elections and his main challenger Ter-Petrossian placed second.
On February 20, the Central Election Commission declared Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan
the winner of the elections with 52.8% of the vote. Based on official results, Levon TerPetrossian won 21.5%. Immediately after the elections, OSCE, Human Rights Watch, and
other international observers criticized the 2008 Armenian presidential elections as nondemocratic and documented several cases of voter intimidation, threatening, violation of the
right to secret ballot, ballot stuffing, and violent attacks of opposition party activists (OSCE
2008; Human Rights Watch 2008). A majority of Armenian citizens also condemned the
elections as unfair.
The election results were particularly strongly disputed by supporters of TerPetrossian. Thousands of citizens contending Sargsyan’s victory as fraudulent organized 10
days of continuous peaceful protests in Yerevan’s Freedom Square after the election. Daily
rallies were held in the streets of Yerevan. Hundreds of protestors camped out overnight in
tents in the Freedom square. On March 1, 2008, this peaceful mass mobilization ended in
deadly clashes between government forces and demonstrators. Early in the morning, the
police attacked people, who were sleeping in their tents on Freedom Square in central
Yerevan and dispersed the demonstrators chasing them for several kilometers (Human Rights
Watch, 2008). Ter-Petrossian was forcefully taken to his residence and put under house arrest
(RFE/RL 2008; Nazaryan 2011). Ten people died, more than a hundred were injured, and
several dozen were arrested as political prisoners (Human Rights Watch, February 25, 2009;
Fuller and Giragosian, April 26, 2011). Police charged those who were arrested with violent
attempts of government overthrow, mass disorder, police resistance, and other criminal
offenses. The opposition – in reality extremely organized and peaceful – was blamed for
creating disorder, political turmoil and instability in the country. The recurring cycle of
Armenian people demanding their right to equal law and fair voting resulted in an imposition
of a 20-day state of emergency, including a complete ban on public rallies, by the Armenian
government (Human Rights Watch, February 25, 2009; Tavernise 2008).
According to the President’s decree, the media were forbidden to use any other source
of information on the internal affairs of Armenia beside the official ones (Message of
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to the People of Armenia, March 1, 2008). In the
218

aftermath of protest crackdown, many newspapers, several radio stations, and most online
news were banned. Foreign broadcasters’ reports on Armenia were shut down along with
other local mass media (Yerevan Press Club, 2009). National Security Service officials
censored newspaper contents and banned their publication when those were in favor of the
opposition (ibid). The Armenian government also banned the Armenian- language broadcasts
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In a March 7 editorial titled “Dark Days in Armenia,”
the New York Times called on President George W. Bush, along with European leaders, to
“make clear to Armenia’s government that such behavior is unacceptable and will jeopardize
future relations” (NY Times 2008). “A clear signal of disapproval is needed in order to halt
what the editorial described as a “slide into authoritarianism” by CIS states” (EurasiaNet
2008).
Nazaryan (2011) comments that although the purpose of the state of emergency was
declared to “promote national reconciliation” (Kocharyan, 2008), the Armenian people
lacked information about how many people had been killed and injured, or who was arrested
and why (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Citizens’ attempts to organize protests in other cities
and towns of Armenia were contained by local authorities in spite of the fact that the state of
emergency was declared only for the capital city, Yerevan.
After the state of emergency was declared, regular army troops were charged with
maintaining public order in the country. The Armenian military deployed its troops in the
city center. Addressing the Armenian nation, the Chief of the Armed Forces Seyran Ohanyan
cautioned that any attempts of rallies by people will be “strictly” countered. “I would like to
warn all citizens that any attempt to organize or participate in events prohibited under the
state of emergency would be adequately and strictly countered by the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Armenia. … In particular, I am asking you to refrain from attempting to
assemble in Yerevan even in small groups” (ArmTown 2008; Horizon Weekly 2008).
Accordingly, the army would intervene at the “slightest” sign of such attempts, consequently
making the Armenian army politicized and the Armenian state militarized.
In contrast to Ohanyan’s announcement that the army would intervene in case of
social mobilization, the Defense Minister Mikhail Harutyunyan had announced days earlier:
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“No one will involve the army in political processes!” (Panarmenian.net, 2008) 201 On
February 23, four days after the presidential elections and a few days before the armed forces
restrained protesting citizens, Harutyunyan said: “All Deputies to the Defense Minister are
performing their duties. The army doesn’t deal with politics. We obey the orders of the
Supreme Commander.” In the same speech, however, the Minister announced that the army
and military leaders do not support Levon Ter-Petrossian and added that “the dreams of the
opposition will never come true” (ibid)202 .
Reporters and analysts conclude that the post-election process of 2008, specifically
the violent repression of demonstrators, the use of not only police but also the army, and the
declaration of a state of emergency, became a turning point for the delay of Armenia’s future
democratization. Using the military in internal affairs is banned by the Armenian
Constitution (Article 8.2; Article 55, part 13). Article 8.2 stipulates: “The armed forces of the
Republic of Armenia shall ensure security, defense and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Armenia, as well as inviolability of its borders. The armed forces shall maintain neutralit y in
political matters and remain under civilian control.”203
Furthermore, part 13 of the Article 55 of the Constitution states: “In the event of an
armed attack against the Republic, an imminent danger thereof or declaration of war, [the
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In 1992-1994 Mikhail Harutyunyan has held different positions in the system of Armed Forces of the
Republic of Armenia. Harutyunyan was one of the reliable figures in the government of Robert Kocharyan after
the 1999 coup, having provided services to Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. In 2000, Mikhail
Harutyunyan, First Deputy of Defense Minister, Chief of General Staff of the RA Armed Forces temporarily
fulfilled the duties of Defense Minister. In 2007 again, Serzh Sargsyan assigned Harutyunyan as Defense
Minister of RA. During the same time, Seyran Ohanyan was assigned the post of Chief of General Staff of the
RA Armed Forces (Gabrielyan 2011).
According to Gabrielyan (2011), the positions occupied in the Defense Ministry helped Harutyunyan and his
family members to illegally convert money into real estate and many businesses. The Harutyunyan family is a
shareholder of “Rome”, “Cactus” and “Central” restaurants, the “Le Boheme” chain of cafes, the clothing shop
“Storm”, and Austrian Airlines in Armenia. It is rumored that the former Minister has apartments in the cen ter
of Yerevan and Moscow, as well as private houses in Armenia.
202 Ter-Petrossian and the opposition were not expecting either the Armed Forces or the Defense Ministry to
support the opposition. However, they hoped that the Defense Ministry would not violate the
ArmenianConstitution and would not interfere with the peaceful demonstrations. But according to the Defense
Minister's words, the Defense Ministry had a predisposition against the opposition. Harutyunyan's statement
that "the army and the military leaders [did] not support Ter-Petrossian" displays the non-neutrality of the
military leaders.
203 For Article 8.2 and Article 55, part 13, please see the Armenian Constitution, available online at:
http://www.Parliament.am/Parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng
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President of the Republic] shall declare a martial law, may call for a general or partial
mobilization and shall decide on the use of the armed forces. In case of use of the armed
forces or declaration of martial law a special sitting of the National Assembly shall be
convened by force of law. The law shall define the legal regime of martial law.” With this
Article, the Armenian constitution contemplates that the President cannot announce martial
law, unless an extreme military situation arises threatening the security of the nation. The
mandatory conditions allowing for the implementation of armed forces were absent in the
post-election oppositional mobilization in the Republic of Armenia. “So, the administration
of the new military structure … could not be justified by the formulation of “the assurance of
constitutional duties of the RA armed forces”” (Gabrielyan 2011).
Ignoring the constitutional ban discussed above, the army was brought to the streets
of Yerevan on March 1, 2008. The DefenseMinister justified the decree of a state of
emergency by the fact that it had been signed by the President, and that he was guided by the
President’s decree. Reporters, therefore, claimed that “the Defense Minister superimposed
the decrees of the President to the RA Constitution” (Gabrielyan 2011).
When confronted by reporters regarding the President’s decree on state of emergency
and its unconstitutionality, the Armenian authorities also stressed the military threat from
Azerbaijan and tried to justify the legality of President’s order by the Armenian-Azerbaijani
border line tensions. According to Robert Kocharyan’s press secretary, Victor Soghomonyan,
“the acts of the Defense Minister of Armenia should be viewed in the framework of security
and territorial integrity, and should be considered in the context of real threats, which are
present in 2008 January-February. The Azerbaijani armed forces contact line tensions and an
aggressive performance in the internal political situation in Armenia, shows the readiness of
Azerbaijan to find a military solution to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”. This kind of reasoning
of Armenian officials and the extensive participation of the military in post-election
processes yet again confirm that after the Karabakh war the Armenian state has continued
militarization tendencies in handling the inner politics of the country. State elites
aggressively used the military during the 2008 February-March events in order to keep the
regime in power at any price.
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The international reaction towards the actions of the Armenian government was
disparaging. Giorgi Gogia, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, commented regarding
March 1 events in the following way: “The authorities’ response to the March 1 events has
been one-sided. The fact that police were themselves under attack at times by no means
excuses them for incidents when they used excessive force.” Human Rights Watch also states
that there was evidence that “the use of force went outside the boundaries of legitimate
policing” and urged Armenian government to prosecute those responsible (Human Rights
Watch 2009).
There was a strong critique of Armenian authorities concerning harassment of the
media. “We’re alarmed by this blatant attempt to censor news of the disputed election,” the
Executive Director of Committee to Protect Journalists Joel Simon stated on March 2. “We
call on Armenian authorities to withdraw the ban on independent news gathering and
dissemination, and restore access to independent and opposition media” (Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) 2008). Three days later, the Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG), which oversees all non-military U.S. international broadcasting joined the Committee
to Protect Journalists’ criticism of socio-political exclusion in Armenia by a strong objection
to blackout of independent media in Armenia. “Censorship and harassment of the media are
the antithesis of democracy,” said James K. Glassman, Chairman of the BBG (Broadcasting
Board of Governors 2008).
Another harsh criticism from the Council of Europe was related to Levon TerPetrossian’s house arrest and the restrictions on his freedom of movement. Terry Davis, the
secretary general of the Council of Europe, indicated that “the limitations placed on the
opposition leader constituted arbitrary action on the government’s part” (EurasiaNet 2008).
Many Diaspora Armenians also reacted negatively to what was happening in their
historic homeland. On March 2, more than 10,000 supporters of Armenia’s opposition staged
a protest in Hollywood's Little Armenia district. Protestors condemned the Armenian
authorities for corruption and unfairness in the country, for fraudulent elections and postelection violence against people. Through speeches and a petition, the protest urged the US to
intervene in “establishing democracy” in Armenia (Horizon Weekly 2008).
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As in the aftermath of the 1999 Parliament shootings, the two other South Caucasian
countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan closely monitored official behavior in Armenia.
Representatives of civil society from both countries expressed relentless criticism of March 1
repression. Georgia’s oppositional parties assailed the Kocharyan administration for resorting
to force and called on Armenian authority to stop violence against the Armenian people.
“Murder of citizens during demonstrations, arrest of oppositional activists, introduction of
the state of emergency and censor, using of military detachments, equipment and armament
confirms that the government of Armenia tried to use violence not having exhausted
resources for dialogue with the opposition, which doubted official results of the president ial
elections,” reads the statement released by the “Republican” party of Georgia (IDEE 2008).
Azerbaijan also condemned the outbreak of violence in Armenia. Azerbaijani
President Aliyev attributed the March 1 aggression in Yerevan to “the ill-considered policies
of the [Armenian] government” (EuraisaNet 2008). At the same time, according to some
political observers, Azerbaijan tried to take advantage of the unrest in Armenia and used the
political tensions inside Armenia to attack the Armenian border near Mardakert on March
4.204 The clash between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces on March 4 caused several
fatalities and was considered to be one of the worst after the ceasefire. According to the
speculation that Azeris initiated the attack, Azerbaijani authorities, frustrated with Armenia
over the seized territories during the war, tried to please Azeri population and “score public
relations” (EuraisaNet 2008). Regarding the clashes, Foreign Minister of the Republic of
Armenia Vartan Oskanian emphasized: “If someone in Baku hopes to gain psychological
dividends, thinking that we are too concentrated on our internal affairs, he is deeply
mistaken” (PanArmenian News 2008).205
While Armenia blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the attack, the Azerbaijani military
accused the Armenian side of attacking Azeri positions in Karabakh’s Mardakert district. The
Azerbaijani officials linked the border clash with the post-election tensions in Armenia,
stating that it was a clear provocation by Armenia and an attempt to divert the attention of
204

It is, however, strongly argued that Armenian side provoked the border clash.
Another source wrote that Oskanian told reporters: "Perhaps they [Azeris] thought we had focused all of our
attention on our internal situation, and that this could provide them with a psychological advantage, but this
hasn't proved the case." (RFE/RL 2008)
205
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their citizens from the domestic political tensions (RFE/RL 2008).Some Armenian historians
and political analysts believe that in this case the Azerbaijani interpretation was closer to the
truth.
Regardless of extensive local and international criticism, on March 17, 2008, the
Armenian National Assembly passed amendments to the law on public assembly. 206 The
“Law on amending and supplementing the Republic of Armenia law on conducting meetings,
assemblies, rallies and demonstrations”was promulgated by the President of the Republic and
entered into force on March 19, 2008207 . The amendments, which severely restricted public
gatherings, came into force just before the lifting of the state of emergency on March 21.
More specifically, the amendments tightened provisions concerning spontaneous assemblies.
They also limited the possibility for decisions on restricting assemblies, which deemed to
pose a risk for public order, to be reviewed by an independent tribunal or court. Furthermore,
a provision allowing for small events to develop spontaneously into bigger assemblies, which
was considered a good practice example in the Law in its previous form, was repealed.
The Armenian government’s tactic to amend the Law on Conducting Meetings has
been widely considered by political analysts and human rights activists to be another
violation of human rights and political exclusion of Armenian people. “The Armenian
government should allow peaceful demonstrations, not ban them,” announced Holly Cartner,
Europe and Central Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “The new restrictions effectively
punish peaceful demonstrators for the violence that took place on March 1” (Human Rights
Watch, 2009).
The amendment was criticized by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
and the OSCE. Both the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and the OSCE’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) raised serious concerns regarding the
above-mentioned amendments. “On the basis of a preliminary assessment, the Venice
206

For details of the Law, please refer to the Armenian Legislation; Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies,
Rallies and Demonstrations of the Republic of Armenia, available online at:
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/9046
207 For details of the amendments to the Law, please refer to the Armenian Legislation; Amen dments to the
Draft Law of April 2008 on amending and supplementing the lawon conducting meetings, assemblies, rallies
and demonstrations of the Republic of Armenia, available online at:
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/9038
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Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR Expert Panel on Freedom of Assembly do not consider
the proposed amendments to be acceptable, to the extent that they restrict further the right of
assembly in a significant fashion,” concluded Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
and OSCE/ODHIR. Human Rights Watch also assessed the amendments incompatible with
Armenia’s obligations to respect freedom of assembly under the European Convention on
Human Rights, to which Armenia was a party (ECHR) (Human Rights Watch 2009).
Armenian government officials themselves have realized the unlawfulness of their
acts, and as a justification to their actions they passed amendments to the “Law on
Conducting Meetings” as a window dressing. The law provided government authorities with
unfettered discretion to grant or deny permission to hold rallies. 208 “Any justified opinion” of
the Interior Ministry or the National Security Service, even if subjective, could have been
used to terminate an assembly or to justify a denial to assembly. Those are some of the
reasons that prompted international reports to note that “the conduct of authorities in many
cases supported the claim they did not adequately appreciate the importance of freedom of
assembly or its utility in helping a country resolve its national problems” (US Department of
State, 2011:39).
The March 1, 2008 events in Armenia were not only criticized as human rights’
abuses and basically, political exclusion of the Armenian people, but they were also
condemned for the economic consequences they had on the Armenian nation. As a result of
the March 1 crackdown of peaceful masses in Armenia, the Millennium Challenge funds,
allocated by the US government to developing countries to establish democratic institutions,
were cut for Armenia. The Millennium Challenge funds in the amount of 67million USD
were frozen by the United States in Armenia. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
explained the cuts with the slow pace of democratization in Yerevan, particularly
highlighting the flawed presidential elections that ended with the government violently
attacking peaceful protesters. In relation to political exclusion, US officials stated:
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The law contained loopholes that allowed authorities to be free in denying or terminating a meeting or a
rally. For instance, according to the law, an authorized body was required to consider the notification of a mass
public event (over 100 persons) within 72 hours of receiving it, and the decision of the authorized body sh ould
be informed to the organizers of a meeting/rally immediately. But in reality, even if a decision is never made by
the authorized body, the law forbids any assembly.
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“Authorities used harassment and intrusive application of bureaucratic measures to intimidate
and retaliate against government opponents. Police beat pretrial detainees and failed to
provide due process in some cases. Courts remained subject to political pressure from the
executive branch, with the selective prosecution of political opponents and absence of due
process reflecting the judiciary’s lack of independence” (Kucera 2009).
Political exclusion of Armenian citizens extended from brutality used during the
protest crackdown to a broader repression of opposition supporters, including repeated
harassment and interrogations of opposition candidate supporters in Yerevan and other
regions of the country (Human Rights Watch, April 2008). Meanwhile, the economic
exclusion of Armenian citizens included tax audits of opposition-owned businesses and proopposition press, and firing opposition supporters and their family members from their jobs
(ibid). The government of Armenia occasionally deployed government agencies, including
the tax and customs services, against political opponents (US Department of State, March
2011). The government campaign of harassment against a Ter-Petrossian supporter,
businessman Khachatur Sukiasyan, is an example documenting Armenian government’s
retaliatory measures against pro-opposition businessmen.209 There were previous harassment
efforts against Sukiasyan for his support of Ter-Petrossian, but this was the first attempt by
the government of Armenia to destroy or seize one of his business assets (Grigoryan, 2008;
Wikileaks, April 07, 2008; A1+, November 6, 2008). 210 After the March events, the customs
agency for several weeks was not releasing cigarettes imported by Pares Armenia, largely
owned by Sukiasyan and his family. The customs agency claimed that the company did not
pay the required payments, despite Pares' insistence that it has made all the required
payments (ibid).211 According to the same source, as well as widely circulated in mass media,
209

More detailed evidence of the economic discrimination employed by the Armenian government against
Khachatur Sukiasyan is presented in Chapter Seven, “Privatization and Social Exclusion”.
210 Marianna Grigoryan, Shut Down for Standing up: Oppositionist’s Business Suffer “Political
Vendetta”,ArmeniaNow, October 28, 2008, retrieved from:
http://armenianow.com/news /9218/shut_down_for_standing_up_oppositi; Armenian Customs Service Joins
Crackdown on Opposition Oligarch, Wikileaks, April 07, 2008, retrieved from
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08YEREVAN297_a.html; Sukiasyan Declares that Their Assets Are
Robbed, A1+ News, November 6, 2008, retrieved from: http://www.a1plus.am/en/politics/2008/11/6/ 7784
211 Pares Armenia, the official importer and distributor of Philip Morris brands of cigarettes in Armenia since
1998, was Armenia’s eighth-largest taxpayer in 2007, paying USD 22 million in customs duties and other taxes,
according to State Tax Service statistics (Wikileaks, April 07, 2008). Pares claimed to have paid over USD 1.4
million for documentary stamps needed to clear three different shipments, none of which were released. On
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the State Tax Service conducted unexpected tax inspections in many of the Sukiasyan-owned
SIL Group businesses. Based on those inspections, the Director of SIL's Pizza Di Roma
restaurant chain and the director of SIL’s Bjni bottled water operation were jailed, two Pizza
di Roma employees were arrested, and a cashier was charged, all on tax-evasion charges. In
early March of 2008, Khachatur Sukiasyan was stripped of his parliamentary immunity. He
and his two brothers were either arrested or had fled the country (Wikileaks, April 7, 2008).
Sukiasyan’s case of political and economic oppression was not a rare incidence.
According to OSCE (2008, October 9), there were several dozens of similar cases of political
exclusion after the 2008 presidential elections. Among them OSCE included Sasun
Mikayelyan (Member of Parliament, Mayor of Hrazdan), Hakob Hakobyan (Member of
Parliament, President of a Civil-Political Organisation), Myasnik Malkhasyan (Vice
President of the Yerkrapah Union), Aleksander Arzumanyan (Former Foreign Minister, Head
of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s Electoral Staff), Suren Surenyan (ANM Party member, Proxy of
Levon Ter-Petrosyan), Nikol Pashinyan (Editor in Chief of “Haykakan Zhamanak” daily
newspaper, Founder of “Alternative” Civil Movement and the Leader of Impeachment
political bloc). OSCE reported that those cases “were fabricated on the basis of contradicting
and vague testimonies given solely by Police” (OSCE, 2008, October 9). The arrests and
detention of these politicians were reportedly conducted with numerous violations.
Not only pro-opposition politicians and businessmen were under government radar,
but also journalists, political activists, students, and blue-collar workers, who were identified
for their support of the opposition candidate. A publicly-known example of government’s
retaliation and economic exclusion exercised against nonpartisan journalism was related to
the case of independent Gala TV station (ArmenPress, November 2007; Human Rights
Report, Armenia 2007). In November, 2007, by launching a massive inspection of Gala’s
accounting books, Armenian tax authorities allegedly discovered several financial breaches
related to the TV station. The tax inspection occurred right after the TV station broadcastTer-

March 1, Customs denied the request for the stamps (despite having received a payment of USD 128,000
several days earlier), saying the length of the contract with the partner (Philip Morris) was not clear. Pares
provided documentation of the contract on March 10, but Customs did not release the shipment, or explained
the reason for holding up any of the s hipments (ibid).
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Petrossian’s speech, in which he harshly criticized the Armenian state leaders (ArmenPress,
November 2007). The TV station was forced off the air, after the tax authorities froze its
assets and bank accounts over allegedly unpaid taxes (RFE/RL, April 9, 2010).
In December, tax inspectors confiscated thousands of leaflets ordered by the
“Alternative” opposition movement, announcing an opposition rally. An “Alternative”
member, Artak Arakelyan, was taken into custody and fined 50USD on grounds that he had
no document certifying the origins of the fliers (Human Rights Report, Armenia 2007). The
State Tax Service also inspected the accounting books of the printing company that had
printed the leaflets and briefly detained one of its employees (ibid). The same month, the
office of the opposition newspaper “Chorrord Ishkhanutyun” was exploded; the office with
its furniture was largely damaged, but there were no employees injured, as the explosion
occurred before working hours. People linked the explosion to the newspaper’s critical
coverage of the government. The examples of tax inspection and customs service activities
against pro-opposition citizens were ample in the press, given that the Kocharyan’s
administration and the newly elected government of Sargsyan used those agencies to
intimidate resistance not only after, but also prior to the elections.
The examination of the political events preceding and following the March 1
demonstrations and killings of peacefully protesting citizens in Armenia, as well as the
political discourse about the 20 days of the proclaimed state of emergency heavily support
the hypothesis of post-war state militarization. The employment of martial forces against
people and state of emergency launched by Kocharyan and Sargsyan administration was a
typical means of political exclusion. It contained most of the elements described in the
definition of political exclusion, such as political arrests, restrictions on freedom of assembly,
limitation of freedom of speech, ban of civil liberties, and other human rights violations. All
of the above discussed fundamentals constitute the non-classical form of state militarization,
when in the absence of war, former and/or current military representatives (in this case, field
commanders turned into politicians) influence the state of political affairs in a country.
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter was devoted to the analysis of war, nationalism, and state militarizatio n
and their relation to social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. It argued that because of the
state militarization after the Karabakh war the role of vital institutions that could increase
political opposition's reinforcement, including its access to decision-making and leadership,
was undermined. Armenian state elites, coercive and extremely nationalist, hindered the
evolution of participatory institutions, institutional norms and informal structures that could
tackle social exclusion and overcome deficiencies of private markets and social services. The
lack of free and fair elections, party competition, independent judiciary and legislation,
which are important structures for fostering social inclusion, has continuously reproduced
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia.
The chapter suggests that if nationalism and militarization were reinstated by a more
pragmatic ideology within Armenian communities, Armenian state elites could more
effectively evaluate national discourses/policies that would not perpetuate violence and that
would alleviate societal problems. The primary goal of the chapter is to demonstrate that
after the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian, the method of maintaining the "status-quo" on
the resolution of Karabakh has been beneficial to state elites in preserving their own coercive
power to solve "uncomfortable" domestic situations. Since the end of 1990s, the
reinforcement of vibrant nationalist ideals among the nation by state elites has become the
main channel to cultivate and nurture post-war state militarization. These nationalist-oriented
tendencies allowed state elites to form elite coalitions or, on the contrary, when necessary,
eliminate former allies in order to maintain opportunity hoarding and social closure, and thus,
affect the expansion of social exclusion, particularly its political dimension, in the country.
Summing up the evidence stemming from the war activities and the three post-war events
described in this chapter, it is possible to draw the following conclusions.
The first important observation is that in Armenia, victory in war resulted in
hardwired nationalism, a more uncompromising position on the Karabakh question, an
increasingly more militarized and more exclusionary tendencies. The victory granted
representatives of the armed forces with huge leverage in the political arena and in policy-
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making. Karabakh’s military success was hailed by Armenians as a rare and historic victory,
and it gave war-related leaders heroic reputations and great influence in Armenia (de Waal
2004:256). “The conflict over the direction of post-war policy set a precedent for a military
veto over political outcomes in Armenia” (Horowitz 2003:39). Consequently, “politics in
uniform has emerged as an alternative avenue to power, offering a new source of political
legitimacy for ambitious elements of the military as the traditional path to political power has
become discredited by rampant corruption and feuding political elites” (Giragosyan 1999).
These feuding elites, once in power, banned more reformist political leaders from politics
and policy-making, as we saw in the case of Levon Ter-Petrossian’s resignation. Many of the
proclaimed war commanders developed siege mentalities, and were less tolerant to not only
high-level political opposition, but also media criticism and civic political participation.
Regulatory mechanisms against opposition have multiplied, financial pressure has increased,
and non-conformist media have faced increasing persecution, culminating in the postelectoral opposition crackdown in March 2008. Post-war state militarization often provided
cover for political repression, economic cronyism, and led to coup threats and greater
electoral turmoil, which all are elements of social exclusion.
The people, on one hand, repeatedly mobilized against the state’s mayhem and
lawlessness, but, on the other hand, they have often given up their confrontation against the
state, recollecting the potential danger (often fabricated) against their rival nation. People
have sacrificed their challenges and grievances for the sake of a more important mission – to
maintain national strength and power against the Azeri threat. In these circumstances, a most
significant consequence of militarization of the Armenian state has been the prevention of the
development of adequate political and economic institutions, such as an independent
judiciary, a satisfactory security system, and a developed civil society with free and objective
mass media. Because of the weakness and lack of those institutions, resulting from the state
militarization, Armenia has continuously failed to function as a viable democracy to the
extreme detriment of its citizens.
The Armenian victory defined the weakening of civilian authority and a reallocation
of military and police power. In his interview, Grigoryan mentioned that he found victory in
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war very important in the post-war militarization of the Armenian politics and economy. 212
According to Grigoryan, the victory politically strengthened the group of the volunteers who
fought in the war and with them the military that had been already institutionally created in
the Defense Ministry of Armenia. A lot of these volunteers became high-ranking officers in
the Armenian military. This victorious Armenian military was politically very powerful.
“That in itself was a problem in terms of distorting the country’s preferences, or not the
country’s preferences as much as the system to match to the preferences of the military
establishment because they were politically so powerful”(Grigoryan, 2010). 213 But what
made it worse was that Armenia had no other way of rewarding the volunteers, no other way
of rewarding the victorious Armenian military but to grant them certain economic rewards,
certain economic and political levers, which strengthened them further. Grigoryan argues that
this reward-granting to the warriors of Karabakh war introduced a sort of economic behavior
that was not really reconcilable with the liberal economic reforms. “You have anti-trust laws,
for example, which are absolutely essential for any market to function properly. But at the
same time it is the Defense Ministry that has to control the imports of gasoline and sugar. It
makes no sense. But that’s how it happened” (ibid).
The second and most essential observation revolves around the national versus the
nationalist cause. In Armenia, Ter-Petrossian and his allies considered the Karabakh conflict
to be a national cause, whereas Kocharyan and his associates looked at it as a nationalist
cause. "In the first case, Karabakh is the problem of real people, living today, in the world of
today. In the second case, the antagonist is the Armenian history, or one's memory of it"
(Libaridian 1999:156). By supporting the national cause, Ter-Petrossian did not contend for
a simple foreign policy change. Instead, he attempted to transform the images of Turkey and
Azerbaijan in the public perceptions and national political discourse from vicious enemies to
vital neighbors for the prosperity of Armenia. As Libaridian wisely underlined, “TerPetrossian could not see how Armenian or any other diplomacy could change the position of
any other countries on territorial integrity and occupied territories” (Libaridian
1999:66). However, the key political elites of independent Armenia, led by Ter-Petrossian,
212

Interview with Arman Grigoryan conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on March 24, 2010.
The quote is from the author’s interview with Arman Grigoryan conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on
March 24, 2010.
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were not capable of swaying public perceptions and feelings concerning the national cause –
peace and economic development – because Ter-Petrossian and his supporters became
victims of nationalism that was revived and nurtured by the "Party of Karabakh".
Whereas, in the background of the war circumstances, it was a significantly difficult
task for the intellectual team of elites to promote the national cause, it turned out to be simple
"elite manipulation" by the "Party of Karabakh", the nationalist core of elites, to advocate the
nationalist cause. "To secure constituencies, political parties transformed resistance to change
into respectable political agendas: "national ideology" provided a convenient cover for
regressive politics" (Libaridian 1999:16)214 . Consequently, real power in Armenia became
basically wielded by the nationalist ideology, so much so that even people, who were not
initially inclined towards nationalist ideas and practices, started to feel it necessary to support
them.215
The chapter extensively analyzed the discrepancies between the "step-by-step" and
"package" approaches to the Karabakh conflict solution with the aim to demonstrate that
these differences became the prime excuse for elite fragmentation within the Armenian
government. Political analysts stress that this "ideological split [between the intellectuals and
the "Party of Karabakh"] was a source of great contention and was one of the key reasons for
the stagnation, poverty, and isolation of post-Soviet Armenia" (Shanazaryan 2010:2).
Ter-Petrossian, as a supporter of the "step-by-step" approach, believed that Armenia
could not become economically powerful without the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. It
was essential for Armenia, a landlocked and blockaded country, to open its borders with
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By "change", Libaridian (1999) refers to the nationalist/"no-consessions" approach accepted by Kocharyan
and allies versus the non-traditional/peace-oriented approach to the Karabakh solution. By "change", I believe,
he means the institutional evolution of the Republic of Armenia.
215 Suny (1999) contends that at first the Armenian public was willing to support the "unorthodox positions" on
the resolution of Karabakh advocated by Ter-Petrossian, but the Diaspora and some of the local traditional
parties were wary if not hostile (Suny 1999:158). The latter were more effective in their efforts to breed
nationalist feelings within the society.
It is worth mentioning here that the case of Karabakh strongly challenges the dominant discourse of nationalist
studies, which argues that the shared ethno-religious, linguistic and cultural attributes of a homogeneous
community unite its members so powerfully that no politically significant internal dis agreements could arise.
Accordingly, the irreconcilable differences among Armenian political leaders on the Karabakh issue are very
puzzling, given that Armenians in Armenia, Karabakh, and Diaspora share ethno-religious attributes
(Harutyunyan 2009:188).
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Turkey and have railroads to Middle Eastern and European markets. Turkey, nonetheless,
had always mentioned that it would continue its blockade until there is a settlement of the
Karabakh conflict. Ter-Petrossian’s judgment was based on the apprehension of the national
interests of Armenia. A pragmatist like Ter-Petrossian realized that the achievement of
international recognition for Nagorno-Karabakh or its attachment to Armenia was as good as
impossible (Cornell 1999:127). As a pragmatic leader, he also feared that Azerbaijan’s
economic performance and military prowess would develop rapidly as soon as oil profits
would start to grow, threatening Armenia’s security even more. The former president stressed
his concern about the non-resolution of the Karabakh conflict before resigning from the
presidency in1998 by stressing, “No matter who rules Armenia, he will fail to ensure normal
economic development of the country as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains
unresolved. It will be impossible to solve the existing public and economic problems without
solving the conflict. The closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, no railway access to the
environment leads to increasing transport expenses, reduces Armenian’s export opportunities
and looses interest in foreign investors to invest capital in our country” (Middle East
Information Center, 2006). For Ter-Petrossian, Armenians won the battle not the war, and the
international community would not tolerate the long-term status quo in Karabakh.
It is often argued that over time, the "step-by-step" approach has emerged as the
optimal basis for solution. It was an optimal blueprint for peace settlement as it envisaged a
potential for creating a balance between two fundamentally contradicting principles of
international law, that is, self-determination and territorial integrity. Aghasi Yenokian, a
political analyst, said in 2008: "History has shown that a package solution, as such, does not
exist. Ten years have passed since Ter-Petrossian was removed from power. And throughout
all these years, every initiative that emerged was based on a step-by-step principle. The
"package" solution was impossible, be it from a political or a technical perspective."
(RFE/RL 2008). It should be noted that current proposals to end the Karabakh conflict are
remarkably similar to the 1997 peace plan, which Ter-Petrossian strongly advocated and
which was rejected as "defeatist" by his political adversaries. "
The third observation of the chapter is that the progression of the nationalist cause is
strongly related to the deepening of social exclusion in Armenia. As predicted by Ter233

Petrossian, the "maximalist" position taken by Ter-Petrossian's successor leaders, Kocharyan
and Sargsyan, ignored the economic and social well-being of the Armenian people in
Armenia, focusing mainly on the war victory and no concessions. After the resignation, the
Karabakh conflict was politicized to the detriment of democratic reform. The country
immediately started to move towards a political and human rights crisis, which culminated in
the October terrorist attack of 1999. Since then, intimidation of political opposition,
oppression of free and fair freedom of speech, fraudulent elections, human rights violations
became frequent. Those and similar practices of political exclusion resulted in the violent
breakdown of peaceful demonstrators in 2008. Post-war state militarization was then
institutionalized.
Finally, the last observation, closely related to the second and third observations, is
that the maintenance of the frozen conflict is considered to be geopolitically and
economically harmful for Armenia. Diplomats and negotiators have concluded that
Armenia's national safety, economic development and societal well-being is permanently
threatened unless the Karabakh conflict is resolved. In an interview to RFE/RL, Caucasus
expert de Waal describes the frozen conflict as a "suicide pact", where both sides hurt
themselves and everyone suffers (de Waal 2013). The non-resolution of the conflict harms
not only the two nations, but the security of the whole region.
Nonetheless, finding a solution is not an easy task. Thinking a way out of the
Karabakh conflict requires a rethinking of conventional notions of nationalism (Libaridian
1999, 2004; Laitin and Suny 1999). A long-term solution of the problem lies not in the
antagonism and separation of Armenian and Azeri people and states, which nationalists of
both countries advocate, but in building links between those people. From this point of view,
the increasing arms race between the two countries and militarization of both states is an
unnecessary condition for the conflict resolution.216
Concluding this chapter, it is worth stating that the collective psyche of fear of the
Armenian nation from its immediate neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, allowed state elites

The increasing arms race in Armenia and Azerbaijan was discussed in Chapter 5, “Social Movements and
State Coercion in Comparative Perspective”.
216
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to exploit the idea of a continual state of war even after war. As Libaridian writes, “this fear
both justified and imagined – of the Turk, the Muslim, Pan-Turkism, pogroms, massacres,
and a new genocide – has been exploited and manipulated to rationalize, even welcome, the
lack of independence and absence of democracy in Armenia” (Libaridian 1991).
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CHAPTER 8
Privatization and Social Exclusion
8.1 Introduction
Armenia’s secession from the USSR was accompanied with the Karabakh territorial
dispute, followed by economic blockade, war with Azerbaijan, and state militarization.
Amidst this political, military and economic instability, with just newly emerging
institutions, without any serious control mechanisms to ensure quality implementation of
reforms, Armenia discarded Soviet ideals and transitioned from a planned to a market
economy.
This chapter provides a brief history of privatization in Armenia, particularly
privatization of industries and services, with an emphasis on the inefficiencies of the process
and how it triggered economic exclusion of particularly the low and middle classes of the
society, which in its turn increased social marginalization and political polarization. The
analysis of the overall social exclusion with its three dimensions, as presented in Figures 2.1
and 2.2, will be discussed through the discussion of 1) the failures of industrial privatization,
such as rapid de-industrialization with increased unemployment, low salaries and poor
benefits, unequal hiring and firing procedures by the private owners, and unfair voucher and
tender auctions; 2) the social impact of major social services, such as the energy sector and
telecommunications; 3) administrative barriers to foreign investment; and finally 4) the role
of oligarchy in the monopolization of economic resources and domination of the policymaking outcomes.
The privatization process started unwisely early in Armenia since Armenia of that
time had still quite weak institutions and could not enforce for all citizens a fair access to the
privatized resources. The efforts invested into the militarization processes displaced the
efforts to create or strengthen the institutions that could make the effects of privatization
more equitable and inclusive. As a result, a hectic privatization process facilitated in a
permissive atmosphere,lacking the vigilant eye of control institutions, allowed the creation of
a few wealthybusinessmen (oligarchs) instead of diffused ownership, and barriers to foreign
investment.Above all, the privatization process with its new market relations negatively
236

influenced the capacity of labor unions’operations,and in general weakened the premises for
collective civic action. The random complaints and scattered pressures from the public
against the effects of privatization were unable to intimidate the emerged oligarchs from
employing the new system for their own interests.
During the privatization period, Armenia failed to alter the role of the state from a
direct participant to a regulator of economic activities. Therefore, the framework of economic
activities has not been properly regulated, free competition was not ensured, and the interests
of private owners without connections and power were not safeguarded. The insurance
system, and mechanisms of private investments and pension funds were not well-established,
and the process of privatization was not established on stock exchange mechanisms, as well
as methods of attracting investments and capital through issuing new securities. In short, the
state’s regulative functions were not formed during the initial stages of privatization. The
inability of government officials to create and enforce clear-cut laws and regulations in its
turn encouraged the rise of corruption and inequitable deals during privatization transactions.
Privatization in itself is a process and as such, it cannot be blamed for its
inefficiencies. The inefficiencies of privatization in the case of Armenia were rooted not only
in the method of privatization, but more importantly, the lack ofthe government commitment
to transparent rules of privatization implementation. Therefore, in order to find the flaws of
privatization, I have considered the context in which this process was executed, as well as the
agents who implemented this process. The state with its institutions, the culture and infor mal
rules, the historic timeframe, the nature of civil society, and other exogenous factors, such as
war with Azerbaijan in the case of Armenia, are all important factors that have had their
certain impact on the nature of privatization Armenia carried out, and the latter’s impact on
social exclusion.217 This stipulation makes one wonder whether it was reasonable to
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The historic, economic and political context in which privatization was implemented in Armenia has been
partially presented throughout this dissertation in different chapters. Some of the factors mentioned in the above
paragraph have been discussed to some extent in the militarization chapter. Nonetheless, it is impossible t o
carry an exhaustive examination of all those factors within one chapter, particularly this chapter, as the aim of
the chapter is not the examination of causes of efficient/inefficient privatization, but how privatization process
affected the emergence of deprivation and inequality within large segments of the Armenian society. It is about
the social consequences of inefficient privatization. A more comprehensive study of the state, formal and
informal institutions, culture and history, as well as how they affect the good or bad implementation of
privatization would be a useful topic for future research.
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implement privatization as an economic development policy in post-Soviet Armenia without
first restructuring the Armenian state with its institutions. The problem of employment, for
example, is reflected in the fact that the process of economic restructuring, with privatization
as its main aspect, could not commence without the mentioned restructuring.
The failure of the above-mentioned and other aspects of privatization negatively
influenced overall social well-being and created social inequalities.As observed by UNDP
experts in Armenia, “what had begun as an attempt to equalize the distribution of wealth
ended with a concentration of wealth in a few hands, and this created the foundation for
rising income inequality” (UNDP 2002:66). The new strata of the wealthy and a few
oligarchs with tremendous economic power, who emerged as a result of privatization, began
to close opportunities for others. Overall, it has been estimated that privatization had little if
any efficiency, produced modest revenues and generated no social benefits in Armenia. It is
true that periodically it generated double-digit GDP growth, providing for Armenia the title
of a "Caucasian Tiger", but it failed to distribute this growth evenly for all layers of the
population.Privatization, thus, served as an initial trigger for social exclusion, particularly the
economic aspect of exclusion.
Armenian state formation coincided with the transition to a market economy in the
country, and the shortcomings of the state formation strongly affected the failures of
privatization.
When the state has to lead the society towards wide-raging structural reforms, and when
transformation of the accepted forms of property is unavoidable, the risk of deflection from
the intended course of development is dangerously high. Naturally it begets hesitations about
the rightness of the selected course of development. If the authority accepts the course of
reforms simultaneously ignoring the Social factor, then it is convicted. … In the case of
Armenia it was fairly proved, when the reforms got a negative impression in the people’s
consciousness. The social basic principles didn’t serve as a basis for the republic model. …
As a consequence, state formation became the privilege of a group of people, generating
opposition of vast stratums. (Darbinian 2001:1-2).

Privatization in Armenia has by and large led to a consolidation of control by
incumbent managers, and a creation of a new wealthy class of oligarchs that are closely tied
to government officials. The few individuals, who consolidated wealth in their hands, were
particularly skilled at engaging in bribes and other forms of theft (Khachaturyan 2004:4).
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This prototype of ownership acquisition and wealth concentration was similar to early
experiences of some transition countries.
Mass privatization, specifically before the mid-2000s, was not characterized by
diffused ownership (ownership either by workers or by large numbers of citizens), and it did
not produce significant improvements in enterprise performance. Even when previous
managers became new owners of a company or factory, the companies still did not register
positive achievements. Relative to other CIS countries, where on average management
ownership tends to support restructuring, it is puzzling that in Armenia it has not yielded
positive consequences, at least not yet. The strategy of incumbent managers who became
owners was typically focused on asset stripping.
The initial privatization of industries and factories through the voucher system,
followed by an attempt to implement the privatization of the larger assets and enterprises
through bids and tenders resulted in the creation of a small number of very rich private
owners, and the majority of the population with few opportunities to have investment shares
or to open up new companies. The industrial privatization was futile, because most of the
privatized companies were unable to operate successfully in the new environment of the
early 1990s. Almost all of these initial companies have disappeared with their assets divided
between the ‘owners’ who had ‘purchased’ the vouchers. 218 Many of the assets were old and
obsolete, while the rest were transferred into a few private hands. This type of privatizat ion
may be called an ‘underground’ privatization, where most of the transactions were not
conducted transparently, where the real prices were vague, and where only a small number of
people knew the precise distribution of assets and their worth. There is a popular perception
of the employees of the transition period that this type of privatization was inequitable,
generating unemployment and increases in poverty, vulnerability, deprivation and despair.
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While in Armenia for dissertation research in the summer of 2012, I had several informal talks/interviews
with middle-aged middle class Armenians regarding the voucher privatization. The stories of their personal
experience revealed that their vouchers were not only sold by them, but also taken away by department
managers and company owners through fraudulent schemes and illegal methods. The most surprising fact was
that some of those men and women believed that they still had their investment shares in the companies they
used to work for, even though some of the factories were long ago inactive, asset -stripped, raided and robbed,
or/and sold to foreign investors. Furthermore, these individuals did not have any documentation or legal
paperwork on the sale of their vouchers.
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The net effects of privatization impacted specifically the poorer families living in the
margins of subsistence. The standard of living declined for most Armenians by the increase
of unemployment, decrease of social service provision and increase in the costs of insurance
for such services. Health and education costs increased as well. Privatization undermined the
role of social services, decreased community involvement and narrowed the vision of a good
society and good life (Starr 1988:20).
Privatization in Armenia is often regarded as basically a political decision with little
consideration given to the poverty and inequality impacts of privatizing state owned property
and enterprises. Sharp falls in output and employment accompanied it. After the fall of the
USSR, it was inevitable for Armenia, as one of former Soviet republics, to move to a market
economy. Therefore, it becomes important not to just challenge the transition to a market
economy and society, where power distributions inevitably change, but discuss alternative
methods of privatization that could have had less ominous effects on social polarization and
exclusion.
Manukyan, who was Prime Minister of Armenia in 1990-1991, stated that while he
was supportive of shock therapy and privatization, he was against the methods through which
privatization was accomplished in Armenia, particularly the voucher privatization. 219 He
considers voucher privatization “idiotism” and declares that it provided the Armenian society
with nothing except privation. Instead, Manukyan suggested that privatization could have
resulted in more efficient outcomes if implemented based on the following principles: 1)
distribute all assets into 3 categories (small, medium, and large enterprises); 2) for a small fee
offer the small enterprises, such as cafés, hair salons, small industries and productions to
their managers, who were practically their owners, instead of auctioning or publicly selling
them. Previous managers would effectively operate them; 3) create cooperatives/cooperation
from the medium-sized enterprises that were not of major industrial importance and then
privatize them through public sale; and finally, 4) create large public corporations out of a
219 Vazgen

Manukyan was the Prime Minister of Armenia in 1990-1991. From 1992 to 1993 Manukyan was
acting Minister of Defense. After Armenia gained its independence in 1991, he was elected in the National
Assembly three times and ran unsuccessfully for President of Armenia in 1996, 1998 and 2003. Vazgen
Manukyan is the leader of National Democratic Union (NDU) political party. Currently Manukyan is the
Chairman of the Public Council since 2008.
An interview with Mr. Manukyan was conducted by the author in Yerevan, Armenia on August 29, 2012.
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couple dozen of large industrial units of major industrial significance the work and operation
of which was impossible to restructure quickly without the existence of Soviet economic
system, and postpone their privatization until the government could figure out reasonable
methods to cooperate with international financial and industrial institutions. 220
All of the politicians and researchers interviewed for this research concur that
industrial privatization, starting from voucher privatization, had several pitfalls in Armenia,
except former Prime Minister (1993-96) Bagratyan, during whose years voucher
privatization was implemented. Bagratyan justifies voucher privatization saying that
“Armenian voucher privatization was a true example of social democratic capitalism, when
the government distributed enterprises to their employees through vouchers”. Whereas the
former Prime Minister acknowledges that this method has been widely criticized, he is
convinced that another privatization method would create a bigger concentration of wealth
and resources. According to Bagratyan, the voucher privatization was incomplete, because
the subsequent Prime Minister halted the voucher privatization in 1996. Particularly under
President Kocharyan’s administration, when all the major industrial assets were privatized,
the so-called “investment privatization” started. “Program-based privatization” was the main
mechanism of this stage of privatization, which means that an enterprise was being sold to an
entrepreneur or company based on promises and/or plans of investment. Retrospectively, it is
obvious that “this was a bluff, as there were rare cases of business plans submitted to the
government”. Moreover, the privatized enterprises did not achieve output goals of the
investment promises.221 The majority of investment privatization funds did not develop into
viable financial intermediaries or key agents of corporate governance. 222
The Armenian state struggled to find appropriate mechanisms and enforcement
strength for successful privatization coordination and productive property management.
There was little reinforcement of the economic freedom based on protection of private
property. According to Darbinian, “the [Armenian] private property management yields to
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The ideas of the paragraph derive from the author's interview with Vazgen Manukyan conducted on August
29, 2012.
221 The quotes are from the author’s interview with Hrant Bagratyan conducted on August 20, 2012.
222 The shortcomings of investment privatization are further discussed in the chapter, when I trace the
development and barriers of foreign investment in the Republic of Armenia.
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the Soviet model of the public property management by its efficiency”. Literature points to a
couple of reasons for this: implementation of a free market economy with disregard for social
welfare and assistance; failure to reassess the role of the state; and inability of the state to
create real mechanisms and contractual certainty intended for ownership protection,
particularly in the realm of legal institutions. (Darbinian 2000; Darbinian and Lalayan 2001;
Ugurluyan 2001)
The reformation of the legal system was delayed and not properly carried out in
Armenia. It was more or less achieved when the process of property redistribution was nearly
finished. “Legal reforms lagged at least 4-5 years behind economic ones, as a result of which
the legal framework for protection of private ownership was established only in 1998 and
became effective in 1999, while privatization started from 1992” (Darbinian and Lalayan,
2001:5).Furthermore, Khachaturyan (2004) argues that in regard to privatization, thelegal
systemhas never been effective in Armenia, which stems from tensions between written laws
versus legal enforcement.

According to

Khachaturyan (2004),

Armenia transplanted

relatively “good laws,” but its legal system isinefficient and lacks legal clarity. Also, the
judiciary lacks expertise to deal with commercial cases. Another problem in the judicial
system is related to the conflicting interpretations of substantial and procedural aspects of
many laws. Subsequently, Khachaturyan suggests that "Armenia lacks the most basic
infrastructure to have an efficiently functioning capital market and its capital market reform
agenda should be critically reconsidered (Khachaturyan 2004:66). The shortcomings of the
legal system are also reflected in the relationship of managers and shareholders of firms. As
Coffee points out, "managers do not either contract with shareholders or pledge a
reputational capital that they have carefully built up over years of service; rather, managers
and shareholders are thrown together as legal strangers" (Coffee 1999).
While there certainly may be significant benefits from industrial privatization, in
developing countries with weaker institutions there is the danger that business people exploit
their power to access to public officials. The exploitation of power creates the opportunit y for
corruption, the “ugly stepchild of privatization” leading to public distrust of the democratic
process (Hebdon 1995:2). At the start of privatization, Armenia had just obtained
independence and, as a developing country, possessed weak institutions. With weak
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institutions, the Armenian state could not protect social equity during privatization
transactions. The industrial privatization provided government bureaucrats with ample
opportunities for corruption and motivated the enhancement of corrupt networks due to the
lack of market-supporting institutions.
Administrative and fiscal inefficiencies were inherent in many auctions and tenders
held in Armenia during privatization. Tender officials, who typically were government
officials, had a privileged status that allowed them to manipulate the results of the tender and
favor a particular bidder in return to side transfers (bribes). In this situation not only revenue
maximization of the company suffered, but also opportunities were closed for other bidders,
who had fewer resources to offer to tender officials. In Armenia, similar to many other
transition economies that have experienced a rapid privatization with vast and heterogeneous
assets being privatized, this problem was particularly severe.
Gupta, Schiller and Ma (1999) mention several issues in assessing the social impact
of privatization. Several of them, related to mainly the transformations of labor market
resulting from privatization, are very important in assessing the impact of privatization on
social exclusion in the case of Armenia. The first socially harmful effect of privatization was
the downsizing of the workforce and therefore increasing unemployment rates. Privatization
also had an adverse impact on salary levels and structure, working conditions, and
employees’ benefits. Private companies reduced not only employment and wage rates, but
also pay supplements as compared to state-owned enterprises and internationally- funded
organizations. The tendency of reduced employment and wages created by privatizat ion,
which was in stark contrast with Soviet-times overstaffed state-owned enterprises that used to
pay excessive wages, were expected to be temporary. Over time, however, the Armenian
privatized enterprises could not expand their activities or increase their efficiency, thus the
adverse impact of privatization on employment and salary structure became a long-term
problem.
Privatization may also affect consumer prices negatively, which happened in
Armenia. Privatization was not accompanied by an improvement in productive and allocative
efficiency, and the prices of goods and services produced by newly private companies
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increased. At the same time there were nearly no subsidies arranged by the state in the
context of privatization that could lead to lower prices of goods and services. In this context,
consumer prices were high. These price increases had an adverse impact on living standards
of vulnerable segments of the population.
According to Gupta, Schiller and Ma (1999) there is yet another issue related to the
negative impact of privatization on consumer prices. It is the transition of public monopolies
into private monopolies. There is a threat that a privatized enterprise might exploit
consumers, and their welfare would not improve. This trend associated with private
monopolies has been common in most of the former Soviet republics after their transition to
capitalism. Armenia was not an exception. Armenian private monopolies pursued
maximization of their profit through exploitation of a monopolistic position instead of
through increased competitiveness. New monopolists and oligarchs created complications for
competition and kept prices higher. Also, the new businesses typically did not deliver
services in poor communities, as it was less profitable for them to do so. With the
substitution of private goods for public goods, privatization endangered the availability of
public goods to those who could not afford it.
While privatization effects in Armenia were strongly conditioned by other contingent
factors, such as Armenia’s heavy dependence on the Soviet economic system, the earthquake
of 1988 that negatively affected industrial production, war and subsequent blockade,
privatization in itself unambiguously increased income inequality with the transfer of state
assets to private hands. Private owners, the majority of whom were sons of the local
nomenklatura and new clan leaders, seized privatized assets and extended control over state
and private institutions.223 They enriched themselves with previously state-owned assets,
contributing to dramatic changes in income distribution. It created a new channel of social
(in Russian "номенклату́ ра") used to be a set or class of people within the Soviet Union and
other Eastern Bloc countries who held significant administrative positions in government, industry, agriculture,
education and other key spheres of those countries. In other words, nomenklatura may be defined as a system of
patronage to senior positions in the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union and some other Communist states,
controlled by the leaders of the Communist Party. Nomenklatura positions were granted only with approval by
the communist party of each country and they were basically granted within only the members of the
Communist Party.This system of patronage provided party leaders a stranglehold on all important or rewardin g
jobs.
223 Nomenklatura
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exclusion and inequality, that is, wage differentials between labor and owners. In this sense,
Armenia was not an exception. An increasing wage difference between owners and
employees is typically greater in the private than public sector; therefore privatization
reinforced this differential in Armenia, too.
The accelerated privatization process in post-Soviet Armenia after the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1991 allowed a small segment of society to monopolize most of the wealth
and exclude most Armenians from access to it. As Keane and Prasad (2001:4) write, “it is
well known that in most of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
making the shift from central planning to market economies, income inequality increased
substantially during the first decade of transition.” Not all citizens of the former Soviet
republic benefited equally from market reforms and transactions, as demonstrated by high
levels of income and consumption inequality (see Table 8:1). Among 27 countries (including
the United States) Armenia had the second highest income inequality (56) at the end of 1990s
after Romania (61). By high levels of consumption inequality, Armenia (41) was the third
after Uzbekistan (47) and Kyrgyz Republic (42).
Table 8.1: Gini Coefficients for Income and Consumption Inequality for Eastern European
and CIS Countries in 1997
Income Gini
Consumption
Coefficient
Gini
Country
Coefficient
Albania
43
29
Armenia
56
41
Azerbaijan
49
35
Belarus
25
26
Bosnia and
n/a
24
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
43
26
Croatia
38
26
Czech Republic
34
25
Estonia
36
37
Georgia
51
36
Hungary
40
27
Kazakhstan
n/a
35
Kyrgyz Republic
45
42
Latvia
39
32
Lithuania
40
34
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Table 8.1 Continued
FYR Macedonia
43
34
Moldova
41
37
Poland
37
33
Romania
61
29
Russia
42
34
Slovak Republic
37
24
Slovenia
34
28
Tajikistan
n/a
31
Turkmenistan
n/a
40
Ukraine
42
33
Uzbekistan
n/a
47
United States of
38
n/a
America
Sources: UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World
Bank Development Indicators 2011.
Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 present average income and consumption Gini coefficient
trends, categorized by the three main privatization methods (voucher, sale and management
and employee buyout (MEBO)) from 1992 to 2002. Both income and consumption
inequalities increased sharply during the period fromthe beginning of the 1990s untilthe mid1990s. It should be noted that countries with voucher privatization had nearly always higher
inequality levels both income and consumption wise. Armenia was one of the former Soviet
countries that adopted voucher privatization as the main privatization method, therefore the
high levels of income and consumption inequality observed for Armenia in Table 8.1 is
predictable.224
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More about the characteristics of the voucher privatization in Armenia will be detailed in the following
sections of this chapter.
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Figure 8.1: Income Inequality Trends for Eastern European and CIS Countries by
Privatization Method, 1992-2002 years

Sources: EBRD 1999 Transition Report, Measuring Income Inequality Database 1996,
UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World Bank
Development Indicators 2011.
Figure 8.2: Consumption Inequality Trends for Eastern European and CIS Countries by
Privatization Method, 1992-2002 years

Sources: EBRD 1999 Transition Report, Measuring Income Inequality Database 1996,
UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World Bank
Development Indicators 2011.
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Income, wealth and consumption inequality, which were relatively new to Armenia,
rose also due to the changes in capital markets and industrial labor force, more specifically
the deindustrialization of the economy. 225 Deindustrialization increased social exclusion of
middle and lower class Armenians and created economic struggles for their families. White
collar and professional workers lost their jobs, and found themselves trapped, without the
funds to improve their circumstances. Job cuts due to deindustrialization in Armenia led to
long periods of unemployment, intermittent employment and increased underemployment.
Deindustrialization created extremely low-paid employment of the poor in the informal
sector and survival- level subsistence farming in the agricultural sector. Massive migration of
thousands of industrial workers to Russia, USA, and European countries, where they could
earn for their families, followed the unemployment of these workers.
The effects of deindustrialization transcended simply the loss of salary and
purchasing power. The economic exclusion of unemployed Armenians further increased their
social marginalization and political polarization, as the financial strain created stress,
depression, family tensions, loss of networks and social cohesion. Itproduced reduced
standards of living and a variety of social disruptions not only for the displaced workers and
their families but alsotheir communities.
Before independence, Armenia was a heavily industrial country. As of 1990, the
country had a high level of urbanization. About one third of all employed population was
employed in the production sector, while in Georgia this rate amounted to about 20% and in
Azerbaijan to 17% (Nranyan 2011:197). Even after the earthquake of 1988 that seriously
damaged light industry (with about a 40% decrease), by 1990, the share of industry in GDP
was about 45%. This was still a good indicator relative to other Soviet republics that would
soon become the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, with the deindustrialization of the economy, particularly since 2004, industry’s share of GDP declined
from about 45% in 1990 to less than 20% in 1998. In 2000, its share was a little over 22%.
225 The

social costs of deindustrialization are wide and go beyond unemployment, poverty and consumption
inequality. They manifest in a variety of ways. The deindustrialized communities wres tle with some core
structural problems, such as declining populations, economic development, increased health and mental
problems of their population, increased crime rates, suicide and domestic violence. These problems are
exacerbated by the loss of social networks that come with deindustrialization. Hence, deindustrialization
increased not only economic exclusion, but also overall social exclusion.
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Both heavy and light industry had huge declines in production. The decline of these
industries has hindered the process of labor-intensive growth. The impact of
deindustrialization, as a result of the privatization process, on poverty was severe. By the end
of the 1990s, different household surveys concluded that about half of the population in
Armenia was poor.
Post-privatization medium and large-scale industrial enterprises in Armenia had low
output and employment levels. At the same time new small-scale private enterprises have
been operating leisurely. The deficiency of property rights restructuring was one of the main
reasons for the lack of growth in industry and the persistence of poverty and economic
inequality. The privatization process was not employment- intensive. It did not keep up with
employment levels of Soviet epoch, as it did was not able to generate widespread full-time
employment. The problem was even worse for the middle class and for the poor of the
society. The poor had fewer opportunities to gain secure employment due to several reasons,
among which was not only lack of training and education, but also lack of powerful networks
and acquaintances. Hence, privatization policies were not designed so that the economy
would not exclude the poor from employment. McKinley mentions that “medium and largescale enterprises, which accounted for most of the country’s production, continued to “hoard”
labor, i.e., to keep workers on their books even when they were not actually employed and
earning wages” (McKinley 2002:75). The 1996 Labor Force Survey revealed that almost
one-third of the employees registered as employed in a company were not employed or were
on extended administrative leave (ibid). Official employment data however did not reflect the
real deprivation of employees resulted from “labor hoarding”. The problem of economic
exclusion became even worse, when in mid 1990s private industries laid off about 100,000
employees.
Privatization of once state-regulated companies and the frail growth of new smallscale private companies forced industrial labor to seek employment in the informal sector,
the agricultural sector or to migrate abroad leaving their families alone for extended periods
of time. While this was a common consequence of privatization in most post-Soviet
republics, reports by Western experts reveal that Armenia’s level of unemployment, as well
as income inequality was very high compared to other transition economics during the
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transition to a market economy (UNDP 2002, World Bank 2002 & 2007). Throughout most
of the 1990s, the percentage of unemployed people was above 20% (UNDP 2002). Besides
unemployment, there was also extensive underemployment problem in Armenia. The number
of people living below the poverty line, as well as the level of the Gini coefficient, increased
between the 1990s and 2000s in Armenia. The country experienced a social deficit: lack of
secure employment, low wages, and lack of healthcare and educational opportunities, which
used to be universal during the Soviet times. There have not been many efforts to solve those
problems because many of the social actors who had traditionally politicized such issues
were not well positioned to do so during the period of structural reforms in Armenia. 226
In a personal interview, Armen Darbinian, stressed the importance of distinguishing
between the objective and subjective causes of privatization’s unintended consequences for
the emergence of widespread poverty and social injustice. 227 One of the objective causes of
poverty and inequality in Armenia can be considered the collapse of the Soviet economic
system. To understand Armenia’s emergence as a market economy, it is important to
highlight its Soviet legacy. For some of the small Soviet republics, such as Armenia, their
economic growth was very much dependent on the interrelated Soviet economic system.
With the breakdown of the Soviet economic system, the economy deteriorated and it
worsened the living standards of the majority of the population in Armenia. Sarian (2006)
observes that between 1960 and 1980, the economic profile of Armenia became that of a
welfare state, which relied on the Soviet Union to sustain its economy. As a result, in 1989,
50.8% of the total volume of industrial production and 71.9% of industrial credits in Armenia
were dependent on Soviet subsidies. The total volume of industrial production was 28% and
the total volume of industrial credits was 59% for Estonia, 28.9% and 72.4% for Tajikistan,
28.4% and 48.2% for Moldova, and 31.4% and 66.9% for Georgia. The comparison of those
figures shows the vulnerability of Armenia’s industrial production and how badly the
collapse of the Soviet Union impacted its economy (Sarian 2006).
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Those actors were not well positioned to deal with these problems during the restructuring mainly due to
war, blockade, and somewhat due to local political events.
227 The interview with Darbinian was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, September 3, 2011.
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Another objective factor that Darbinian mentioned concerns human expectations.
According to Darbinian, the collapse of the Soviet system was equal to a revolution. One of
the characteristics of a revolution is that the people who carry on the revolution want their
share. This was the case of Armenia. In his interview, Darbinian stressed the factor of human
expectations out of the privatization process as a most important objective cause of poverty.
People were used to receiving public goods and services through social welfare, and they
continued to expect to receive social welfare without hard work and much effort.
While a sharp reduction in equality across transition economies has been viewed as a
common part of transition, there are also subjective reasons affecting the inequality and
exclusion in each transitioning country. As 90% of my interviewees agreed, in Armenia, the
privatization process affected social exclusion through voucher and auction fraud, lack of
information/education about the use of vouchers by wide sectors of the population,
emergence of local oligarchy, the misuse of recently obtained industries and businesses by
the new capitalists, corruption in the distribution of wealth, and tax avoidance by the very
same people. Following is a brief summary of the interviewees' accounts regarding these six
points and their effects on the exclusion of ordinary Armenians:
Voucher fraud: In Armenia, unlike some other post-socialist countries, vouchers were
publicly tradable.This fostered a voucher market, which allowed citizens to sell their
vouchers, and also made it easy for managers to buy vouchers that could be traded for shares
in their own companies. Managers often acquired the funds to buy vouchers by illegally
“privatizing” company funds. They continued to accumulate control after the voucher
auctions were completed, by convincing or coercing employees to sell their shares.Moreover,
the face value of the voucher was very low. The average citizen, after having received the
voucher, decided that the voucher wasn’t worth anything. Hence, most Armenians
immediately sold their vouchers on the street for an extremely low cost.
Lack of information/education about the use of vouchers by wide sectors of the
population: Vouchers were a new phenomenon in post-Soviet Armenia. With very smallscale to almost no awareness-raising action initiated by the government on this theme,
ordinary citizens remained largely uninformed of the vouchers' value and access to them.
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Emergence of local oligarchy: While only a small group of the Karabakh war
participants later became the government, a few others who also stood out during the war and
felt close to the former peers now running the country, informally served as the peripheral
units or the support groups of the new government. They had more information about the
reform discussions, felt privileged, exchanged favor services with one another, supported
their friends in the implementation of reforms, and as a result, during the privatization they
had more and, usually, not deserved access to the public resources.With this, they stole many
other deserving citizens’ access to the reform processes and the benefits emerging from those
reforms. Local oligarchy was a by-product of the permissive environment with weak
institutions, absence or lack of control mechanisms and absence of civil society throughout
the implementation of one of the most serious reforms determining the future of the country.
Misuse of recently obtained industries and businesses by the new capitalists: Most of
the new owners of the assets were not economists or managers, neither by education nor by
experience. Facing the absence of the coordinated Soviet trade system where one republic
served as a supplier, and the other a customer, they now had difficulties in treating these
industries as a source of stable wealth. Therefore, instead of designing long-term strategic
business plans and making the investments necessary to refresh the business to serve the new
market demands, they set to generate as much cash as possible in the shortest period in the
easiest ways. Most of them sold out the equipment; some started to employ their own keens,
without complying with the rules of quality-based administration and merit-based
employment; some started employing people without contracts and without fixed contractual
agreements, earning more and paying less.
Corruption in the distribution of wealth: During the privatization reform of the larger
industries, business merged with the government, allowing a lot of room for corrupt ways of
decision-making. The business “sponsored” the government, and the government enforced
laws which allowed unfair market competition and encouraged accumulation of growth in the
hands of a few. Citizen groups remained without a right to consult and contribute into the
wealth distribution processes. They operated as mere receptionists and passive users of the
new welfare system.
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Tax avoidance: Feeling privileged and enjoying friendly relationships with the new
government, many oligarchs started new unlawful practices, among them avoiding paying
tax, without being punished for that. This resulted in artificial reduction of state budget and
created favorable climate for increasing the wealth distribution gap.
8.2 History of Privatization in Armenia
During the early 1990s, like many post-Soviet Republics, the Republic of Armenia
experienced economic stagnation and crisis. There was a huge drop in output, and all
macroeconomic indicators worsened. Compared to 1989, GDP decreased by 60% in 1993.
Consumer prices increased 110% in 1993 (Arakelyan 2005). Within this environment, the
Armenian government, under the guidance and advice of Prime Minister economist Hrant
Bagratyan, started its structural reforms, which included liberalization of prices,
liberalization of trade and foreign exchange, and development of private markets.
Armenia adopted the Law of “Privatization of the State Enterprises and Incomplete
Construction Sites” in August of 1992. The law aimed at the development of an efficient
market economy in Armenia through a juridical basis for setting a private relationship
towards basic production funds. This law and subsequent laws regarding the privatization
process in the Armenia have been frequently amended with the verification and confirmation
of Ministry of State Property Management of the Republic of Armenia, the government
agency that was established in July 1999 to oversee and govern privatization. 228
Two principal laws of privatization were enacted in 1996 and 1997, replacing the
earlier privatization law. These laws have been amended later, but with little changes. The
first one was the Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies, (JSCL) adopted
by the National Assembly in 1996. The JSCL of 1996 was revised in 2001 to reflect the
changes introduced by the Civil Code and the Law “On Regulation of Securities Market”

228

For the most current information related to state property privatization and alienation of the liquidating
companies, rental of property consigned with participation of commercial organizations, as well as other
information related to state property management in the Republic of Armenia, see the official website of the
Department of State Property Management by the Government of the RA: http://www.privatization.am.
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(SMRL) adopted by the National Assembly in 2000. 229 The revised JSCL came into effect on
December 6, 2001. Theoretically, this law defined the establishment and registration of
privatized companies, stipulated the legal status of joint-stock companies, the procedure of
their operation and termination, the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, as well as the
protection of the rights and lawful interests of shareholders and creditors. Companies could
decide on the amount of shares to issue, the value of each share, and the rights pertaining to
each type of share that were stated on the share certificate. The joint stock companies could
have been open or closed. Open companies were publicly- held companies that sold shares
through a public offering and allowed shareholders to sell their shares. Closed companies
could not have more than 25 shareholders who could sell shares only to members of the
board and predetermined persons who had priority in acquiring the sold shares (Ugurlayan
2001:438).230
The second law, the Law of the Republic of Armenia on Privatization of State
Property, enacted in 1997, regulated legal relationships concerning privatization of state
property, including unfinished construction sites. 231 The government decided which type of
privatization process (auction, tender, or direct sale) to use in privatizing a state property. In
deciding whether to privatize a company or not, several criteria were taken into
consideration, such as the financial condition of a company and the amount of investment
needed. Foreign corporations were allowed to participate in the privatization process by
bidding on enterprises through a tender offer. The government had a final decision in
maintaining full or partial control of an enterprise. Employees of enterprises were provided
with equal rights to purchase an enterprise that was being privatized, with preferential
treatment granted to certain employees in the case of direct sales of privatized property.

229

See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies, available in the official website of the
Government of RA, http://www.parliament.am/law_docs/271001HO232eng.pdf?lang=eng
230 Later, the law on state property privatization program for 1998-2000, stated that the Armenian government
should shift closed joint stock companies in which state-owned shares comprised 50% of the authorized capital
into open joint stock companies (“Armenian Government Redistributes State-Owned Shares in Joint-Stock
Companies”, SNARK News AGENCY, Jan. 14, 2000)
231 See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Privatization of State Property, available in the official website of
the Government of RA, http://www.parliament.am/leg islation.php?sel=show&ID=1657&lang=eng .
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The privatization process in Armenia occurred through three stages: initial (19911994), large scale or mass (1994-1997), and finally cash or decelerated (1998-2001).232 The
process continues until today case by case. During the first stage, the Armenian government
privatized 4% of the total small enterprises to the employees of these enterprises through
direct sales at a nominal price. Around 1.6 Million USD, which was equal to 173.1 million
rubles (the Soviet or Russian currency) was collected at the end of the first stage of the
privatization. While there was a small effort to privatize small enterprises, the first stage of
privatization in Armenia is primarily characterized by land privatization.
8.2.1. Land Privatization
Armenia adopted a law on land privatization in 1990, becoming the first Soviet
republic to privatize land. With the breakup of the collective and state farms in early 90s,
Armenian farmland shifted from state ownership into the private sector at a faster rate than in
any other Soviet republic since 1991. Within two years, by 1992, 63% of cultivated fields,
80% of orchards, and 91% of vineyards of the previously state and collective farms were
privatized and belonged to family farmers. The result of land privatization was the creation
of a small peasant farming system comprising about 335,000 family-owned farms with small
areas of land. Farmers among Armenia’s 35% rural population received a parcel of land that
averaged about one hectare (2.5 acres) in size.
The international community has praised Armenia as one of the most thorough
privatizers of land among the former Soviet Republics. The consequences of land
privatization in Armenia were similar to land reform in China in 1950s. As a result of both
reforms, many peasant households owned their piece of land for the first time ever. The
Chinese land reform, however, was implemented in the context of a growing economy, while
in Armenia land reform was implemented within an environment of war, depression, and
structural changes.
Land privatization in Armenia was an outstandingly equitable process. Land was
distributed to each family according to its size. The location of land that each family received
232 The

next sections of this chapter discuss the three stages of the privatization process in Armenia more
specifically.
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was determined by lottery, making the allocation of land even fairer. Farmers had to pay for
their newly acquired land, and the standard payment was equivalent of 70% of net farm profit
for two years. This amount of payment was not considered much. These pieces of private
land, although often difficult to cultivate for the new farmers without collective efforts and
machinery that during Soviet times were provided by the state collectives (famously known
as ‘kolkhoz’ in Russian), became very effective social safety nets in rural areas. They
represented a significant value for the famers, particularly when the state owned few
resources to finance transfer payments to poor households and provide social welfare. This
may be one of the reasons that there was basically no trade of land after land privatizatio n.
Contrary to industrial privatization in Armenia, during which virtually the majority of
shareholders sold their vouchers, there was basically no buying or selling of land by farmers,
because those pieces of land were the mere guarantee of subsistence for the new owners of
land.
Through land privatization, the dominance of the private sector transferred from
urban areas to rural areas. Whereas in 1990 the private sector accounted for 35% of
agricultural output, land privatization increased it to about 98% (UNDP 2002). Land
privatization prevented the increase of poverty. Compared to other sectors of the economy,
land privatization definitely prevented a much wider prevalence of poverty, particularly in
rural areas.In rural areas only those families were impoverished, who did not own land.233 It is
a popular view that land privatization played an important role in alleviating widespread
hunger and poverty in 1991-1994 (Suny 1997:347-387 in Hovannisian). During an economic
crisis, agriculture also became the “last employer” for most of the unemployed, particularly
in the rural areas (ibid).
Whereas it is widely considered that Armenian land reform completed by the end of
1993 was fair and equitable, Vardanyan and Grigoryan (2007) mention that the effectiveness
of land management and the development of land market activities were hindered by factors,
such as insufficient legal framework to local conditions; economically not viable land parcels
(land fragmentation); the absence of the privatized land titles; the absence of maps of
On a more detailed account of land privatization, see UNDP 2002 Report “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in
Armenia”.
233
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property lines and ownership (cadastral maps); and the absence of the value of the obtained
land, as well asprice estimation principles.
8.2.2. Large Scale or Mass Privatization
Large scale or mass privatization in Armenia began in 1994. During the mass
privatization period, a majority of firms were privatized. Mass privatization was mostly
voucher-based in Armenia. According to EBRD’s categorizations of privatization methods,
as published in its 1999 Transition Report, voucher or mass privatization refers to
privatization in which citizens are given or can inexpensively purchase vouchers that
represent shares in a state-owned company.
Mass privatization was the first serious step to privatize medium and large scale state
owned enterprises, when 240 such enterprises were converted to private ownership. Other
613 enterprises were privatized in 1996 and another 397 in 1997. 1996 and 1997 were the
two peak years of mass privatization in Armenia. By 2001, a total of 1643 medium and large
enterprises were privatized, and the sate played a trivial role in the administration of
industrial enterprises by the end of 2001 (McKinley 2002).
Table 8.2: Privatization of Small, Medium and Large Enterprises in Armenia,
1995-2001 (number of enterprises)
Year
Small Enterprises
Medium and Large Enterprises
Annual Number

Cumulative
Annual Number
Cumulative
Number
Number
1995
n.a.
1833
240
240
1996
2130
3963
613
853
1997
2058
6021
397
1250
1998
599
6620
210
1460
1999
186
6806
54
1514
2000
43
6849
40
1554
2001
78
6927
89
1643
Source: UNDP 2002 report, “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Armenia”.
In the early stages of privatization, mass privatization and MEBO (management and
employee buyout), 20% of the value of state owned enterprises was distributed as free
vouchers to the employees of the enterprises who had worked in them for at least one
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year.234 During this phase of the privatization, many enterprises were transformed into open
or closed joint stock companies. First, they were sold to employees through a closed share
subscription. After the closed share subscription, the enterprises that were not purchased by
their employees were sold through open share subscription. As a result of the voucher
distribution, about 127,000 employees ‘obtained’ ownership of their enterprises. 235
According to Arakelian (2005), this was an unprecedented result among all former Soviet
Union countries.236 Each voucher had a nominal value of 10,000 Armenian drams (AMD), or
approximately 25 US dollars (USD) in September of 1994, but it was raised to 20,000 drams
or about 50 USD in March of 1995 to make up for the effects of inflation. While 50 USD was
then quite a valuable amount, without investment funds or operating stock exchanges and
appropriate market infrastructure, citizens did not find it reasonable to keep their certificates.
They converted their certificates into cash by selling them in markets at about 12.5-40% of
their nominal value.
According to international reports, by the end of the MEBO phase of privatization,
about 60% that is about 6000 of all small enterprises were privatized, and there were around
150,000 shareholders in Armenia. This is a large sector of the population for a country with
roughly 3 million population.237 Based on this fact, one may argue that the mass privatization
should have been economically favorable for the majority of the Armenian society. The
problem, however, was that most of the shareholders had no elementary knowledge about
joint stock companies, how to manage and conduct business with them. Not only were they
clueless about the idea of shareholding and stocks, but also about their lawful rights. People
sold their certificates not only because of the lack of information on how to use those
certificates, but they also sold their certificates because of their dire living conditions and
insufficient financial resources. Those, who could purchase vouchers, were the wealthy and
well connected. Human Development Armenia Report 1997 estimated that only 7% of the
For more details on the distribution of vouchers, s ee World Bank, “Armenia: Growth Challenges and
Government Policies”, Vol.II: Main Report, November 2001, p.32.
235 Some sources, such as the UNDP 2002 report on Armenia, mention that 20% of the value of public
enterprises was distributed to the population, other sources, such as Vazgen Arakelian (2005), state that
according to the law, 30% of the enterprises was given to RA citizens.
236 Later in this chapter there is a more detailed explanation of why this high rate of shareholders, which is
considered a success, turned into a more concentrated ownership of enterprises.
237 The number of shareholders ranges from about 127,000 to 150,000 people in different sources. In any case,
this is considerably large number for Armenian population.
234

258

population participated in the privatization process as shareholders by the end of 1997
(Human Development Armenia Report 1997:36).
The voucher stage of industrial privatization in Armenia failed to create real
businessmen and generate visible results in Armenia due to several reasons as observed by
Arakelian (2005): 1) lack of knowledge and information on operating and managing joint
stock companies; 2) frequent violation of shareholders’ rights; 3) violation of rules of
corporate governance; 4) non-transparency of activities of joint stock companies; and 5)
inefficient performance of management tasks. Similarly, many cross-country studies on post
privatization process in Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries conclude
that the worst performance was observed in the countries that implemented mass
privatization, such as Russia and Armenia (Spicer et al., 2000; Sunita Kikeri and J. Nellis,
2002).
Mass privatization ended in 1998 without yielding the expected results. Also, it did
not generate the predicted amount of revenues. While it was projected to collect revenues of
3.5 billion dram ($700,000,000) by the end of the first stage of the industrial privatization,
only $700,000 to $800,000 was generated by the state (Astourian 2000:14). These figures are
important, because they show that privatization revenues were only one thousandth of the
projected amount. Astourian argues that the huge disparity between the projected and actual
revenues shows that majority of the privatized enterprises were sold for a few hundred
dollars only.238
When the campaign for privatization was in full swing, the principle of “forward at
all costs” acted. In some cases it caused such situations where the value of the enterprise
under privatization looked in the least suspicious. For example, the Yerevan Auto factory
was sold off for 11,541 vouchers (the market value of these at the time of privatization
equalled 57,705 US dollars which corresponded to the average price of a 3 or 4-room
apartment).The enterprise “Armelektroaparat”, producing mechanisms and accessories for
238

The example of the cheese factory privatization in Vardenis, Armenia serves as a piece of evidence for this
speculation. With its buildings and machines, it was sold for $400 (Asto urian 2000:15). Whereas it is nearly
impossible to find accurate data on the prices at which companies, plants and factories were sold, there are a
few accounts that reflect the surprisingly low prices. One of those reports written by Russian economist
Puzanov (1998) will be discussed later in this chapter.
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industrial elevators, was privatized for 26,800 US dollars, the Yerevan furniture factory for
33,600 US dollars, the Tin Can factory for 10,600 US dollars (Puzanov 1998:237-238).
Practically no attention was paid to the availability of business-plans and the capacity
of new owners to fund the modernization and restructuring of obtained enterprises. For
example, in the case of the aforementioned Yerevan Auto factory the question of its
reconstruction was not even on the agenda, since the new owners, just like the state, did not
have sufficient finances for the company’s modernization.
In the press, other more mysterious prices were quoted. For example, the Vardenis
Sеwing Factory and Cheese factory were sold off for 62 and 70 vouchers correspondingly,
Ararat Greenhouses for 36, Dilijan factory of Mineral Water for 56 vouchers, Yeghegnadzor
Sеwing Factory for 46, the one in Echmiadzin for 51, Shahumyan Bird factory and Aragats
Cheese Factory for 48 vouchers. It is important to note that although sold at a very cheap
price, Vardenis Cheese Factory was a profitable firm, occupied a territory of 2.2 hectares,
and had a 0.5 hectares platform of industrial and administrative sections and an auto park of
16 operational vehicles. This factory was not the only one that was fully operational among
the inexpensively privatized enterprises.
Based on the 1997 "Human Development Report on Armenia" estimates, by the end
of 1997, only 7% of the population participated in the privatization process as shareholders.
Another source, the ministry of privatization in Armenia evaluated the number of
shareholders of medium and large enterprises as of November 1998 to be 143,000 citizens,
that is, about 4.5% of the population that received vouchers. Astourian (2000) suggests that
the concentration of wealth was greater than these figures suggest. According to his sources
(Markosian 85-86), 2.5% of shareholders controlled 60% of the shares of 713 companies
privatized through open share subscription.
While enterprises were formally offered for public sale, the process through which
the bidding was conducted was not truly accommodating and comfortably comprehensive for
ordinary citizens, therefore, it was not truly oriented towards the benefit of the latter. The
voucher certificate distribution thus produced an "illusion of social justice", because in reality
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people lacked the appropriate knowledge, tools and regulations to make investments with
their certificates (Arakelyan 2005:196).
Concerning voucher privatization, Paruyr Hayrikyan, the leader of the Union for
National Self-Determination (UNSD) party and one of the founders and most active leaders
of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union, mentioned that “the traditions of
corporative philosophy and action were not only discouraged since the start of the industrial
privatization in Armenia, but also were totally ignored”. 239 According to Hayrikyan, the idea
of financial dividends, as portions of corporate profits paid out to stockholders, was
absolutely lacking in Armenia. Businessmen who were major shareholders of joint stock
companies were automatically becoming the owners of the companies, treating the rest of the
shareholders like their servants. Hayrikyan also stressed that it was a widely popular practice
for managers and directors of enterprises to often buy vouchers at extremely low prices from
workers, telling the latter that in any case they would never get any profit from their
vouchers. Hayrikyan said that when he addressed this issue to the government implementing
the voucher privatization, then Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan (1993-1996) replied that the
problem would not exist if shareholders kept their own vouchers and did not sell them with
minimal prices. Perhaps Bagratyan was right, but considering the transitional moment and
the ignorance of most of the population on economic issues, a fundamental question arises:
what type of informational training related to the use of vouchers had the government
implemented for the society, who had just broken free from the centrally planned economy
and a socialist system?
In general, 99% of the politicians and researchers interviewed for this dissertation
agreed that the voucher privatization in Armenia occurred in animproper way and that the
small shareholders' property rights were not protected from the beginning of the process. The
latter were doomed to falling out of market competition too soon. “On the other hand, wellconnected entrepreneurs became millionaires within a night without minimal business
efforts. These people, unlike famous businessmen such as Rockefellers and Fords in the US
who became wealthy based on their entrepreneurial talent and hard work of decades, did not
239 The

quote is borrowed from theinterview with Paruyr Hayrikyan conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, August 8,

2011.
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work hard; they achieved wealth and power essentially by exploiting speculation in the
privatization process. This was the case in many post-Soviet states, such as Russia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia” (Hayrikyan 2011). Similar to Hayrikyan, many other politicians
and economists I have talked to, while disinclined to contradict to the principles of free
market society, believe that in the above-described situations the state has to be practical and
flexible, especially if the people face extremely poor social conditions. They agreed that a
government needs to intervene in the market whenever the market creates social exclusion.
Mass privatization was unsuccessful not only because of equality and impartiality
issues, but also because of inefficiency. Whereas the privatization literature widely
speculates that the shift from planned to market economy stimulates new managers to
increase efficiency, in Armenia this premise did not work for many sectors of the newly
privatized economy. As described earlier, after the massive voucher sale by workers,
incumbent managers were able to consolidate company ownership very quickly. Through a
survey of 145 large joint-stock companies in 1999, the Securities Market Inspectorate of RA
found out that on average 2-3 largest shareholders held about 70% of company stock (World
Bank 2002). But the new owners in Armenia were less supportive of restructuring compared
to other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. After privatizing a company,
the Armenian managers primarily exported the existing equipment of the company, due to
which the company stayed idle for most of the time.The export of equipment was a deliberate
deindustrialization, and industrial productivity was a comparative advantage of Armenia after
independence.
Three factors explain the weakness and/or unwillingness of the new management to
restructure their companies. One reason was the lack of fair entry competition and thus
insufficient management change. Another reason was the uncertainty and lack of market
control in a geopolitically unstable country. Because of this factor, many company owners
decided that it was more profitable to enrich themselves with profits of stripped company
assets than invest their time, skills, and finances into a long-term strategy of restructuring the
company. Finally, a third reason was simply the lack of information and management skills
for an efficient restructuring. The World Bank Country Study "Growth Challenges and
Government Policies in Armenia" (2002), in efforts to evaluate growth trends in Armenia for
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the period of 1994-2000, after the mass privatization was over, identified three elements as
critical constraints to sustainable economic growth in Armenia: “a poor business and
investment environment, weak managerial skills, and uncertainty about the country’s
economic and political prospects in an unstable region.” (World Bank 2002:VII)
The new private sector was unable to respond to the restructuring of property rights,
and it became a major obstacle for the growth of industry, persistence of poverty, and
vulnerability of small entrepreneurs. There has been registered growth in the service sector in
the late 1990s but its growth did not have a big impact on growth and poverty reduction.
Industrial sectors, such as power generation and food processing increased. Smaller, exportoriented sub-sectors, such as jewelry and computer software, were noted to be successful.
None of these activities, however, were developed enough to compensate for the continuing
decline of industry. The sector of de novo firms was too small to make a significant
contribution to the economic development of small and medium entrepreneurship, and to
affect overall poverty levels. The new companies have not been active, and they did not
absorb excessive labor. Self-employment rates after mass privatization were also small in
Armenia. This is a reflection of existing barriers for both new entry and factor reallocation.
The World Bank (2002) estimated self-employment in Armenia to be at least three times
lower than in leading economies in post-Soviet region.
The data obtained from National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia
(NSS)shows the overall number of registered companies in Armenia for the years of 19942000 (see Table 8.3). In 2000, there were about 44,000 registered businesses in Armenia, that
is, 14.5 businesses per 1,000 residents. 240 According to these numbers, privatization resulted
in a rather decent level of entrepreneurship in Armenia. But according to the World Bank,
these numbers provide a biased picture that overstates success. The majority of the registered
firms did not operate based on business surveys conducted between 1996-2000 years. For
example, surveys of small businesses conducted by the National Statistical Service (NSS) in
1997-98 showed that between 56% and 61% of participating businesses were not operating
240

The calculation is based on the official number of the population in Armenia, which is about 3 million. In
reality, the population is even less than 3 million due to high rates of migration from Armenia. Thus, the
number of registered businesses could have been even more per 1000 residents, if we considered not the
official, but an approximate real number of the population of Armenia.
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during the year of survey. The 1999 similar survey found out that this number increased to
about 80%. From the registered 44,000 businesses in 2000 about only 30,000 operated. This
means that there were less than 10 businesses per 1,000 residents. This number is small,
compared to the numbers of small and medium enterprises (SME) in modern market
economies for the same year, such as 37 registered SMEs per 1,000 residents in Germany, 45
in Slovenia, 74 in USA (World Bank 2002, page 42).
Table 8.3: Number of Registered Business Entities in Armenia, 1994-2000
Years
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Number of
Registered Business
Entities
Growth Rate, %

5,089

2000

21,238

29,836

37,687

41,241

43,327

44,164

317

40

26

9

5

2

Source: National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (NSS).
Business registration since 2000 has slowed even more in the republic. The number of
registrations continued to decrease considerably in 1999-2000. The World Bank mentions
that the low rate of small and medium business operation was accompanied with a high rate
of business liquidation. In 2000, per each 3 new registrations, two companies were
liquidated.This type of new private sector suggests that business transactions were governed
by informality instead of legal regulations. Entrepreneurs, particularly small and medium
ones, typically stayed in the informal sector because of shortcomings in the regulatory system
and enforcement practices. Major challenging issues experienced by new businessmen
included specifically tax administration arbitrary practices. Those entrepreneurs, who
managed to stay in the formal sector, “pursued survival, defensive strategies. These were
“forced entrepreneurs”, who had been waiting for an opportunity to return to their traditional
occupation as hired labor. Such businesses had a rather limited development potential.
(World Bank 2002:42).
Since 2000, the pace of business registrations did not accelerate. In fact, it slowed
down dramatically. According to the World Bank Entrepreneurship and Survey Database,

264

there were 2,576 new businesses registered in the years of 1999-2003. Within the following
four years, 2004-2008, the database indicates 2,523 new businesses. 241
The privatization literature widely speculates that the shift from planned to market
economy stimulates new managers to increase efficiency. In Armenia however, this premise
did not work for many sectors of the newly privatized economy. After the massive voucher
sale by workers, incumbent managers were able to consolidate company ownership very
quickly. Through a survey of 145 large joint-stock companies in 1999, the Securities Market
Inspectorate of RA found out that on average 2-3 largest shareholders held about 70% of
company stock (World Bank 2002). But the new owners in Armenia were less supportive of
restructuring compared to other CIS countries. After privatizing a company, the incumbent
managers primarily exported the existing equipment of the company, due to which the
company stayed idle for most of the time.
A survey of fifty representative privatized enterprises from seven different economic
sectors, conducted in 1997 by the Center for Economic Policy Research and Analysis
(CEPRA), aptly captured the impact of mass privatization in Armenia through the end of
1997. Related to CEPRA findings, it is worth quoting Astourian (2000:14) at length:


About eight percent of enterprises were owned and controlled by their former directors,
who automatically became executive directors and chairmen of the board of the newly
privatized enterprises. Although experienced in manufacturing, they did not have
sufficient knowledge in management and strategic thinking.



The majority of surveyed enterprises were not being restructured. Among the reasons
mentioned were the poorly developed institutional infrastructure and an unclearly
formulated legal framework.



Low liquidity and huge arrears of enterprises, caused by lack of markets and ignorance in
marketing, was a large problem. The utilization of production capacity in the sample for
large enterprises was less than ten percent, while it was 20-30 percent in small and
medium enterprises.



Downsizing by more than 40 percent and low salaries (the average salary was $30 per
month) were other major problems. There was a low level of accounting and auditing
services. In many cases, tax records were the only available accounting documentation.

241

See World Bank Entrepreneurship and Survey Database: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.NREG
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8.2.3. Decelerated and Case-by-Case Privatization
Since 1998, the privatization process slowed down in Armenia. The mass
privatization was transitioning into monetary privatization. In 1999, 48 medium and large
enterprises were privatized, producing about 8 million USD sales revenues and about 15
million USD of investment commitments. During the case-by-case privatization in Armenia,
about 60 enterprises were privatized by foreign investors. Those enterprises included powergenerating factories, diamond processing companies, food processing factories, breweries, as
well as light industries. The case-by-case privatization was completed with the support and
advice of international consultants. For instance, Merrill Lynch was a main contractor in the
privatization of 14 key enterprises. Among those enterprises were the Armenian
telecommunications monopoly, ArmenTel, Yerevan Konyak (Brandy) factory, and Hotels
"Armenia" and "Ani". All those enterprises were sold to foreign investors and generated huge
revenues and cash transactions.242
In this stage of the privatization process insufficient attention was paid to important
issues, such as transparency and public relations (Arakelyan 2005). As in the previous stage
of industrial privatization process, those discrepancies, whether intentional or unintentional,
were the beginning of unequal access to assets and resources by the citizens of Armenia.
Privatization transactions, therefore, chiefly affected the development of social exclusion of
ordinary citizens by more powerful members, groups and networks of the society. The more
powerful were those who were well-connected with state elites, former managers of
enterprises, and of course, those who had more wealth accumulated during Soviet times.
According to Gevorgyan and Melikyan (2004:5), the privatization process,
specifically the decelerated privatization, was characterized by the following conditions:
1. Absence of stock market financial intermediary (investment funds, investment
companies, etc.);
2. Weakness of state institutions in charge of privatization;
3. Very low savings among the majority of the population;
4. Low interest in the process of privatization on the part of external investors;
242

These data are taken from Vazgen Arakelian, 2005.
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5. Majority of companies at the time of privatization were non-functioning.
These conditions first of all suggest that there was very little competition, high
concentration of ownership supported by low market prices of companies on sale. Companies
were purchased mostly by former senior management, thus blocking opportunities for
outsiders to bid. There was little participation on behalf of foreign investors. This was due to
the fact that privatized companies were not well presented to potential foreign investors. All
these circumstances created an environment leading to an ownership of most of the
privatized enterprises by a small number of shareholders, mainly insiders.
While conventional wisdom suggests that ownership of a company by insiders may
improve work incentives and company loyalty, and positively affects restructuring of the
company, the experience of transitioning countries that went through insider privatization
presents a different picture. In the case of post-Soviet Armenia, for example, insiders hailing
from the planned economy of the Soviet times lacked necessary skills, information and
knowledge, access to foreign markets, and technologies necessary for company restructuring
and reorganization. This consequently led to poor privatization outcomes. Also, literature
argues that the role of foreign ownership with better knowledge of market processes
increases the opportunity for firms to have better performance in transition countries
(Deardorff and Djankov, 2000; Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999). Insignificant
investment level from foreign investors was another reason for unsatisfactory consequences
of decelerated privatization in Armenia.
During this stage of privatization the Republic of Armenia experienced major issues
regarding the evaluation of the property that had to be privatized. The Armenian government
greatly undervalued its industrial assets, 'failing' to come up with substantiated and applicable
methods to define a proper price for the property that was being privatized. The
undervaluation of industrial assets by the governmentduring the third, decelerated, phase of
the Armenian privatization was one of the avenues for economic exclusion, considering the
fact that the insiders were given preference during the privatization. The new management
(insiders of the privatized company) reserved the right to buy shares from outsiders at a price
it dictated. The result was that chiefly insiders ended up buying the shares, and of course it
267

was the managers who had the money to buy the vast majority of those shares and who ended
up benefiting from the auction.243 The low price of companies supported and led to high
concentration of the ownership by insiders.
Decelerated privatization practices in Armenia were not free of the “faults” typical of
industrial privatization processes in other countries of CIS. For example, the status of
privatization for a profitable enterprise, in comparison with similar but not profitable
enterprises, assumed a higher privatization “value”. In order to avoid paying a high price for
the profitable enterprise, usually the team of the enterprise, intending to buy it from the state,
in an operative and conscious manner brought it down to a bankruptcy condition (Puzanov
1998).244
These and many other problems of privatization occurred because of a practical
absence of a functioning state, as well as lack of public control over the privatization process
(Puzanov 1998:238). Such practices became one of the reasons of privatized enterprises’ low
efficiency: in 1996 only 30% of their overall number increased the scope of industry, about
40% stood paralyzed, and another 30% were close to bankruptcy. The value of companies
after revaluation varied from 242,000 USD to 2.37 million USD, which, according to
Puzanov(1998), is significantly lower from the international value for similar companies. As
he mentions, the following enterprises were included among those under-valued companies:


The chemical plant “Nairit” (produces rubber-technical products for automobile, oil,
electro-technical, footwear, optical and medical industries);



The “Polyvinil” plant with the capacity of 35,000 tons annual production (met up to 28%
demand of polyvinyl and vinyl acetate of the entire USSR). By the end of 1990s, it was
idle because of the lack of raw material;

243

A good example of enterprise undervaluation in Russia, where industrial privatization was conducted in a
similar manner to Armenia's industrial privatization, is provided by Paul Klebnikov, the author of "Godfather of
the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia ". Lebnikov reports that the price at which Gazprom
was privatized in 1994 through the vouchers was $250 million, which is 160 times less than the price the st ock
market would put on the company a mere three years later. Thus, it was less than 1 percent of the stock market
value of the company. "That makes it one of the great robberies of the century." (The Multinational Monitor,
2002)
244 Examples of this problem, such as the sale of the Yerevan Auto Factory, the Vardenis Sewing factory, the
Vardenis Cheese factory and other enterprises at surprisingly low prices, were reported earlier in this chapter.
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The former USSR Military Industrial Complex “Rubin” is extended in 100 buildings,
occupying a territory of 77 hectares, nearby Yerevan. The plant's main product is
artificial synthetic crystals (including products for the jewelry industry);



The chemical Plant “Vanadzor” (produces acetate fiber, 95% of which is exported to
England, to South Korea, Syria and Egypt);



The Yerevan Cognac/Brandy Factory (annually produces 5mln bottles which comprises
55% of its capacity);



The textile factory of “Gyumri” (cotton and linen);



The footwear factory “Araks”;



The electrolamp factory “Luys” (produces all types of light bulbs and chandeliers);



The national telephone company “ArmenTel”;



The enterprise “Mars” (built by British firms for production of complicated electrical
devices; including integral microchips; before its privatization, about 200 million US
dollars were invested in improvements, including systems of computer design).

8.3 Social Impact of Privatization of Energy Sector and Telecommunications
There have been a few successful privatization deals of large companies that resulted
in overall welfare of the population. They increased company employment rates, made social
conditions of their employees better by raising salaries and offering good benefits. This was
the case of the privatization of the cigarette industry in Armenia.245 Moreover, the prices of
the products produced by the company were reasonable and accessible to the majority of the
population.246 The privatization of tobacco production has been one of the rare instances of
efficient privatization transactions, generating favorable conditions for their employees and
making their product obtainable for many in the society.

245

Whereas there are no available data on pre-privatization and post-privatization salaries in tobacco producing
companies in Armenia (even if they were available, a comparison would have been incompatible due to
hyperinflation and change of currency), the estimates of salaries in the period of 1998-2001 show that the
average salary in cigarette industry was higher than that of all other industries in Armenia. In the first half o f
2001 the average salary amounted to an equivalent of 32,727 AMD monthly (an equivalent of 59.5 USD) in the
industrial sector, and 59,000 AMD monthly (107.3 USD) in the cigarette industry. Also, the annual average
salary growth in cigarette industry was higher than in other industrial sub-sectors. While the average salary in
the industrial sector increased by 49%, in the cigarette industry it increased by 136% for the same period.
246 The fact that smoking is bad to human health should be disregarded in this case, because the discussion here
concerns not health side effects for the smoking part of the population, but the efficiency of the company based
on the price of the product and on how available the company makes its product for an ordinary person, who
consumes the specific product.
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A good example of mismanagement and non-transparency in the privatization process
has been the privatization of the energy sector in Armenia. In 1998 the Armenian Parliament
passed a law to privatize the country’s electricity supply network. This law allowed potential
investors to buy minority stakes in four distribution networks – Yerevan, Central, Northern
and Southern – which served around 750 000 users. The state retained control of the
generation facilities. Following this development, the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) signed an agreement to purchase a 20% share in each of the networks
pending participation from an international investor. Subsequent tenders were released for
75% stakes in 2 networks (Black and Veattch, 2002).
A total of fifteen foreign companies had initially applied for the tender. Later, some
of the bidders decided that did not want compete. Others, including such world leaders as
Electricite de France and the Swedish-Swiss Asea Brown Boveri, withdrew late in the game.
By that time, this privatization project had become overly politicized in Armenia, and the
government tinkered with the tender’s terms in the endgame phase (Khachatrian 2001).
Energy privatization encountered political difficulties almost from the start: first it was
slowed by the campaign leading up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections in May 1999, and
then by the political government upheaval sparked by the October 1999 parliament
assassinations. Anti-privatization resistance gained momentum in April, when the two tender
favorites, the American corporation AES Silk Road and Spain's Union Fenosa, failed to file a
formal bid. Some observers suggest that the missed deadline was a signal of waning foreign
investor interest in Armenia (ibid).
The process of privatization of the electric sector was met with difficulty. Due to a
lack of interest in investment the privatization process was halted in March of 2001, and for a
long time the international tender for the state energy distribution network has raised
questions about Armenia’s openness to foreign investors. Besides political reasons for the
difficulties in the energy sector privatization, there were also governance issues related to the
mismanagement of the process. A major difficulty in the sale of the electricity distributio n
networks was the fact that the Armenian government was influenced and severely pressured
from the Russian energy giant Gazprom despite of the pleas of Armenia’s largest lender
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World Bank to conduct a fair bidding process. 247 In February 2000 RFE/RL reported that the
World Bank urged the Armenian authorities to ensure transparency in the ongoing bidding
for the country’s energy distributing network. In response to past scandals linked with the
sell-off of other major government owned assets, the World Bank also asked the government
not to collude with Russian firms on tender results. 248
Whereas Armenian officials were publicly puzzled about the reasons behind the
tender’s failure, a few of the officials expressed concerns related to the decisions of the
government. For example, Justice Minister David Harutiunian, indirectly acknowledged that
the government had changed some of the terms in the final stage of the tender process. The
2001 Jamestown Monitor reported that the changes would have curtailed the new owners’
managerial authority and would have limited their leeway for legal recourse in the event of
disputes. As such, the changes could have enabled corrupt and shadowy local groups to
meddle with the privatized networks.
Several World Bank assessments judge Armenia’s energy reform successful from the
point of view of commercial losses and collection rate. Table 8.4 represents the data available
on energy losses and collections for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and
Tbilisi.249 Those are countries in the region that have undertaken some degree of power
sector reform. Whereas Tbilisi managed to improve collections, losses remained relatively
high and constant. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were able to reduce losses, but their
collections decreased or remained relatively constant. According to the World Bank
accounts, only Armenia managed to unambiguously improve in both collections and
commercial losses during this time period.

Armenia relies heavily on Russian gas for power generation and Armenia’s entire gas infrastructure is
dominated by a Gazprom-controlled joint venture. Moreover, the "Metsamor" nuclear plant, which accounts for
about 40% of Armenia's electricity production, is also heavily dependent on Russian loans and nuclear fuel.
248 In February of 2000 “Azg”, a local Armenian newspaper informed that Russia's Gazprom monopoly, with
Moscow's backing, was lobbying hard to get preferential treatment for its subsidiary, the ITERA Corporation .
ITERA was taking part in the tender in conjunction with another Russian firm, Rosatomenergo, and was
reportedly shortlisted for the last phase of the contest. The newspaper alleged that the interruptions in Russian
gas supplies to Armenia that occurred during that phase of the tender could have been a sign of Russian threat
and a method of putting pressure on Armenia to win control over its power grid.
249 The capital city of Georgia, Tbilisi, is included separately in the table, because the data on losses in Georgia
is not available after the year of 1997, but it is available for Tbilisi. Therefore, Tbilisi is included, so that we can
have an overall perspective of losses and collections in the Republic of Georgia.
247
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Table 8.4: Losses and Collections (in percentages) in Selected CIS Countries, 1994-2002
Losses
1994 1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000 2001
2002
Kazakhstan
13
15
18
20
21
21
13
13
Armenia
40
40
34
29
26
27
25
26
26
Georgia
50
50
50
50
Tbilisi
37
52
48
38
Azerbaijan
18
21
19
21
17
16
15
12
16
Collections
1994 1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000 2001
2002
Kazakhstan
99
77
85
63
82
74
62
62
Armenia
39
54
60
61
77
88
89
81
90
Georgia
20
22
42
38
39
40
42
45
47
Tbilisi
32
44
77
91
Azerbaijan
35
39
57
50
43
46
18
26
34
Source: Power’s Promise Dataset adapted from World Bank 2006 report on Armenia’s
Energy Reform, available online at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ARMENIAEXTN/Resources/Chapter3.pdf
The Armenian energy reform was far from being successful considering the
continuously increasing service costs, although the World Bank calls those costs effective
price increases (World Bank 2006). From the perspective of the ordinary citizen, the
privatization of energy raised its price, increased the energy share of household budgets, and
decreased family standards of living. Natural gas prices, for instance, have been continuously
rising. On April 18, 2008 Tigran Sarkisian, the Prime Minister of Armenia, announced that
the government would lift natural gas subsidies beginning May 1. This meant that retail gas
prices increased from 59 AMD per cubic meter (about 19 US cents) to 84 AMD (about 27
US cents). In April, 2006 the government had decided to subsidize prices for imported gas
with an aim to ease the burden placed on private consumers and companies through
allocating about $190 million dollars to in order to cover the subsidy for three years. Only
two years later, almost a year before the subsidy schedule of three years was over, the
government indicated that the funds for the subsidy ran out (Grigoryan 2008). Similar to this
case, gas and electricity price hikes have always posed a serious challenge to the socially
vulnerable strata of society.
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Another report, prepared for the Second ECA Poverty Forum of 2001 in Hungary,
assesses the 1999 electricity tariff increase with particular attention to questions of service
accessibility and affordability for the poor. The report findings were based on a survey of
2,010 randomly selected households conducted in December 1999 and January 2000. The
report mentions that household tariffs in Armenia were raised to reflect the high cost of
supplying low voltage electricity. Thus, in order to improve the financial sustainability of the
utilities, in January 1999 the increasing block tariff was eliminated in favor of a single price
of 25 AMD per kWh.250 “Elimination of the increasing block tariff was predicted to raise the
average price of electricity 30% (from 19.2 to 25 AMD per kWh). However, the household
survey indicates the new price of 25 AMD per kWh represented an unexpected 47% increase
(from 17 to 25 AMD per KWh). The difference between the expected and actual tariff
increase occurred because the calculation of average price was based on aggregate utility
data rather than household level data.” (Lampietti, Kolb, Gulyani, and Avanesyan, 2001:1)
The increase of nearly 50% in electricity prices was a huge blow to majority of the
population in Armenia. As the authors imply, the sampled household’s response to this
change in the electricity tariff offers key insights into electricity pricing policy and energy
sector strategy. For the surveyed households, electricity consumption records dropped on
average 17%. Apparently, as a substitute to electricity, consumption of wood and natural gas
increased. From the point of view of social exclusion, it is important to note that compared to
the non-poor, the poor cut consumption more, the percentage of households with arrears was
higher, and the average size of arrears increased more (ibid).
At the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, most Armenian households,
particularly the poor, experienced a large burden of energy expenditures. Electricity made up
the bulk of these expenditures, and additional increases in tariffs, without access to low cost
substitutes, created maximum hardship for the urban poor. The urban poor used to spend
16% of monthly cash expenditures on electricity. Besides, they possessed the least access to
wood as a substitute.

250

Energy related 'block tariff' is the tariff in which the charge is based on a series of different kilowatt -hour
rates applying to successive kilowatt-hour blocks of given size, supplied during a specified period.
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Before the failure of the energy sector privatization, the Armenian Republic had
already faced another failure, in the privatization of telecommunications system, which was
yet another significantly valuable sector of public services and an important component of
service privatization.
Armenia’s privatization of its telephone monopoly was even worse than the initial
privatization effort of the energy sector. ArmenTel, Armenian telecommunications network,
was established in 1995 as a joint venture between Armenia’s Ministry of Communications
and Transport (with 51 % of the shares) and a consortium of U.S. and Russian companies
called Trans-World Telecom Ltd. In 1997, the Greek government-owned Hellenic
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) purchased ArmenTel, becoming the sole owner of
90 % of ArmenTel. The Armenian government retained 10 % of the company.
The privatization of ArmenTel was marred by serious weaknesses in the decision to
grant ArmenTel a monopoly in international telecommunication services including the fixed
line market and mobile communications for 15 years. ArmenTel was entitled to decide on its
rates unilaterally. So the company introduced increases starting January 1, 1998. In addition
to an increase in charges for international calls, the basic monthly telephone service charge
for local lines was raised from 600 to 900 Dram (about $1.70) with only four minutes a day
allotted for free calls. The company introduced the per-minute billing for telephone service in
September of 1998, a move that caused up to a three-fold rise in phone costs. With a
population of about three million, Armenia then had 585,000 telephone lines in service. In
1997 ArmenTel reported $34 million in pre-tax earnings in the first half of the year alone,
compared with $47 million for the whole of 1997. These figures rose to about $70 million in
1999 (Tchilingirian 1999:18).
Growing dissatisfaction with OTE’s management of ArmenTel became evident early
in 1999. ArmenTel allegedly failed to make many of its promised investments. This hindered
the development of Armenia’s telephone system, which at that time lagged behind those of
its neighbors. According to World Bank reports, compared to Azerbaijan and Georgia, fixedline and mobile tariffs were higher, fixed-line teledensity had grown at only half the pace,
and mobile penetration was at only 0.2 % of the population (compared to 3.5 % and 1.8 % in
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Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively). According to press coverage, ArmenTel was
perceived to have stifled Armenia’s growth in potentially competitive markets for Internet
service provision and cable television through excessive access fees for international data
transfer, another service over which ArmenTel had exclusive monopoly rights. 251
Multi-layered problems caused by unfulfilled original objectives, mismanagement
and failure to meet investment expectations surfaced. There were also bribery charges
reported. While major administrative problems related to the OTE handling of the
telecommunications services exasperated the government’s patience, the Armenian people
were more irritated about the escalating service costs OTE started to introduce. There was
enormous dissatisfaction with ArmenTel by the frustrated population in Armenia. Many of
the ArmenTel customers, among them Arminco, which is the largest Internet provider in
Armenia, the National Academy of Sciences, and Noyan Tapan News Agency, started to
challenge ArmenTel, when communication lines were cut unexpectedly and without reason.
The Armenian Union of Internet Users complained against ArmenTel’s monopoly stating
that it “hindered the development of Internet services in Armenia. For example, to lease a
64kb/s Internet channel costs $5,000-$6,000 in Armenia, some “seven to ten times more than
in other countries in the world”” (Tchilingirian 1999:19).
Angry protests were launched against ArmenTel, for its unfair monopoly,
unimpressive services and price hikes. Some political parties, particularly the opposition
parties, actively campaigned against ArmenTel, advocating people to refrain from using their
services. In spite of huge public negative reaction against ArmenTel, then Prime Minister
Armen Darbinian stated that the 1997 deal with the Greek telecommunications company,
OTE, was “the best in the CIS”. He argued that the sale to OTE has advanced the quality of
telephone services and that “high quality has to be paid for. Telephone services that are free
of charge existed only in communist times.” (Tchilingirian 1999:19) Another government
official that tried to justify the privatization of the telecommunications system the way it was
achieved in Armenia was Artak Vartanian, the Minister of Postal Services and
Telecommunications. While admitting that it was politically wrong to introduce the highly
251

World Bank, "Regional Study on Telecommunications in the Caucasus",available online at:
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01023/WEB/IMA GES/REGIONAL.PDF
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unpopular per minute fee, specifically before the parliamentary elections, he asserted: “Yes,
we do have low salaries and grave social problems, but we must have a growing economy,
which is impossible without investments.” (ibid)
Finally, following the public outcry against ArmenTel, the government of Armenia
adjusted ArmenTel’s license in 2003, depriving ArmenTel of its monopoly over mobile
phone services. ArmenTel initiated a dispute, which was settled in November 2004, reducing
ArmenTel’s license from 15 to 11 years. World Bank experts find that the most obvious
problem with ArmenTel’s license was its exclusivity over fixed-line and mobile services, just
as mobile telephony and Internet communications entered the mainstream and began to be
established as competitors with fixed-line telephone service. As mentioned before, OTE was
given a 15-year exclusive license for fixed-line telephony (local, long distance, and
international) and GSM services. Exclusivity over fixed-line and mobile telephony for 15
years obviously hampered the growth of telecommunications infrastructure in Armenia.
Other problems included lack of appropriate regulation and lack of appropriate incentives
embedded in the legal and regulatory framework and licenses (World Bank 2006:32).
A July statement of Noyan Tapan reported that ArmenTel’s activities and
privatization did not correspond with the Armenian law. An interim commission on
ArmenTel announced that “its activities conflicted with numerous legislative acts of the
Republic of Armenia” (Asbarez 1999). ArmenTel’s monopoly allowed the company to
derive immense profits failing to make any serious investments directed to Armenia.
The transfer of natural monopolies and major strategic enterprises into private hands
was the policy of a decreasing role of the state in the economy. “Strategic enterprises of
energy and gas supply, communications, water supply, transport, etc. were either privatized
or operated on a concession basis. This policy was justified by the statement that the state
was a bad manager” (Nranyan 2011:201-202). Based on the logic of this policy, the
privatization of Armenia’s telecommunications and energy distribution networks were
supposed to be key elements of the country’s economic development strategy. Many
considered their privatization as an important stage in the transition to the free market.
However, Armenia’s power and telecommunications privatization were far from being
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examples of fair and efficient privatization in a country that needed them so badly for its
economic development and for its people to have appropriate access to energy and
telecommunications.
It was difficult for the Armenian people, extremely used to the Soviet system of the
state control for equal distribution of resources, to easily trust the privatization of services,
especially as they witnessed the mal-administration of the privatized first major
infrastructures such as transportation, power and telecommunications. People feared that new
owners would raise service costs based on their monopolistic power, and those fears were not
imaginary. Immediately after privatization, practically all natural monopolies of the country
raised tariff rates and prices of services for several times. Since the privatization of gas,
energy, and telecommunications, costs for those services have increased dramatically,
worsening the living standards for most Armenians and maximizing daily hardships
experienced by the poor, a majority of Armenians.
8.4 Privatization and Administrative Barriers to Foreign Investment
A major problem of privatization in Armenia was related to foreign direct investment
(FDI). Armenia lags behind many transition countries with its FDI per capita rates or the
share of FDI in GDP. Literature on Armenia-Diaspora-related economic relations mentions
that the Armenian government’s strategy was not as favorable for Diaspora Armenians, as
well as other foreigners to invest in Armenia. This strategy has generated mainly small scale
investments that could have potentially been massive.
According to the Armenian Development Agency (ADA), investment and trade
policies of Armenia are considered to be the most open in the CIS by international
organizations.252 Foreign companies are encouraged to invest and are entitled by law to the
same treatment as local companies, moreover they have certain advantages. The Law on
Foreign Investment, adopted in July 1994, regulates foreign investment in Armenia. It
provides guarantees to foreign investors and protects investors from changes in the business

252

The information in the next two paragraphs is taken from the Armenian Development Agency, available
online at http://www.ada.am/eng/for-investors/fdi-statistics/.
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related laws for 5 years. According to the Law a “Foreign Investor” is any foreign company
or citizen, a person without citizenship, an Armenian citizen permanently residing outside of
Armenia, or an international organization that invests in Armenia. “Foreign investme nt” is
any form of property, including financial assets and intellectual property, which is invested
by a foreign investor directly in the territory of Armenia, in any economic or other venture.
Foreign investors can make investments in Armenia through the establishment of
fully foreign-owned companies (including representations, affiliates, and branches), the
purchase of existing companies and securities, or the establishment of joint ventures. The
company registration process takes about a week. There are also incentives for exporters – no
export duty and a VAT refund on goods and services exported. There are no limitations on
the volume and type of foreign ownership, the number of foreign employees and access to
financial sources. Although foreigners can only lease land, a company registered by a
foreigner as an Armenian business entity does have the right to buy land. Foreigners may
obtain permission to use land under long-term leases, and concessions for the use of
Armenian natural resources with the participation of an Armenian company.
Similar to ADA, literature on post-Soviet economic reforms often honors Armenia,
acknowledging that market reforms have been more advanced and foreign investment
climate quite favorable in Armenia than in other post-Soviet republics. While this was a
widely accepted view among Western observers, economists and international organizations,
at the end of 2000s foreign investment in Armenia decreased tremendously due to ongoing
political and military insecurity resulting from theKarabakh conflict and its unclear
prospects. It declined from $240 million in 1998 to $100 million in 1999 (Ugurlayan
2001:436). Another reason for the decline in foreign investors’ willingness to invest in
Armenia was due to political assassinations during that period.
As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, corruption in the process of
privatization was another hindrance for the successful and fair sale of companies. Armenian
mass media have frequently cites the corruption issue, mentioning that there were charges of
bribery and mismanagement. These also served to minimize investor confidence and thwart
foreign investment in Armenia. Although important for Armenia, proper measures were
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rarely undertaken to ensure open and accurate management of foreign investments.
Typically, lack of appropriate economic information regarding the market value of firms that
were being privatized and reluctance to implement the sale process based on real market
values resulted in the corruption problem.
In 2000, ArmenPress, citing State Property Minister David Vardanian, indicated that
Armenian government faced serious challenges in its attempts to privatize around 2,500
small and medium enterprises, which failed to find buyers. 253 According to Vardanian, the
lack of appropriate information about these enterprises prolonged the process of their
privatization. The minister complained, “There are four approaches towards evaluating their
real prices, but all of them have shortcomings. However, the biggest problem is the absence
of demand.”254
Research shows that developing countries similar to Armenia have achieved solid
economic progress by incurring FDI in various sectors of industry and agriculture (Bevan
and Estrin 2000, Marino 2000, Shiells 2003, Zarsky 2005). It has been estimated that FDI is
strategically the only way to guarantee a sufficient rate of employment and economic growth,
as well as social and political stability in Armenia (World Bank 2002). But despite ADA’s
optimistic description of foreign investment policies in Armenia, foreign investment has not
been flourishing in the republic. The investment climate has not been conducive in the
republic. Besides the fact that geopolitically Armenia was not attractive for FDI, the
Armenian government in its turn has not taken specific steps to draw FDI in potentially
significant sectors, such as internet technologies and software development, jewelry, mining,
tourism, textile production, etc.
Table 8.5 shows that based on FDI per capita, Armenia had a better position relative
to many of the former USSR countries in 1990s (except the resource-rich countries, such as
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states). A more careful look of the table, however,
253

A major Armenian news agency operating since 1918, ArmenPress is the oldest and biggest agency in
Armenia. ArmenPress currently is acting as a closed joint stock company with its shares held by the government
of Armenia. It produces domestic, international, regional news bulletins, photo news and provides a wide range
of analytical stories covering politics, economy, culture and other areas. News items are issued on a daily basis
in Armenian, Russian and English.
254 “Privatization of Big Enterprises Opposed, Says State Property Minister”, ARMENPRESS, Nov. 17, 2000,
available online at http://hyeforum.com/index.php?showtopic=6066
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indicates that Armenia's investment rate was very low compared to the Eastern European
transition countries. Besides, as World Bank reports, these data are misleading because they
are inflated by high privatization proceeds received from privatization of telecommunicatio n
and gas distribution companies. Approximately one third of total reported FDI in Armenia
during the period of 1992-1999 came from these transactions. Small and medium investment
transactions, including those in start-up companies, have been very low.
Table 8.5: FDI Per Capita for Selected Transition Countries, US dollars, 1994-1999

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Total for the
region

Annual average
1994-1999
17.9
18.8
73.8
9.1
33.4
91.7
178.5
183.3
6.6
218.6
51.8
13.9
105.7
75.9
14.2
13.4
109.3
36.2
17.2
60.6
88.5
2.6
11.9
8.4
5.9
40.4

1999
13.2
40.5
104
18.5
83.3
163
339.8
233.3
17.8
156.9
53.3
13.9
60
108.1
14.3
39.5
168.4
59.8
23.9
92.6
75
4.9
20.8
12
9.4
57.2

Source:A World Bank Country Study, “Growth Challenges and Government Policies in
Armenia”,2002.
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According to the World Bank data, even when large privatization transactions were
included, the per capita FDI rate in Armenia in the mentioned period was below many of
other former socialist countries, regardless of the fact whether those countries had oil or not,
a resource that would be conducive of more investment. Some of the included countries have
large assets of oil, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and therefore they attracted more
FDI. But even some of the non-oil countries have had higher FDI rates than Armenia, despite
Armenia’s strong human capital that could have been very effectively utilized in sectors,
such as telecommunications, software development, chemical industry, and despite the
willingness of thousands of wealthy and nationalistic Diaspora Armenians all over the world
to invest in their historic homeland. For example, Armenia’s overall per capita FDI for 19921999 was nearly 3.5 times below that of neighboring Azerbaijan’s. It was 6 times below
Poland’s FDI, and 10 times below Estonia’s FDI. The existing opportunities for FDI
promotion have been grossly underutilized.
Another source, “The Role of the Diaspora in Generating Foreign Direct Investments
in Armenia” by Hergnyan and Makaryan (2006), evaluates FDI comparatively in some
transition countries for the period of 1997-2003. It shows that by per capita net FDI rates
Armenia lagged behind all of the countries selected for comparison, except Uzbekistan in
approximately all of the years. For example, if we compare per capita net FDI inflows for
Armenia (39.56) and Azerbaijan (399) in 2003, we observe that it was 10 times less in
Armenia.
Table 8.6: FDI Statistics for Selected Transition Countries, in US
Armenia
1997
1998
1999
2000
GDP per capita
1,839 2,079 2,209 2,422
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
3.2
11.7
6.6
5.5
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
16.1
69.4
38.8
33.5
Azerbaijan
GDP per capita
1,816 2,002 2,177 2,571
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 28.1
23.0
11.1
2.5
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
142.2 129.3
63.9
16.1
Bulgaria
GDP per capita
4,990 5,216 5,399 5,990
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
4.9
4.2
6.3
7.9
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
60.7
65.1
99.8
124.3

dollars
2001
2,733
3.3
22.6

2002
3,138
4.7
36.1

2003
3,671
4.3
39.6

2,877
4.0
27.9

3,218
22.3
170.4

3,617
46.0
399

6,483
6.0
102.8

6,906
5.8
115.0

7,501
7.1
181.4
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Table 8.6 Continued
Estonia
GDP per capita
7986
8453
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
5.4
10.4
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
190.1 418.8
Georgia
GDP per capita
1,569 1,688
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 6.91
7.34
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
49.5
54.7
Kazakhstan
GDP per capita
3,602 3,624
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
6.0
5.2
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
83.9
74.2
Russian Federation
GDP per capita
6,000 5,894
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
1.2
1.0
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
33.0
18.8
Uzbekistan
GDP per capita
1,328 1,371
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
1.1
0.9
Net FDI Inflows, per capita
7.1
5.8
Source: Adapted from Hergnyan and Makaryan

8665
5.5
221.8

9779
7.1
282.8

10803
9.1
397.7

11806
4.0
209.5

12913
9.8
658.4

1,775
2.94
17.2

1,990
4.31
27.8

2,151
3.42
23.5

2,333
4.93
36.3

2,666
8.46
74.0

3,903
9.4
103.8

4,594
7.0
85.2

5,330
12.8
190.2

5,897
10.5
173.7

6,663
6.8
140.4

6,360
1.7
22.6

7,086
1.0
18.6

7,573
0.8
17.1

8,130
1
24.0

9,033
1.9
55.5

1,435 1,516
0.7
0.6
5.0
3.0
(2006:27).

1,600
0.7
3.3

1,664
0.7
2.6

1,737
0.7
2.7

The history of bad investments, low purchasing power of local population, the
geopolitical risks, corruption and inadequate legal regulations to protect investors made
Armenia less desirable than other former socialist nations for foreign investment in 1990s.
The trends of the 1990s continued in the 2000s. The investment climate was still challenged
by factors, such as limited local market, weak governance, and weaknesses in the legal
system (Shiels 2003). Privatization of Armenian state companies and public services through
international tenders has also been complicated by the fact that the Armenian society could
not accept easily the fact that foreigners might manage local property and Armenian
employees. This trend was characteristic of the mentality of nearly all post-socialist societies.
In September 2000, after attending United Nations Summit of the Millennium,
President Kocharyan held meetings with Diaspora Armenian businessmen in New York and
later in Geneva to discuss potential and prospects of more active participation of Diaspora
businessmen in the economic life of Armenia. Kocharyan then stated that there existed
positive conditions for supporting business and investments in Armenia. Nonetheless, many
of the investors, particularly Diaspora Armenians, who represent a large percentage of
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foreign investors, were skeptical. Sarkis Hacpanian, a businessman, who has lived in
Armenia for 10 years, told RFE/RL that conditions for doing business in Armenia had
become worse. “The laws which are supposed to support business and investment do not
work, they exist only on paper. Sometimes even court decisions in favor of the investor do
not work” Hacpanian said. He dismissed the Armenian authorities’ assurances as “just
words.” (Hyeforum, November 2000)
Several surveys and research (Amirkhanian 1997; Gillespie and other 1999;
Freinkman 2001; Gevorgyan and Grigoryan 2003: Gillespie and Adrianova 2004;
Manasaryan 2004; Hergnyan and Makaryan 2006; Khachatryan 2011) have tried to
determine the perceptions existing in the business community regarding the business
environment and barriers for foreign investment in the republic of Armenia. As surveys of
entrepreneurs have shown, there existed numerous barriers for investments in Armenia.
Those barriers were even more intricate for diaspora Armenians, whose economic role has
been important during structural reforms in Armenia.
Diaspora Armenians were the first generators of business investments in Armenia
after the Karabakh war and the start of the privatization program in Armenia. Since the
launch of structural reforms and privatization initiatives in the republic, Diaspora investors
have experienced a series of conflicting political, economic and cultural events in Armenia
that either stimulated or discouraged them from investing. When in 1994, the Armenian
government banned the activities of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), one of
the most influential political parties in the diaspora, Armenia became a less attractive
destination of investment for Diaspora Armenians. 255 On the contrary, the annulment of the
restrictions on ARF by President Kocharyan, and an official declaration of strengthening
cultural, economic and business ties with the Diaspora in 1998 boosted Diaspora-related FDI
rates. However, the 1999 Armenian parliament shootings and assassination of important
politicians, negatively affected the Diaspora-related investments in 2000. Their share of all
foreign investments decreased to 57% (Hergnyan and Makaryan 2006:8). “Such an interplay
of contradictory factors (convergence of “opportunity” and “shock”) to a large extent
255

The context, political origins and consequences of the ban initiated by President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s
administration on ARF have been described in Chapter 7.
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contributed to “freezing” of the Diaspora involvement in investing in Armenia at a very low
level compared to the potential (from 1994 to 2004, there were only 2,526 DCIR (number of
Diaspora-connected investors) from the Armenian Diaspora which exceeds 6 million
people)” (ibid).
A major barrier for FDI was related to the willingness of top officials to ensure an
adequate infrastructure for investors. Sufficient steps were not initiated by government
officials to attract and support foreign investors from the beginning of the privatization
process. State elites in Armenia have been concerned that the new investors would reduce
their power both politically and economically, especially in the long-run (Amirkhanian
1997). They were reluctant to split their political and economic share with new players.
While for the short-run, it has been beneficial to the Armenian government to fill the state
budget with proceeds of foreign, as well as domestic investment, there has been significant
opposition towards the critical role of FDI, particularly from diaspora Armenians. According
to Amirkhanian, the local Armenians could not "afford to share their limited resources and
opportunities with the outsiders” (Amirkhanian 1997:21). But besides the issue of local
Armenians' reluctance, there was also the issue of Diaspora Armenians' credibility Diasporas
towards the Armenian government.
Examining the Diaspora’s contributions to the socio-economic development of
Armenia, Amirkhanian (1997) emphasizes a complex relationship between the Armenian
Government and the Diaspora. Freinkman (2001) also highlights the imbalance between the
lack of Diaspora contributions to Armenia’s development and the efforts of the Armenian
state to hone Diaspora investments in Armenia’s transition to a market economy. The
Armenian government lacked credibility with the Diaspora Armenians, who were considered
a vital part of the economy.
Fourteen large organizations of the Diaspora have provided assistance of about 900
million USD to Armenia. The total amount of material assistance granted to Armenia since
independence has reached 1,493,760,000 USD (Manasaryan 2004). While Diaspora
Armenians’ contributions to Armenian socio-economic development are irrefutable, the level
of private investment on behalf of Diaspora has been limited. According to Manasaryan
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(2004) important factors related to Armenia-Diaspora economic relations are affected by the
lack of a long-term cooperation strategy towards Armenia’s development agenda from both
sides. Whereas the Armenian government has not made sufficient attempts to expand
diaspora investors’ business initiatives, Diaspora businessmen in their turn have failed to
adjust their cultural and nationalistic agenda in their efforts to collaborate economically in
Armenia. Their historical and cultural connections are weak with Armenia, and they have
less tolerance for potential risks associated with doing business in Armenia.
With a case study of three large Armenian Diaspora initiatives to support business
development in Armenia, Gillespie and Adrianova (2004) conclude that there are significant
constitutional constraints, including barriers to personal involvement in project management.
Instead, investors have to entrust management to local partners, such as government agencies
and other local firms. The lack of investors’ direct participation in project/program
management blocked small and medium companies in Armenia from key advantages of
Western experience, such as strategic advice on customers, suppliers, and personnel.
Based on a survey of 35 foreign firms in Yerevan, Khachatryan (2011) concludes that
foreign companies experienced problems, such as monopolies, corruption among top
government officials, and uneven access to information. About half of the investors
complained about the limited openness of the economy, mainly due to the problem of
privileges for certain families or individuals. Also, they were not satisfied with post-entry
restrictions. The survey found out that the Armenian government did not support small
businesses sufficiently and it did not implement business regulations successfully and fairly.
It failed to support small businesses but was always supportive and protective of big
businessmen. A major problem mentioned by the survey respondents was the
underdevelopment of insurance industry. According to the investors, insurance services
should be more essential and developed, particularly since subsidies for small and medium
businesses are not common in Armenia (Khachatryan 2011, pages 71-72).
Since the end of 1990s, Armenian banks have been able to perform foreign currency
transactions. They can also conduct foreign exchange auctions. Many companies and
organizations have international accounting standards in place. All these factors were
285

conducive of foreign investment. Yet, relevant legislation was not in place to ensure a
consistent pace and process of investments. As a barrier to efficient investment, USAID
experts, for example, indicate to the 2000 February rejection of a draft law on Securities
Market Regulation by the Armenian National Assembly. This bill was aimed at protection of
investor rights and creation of transparent market transactions, including preventions of
fraud, and disclosure of transparent information by issuers of securities and other market
participants (USAID 2000; Ugurlayan 2001).
There are certain barriers that have been worrisome for both local and foreign
investors in terms of the investment environment in Armenia. A major problem is that
personal connections and networking are practically required for the success of businesses.
The ability to protect their assets due to the lack and deficiency of property rights protection
has been another main concern for businessmen.
8.5 Privatization and Oligarchs
It is typical of scholars of Soviet transition to consider that the increase of inequality
and the rise of social exclusion are closely related to privatization. While wage
decompression created income inequality, it was mainly due to privatization and subsequent
consolidation of ownership that produced much-spread wealth inequality in most of the
former Soviet countries (Guriev and Rachinsky 2006). The privatizatio n process influenced
the dynamics of wealth inequality in the following way: state assets were channeled into the
hands of a few, government had a limited role and ability to fund previously public goods
and services, and many citizens were left out of economic opportunities.
With the analysis of Russian oligarchs, Guriev and Rachinksy (2006) argue that in
Russia and many CIS countries inequality remains high because of post-privatization
oligarchic activities, while in CEE countries the governments prepared institutions, as well as
entrepreneurs, for greater equality of opportunity prior to privatization. 256 In Russia and some
of the CIS countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, the transition from planned to market
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The data includes the following information on the examined oligarchs: income tax; employment and sales
rates (World Bank estimates); companies/firms they own, major sector(s); employment (in thousands (% of
sample)); sales (in billions of rubles (% of sample)); wealth (in billions of U.S. dollars).
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economy produced a new class of affluent individuals, whose business activities in the
perception of the median voter were basically illegitimate. 257 Following privatization, there
has been an extreme concentration of wealth in Armenia, which suggests that the industrial
and commercial assets generating this wealth were also strongly concentrated. The wealthiest
households accrued very high incomes and large amount of wealth. Table 8.7 provides the
income distribution in Armenia in 1999. It reflects the enormously high concentration of
income among the richest households. The top decile of the population possessed 45% of all
income, while the bottom decile had only 0.7% of all income. The bottom half of the
population together received only 15% of income. These estimates of inequality are striking.
Moreover, it is a reflection of the fact that not only the poorest, but also the middle and lower
middle classes were deprived of appropriate wages and resources. On the other hand, at the
top decile of the population were a handful of businessmen, who controlled sufficient
resources to influence politics, policy-making and implementation, and judiciary in order to
increase their wealth even more. The top decile is comprised of Armenian oligarchs, who
emerged as a consequence of consolidation of ownership after the voucher privatization.
Table 8.7: Income Distribution in Armenia by Decile, 1999
Decile
Share of Gross Income ( percent)
I
0.7
II
1.9
III
2.9
IV
4.0
V
5.0
VI
6.4
VII
8.1
VIII
10.7
IX
15.3
X
45.0
Total
100
257

For instance, in 2004, the World Bank researched the activity of 1.3 thousand enterprises in Russia, and
based on the research suggests that the achievement of major oligarchs was determined not by their successful
management of enterprises but by their monopoly power. Besides, from the viewpoint of efficiency of resource
use, these enterprises were less efficient than the smaller companies (http://www.rg.ru/2004/04/ 08/ Ryul.ht ml).
Although a similar research study has not been conducted on Armenia, there are a few accounts that mention
about the same problem of inefficiency in RA. Nranyan (2011) mentions that before the transfer into private
operation, the losses of water in the water supply systems amou nted to about 40%. Today, the water tariff is
several times higher and losses amount to about 80%. For example, in 2010 losses of the company “Yerevan
Jur” amounted to 83.5%, losses of "Armvodokanal" amounted to 85.1% (Public Service Regulatory
Commission of the Republic of Armenia http://www.psrc.am/download.php?fid=17236).
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Source: Oxfam, “Growth with Equity: Policy Choice for Poverty Reduction Project,”
Yerevan, 2002.
This trend continued in the 2000s. Whereas in 2002 Armenia’s GDP reached 83.2
percent of its pre-reform level, and equaled to it in per capita terms, the Gini coefficient
increased by 0.258 and became 0.528, which caused a significant increase of poverty
incidence from 20 to 50.9 percent.258 For the period of 2004-2009, income inequality and the
income gap between the poor and the non-poor were slightly reduced (Table 8.8).259 The Gini
coefficient decreased as well for this period, but it is still high compared to other
transitioning countries.
Table 8.8: Indicators of income distribution inequality, 2004-2009
Monetary income ratio between the richest
20% of the population and poorest 20% of the
population
Monetary income ratio between the richest
10% of the population and poorest 10% of the
population
Gini coefficient

2004
10.6

2005
9.5

2006
7.6

2007
8.0

2008
7.8

2009
8.0

20.8

17.9

13.9

15.6

14.1

14.5

0.395

0.395

0.369

0.371

0.339

0.355

Source: "Social Snapshot and Poverty in Armenia", NSS RA, 2007, 2008, 2010 in IMF
Country Report, "Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress
Report", No. 11/191, July 2011.
Plato’s ideas on the evolution and nature of oligarchy are very relevant to the origins
and character of today’s Armenian oligarchy. According to Plato (551b), oligarchs value
property and honor wealth more than anything else. Righteousness and merit are not
honored. In an oligarchy, the wealthy rule, and the poor are ruled. The latter do not
participate in politics. One of the major defects of an oligarchic state is that rulers are
appointed on the basis of wealth and not on the basis of qualifications. Oligarchs rise to
power unlawfully (Cartledge 1998).
Privatization has been flawed by insufficiencies inherent in the phenomenon of
oligarchy, such as favoritism and corruption, during all three presidencies of post258 See

Economic Development and Research Center, "Modeling of Economic Policy, Income Distribution and
Poverty: Case of Armenia", available online at: http://old.edrc.am/user_files/42.pdf, last access December, 2013
259 See IMF Country Report, "Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report", No.
11/191, July 2011, available online at:
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Armenia/Armenia_PRSP_Progress_Report_2011.pdf

288

independent Armenia. Irrefutably, the oligarchic notion emerged since the initial stages of
privatization in Armenia, and there were big businessmen during Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s
presidency. But the oligarchic power started to meddle into the political affairs of the country
towards the end of 2000s. Since then, oligarchs, most of whom are also politicians, have
continued to enrich themselves (in most cases unlawfully) without facing challenges from
either the government or the legal system.
In my conversation with a former Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Hrant
Bagratyan, it was revealed that the first oligarchic clusters emerged in Armenia beginning in
1997-1998, with fuel imports. Bagratyan concluded that in a small country like Armenia the
concentration of capital is very typical. “But there is a distinction between concentration of
capital occurring in a natural way and concentration of capital, which is organized
intentionally through government policies in order for state elites to deal with maximum 2030 people, the wealthiest ones. This was the politics of Armenian state elites since the end of
1990s.”260
Mass media accounts indicate that companies and factories privatized in the mid1990s were small and most often non-operating. But since 1999-2000, the industrial
privatization included the biggest, most lucrative and most profitable enterprises, specifically
in the construction sector and production of certain commodities. Based on the evidence
provided by the independent press these enterprises were purchased for nominal prices –
much lower prices than their book values. This type of transactions transformed new
capitalists into wealthy industrial tycoons. In return to the granted fortune, the new oligarchs
had to offer political, as well as financial support to the government top officials, specifically
in times of elections. The basis of private sector development was grounded on “influencepeddling” (borrowed from Astourian 2000:16) between high-rank government officials and
owners of the private companies. The officials had “direct, indirect, partial or hidden control
over the new companies”.261 The hidden control of the officials was through hidden
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The citation is taken from the author's interview with Hrant Bagratyan conducted on August 20, 2012.
The information is borrowed from Astourian (2000), whose statements are based on a report of U.S.Armenia Business & Investment Association, “Corruption”, in Investment Climate Report on Armenia, 15
January 2000.
261
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partnership and shareholding, and the indirect control was based on partnership or
shareholding through a family member (of the official) or a friend.
Whereas some believe that oligarchs became an engine for Armenia’s economic
growth, for many more oligarchic elites who nourish one another have weakened the
Armenian economy by creating unfair competition, by stripping assets from companies and
by dodging taxes. Some others speculate that they have had a negative impact on the
evolution and consolidation of democratic institutions in Armenia by manipulating state
politics and policies. “As the market institutions were underdeveloped, there were huge
“institutional economies of scale” – large owners have been able to influence the rules of the
game through capturing regulators, courts and legislatures” (Guriev and Rachinsky 2006:16).
According to Crisis Group Europe (2012), Armenian oligarchs control the economy
and influence policy. They are “centered on several informal commodity-based cartels and
semi-monopolies” in specific economic sectors, particularly in the trade of commodities,
such as gasoline, sugar, flour, and alcoholic beverages. Two companies reportedly control
virtually all cement production and sales. Oligarchs possess most of the mining industry.
Taking into account the small territory that Armenia has, it may be considered that the
country is rich with valuable resources such as molybdenum and gold. All profits from those
lucrative resources are said to belong to a few oligarchs. Among those are Parliament
Speaker Hovik Abrahamyan, member of Parliament Tigran Arzakantsyan, and former
Minister of Environmental Protection Vardan Ayvazyan. 262
There have not been effective legal methods that would encourage small and medium
entrepreneurs to enter into fair competition with those oligarchs. For instance, every other
small-scale businessman or potential importer of sugar or gasoline knows that sugar, flour,
gasoline, etc. are monopolistic businesses and do not try to import those commodities. Efforts
to import any of the known monopolies by other entrepreneurs have been doomed to failure.

262 Aghajanian

(2012) records that Ayvazyan was accused of corruption and fraud in the mining business in
2012. A U.S. court ordered him to pay $37.5 million in damages to a U.S. mining company that was accusing
him.
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One of my interviewees, Arman Grigoryan, provided very illustrative examples of
how the interests of the society at large clashed with the interests of the politically wellconnected businessmen.263 According to Grigoryan, “the artificial high rate of the Armenian
currency, which was devouring the savings of the poor people, was detrimental to the
politically weak exporters and very beneficial to the politically powerful importers of
Armenia”. For a long period of time there was a lot of political demand in the society to do
something about this issue, but the President did not initiate any steps, the Parliament did not
intervene, and the Central Bank did not do anything to protect the rights of the small
entrepreneurs.
Another example of how state policy outcomes have been beneficial to both
politicians and large businessman was related to arbitrary practices used by the customs
officials. “Well-connected businessmen have their imported goods cleared through the
customs very quickly. The not so well-connected businessmen or the ones who are
sympathetic to the opposition have their goods lying in the customs for 2-3 months.
Sometimes these are perishable items of seasonal goods, so by the time they get it cleared,
they are out of competition in the market. This way the latter businessmen are easily
defeated”.264 As a most interesting case to support his statements, Grigoryan provided the
example of Khachatur Sukiasyan, some of whose assets were stripped by the government in
efforts to bankrupt the businessman in 2008. Grigoryan concluded that the gamut of the
government ran from very vulgar and very direct ways, such as seizing one’s business
through fraudulent law-enforcement cooperation and keeping goods in customs for a long
period of time, to very subtle ways, such as keeping the exchange rate of the Armenian
currency high or low to benefit the government-connected businessmen.

263 Interview

conducted with Arman Grigoryan on March 24, 2010.
The quote is from the author’s interview with Arman Grigoryan on March 24, 2010. There were other
interviewed politicians and researchers, who used similar examples regarding subsidized tax privileges for
certain businesses and businessmen. Among those were Richard Giragosyan (mentioning the import of fuel/gas
and sugar), Heghine Manasyan (fuel), Paruyr Hayrikyan (fuel and cars), Gevork Manoukyan (cars and cellular
phones) and Stepan Safaryan (all of the mentioned products and services).
264
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ACRPC Chairmain Gevorg Manukyan presented two other examples of privileges
granted to businessmen favored by top officials. 265 One was regarding a famous case of fire
extinguishers for cars, imported to Armenia by a big businessman during Interior Minister
Vano Siradeghyan’s years. So, the government required all cars owners to purchase fire
extinguishers. As Manukyan indicated, it was not a bad idea to introduce car fire
extinguishers in Armenia; the unfairness of the deal was that the fire extinguishers had to be
exclusively of the type that the mentioned businessman imported into the country. It was, in
principle, a violation of constitutional rights of other entrepreneurs in the same business, as
well as of car owners, who were fined if found by police not to own that exact type of fire
extinguisher.
The other example concerned professional photos for Armenian passports, when all
citizens were required to change their Soviet passports after independence when the
Armenian government began issuing its own national passports after the adoption of a new
Armenian Nationality Law. The passport issuing government entities accepted photographs
for these new passports taken only by a single photo-making company. According to
Manukyan, behind this scheme there was a simple business calculation and certain amount of
profit for the state-favored photography business: Armenia had 3 million people, each
photograph cost a certain amount of money, so a single photo company would make a certain
amount of profit. The requirement of photographs to be taken by the particular company
created an outcry by other photographers, who were losing customers. Their protest and
complaints however were very quickly silenced by local officials.
Both of these cases, that occurred as consequences of private/market economy, are
minor considering the size of finances involved in those deals as compared to tax evasion and
other fraudulent activities involved in bigger businesses, such as for example, import and/or
production of fuel, sugar, cell phones, cars, dairy, etc. Yet they clearly illustrate how corrupt
networks of large businessmen and government officials have created inconveniences for
ordinary people through unconstitutional actions.

The following two examples are from the author’s interview with Gevork Manoukyan conducted on May 20,
2009 in Vanadzor, Armenia.
265
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Oligarchic monopolies are acknowledged to have been a major obstacle to business
development in Armenia.266 They also eliminated large groups of the society from the labor
market by curtailing workers’ rights in many aspects. With the increase of oligarchic
businesses, the interests of ordinary people decreased and became a minor priority for the
government. Workers’ rights protection became minimal on the grounds of protecting the
interests of large entrepreneurs.Nranyan (2011:201) mentions that trade unions were almost
absent in the country. Moreover, the reform of the Labor Code first adopted in 2004 puts the
employer and employee in unequal positions; hence a preference for a policy of low-salary,
poor-benefits and low-standard of living for workers is prevalent. 267 The few labor unions
that operate in Armenia hardly ever challenge business owners over worker rights.
A simple mechanism is behind the process of social exclusion practiced by oligarchs.
First, oligarchs weakened democratic institutions and generated corruption of large-scale
levels based on their wealth, resources, and connections, hence excluding all other potential
businessmen from entry into business. They also evade and dodge taxes and customs through
patronage networks. And finally, oligarchs enjoy customs benefits. Arbitrary practices are
frequently used to collect levies and duties, which yet again automatically closes
opportunities of new entries into the business sphere. In fact, there are claims that only about
10% of imports pass through proper customs procedures. This is one reason why the
266

More specifics on the hampering nature of oligarchic businesses on equitable business development may be
found in several reports and observations of international financial institutions, such as “Strategy for Armenia”,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 21, 2009 ;“OECD Anti-Corruption Network for
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, second Round of Monitoring Armenia,
Monitoring Report”, September 29, 2011, p. 7; “Progress Report on the Country Partne rship Strategy for the
Republic of Armenia”, World Bank, June 3, 2011, p. 10.
267 While the Armenian Labor Code provides a few incentives for certain employees, such as for example,
maternity benefits, overall it does not include strong worker protection. As Parliament member Artsvik
Minasian, a trained economist, said "employers' interests are taking precedence over employees' interests” (RFL
2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Labor_Law_Reforms_Raise_Concerns/2033931.ht ml). The
following is some evidence of poor employment benefits and absence of worker protection laws in Armenia:
 According to the 2004 Labor Force Survey (LFS), 23% of Armenian employees in private companies worked
based on a verballabor contracts/agreement (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, 2005).
This is evidence for the need to deepen the legal and contractual regulation of labor relations.
 Overtime work is particularly common in Armenia: by the LFS data, 26% of the workforce works 51 or more
hours per week (World Bank 2007). Moreover, there is no wage premium for the overtime employment,
particularly if the overtime is verbally agreed between the parties.
 According the World Bank “Doing Business 2009” database employment indicators, severance pay for
redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment is very low in Armenia. As compared to the most
generous severance pay in other post-Soviet countries, such as Albania (42.9 weeks of pay), followed
Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (28.9 weeks of pay), Armenia offers the lowest severance pay, only
one month of pay. Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are similar to Armenia in this reg ard.
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Armenian government collects only about 19.3% of GDP in taxes, compared to the 40%
average in the European Union (Crisis Group Europe 2012).
Guriev and Rachinsky (2006) argue that the post-Soviet authoritarian rulers are so
affluent that they may be considered the “ultimate oligarchs” of their countries. In the case of
Armenia, this speculation is reasonable. U.S Ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovich
similarly observed in 2009: “The murky ownership of Armenia’s major industry clusters is a
hidden driver of Armenian politics and elites’ inter-relationships. … Business elites are thus
deeply intertwined with political power, and vice versa, and each has an incentive to preserve
the status quo, fearing that regime change could kick off a new campaign of economic
redistribution at the expense of today’s oligarchs”. She mentions that there existed two main
political/economic pyramids of oligarchs in Armenia, one belonging to the second President
Robert Kocharyan, and the other to the current President Sargsyan. According to
Yovanovich, a third major cluster of business enterprises was soon to emerge led by
Parliament speaker Hovik Abrahamian (for the years of 2008-2011), who tried to break free
of the Kocharyan pyramid.268
Not only are many state elites oligarchs in Armenia, but the rest of the oligarchs are
‘endorsed’ and sponsored by the ruling regime. Under top elite’s patronage, oligarchs plague
elections with electoral irregularities, such as fraud, bribery, ballot stuffing, intimidation of
oppositional voters and party leaders. Garo Yegnukian, an executive board member of Policy
Forum Armenia, a U.S.-based research organization, reported that oligarchs influence on
Armenian elections is huge. “They’re the ones who distribute election bribes, who intimidate,
who break people’s knees, if they have to” (in Aghajanyan 2012).

268

Whereas this information is not covert and is frequently discussed among the population, there have been
rare, if any efforts by journalists, political scientists, analysts and researchers to officially touch upon this data.
There have been a few published stories in the media, which will soon be highlighted in this chapter. In fact,
Yovanovich herself has not mentioned the business of politics openly and publicly; the information was found
in a U.S. embassy cable leaked in 2009. There are a series of confidential cables leaked on the topic of
oligarchy and how it generated discrepancies and shortcomings in the society related to economic and political
issues. Some of these accounts will be discussed here.
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The Armenian Constitution does not allow members of Parliament or government to
own or run a business, but this law is commonly ignored. 269 For the majority of oligarchs
trying to secure a seat in the Armenian Parliament is not so much about influencing
policymaking, but more about the immunity and prestige that they get by becoming a
government member. Especially prestige is very attractive to those tycoons. In 2011, the first
President of post-independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian claimed that 76 of 131
members of the Armenian Parliament were businessmen. He added that “All of them keep
violating the constitution. But they constitute a majority and nothing can be done without
them. Today, the parliament is in the hands of oligarchs.” (Ter-Petrossian 2011)
There has never been a detailed examination of the Armenian oligarchy in literature,
except spontaneous newspaper coverage on this or that oligarch addressing a specific socioeconomic issue that was relevant for a certain period and/or generated public outcry.
Although there is very little research or official statistics related to the distribution of assets
in the Armenian economy, press coverage and anecdotal data on the wealth of oligarchs in
Armenia, who are known and referred by nicknames among people show that a large fraction
of this class became rich through controlling the mining and exporting of Armenia’s
diamonds, copper, and gold, to name a few270 . They also dominate major commodity
imports, such as gas, wheat, oil, butter, sugar, etc. Aprhamian and Yekikian (2010) state that
“business interests of the oligarchic class reflect the makeup of Armenia’s skewed economic
landscape as a whole, with imports making up 40% of the GDP, while exports only account

Article 65 of the Armenian Constitution stipulates: “A Deputy may not be engaged in entrepreneurial
activities, hold an office in state and local self-government bodies or in commercial organizations, as well as
engage in any other paid occupation, except for scientific, educational and creative work. [Upon entering into
business activities] A Deputy shall [resign from his/her parliamentary seat]”. A non -official translation is
available on the website of the Armenian government, www.parliament.am.
Furthermore, The National Assembly and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia does not want to
or has been so far incapable of enforcing Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, which
states: “The powers of a Deputy shall terminate upon the expiration of the term of office of the National
Assembly, dissolution of the National Assembly, violation of the provisions stipulated in Part 1 of Article 65 of
the Constitution, loss of citizenship, absence from more than half of floor voting in the course of a single
session, prison sentence, legal incapacity and resignation from office.” (italics added)
270 For instance, the following are the nicknames of oligarchs who are at the same time members of Parliament:
Lfik (brassiere) Samo, Alyuraghatsi (flour mill) Lyovik, Tsaghik (flower) Rubo, Kombikormi (animal food)
Vlad, Lady Hagop, Nemez (Nazi/fascist) Rubo, Dodi (idiot’s son) Gago, etc. Armenians know these
businessmen by their nicknames. It wouldn’t be easy for many people to give their real names. Some of these
nicknames are based on the products related to which these oligarchs had small businesses before becoming
affluent, and some nicknames refer to a feature of their characteristics.
269
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for 10%”. Aprahamian and Yekikian write that 70% of exports are comprised of raw
materials, minerals, and stones. Based on this information, one may assume that export
activities do not include manufacturing, which in its turn suggestsa poor level of employment
by these businessmen.
I have compiled an informal chronicle of “who owns what in Armenia”, with the
caveat that some of the information is based on rumor, speculation, and interview
discussions. Many of the local tycoons included in the list possess businesses that are
registered on the names of family members and friends, therefore their wealth presented here
may be considered incomplete. For instance, second President Robert Kocharyan’s family
assets are estimated to be around 4 billion U.S. dollars. Subsequent president Serzh
Sargsyan’s wealth does not lag behind Kocharyan’s wealth. 271 The two presidents are
reported to share a significant amount of revenues from a number of government and
business revenue streams. According to the US Embassy in Armenia, “it is safe to assume
that the sources of this revenue stream include customs proceeds, bribes, and other illegal
payments”. Some other oligarchs in the Kocharyan and Sargsyan pyramids are so affluent
that their wealth could have been easily included in the international Forbes list. Among
them is member of the National Assembly and “Bargavaj Hayastan” (“Prosperous Armenia”)
political party leader Gagik Tsarukyan. “The former arm-wrestler started out as a minority
shareholder in one of Armenia's two largest breweries in the late 1990s. The brewery has
claimed to be loss-making since then, and it is not clear how exactly the unusually beefy
tycoon, who is very close to the ruling regime, has earned his millions” (Danielyan 2005). It
is ironic that Tsarukyan’s way to the world of big business and politics began with armwrestling. According to Danielyan (2005), Tsarukyan arguably the wealthiest man in the
country, owns more than 40 medium and large companies. Only one of the assets belonging
to Tsarukyan family, the Bulgarian water bottling company “Gorna Banya”, which was
purchased in 2009 by the businessman and his wife Javahir, cost almost 25 million Euros.
The mogul’s wealth is rumored to be 400-500 million.
There are no reliable published sources related toactivities of oligarchic nature during
Ter-Petrossian's presidency. The only businessman hailing from the Ter-Petrossian
271

Kocharyan's and Sargsyan's businesses and ownerships wealth are presented in Tables 8.9 and 8.10.
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administration, who may be considered to be an oligarch, is Khachatur Sukiasyan.272
Sukiasyan – a member of the National Assembly (1999-2003 first term and 2003-2012
second term) – continued to hold some businesses after Ter-Petrossian’s 1998 ouster.
According to the U.S. Embassy Yerevan cable (2011), Sukiasyan owns Restaurant chains
Pizza di Roma, Queen burger, Chalet; SIL Hotel and SIL Plaza department store; official
distributorship of Phillip Morris; real estates in downtown Yerevan; Golden Wood
International (hardwood lumber, flooring strip and finger-joint panel manufacturer); Yerevan
Furniture Plant panel manufacturer; Armeconombank (a leading commercial bank); Bjni
mineral water plant; Yerevan Polyplast OJSC (manufacturer of various plastic household
items, pipes, sanitation piping units, polyethylene film and bags, linoleum and artificial
leather); Zovq Factory OJSC (Zovq natural juices factory); a construction business (wood
and panel); Star Valley Co. (Dubai): SIL Group’s representative in United Arab Emirates;
Masis Gofrotara (cardboard and napkin production); and Sevan Grain Milling Company.
Yet again, Sukiasyan family and companies became government targets in retaliation
for his support of Ter-Petrosyan's 2008 presidential candidacy. The fact that Sukiasyan’s
main business, SIL Group, has been substantially disassembled and its most lucrative assets
effectively transferred into the hands of President Sargsyan’s supporters serves as a good
example of how economic power changes in Armenia with the change in political power. For
example, in 2008 the government brought tax and other charges against the Bjni Mineral
Water Factory, previously belonging to Sukiasyan. The factory was seized by the
government and later purchased by another businessman, Ruben Hayrapetyan, a president’s
loyalist. Sukiasyan supporters say that those charges were fabricated because of Sukiasyan’s
support for Ter-Petrossian. The government tried to do the same with the “Byuregh” spring
water factory, one of the best mineral and spring water production factories in CIS countries,
and “Pares Armenia”, the exclusive distributor of Phillip Morris tobacco products in
Armenia, belonging to Sukiasyan.

272 Khachatur Sukiasyan

is widely known by the nickname “Grzo” in Armenia. The word ‘grzo’ does not have
any special meaning and is not translated.
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Asset stripping, along with bribery, illegal customs proceeds and tax evasion, is
considered to be one way of wealth hoarding for some of the oligarchs presented in the
following pyramids.
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Table 8.9: Robert Kocharyan Pyramid
Type of Business/
Ownership
Robert
Kocharyan

-

MAP CJSC (One of the leading companies in
Armenia, manufacturing brandy, wine and canned
food) (50% co-owner);
Areksimbank (co-owner);
Unibank (co-owner);
ABB Bank (co-owner);
Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Plant (90%);
Complex Kaputan Sevan (100%);
Medical Center Nairi (50% together with the
Minister of Health Harutiun Kushkyan);
Brand shops (Emporio Armani, Stefano Ricci, etc.);
Renko Construction;
Construction Company “BiShin” (100%);
Chain stores SAS (50% through Deputy Prime
Minister Armen Gevorgian);
“Noah” konyachno-vinovodochny Mill - 50% (coowner Gagik Tsarukyan);
Airport Zvartnots - 50% (30-year lease, co-owner of
a citizen of Argentina, Eduardo Eurnekian);
“K-Telecom” (trade mark VivaCell);
Agro-industries Ltd. (1870 ha);
“AraratCement” (33%)
A large shopping complex in Moscow (co-owner);
A Casino in Moscow;
Russia’s “AFK” Sistema273

Government Member/
Public Office
Second President of postindependent Armenia
(1998-2008)

Relation to
President/Other Top
Official
N/A

Kocharyan is a shareholder and a member of the Board of Directors of Russia’s AFK Sistema. Moscow-based London-listed AFK Sistema is a sprawling
operation with interests in some 200 companies ranging from microchips to toy stores. Early on, Sistema create d a joint venture with Moscow's municipal
273
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Table8.9 Continued
Gagik
“Kotayk” Brewery (a joint venture with Castel Beer);
Tsarukyan
“Manana” Grain (one of Armenia’s major wheat
importers);
Aviaservice CJSC (Airline ticketing; food
preparation and service for air passengers);
Armenian International Airways (AIA);
“Ararat” winery;
- Multi Group Dairy;
Multi Leon chain (gas stations and natural gas
stations):
“Multi Stone” Plant (travertine export to Europe);
Casino Club “Cleopatra”, along with a new casino
(“Pyramid”) under construction;
Gyumri Textile plant (hidden co-owner);
Farm projects (including most of the vegetables sold
to the Armenian Military forces);
Furniture Salon network (the largest importer of
European furniture in the country);
Two major retail markets (GUM and Mashtots Ave.);
Bulgarian water bottling company “Gorna Banya”
Sedrak
Converse Bank (30% - 50%)274 ;
Kocharyan
Ardshininvest Bank (over 50%);
“H2” Television station (about 35%);
Representation of Toyota company in Armenia;
Construction company “Downtown Yerevan”;
Network of shops “Star” (30%);
Armenian postal service, “HayPost” (50%);

Member of Parliament,
2003-current

Related to Hovik
Abrahamyan, Speaker of the
National Assembly;
Also related to Andranik
Manukyan, who has held
several top positions in the
Armenian government

No

Son of the second President
Robert Kocharyan

telephone network (MTS) and later received a controlling stake in the network, along with its main assets, which included MTS (now the largest cellular operator
in Russia, traded on the NYSE). Since 2008 Sistema has controlled the Indian Sistema Shyam Teleservices Ltd.
274 Converse Bank is officially owned by billionaire Eduardo Eurnekian, a wealthy businessman from Argentina. He is also the owne r “Zvartnoc” airport
(Armenia International Airport CJSC) and Gyumri airport. Eurnakian also purchased the Armenian postal service, “HayPost” in 2006.
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Table 8.9 Continued
Import of mobile phones (80% of the market);
Golden Palace Hotel in Yerevan (83%)
Andranik
A monopoly on the import and distribution of
Manukyan
Russian Lada cars in Armenia (a booming segment
of car market);
A share of the Vivacell MTS mobile phone service.
Downtown “Metropol” Hotel;
Import of Ford, Nissan, and Renault vehicles;
A broad range of smaller businesses

Hovik
Abrahamyan

A monopoly of significant-scale agribusiness;
“ArtFood” company (Armenia’s leading processed
food company);
A number of alcoholic beverage plants;
A considerable percentage of Armenia’s cultivated
land and the produce thereof

Deputy in the Supreme
Council of the ASSR, later
Member of the National
Assembly (1990-1999);
Member of the Finance,
Credit, Fiscal, and
Economic Affairs
Committee in NA (19992000);
Minister of State Revenues
(2000- 2001);
Minister of Transport and
Communication (20012008);
Advisor to President
Sargsyan and RA
Ambassador to Ukraine
(2008-current)
Member of the National
Assembly (1995-current);
Minister of Territorial
Administration (20002008);
Speaker of the National
Assembly (2008-2011)

Related to Gagik
Tsarukyan, a member of the
National Assembly

Related to Gagik
Tsarukyan, a member of the
National Assembly
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Table 8.9 Continued
Davit
A number of businesses, which Harutyunyan does
Harutyunyan
not report275

Deputy Minister of Justice No
(1997 to 1998)
Minister of Justice (19982007)
Yervand
A number of businesses, of which there are no
Deputy Minister of Energy No
Zakharyan
published records or reported disclosures
(1992-1993);
Minister of Transport
(1998-2000);
Vice Minister of State
Revenues (2000-2001);
Minister of State Revenue
(2001-2002);
Head of state tax service
(2002-2003);
Mayor of Yerevan (20032009);
Head of State Committee
of Real Estate Cadaster
(2009-present)
Armen
A number of businesses, of which there are no
Chairman of the State
Avetisyan
published records or reported disclosures
Customs Committee
(2000-2008)
Source: Adapted from Petrov (2010); U.S. Embassy Yerevan cables (2003 and 2009) available online at
news.am/eng/news/72188.html and www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09YEREVAN798

275

Press accounts relate Harutyunyan to a number of businesses, although he reports his salary as his sole source of income and asset disclosures. For example, in
2011, “Hetq” investigative Journalists online declare that Harutyunyan’s reported income and the cash deposits in his bank account at the e nd of the year were
very different. The same source states that the Minister is known to be an antiques aficionado with a collection of 198 gold and silver Russian coins and a
collection of expensive paintings. These items, according to his asset disclosure, are worth some 8 million AMD. ( http://hetq.am/eng/articles/16464/mp-davitharoutyunyan-8-million-amd-worth-of-o ld-coins-and-paintings.html)
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Table 8.10: Serzh Sargsyan Pyramid
Type of Business/Ownership

Hrant
Vardanyan276

Ruben
Hayrapetyan

Alexander
Sargsyan277
Harutyun
Pambukyan278

Grand Candy (most dominant Armenian producer of
chocolates, sweets, ice creams.);
Grand Tobacco (major cigarette producer);
Grand Sun (production of
and lamps);
Alcohol production;
Several Company stores and cafe chains
Co-owner of Grand Tobacco;
“Aragats” textile production plant;
“Harsnaqar” hotel on Sevan shore (one of the
paramount hotels in Armenia);
Several gas stations;
Other additional minor businesses
Large shares in a wide array of big businesses
without dominating any sector in particular
“MaxGroup” (one of the largest commercial and
industrial structures of Armenia, the scope of which
ranges from fuel imports to agribusiness);
A chain of large retail gas station (GPS);
A large candy enterprise;
Lusakert Poultry Plant;

Government Member/
Public Office
No

Relation to
President/Other Top
Official
Father of Mikhael
Vardanyan, Member of the
National Assembly

Member of the National
Assembly (2003-current)

No

Member of the National
Assembly (2003-current)
Member of the National
Assembly (1999-2011)

Brother of President Serzh
Sargsyan
No

276

Vardanyan formerly supported both Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, but currently he has devoted his loyalty to t he current President Sargsyan and is
purely a Sargsyan ally. Thus, Vardanyan has been included in the Sarsgyan Pyramid. This concerns most of the oligarchs economically (frequently also
politically) active during the last two administrations.
277 It is widely acknowledged in Armenia that if a businessman faces any problems with taxes, police or other authorities, the easiest wa y for the businessman to
overcome the problem is to give up a significant stake of his business to the brother of third President S argsyan, Alexander Sargsyan, known as “Sashik”.
278 “Haykakan Jamanak ” declares that Pambukyan was a businessman that managed to sell a number of Armenian enterprises to Russians. His biggest de al was
selling Armenian distributor electricity networks company to Russians.
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Table 8.10 Continued
Yeghvard Animal Feed Plant;
- Stakeholder in Midland Resources (electricity
distribution networks)
Misha
- Pares Armenia ( exclusive distributor of Philip
Minasyan
Morris tobacco products in Armenia)279
Aghvan
“Shant” Television;
Hovsepyan
“Shant” Dairy
Samvel
Lusastgh (Shining Star): produces vodka and
Alexanyan280
vegetable oil, owns supermarkets;
Informal ‘Feudal Lord’ of Malatia (a district in
Yerevan);
Natali Pharm (a chain of pharmacies, imports and
distributes drugs;
Major importer of wheat, sugar and butter;
Other additional minor businesses
Barsegh
Flash Ltd. (One of the two most dominant fuel
Beglaryan281
import companies);
Ararat Bank
Mikhail
ArmSavings Bank, privatized in 2001;
Baghdassarov Viktoria Trade (a major wheat importer);
Mika Trading (oil products imports and distribution,
including 40% of gasoline imports);
Armavia (chartered flights to major Russian cities);
Hrazdan Cement Plant, renamed to Mika Cement;
MIKA Ltd (one of the two most dominant gas
station chains;

Senior presidential staffer
and advisor
Prosecutor General (1998cuurent)
Member of the National
Assembly (2003-current)

Son-in-law of President
Serzh Sargsyan
No

No

Claimed to be President
Sargsyan’s Godfather

No

Classmate and best friend of
President Serzh Sargsyan

No

279

Minasyan owns Pares Armenia, the exclusive distributor of Philip Morris tobacco products in Armenia, when the government deployed the customs service
(now the State Revenue Committee) to take control of Pares Armenia from Khachatur Sukiasya n.
280 Aleksanian, known as “Lfik Samo”, is considered to be a semi-criminal oligarch. He maintains an army of bodyguards and boasts little formal education
(maybe the least educated among oligarchs).
281 Beglaryan is dubbed as “Flash Barsegh”. He is considered to be one of the most loyal businessmen to President Sargsyan, as well the latter’s Godfather.
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Table 8.10 Continued
Mineral water bottling in Dilijan (Dilijan Frolova);
Other major businesses in Russia and Europe
Serzh
Assets of “Flash” (co-owner)
Third President of postSargsyan
Network of gas-fueling stations;
independent Armenia
Three wine factories in Nagorno-Karabakh;
Distillery (1/3 of all vodka sold in Armenia, 2.3
million liters);
Bank “Ararat”;
Chain of restaurants “Ararat”;
Assets of the company “MIKA” (co-owner),
including “Armavia” airlines, imports of fossil fuels,
gasoline, kerosene (monopoly), diesel fuel; FC
MIKA (estimated 40-50 million USD); MikaCement (a construction company), “MIKA House”
(more than 5 large elite houses in Yerevan);
A Hotel Complex in Moscow;
A private house in London;
VTB Bank (bought for 300 thousand dollars, sold for
$ 28 million);
Network of stores “Jazve”;
Supply of small arms by private producers of
Bulgaria in the Third World countries;
Owner of “Armenakob” and “A1TV” stations
Hayrapetyan - “Hayastan” Department store;
No
Family
- Hotel Ararat;
- BMW dealer;
- “Erebuni” textile production plant;
- A Hotel on Lake Sevan shore;
- Other additional minor businesses
Source: Adapted from Petrov (2010); U.S. Embassy Yerevan cables (2003 and 2009) available online
http://news.am/eng/news/72188.html and www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09YEREVAN798

N/A

Close to the President’s
office, especially to advisor
Alexan Harutiunyan

at
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Petrov’s article (2010), which followed “the first edition of the Armenian Forbes”,
reveals that six of the businessmen in the below list (those written in italics) have been in the
executive branch of the government of the Republic of Armenia (including former and
current presidents). The other three businessmen are Members of Parliament. Hrant
Vardanyan, who is neither a MP nor a government member, has close ties with the political
elites of the country through his son Michael Vardanyan, who is a Member of Parliament.
According to law, these politicians were obliged to live ‘solely’ on their salaries.
1.

Gagik Tsarukyan - Chairman of the “Prosperous Armenia” political party;

2.

Armen Avetisyan - Head of Customs;

3.

Mikhail Bagdasarov - President of MICA and the owner of Armavia;

4.

Hrant Vardanyan - President of the “Grand Tobacco” and “Grand Candy”;

5.

Khachatur Sukiasyan – Owner of “SIL group”;

6.

Yervand Zakharyan - Mayor of Yerevan;

7.

Robert Kocharyan - 1st President of Armenia;

8.

Serzh Sargsyan - Minister of Defense, 2nd President of Armenia;

9.

Andranik Manukyan - Minister of Transport and Communications;

10.

David Harutyunyan - Minister of Justice
With the presentation of the Armenian wealthiest people, I showedthat business

interests are closely interrelated with the state's decision-making and the policy outcomes. As
observed in Tables 8.9 and 8.10, more than 80% of the top businessmen in the country are
government membersand representatives of the executive branch, which is illegal by the
Armenian law, or closely connected to state elites. It is just a small group of powerful people
who control much of the Armenian economic resources and political affairs. This is perhaps
common in the world, even in western democracies. The dilemma, however, is that in
Armenia as in many transitioning countries the concentration of wealth and power is usually
achieved illegally and through violence, which makes the problem of social exclusion more
acute.
Regarding the list of the richest people in Armenia, economist Edward Aghajanov
said: “If these people paid at least 20% of their incomes to the state budget then good for
them. Being rich is not a crime. The only thing that worries our society is what the relations
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of these people are with the state budget. As the institute of tax publication is not very
developed in our country it is not easy to know the number of rich people and the amount of
their capital. In foreign countries this is a quite transparent process. … In our country rich
men do a great job in hiding their actual incomes.” Aghajanov also stated: “If you are from
the wing of the government it is not dangerous to be rich. If you are not linked to the
government you may be subject to government racket. I know many people, who being
successful average businessmen fear to expand their businesses and instead prefer to buy
apartments in Armenia.” (Avagyan 2006)
Many believe that Armenia can achieve consolidated democracy, economic success
and social equity by eliminating oligarchic monopolies and by reducing oligarchic
interference with politics and socio-economic affairs of the country. One of my interviewees,
Vazgen Manukyan, for example, believes that social exclusion in Armenia is prevalent
because capital and political power are interrelated. While in most countries of the world,
including democratic ones, financial elites and political elites support and serve each other,
“in Armenia this bond is so tight and massive that the government practically dictates who
can become wealthy”. For the rest of the society, specifically those, who have entrepreneurial
abilities and motivation to enter into financial markets, the doors are thus shut. The
competition is limited not only in economic but also in political sphere. Manukyan added that
“it was erroneous of Armenia not to have a law or an act similar to the US Sherman Antitrust
Act, a law that restricts and limits a certain level of monopolies and prohibits business
activities that reduce competition in the marketplace.”282
8.6 Conclusion: Results of the Private Sector
This chapter showed that the privatization process in Armenia increased exclusion of
many Armenians from economic life, creating unequal assets, incomes and employment
opportunities. Besides the increased economic exclusion, social marginalization of thousands
of Armenians also grew, as they lost key channels to education, health care and medicine,
basic infrastructure, and social protection due to their reduced purchasing power. The
availability, quality, accessibility and affordability of the mentioned social services became

282

Quotes are fromthe personal interview with Vazgen Manukyan conducted onAugust29, 2012.
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inequitable within the Armenian society. The decrease of financial opportunities and loss of
social welfare of the poorer consumers in the private market not only shifted the economic
viability and profitability towards the private owners, but it also provided a dominant role for
the latter in Armenia's political affairs and policy making. In the absence of inadequate
institutions that could protect the rights of the excluded, the latter have persistently
experienced insufficient representation in the decision making process. For example, the
National Assembly of Armenia has been packed with businessmen and representatives of
oligarchic networks, with very little accountability from the public sector. Private ownership
of the economy, thus, has increased social exclusion and also made it difficult to ensure
political participation for the lower and middle classes of the society.As mentioned in
Chapter Two, government leaders together with large business owners "shaped the character
of economic and social arrangements, the very stuff of social politics, to their own advantage
and to the disadvantage of others” (Byrne 2005). Effectively denied of the economic,
political and social rights of citizenship, the disadvantaged groups could not successfully
counterbalance the dominant groups.
With the above said, however, it cannot be generalized that privatization process is
always a cause of social inequalities, as it has had different outcomes in various Eastern
European and post-Soviet countries. The variance in privatization consequences depends on
many factors, among them initial conditions of a country, such as geographical location,
natural resources, educational and income level of its population, prior economic growth rate,
etc. While Armenia’s initial conditions (before the structural reforms)that would lead to a
successful transition are not considered to be satisfactory, the structural reform itself was
poorly conducted in Armenia.283
It can be concluded that overall private solutions of the transition period that
successfully occurred in some Eastern and Central European countries have not occurred in
Armenia. The restructuring process was fraught with unwanted consequences in the Republic
of Armenia. An obvious conclusion is that the private sector has played a very weak role in
283

Based on initial conditions, such as the level of income, its geo political situation, urbanization rate, and
natural resources, Armenia was far below the average level of the USSR’s initial conditions for a successful
transition. The only comparative advantage regarding initial conditions was the very high educational level of
Armenian population.
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generating employment in Armenia, creating widespread poverty and inequality within the
society. Large segments of the population were excluded from productive employment.
While the new firms did not secure public employment, the state was not able to guarantee
adequate social assistance to the unemployed and underemployed. The main beneficiaries of
privatization were the wealthy, the well-connected to government elites, and top government
officials themselves. There was a very tiny percentage of really talented entrepreneurs, who
were able to secure an economically beneficial place for themselves during privatization due
to their knowledge and skills. A majority of the equally talented employees, who could have
been new owners of the privatized firms, were excluded from the process, becoming
unemployed, underemployed or emigrants working in foreign countries.
State elites in Armenia have nearly always avoided or failed to turn the society into a
vigorous participant of political, economic and institutional reforms. While during the first
stages of the privatization process, the country lacked an organized civil society, recently
developed Armenian civil society has constantly faced enormous objectives in claiming their
demands to the state. This concerns public grievances related to transparent information in
privatization transactions, discrepancies in the tax system, barriers of business entry and
registration for small and medium entrepreneurs, etc.
A very rapid implementation of mass privatization, which was carried out in Armenia
through sale of vouchers, implied an already developed level of knowledge and skills,
effective methods of corporate management, and institutional capability to create a fair and
transparent capital market. However, none of those existed at the beginning of 1990s in
Armenia. Instead, privatization transactions were marred with irregularities, most of the
auctions were rigged, and illegitimate property rights resulted in expropriation. Armenian
mass privatization hampered the production of diffuse ownership of private enterprises due to
the following:
a) Obstacles for entry into the market that impacted the exclusion of specific market players;
b) fair competition, which implied that market players could influence price formation, either
individually or as a group;
c) transaction costs that were not set reasonably and transparently to all market players; and
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d) asymmetry of tax system, i.e., different parties to the same (type of) transaction paid
different tax rates.
It also affected social conditions by creating massive unemployment, low salaries,
high prices of goods and services due to the following:
a) Creation of monopolies and a new strata of society – oligarchs;
b) lack of information and skills to operate companies, due to which newly privatized
companies were idle and had to lay off employees; and
c) asset stripping for gain maximization by new owners.
Most post-privatization companies had to deal with restructuring problems.
Maintaining the existing employment levels was for most companies impossible. Financial
sustainability and maintenance of high employment levels were conflicting for most
companies, particularly the small and medium ones, thus a majority of company employees
were fired in order to maintain economic effectiveness. In retrospect, it has been realized that
several years were necessary for the players of the privatization process to learn the adequate
knowledge necessary to deal with efficient market transactions. An alternative concept of
privatization through direct sales and tenders, specifically of medium and large companies
with the highest numbers of employees, was not even considered as an option until late 1998.
Instead, by 2000 most of the newly privatized companies had low turnover index, which had
a direct impact on increasing losses and growing insolvency. Irregular payment and
cancellation of salaries for months decreased employees’ standard of living. The reaction in
terms of protection of rights of the employees and the guaranteed level of minimal payment
was the growing dissatisfaction of the masses in Armenia. In conclusion, it is worth bringing
in former Prime Minister Darbinian’s statement about the role of the state in relation to social
protection: “Within the countries in transition, Armenia is among them, re-comprehension of
state’s role has a definite preponderance, as in the existing conditions the state not only
should ensure the undisrupted activity of state institutions and productive substructures, but
as well create favorable conditions for the development and progress through protection of
human and citizens’ rights and their liberty” (Darbinian 2001:2).
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion
“The disposition to admire, and almost to
worship, the rich and the powerful and…neglect
persons of poor and mean condition…is the great and
most universal cause of the corruption of our moral
sentiments.” - Adam Smith

9.1 Theoretical Implications
This dissertation contributes to understanding the concept of durable social exclusion
by focusing on the factors that explain the emergence and persistence of social exclusion in
the context of post-Soviet Armenia's twin transition. The aim of the study was not simply to
understand what durable social exclusion is in a non-European context, which is the most
widely applicable geographic site for the problem, but also to explore alternative factors that
would lead to more inclusive societies. This being the primary focus of the dissertation, the
particular emphasis was placed on the post-Soviet Armenian society that, based on the
available data, was plagued by high degrees of social exclusion. The overarching research
question was the following: "What factors contributed to the development of durable social
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia from 1988-2008?"
Based on my theoretical framework, I argued that the industrial and service
privatization was an initial trigger for the emergence of social exclusion of the majority of
Armenian society in post-Soviet Armenia. It particularly affected the exclusion of citizens
from economic opportunities and resources. State militarization after the Karabakh war
exacerbated the problem of social exclusion in Armenia, by further intensifying the processes
of opportunity hoarding and social closure in the political sphere of public life. In the
analysis of the privatization and the state militarization processes, the role of the state, as an
important agent that malfunctioned and hampered the development of democratic
institutions, was emphasized. The Armenian state elitescreated an institutional vacuum,
which has hindered the promotion of democracy, vibrant civil society, rule of law, human
rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, basic prerequisites of social inclusion.
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The state apparatus guaranteed the supremacy of the ruling class by the co-option of
the main instrument of coercion, the repressive apparatus (army, police, paramilitary forces,
etc.). The exploitive domination of politics with a civilian façade, but actually military force,
controlled state institutions, particularly the legislative and the judicial branches of the
government. This type of state militarization seriously weakened the development of other
institutions that could restrict the concentration of the executive power and create more equal
social opportunities, thus producing persistent civil unrest. Some of the political and social
institutions of the civil state, such as the Armenian political parties and the Armenian civil
society, whereas still new, have rapidly developed and strived to protect the rights of
ordinary citizens. Nonetheless, the repressiveness of the state, which peaked during president
Robert Kocharyan's administration (1998-2008), has gradually eclipsed the rest of the
institutions that could support the formation of a socially inclusive society.
Social exclusion is not only important to investigate because many elements of social
inclusion, such as economic opportunities and assets, political participation, and social
networks are valuable resources in their own right, but also because they influence the
success of new generations in basic domains of life, like education, health, family formation.
The mentioned elements of social inclusion are also critical for the pace and type of the
democratization process in a country. This dissertation contributes to the research literat ure
on social exclusion by studying the following elements of social exclusion: 1) the exclusion
of ordinary citizens from economic opportunities and processes, such as unequal and
discriminatory prospects in the job market; difficulties in starting a business and investment
initiatives; and non-transparent tax system; and 2) political and social marginalization of the
same citizens, such as through deficiency of sufficient political participation; resistance to
political opposition; deprivation of citizens' rights to influence policy-making; the
exploitation of nationalism to achieve political aims; and finally; alack of access to vital
social services.
Within

the social exclusion literature,

the causes of social exclusion were

systematized into three main groups: 1) agency-related causes, 2) structural/institutional
causes, and 3) causes originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial, and self-destructive
values and lifestyles. Causes stemming from the third category were not applicable to this
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dissertation, since they are discussed in relation to exclusively social groups at risk (such as
the homeless, the alcoholics, drug addicts, pregnant teenagers, etc.), therefore very little
attention was paid to causes of exclusion originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial,
and self-destructive values and lifestyles.284 The agency-related causes of social exclusion are
somehow related to the third category, and they basically blame human behavior for their
own exclusion. Finally, authors, who focus on structures, as the main cause of social
exclusion, argue that humans respond to the structures of one kind or another, in which they
are situated. A person's economic opportunities, social lifestyle, and political involvement are
therefore predicted according to various structures such as class, race and gender, and how a
person reacts to the constraints and incentives of those structures.
A myriad of factors that include institutional sources of social exclusion lies within
the structural causes of social exclusion. Addressing the particular effects of each of these
factors lay outside of the scope of this dissertation, but a few of them, considered to be
important in determining social exclusion in the case of Armenia as a transitioning country,
were addressed in the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Some were briefly discussed,
including the weak/strong civil society, the natural resource abundance, the privatization
process and changes in the market labor were briefly discussed. The vital role and
significance of courts, the Constitution, and civil society was also mentioned.
Acknowledging the importance of the institutional factors, such as the Constitution and
Courts, I emphasized that they did not function according to their design in the presence of
authoritarian states, nationalist history and culture. Thus, the institutional perspective alone,
so widely cited for deepening social exclusion in western societies, does not fully explain the
problem of social exclusion in Armenia.
The limited applicability of the Western society-characteristic accounts of social
exclusion to the case of post-Soviet Armenia requires alternative explanations of the
problem. It is flawed to discuss social exclusion without the analysis of political power.
Consequently, I focused on the various interacting aspects of the problem through the notion

284

In the analysis of the problem of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, the emphasis was neither on
categorically bounded social groups nor on social groups at risk. The focus was placed on the marginalization of
the vast numbers of the society, particularly workers, by powerful state elites and their networks.
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of power and employed a range of theories and concepts to study the impact of privatization
and state militarization on social exclusion. Each perspective/theory was used to frame some
aspect of social exclusion. In particular, the core arguments of the dissertation were basically
grounded in the following theories and approaches:
Through the application of the social closure and opportunity hoarding theories,
"instruments of social stratification" (Marshall 1964:110), I analyzed key features of the
privatization process in Armenia that resulted in the polarization of the middle and working
classes. According to this type of theory of social exclusion, the government was responsible
for the regulation of the distribution of resources. 285 “Powerful class and status groups, which
have distinct social and cultural identities as well as institutions, use social closure to restrict
the access of outsiders to valued resources (such as jobs, good benefits, education, urban
locations, valued patterns of consumption)” (Saraceno 2002:7-8). The disadvantaged groups
of the society often do not challenge those elites because they are incapable of enforcing
rights that undergird inclusion and/or power to do so. I argued that exclusion arose as a
consequence of discriminatory policies and practices of Armenian state elites during different
stages of the privatization process, who have pursued privileges for themselves excluding
other members of a society. The opportunity hoarding was achieved through deficiency of
knowledge and skills of ordinary workers to sufficiently operate in the free market totally
unfamiliar to them; non-transparent privatization auctions and tenders; artificial barriers to
register a private business for the poor and middle class representatives, biased competition
practices in the export and import market that favored oligarchs, who, as a class, were created
as a result of privatization, and other processes that were discussed in Chapter eight.
Weber's (1919) theory of state's monopoly on the use of force or violence, together
with Tilly's (1978) concepts of revolutionary situationsand outcomes were helpful in the
comparative analysis of the post-Soviet Armenian state's coercive strength. Incumbents'
organizational power, specifically how state elites exercise monopoly on violence, was
applied to five post-Soviet countries to emphasize the repressive power of the Armenian
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The assumption derives from state-centered theories of inequality that critique market-driven theories on the
basis that capitalists, embroiled in the unregulated market, will act to increase their own wealth, exploiting the
lower classes.
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regime. The Armenian state's coercive strength was further studied in the context of the
Karabakh war. Finally, the consequences of the Armenian state militarization through war
was examined in relation to local socio-economic and political affairs, and in this assessment,
the social closure and opportunity hoarding phenomena were re-applied. War-related elites'
positioning towards expansion of nationalist politics, by means of which they achieved the
elimination of liberal political representatives, as well as the breakdown of social protests and
opposition in general in order to maintain their regime, underlined the high degree of
political polarization and marginalization in the Armenian society. More than in other postSoviet countries, the Armenian state elected to "delegate its coercive power as it saw fit",
containing revolutionary situations and maintaining alterations in the distribution of power
advantageous to economically, politically and militarily powerful members of the society.
A brief outline of the findings of each chapter sustain this dissertation's claim that the
combination of the privatization and state militarization processes are relevant to the
examination of social exclusion in the post-Soviet transition period of Armenia. In the next
section, the main findings of the chapters are discussed and summarized.
9.2 Summary of Findings
To wage an effective attack on the determinants of social exclusion, it was vital to
identify the nature and extent of the problem. The first three chapters of the dissertation
contributed to this task through a series of analysis. The Introduction chapter focused on the
centrality of studying the consequences of social exclusion, highlighting the nefarious effects
of the problem on human development in all aspects of life. It underlined the lack of research
that deals with causes of the problem in the post-Soviet societies, specifically that its causes
and consequences vary significantly in developed and developing countries.
The multidimensional nature of social exclusion, specifically in contrast with the
problem of poverty, was the primary discussion of the second chapter. Social exclusion refers
to multidimensional disadvantage, whereas the problem of poverty is restricted to monetary
shortage. To be labeled "socially excluded", a person/a community/a society needs to be
simultaneously excluded along several dimensions. The analysis conducted in the next
chapter (Chapter Three) revealed that this is the situation in Armenia. Many Armenians
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experience the three forms of exclusion concurrently, adding up to the situation of
multidimensional disadvantage. Consequently, if the concept of social exclusion refers to
multidimensional disadvantage, "which involves dissociation from major social and
occupational milieux from society" (Room 1995:25), it is then relevant to address the issue of
social exclusion in discussing economic, social and political problems in post-Soviet
Armenia.
The third chapter concerned the problem of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia
exclusively. The intention to substantiate the critica l situation on the problem for the selected
case was accomplished through the discussion of the three dimensions of social exclusion
(economic, social, and political) separately. Once dubbed the ‘Soviet Silicon Valley’ because
of its high-tech industries, the country became one of the most impoverished in the region
(Torosyan 2004). Armenia has lost approximately 20% of its population in recent years; from
a population of 3.5 million in 1989, it is estimated that somewhere between 800,000 and 1.2
million Armenians have left the country for employment or residence elsewhere by mid2000s. It is estimated that 50% of Armenians live below the poverty line, with an average of
570 USD yearly income (Torosyan 2004). Massive unemployment, substantial labor rights
violations, migration, the wide gap between the rich and the poor, human rights violations,
corruption, political intimidation add to the sense of a society under threat. Moreover, there is
an absence of state control over vital spheres of life and weak development of democratic
institutions, which have a toll on the moral and psychological atmosphere in society
(Nranyan 2011:213-214).
The chapter also demonstrated the durability of social exclusion in Armenia,
presenting available data and information on the Gini coefficient, employment trends,
challenges of low income families in the educational and health sectors, and human rights
issues throughout the 1990s and 2000s, showing that it persisted for more than a decade.
In Chapter Four, I specified the research design of the dissertation, with a thorough
discussion of the hypotheses and the operationalization of the important concepts of the
study. Given the dearth of theoretical explanations regarding causes of social exclusion in
non-Western societies, the analysis of this study was limited to two hypotheses that focused
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on the role of the privatization process, and the role of the Karabakhwar and state
militarization. It is almost certainly accurate to state that those two factors had a significant
effect on the re-structuring of the Armenian society towards a more stratified society.
However, the question of whether the consequences of privatization or state militarization on
increasing social exclusion should be treated separately or together with other national and
international processes and their dynamics merits further exploration. Acknowledging that
this is one of the limitations of my study, I note that the examination of social exclusion
needs further fine-grained analysis buttressed with alternative hypotheses. Similarly, the
recently increasing similar scenarios in the world, with mounting publics grievances, social
movements, 'refolutions' aiming to overthrow their repressive regimes, and states' responses
to those grievances present an interesting laboratory for a comparative study of militarized
states and social exclusion. The latest examples of the March 2011-present Syrian civil war,
2012-2013 Egyptian protests, and more recently, the political turmoil in Ukraine, most
famously known as Euromaidan (literally Eurosquare) that started in November of 2013 are
excellent cases of comparison. On the other hand, in the background of rapidly mounting
violence in those countries, it is important to discern when the 'militarization' features
transmit to the society, and the socially excluded become the aggressors of violence rather
than advocates of social inclusion.
In Chapter Five, using student surveys, I gauged public perceptions of key issues
central to Armenian self-perceived exclusion. Results of the survey data revealed public
attitudes of overall social exclusion in Armenia that were similar to the social exclusion
situation described in Chapter Three. Similar to political elites and researchers interviewed
for this dissertation, the surveyed public confirmed that social exclusion exists in Armenia as
a serious problem and that it is intensely acknowledged by ordinary citizens.
It was also critical to understand whether the hypothesized factors are crucial for the
Armenian citizens in evaluating the problem of social exclusion. What other factors, besides
the regime type and the alterations of the labor market due to privatization, affect selfperceptions of exclusion? In this regard, the results pointed towards the direction of primary
institutions of the state. The survey concluded that Armenian people relate their dire socioeconomic situation and grievances particularly with their president's choices and actions, the
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National Assembly's (the parliament) policy-making ability, and the authoritarian nature of
the security sector, more than to any other institution or factor, either local or international.
This finding is in line with prior research in Armenia that has dealt with the
consequences of latest political regimes on anti-democratic tendencies in Armenia.
Harutyunyan (2009), for example, contends that the current political elites and the national
identity endorsed by them are predominantly ethno-nationalist; consequently, policy
decisions made by state officials are to a large extent "unreflective of citizenry choices". 286
Fraudulent elections are a norm rather than an exception, and elected officials are not obliged
by their promises to represent publicly approved policies and societal demands. Based on the
survey results, Armenians agree that Armenia’s politics does not fit into minimalist
procedural definitions of democracy, where electing leaders competitively is a minimum requirement for democracy and where the legitimacy of public decisions and decision-makers
is guaranteed as a result of their competitive electoral victory (Harutyunyan 2009).
The core discussion of the sixth chapter was an effort to connect failed social
movements to the explanation of growing social exclusion through a comparative
examination of five post-Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) that experienced similar waves of repeated social movements against social
exclusion and different outcomes based on their states' repressive capacity. 287 The chapter
focused on the conditions that made certain post-Soviet states in transition, namely Armenia
and Azerbaijan, more repressive than others. It also analyzed the waves of massive protests
in Armenia and Azerbaijan that did not manage to turn into revolutions, in contrast to the
Rose revolution in Georgia, the Orange revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip revolution in
Kyrgyzstan. First, through the quantitative examination of the military budgets and
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The ethno-nationalist type of identity as a norm is resistant to and intolerant of alternative explanations and
new ideas pertaining to national self-definition. State elites endorsing the ethno-nationalist type of identity
block any new ideas that challenge the collectivistic sense and the conventional interpretation of national
identity.
287 One may argue and it is important to note that those five countries experienced different levels of social
exclusion. However, although the overall social exclusion might have been less severe in one country than in
another, certain dimensions of the problem had high degrees in all of them. Ukraine, for example, might hav e
been characterized with less economic exclusion, than, for example, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan or Armenia, but its
social and political dimensions were as critical as of the latter countries. Therefore, if protests and
demonstrations resulted due to even one or two forms of social disadvantage, I still considered those
movements as grievances against social exclusion in general.
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manpower ratios in the selected cases and secondly, through a descriptive analysis of
revolutionary situations and outcomes in the mentioned countries, based on the state-centrist
approach, I demonstrated the highly militarized nature of the Armenian state. The chapter reemphasized that the Armenian state elites are indeed apathetic to the demands of the
citizenry, and they manage to maintain their aloof dominance by strengthening and co-opting
the coercive apparatus. The main conclusion of this chapter was that Armenia, along with
Azerbaijan, was more militarized than Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because of an
external war, and that it affected negatively the outcome of social movements.
State and politics each become militarized, when there is an increase in military
prerogatives (Bowman, 2002:19; Stepan, 1988). The expansion of the military prerogative in
Armenia was rooted in the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict. Chapter Seven was devoted to
the analysis of this military prerogative, arguing that assertive war-affiliated leadership of
Armenia, although not a majority, posed an alarming threat to the development of social
democratic reform in the country. It increased social exclusion through arbitrary, forceful
sacking of pragmatic and democratic politicians and shifting political developments and
socio-economic reform to their own benefit.
The Karabakh war did not create militarization through only symptoms such as rush
to obtain armaments, increased military budgets and military manpower, but also through the
growing role of field commanders in national affairs even after war. A few of those leaders
have been inclined to make Armenia’s security a very strong basis for breeding
nationalism.288 They made it a political tool to avoid resolving many serious political and
socio-economic problems dominating the public agenda. In this sense, the Armenian
militarized state is very similar to a "racketeering state", a state that manipulates insecurity of
victory in war (Tilly 1985; Lynch 2002). “Someone, who produces the danger and, at a price,
the shield against it is a racketeer” (Tilly 1985). The fear of the Armenian nation not to attain
hard-achieved victory became a source of exploitation for the Armenian racketeering
state.289 The racketeering nature of the Armenian state that resulted from victory in
288

In Chapter Seven, a detailed discussion regarding those leaders, representatives of the "Party of Karabakh",
was provided.
289 The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has the characteristics of a "protracted conflict", which denotes hostile
interactions between groups or nations that are embedded in deep -seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural
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Karabakhwar thus became a critical source of social exclusion in Armenia. Through the
racketeering dimension, coupled with the absence of the rule of law – rudiments of state
militarization in Armenia and Karabakh – opportunity hoarding and social closure as a means
of exploitation took place. The group of elites, most typically those who had control over
armed forces as a result of war, have monopolized resources by closing opportunities for
other members of the society and shared their power only with networks supportive of their
activities.
One of the findings of the chapter was that the victory in war encouraged
“feudalization” of the Armenian state in the military realm, which emphasizes a clientelistic
relationship between the state and another institution or [an] individual(s). In exchange for
support or for a service, the state allows an official/an individual or an institution to exploit
certain resources (Fairbanks 1999). When the “feudalization of the state” expands to the
military realm, the “multiple militaries”, including the Interior Ministry, the National
Security Service, and the Armed Forces also ““moonlight” as bodyguards, protectors of
private shipments and warehouses, and the like, relieving the budget while doing political
favors. Only a thin line separates this activity from a protection racket.” (Fairbanks 1999:48)
The three post-war events analyzed in Chapter Seven were the causes and consequences of
the “feudalization of the state” in the military realm, through which government leaders
continued their nationalist policies and resource monopolization. 290
As a result of those nationalist strategies Armenia has a poor economy with a huge
gap between the wealthy and the poor. The latter has in its turn also increased the
demographic problems in the country, and thousands of people leave the country every year.
Those policies have starved Armenia of the opportunities for regional integration and trade.
According to the World Bank, with the opening of borders with Turkey (which were closed
after the war), Armenia’s exports would double in the short term, and its GDP would
hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence (Fisher 2001:308).
Whereas the roots of Karabakh war are not embedded on religious or cultural hatreds, but a territorial
disagreement, it is the most prolonged frozen conflict in the post-Soviet space, and tensions between the two
nations prevail up until today. Both Armenians and Azeris believe Karabakh to be an ess ential element of their
national identity and nationhood, both believe in their historic claims over the region, and this belief creates a
sense of insecurity in the face of the threat by the other side.
290 Those events were: 1) the resignation of president Levon Ter-Petrossian in 1998; 2) the 1999 Parliament
shooting, and 3) 2008 March repression of post-electoral protests.
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increase by an estimated 30 percent (Polyakov 2001:37). Meanwhile, corruption permeates
every aspect of daily life due to legal uncertainty. This dynamic is both an outcome and
supporter of the status quo on the Karabakh issue (King 2001).
Armenia is currently less significant in the region and its relations with the West have
been undermined. At the same time its dependence on Russia has increased, as Armenian
leaders allow Russian military presence in the country for security reasons. Also, the
economy is chiefly governed by Russian business interests. An example of an economically
negative consequence of the Armenian nationalist policies was that Armenia was bypassed as
a transit country in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, because Armenian
officials refused to withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories. 291 Similar examples are
the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzrum (BTE) natural gas pipeline and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway.292
Both of these projects, similar to the BTC, directly bypass Armenia despite the economic
logic and geographic convenience of incorporating Armenia. Armenia, which has no coal,
natural gas or oil of its own and had long been suffering from severe energy shortages,
should strive to be involved in those types of projects, instead of casting itself out. A key
observation here is that the consequences of Armenia's poor economy first of all affect the
livelihoods of middle and poorer families, depriving them of employment opportunities.
Some authors, among them Tchilingirian (2005), argue that it is a mistake to attribute
democratic deficiencies and the problem of social inequalities in both Armenia and
Azerbaijan to the Karabakh conflict and its consequences. Tchilingirian supports his
argument by the fact that other post-Soviet states, such as Belarus or Turkmenistan which, as
opposed to Armenia and Azerbaijan, lack secessionist conflicts, are not characterized with
successful democratic transitions. He instead believes that the absence of democratic
development in Armenia, Azerbaijan and other states in the region is due to “a combination
of regime- induced and inherited systemic problems” (page 64). Whereas I agree that regime291

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BCT) is a 1,768 kilometer-long (1,099 miles) crude oil pipeline that
carries oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. BCT connects Baku (the capital of Azerbaijan) and
Ceyhan, a port in the south-eastern coast of Turkey, through Tbilisi (the capital of Georgia). Being the second
largest oil pipeline in the former Soviet Union after the Druzhba pipeline, the BCT marks the Caspian region as
a new force in the world's oil markets. The pipeline bypasses Armenia, and thus deepens the economic isolat ion
of Armenia. The first oil was pumped from the Baku end of the pipeline and reached Ceyhan in May, 2005.
292 TheKars-Tbilisi-Baku railway was a project initiated after theclosure of the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railway,
which was passing through Armenia.
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induced problems, as well as other structural problems inherited from the Soviet legacy are
important, I also stress that there are certain factors that make those regimes more autocratic
and dictatorial. While nearly all Soviet states inherited systemic problems and nondemocratic practices, not all of the post-Soviet states have high levels of state militarization
that substantially affect the social exclusion problem through different channels. Those
nations, such as Armenians and Azeris, Russians and Chechens, which have gone through a
conflict with another country, are more susceptible to nationalist ideas and practices, which
often become the basis of coercion and violence on behalf of their states. A nation’s
vulnerability towards extreme nationalism becomes its own peril. This has been the case of
the Armenian nation.
Tchilingirian (2005), although discounting the Karabakh conflict as a cause of the
lack of democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan, describes Armenian and Azeri presidents’
statements regarding the settlement of Karabakh as essential for understanding state-society
relations in those countries. In September of 2005 President Ilham Aliyev announced: “We
are creating a strong military potential, and the enemy must know that Azerbaijan is capable
of liberating its lands at any moment”293 . The Armenian president Robert Kocharyan, a
native of Karabakh, retorted putting it more bluntly: “Nagorno-Karabakh has never been part
of Azerbaijan and never will be. This is the bottom line. Beyond [that] one can think of some
solutions and invent new statuses.” (page 64) According to Tchilingirian, political leaders’
deterministic judgments like these have had a great impact on public perceptions. He
considers that the resolution of the conflict has become a major problem for the Armenian
society and its egalitarian development because the Armenian people over-depend on
individual leaders. Thus, the centrality of those leaders, rather than institutions and civil
society, is a key factor for the development of autocratic practices in Armenia.
Tchilingirian disregards that after independence there was a lack of institutions and
civil society in the Republic of Armenia. In those circumstances, it was natural that people’s
over-dependence on certain political leaders would become a tendency in solving sociopolitical matters, among them resolving the frozen conflict. Moreover, it is not so much the
293

In the same speech, Aliyev publicly stressed that Baku was intending to double it s military budget in 2006 to
about US$600 million.
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over-dependence of people on individual leaders per se that create non-democratic tendencies
in the country, but rather the constant fear of the small nation to be defeated and, therefore,
its powerful nationalistic stance on both domestic and foreign affairs. It is this nationalism
among the people that allows state leaders to constantly manipulate the danger of a potential
war in order to have a strong hold on military forces and use it to their own advantage.
Concerning conflict resolution, Tchilingirian (2005:66-67), also argues that “the
extreme forms of ‘othering’, that is the demonization and exclusion of the ‘other group’,
whether Armenians in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Karabakh”, has become a
formidable and yet an overlooked problem for conflict resolution in South Caucasus. 294
Besides the structural weaknesses of states, the social discourse of ‘othering’ becomes a
major factor for both nations and states to have predominantly military-oriented politics and
government leaders, who exploit this idea of ‘othering’. Thus, agreeing with the ‘othering’
discourse, yet disagreeing with Tchilingirian that Karabakh conflict has not been essential for
the democratization process and the development of equal social, political and economic
rights for Armenian citizens, I argued that the above-discussed powerful sense of
nationalism, which in post-Soviet Armenia basically was expressed within the framework of
the Karabakh conflict, facilitated the exploitation of the idea of ‘othering’ by state elites. 295
Indeed, one of the most emotional issues in Armenia, the issue of Karabakh, "both a source
of inspiration and a cause for concern, ... elevates, but it also makes Armenians vulnerable to
manipulation from within and without" (Libaridian 1999:14).

For the Azeri people, the ‘othering’ discourse is embedded in their military defeat in the Karabakh war, loss
of territory and the issue of about 800,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). For the Armenians,
it is mainly embedded in the memory of the 1915 Armenian genocide by Turks, the 1988 Sumgait Pogroms of
Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan by Azeri ethnic groups, as well as the sense and mentality of national
victimhood and constant fear of a small nation to be attacked and annihilated (Tchilingirian 2005, pp. 66-67).
295 This argument may be supported, for example, by the conduct and statements of both Armenian and Azeri
authorities in the aftermath of the 2008 post-electoral tumult in Armenia. Close attention to Azeri officials’
indication that the Armenian government organized the clashes on border of Mardakert right after elections in
order to distract local grievances reveals the significance of ‘othering’ in controlling public dissent a nd
rebellion. Animosity towards the neighbor nation (in this situation the notion of ‘othering’) serves a
‘reasonable’ ground for an easy distraction. No other cause would be as valid to grip people’s attention, as the
cause of external threat.
In their turn, the Armenian authorities blamed Azeri attempts to violate the ceasefire of the 1994 between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and organizing the borderline clashes with hopes to make Azeri people’s sense of
‘othering’ even more profound. This would allow the Azeri government to restart war with Armenia. In this
regard, Azerbaijan's President Aliyev has stressed several times that his country was ready to re -take the region
by force and has been buying the military hardware and ammunition to do so.
294
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Two issues that have strong political implications for the governing elites in Armenia
– to maintain their regime and exclude the less powerful – have dominated recent narratives
in Armenia. One, as discussed in Chapter Seven, has been the rhetoric of the Armenian
state's military power, legitimized by the power structures and spiced up with national
sentiments. The second was the rhetoric of economic growth, manipulated by the neoliberal
oligarchy. The main discussion of Chapter Eight related to this rhetoric of 'growth' that was
assumed to be a consequence of private market transactions in Armenia. The result of this
growth was an increased social polarization, instead of the recovery of existing social
problems.
Double-digit growth was recorded due to the privatization in Armenia, but it has been
subject to much controversy. “Economic polarization is too high for the greater part of the
population to benefit from the rapid economic growth. Worse still, the growth, combined
with polarization, serve[d] to further enhance social inequality,” mentioned Delovoy Express,
a leading business weekly in Yerevan (AGBU News Magazine, 2008, page 7). “Just a few
families are the country’s main employers,” said Hrant Bagratian, Armenia’s 1993-1996
Prime Minister. “In the US, ten wealthiest families control 2.3% of the country’s gross
domestic product. In Armenia, they control 55%”. (AGBU News Magazine, 2008, page 7)
Many experts agree there is a middle class emerging in the country, although
estimates of its size and basic parameters vary. The Armenian Sociological Association
estimates it at 10-12% of the population; a study by the Armenian Center for National and
International Studies, at just over 15%. Also, one should not over-estimate recent economic
development in Armenia. According to data given by Armenian banks, 15% of the GDP is
dependent on foreign remittances, and if one includes remittances that take place outside the
banking system, this figure could go up to 30% by some estimates (AGBU News Magazine,
2008, page 7).
The chapter concluded that Armenian privatization hampered the production of
diffuse ownership of private enterprises and increased dire social conditions by creating
massive unemployment, low salaries and poor employment benefits, and high prices of goods
and services. The process also created monopolies and oligarchs that have rigorously
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excluded other market players from business deals. Those oligarchic interests were not only
dominant in the economic realm, but also in the policy-making process (please refer to the
Oligarchic Pyramids, tables 8.8, 8.9, 8.10). These socially inefficient consequences of the
privatization process were due to several factors. At the initial stages of the industrial
privatization, Armenian state failed to become an adequate watchdog of economic activities,
and market transactions were not properly regulated. Due to the shortage of knowledge and
experience related to free-market transactions, free and fair competition was not ensured. At
further stages, in the privatization of bigger industries, the interests of entrepreneurs without
connections and power were not safeguarded, increasing economic exclusion.
9.3 Key Findings and Contributions
A number of studies exploring social exclusion in developing countries focus on
mainly causes and correlates of poverty. Focusing on the identification of merely the
economic dimension of social exclusion, these studies have ignored political change and
neglected socio-political processes. Moreover, the social exclusion frameworks, particularly
the few developed for the context of the post-Soviet region, predominantly analyze
characteristics of social exclusion rather than processes that lead to social exclusion. Their
theoretical suggestions and practical recommendations are mainly directed towards poverty
alleviation policies. The exploration and rectification of political processes that result in
overall social exclusion are therefore left behind. A most noteworthy feature of this study is
that it brings a shift in the emphasis from outcomes to processes. Such an emphasis in the
social exclusion approach will help divert the attention of the research engaged with the
problem in developing countries towards political correlates and bring the examination of
processes of exclusion to the fore.
I argued that because of high levels of social exclusion coexisting with strong social
movements against it, Armenia is an ideal case for empirically testing theoretical
expectations pertaining to social exclusion. Indeed, the case study of social exclusion in postSoviet transitioning Armenia offers a number of valuable insights with broader theoretical
implications.
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Overall, the findings of my research suggest different possible expansions and
revisions of earlier empirically based research of the social exclusion problem on one hand,
and possible developments of concepts regarding the problem, on the other. The key findings
of my research and possible expansions of earlier research are presented in the following
section.
The study presents evidence in support of the hypotheses of privatization and state
militarization to explain the vexing problem of social exclusion, and this is a rare approach
within the scholarly and policy debates on the issue not only in Armenia but in most
transitioning countries. One of the novelties of this research is that it emphasizes the
centrality of state elites and their interaction with other structures and layers of the society in
the reduction or durability of social exclusion problem. This dissertation, thus, has developed
a state-oriented theoretical perspective on the success of social movements, economic growth
with an equitable distribution of resources, democratic consolidation, human rights
development, and social inclusion prospects in the context of post-Soviet Armenia's
transition.
Indirectly and largely, I argued that the mere presence of certain institutions, able to
decrease economic or political exclusion, has minor consequences for a more inclusive society,
in case the state structure, more specifically the regime type, is not favorable for the former's
productive performance. As one of my colleagues put it, "the problem is not so much about
the de jure laws ..., but in the de facto administration and enforcement of those rules. ... The
key finding in this respect is that de jure laws can be simple but the actual practice of dealing
with officials along the way can be quite cumbersome without proper administration"
(Kobonbaev 2010:190). Agreeing with Kobonbaev (2010), I should stress that the abovementioned 'actual practice', 'proper administration', and the 'de facto administration of rules'
greatly hinge upon the willingness, will and decency of state elites, at least in the case of
peripheral countries.
The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that in post-Soviet Armenia
the exclusionary character of militarized state elites has been the main driver of durable
social exclusion. Particularly a few hegemonic elites, specifically the members of the
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"Karabakh Party" ascended from the Karabakh war that have been able to effectively
monopolize the privatization benefits on one hand and use the coercive apparatus of the state
on the other hand, were detrimental in the marginalization of many citizens in economic and
political affairs of the country. Therefore, broadly speaking, this dissertation puts forward a
focal policy lesson that controlling social unfairness is not fundamentally about the existence
of credible institutions, but more importantly ensuring that in the interaction of state elites
with those institutions and different clusters of the society, the checks and balances work
appropriately so that the power is not unilaterally skewed towards the executive.
The case of Armenia provides additional evidence supporting the conclusion that
institutions in transitioning countries have often great designs with poor performance. In
other words, even though the Armenian Constitution is relatively well-written, Armenian
civil society is strong and continuously maturing and the Armenian citizens are
technologically and intellectually developed, it does not necessarily enhance social inclusion.
The courts and the constitution are highly subject to the executive's whims in regard to
policies and their implementation. The rest of the institutional framework, such as the
unofficial norms and behavior, is consequently, weakened and heavily reliant on the
irrational structure and implementation of official rules and norms, or in other words, the
government's practices. "In Armenia, where electoral victory largely is not dependent on
effective functioning of institutional-procedural mechanisms, politicians neither can
reasonably be held responsive and accountable for their decisions nor will they have electoral
incentives to confine their decisions to reflect wishes of the electorate" (Harutyunyan
2009:317).
More specifically, first, the findings of this study challenge the extensive literature on
the link between privatization and socially positive consequences of economic growth
resulting from privatization. Empirically, this finding challenges the simplistic view that
privatization promotes economic equality through economic growth and the “trickle-down”
effect of that growth to wide segments of the population. 296 It reinforces the argument that
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The "trickle-down" effect is a market-related phenomenon that refers to economic benefits, such as tax
breaks, provided to businessmen and the wealthy, which in the long -run are supposed to benefit poorer
members of the society by improving the overall econo my. The term has been attributed to humorist Will
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that fast-paced privatization produced greater income inequality between the top and bottom
social groups in post-Soviet Armenia, generated unemployment, under-employment and low
salaries. Whereas many aspects of capitalist economy and governance, among them private
and corporate ownership of goods, services and industries, might be economically and
socially progressive in certain economies, the privatization process did not work efficiently
for the Armenian society. Both the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis
confirmed that the majority of the society, particularly the working class, was excluded from
labor markets due to the privatization failures in post-Soviet Armenia. Ordinary citizens had
also problems with voucher use and with business registrations; therefore, very few of them
could become private owners. These anomalies of privatization remained largely undetected
in the extensive post-Soviet literature on privatization, as well as in the rare post-Soviet
literature on social exclusion.
Theoretically, the analysis of the hypothesis related to the link between privatization
and social exclusion offers a critical discussion of boundaries and processes of social
exclusion in the Armenian labor market. Privatization produces and maintains income
inequality in developing market economies. An important implication, therefore, concerns
the speed and scale of a privatization policy, and that social boundaries are often reinforced
by the practice of privatization.
Scholars have long established a link between state militarization and social cohesion.
As a second theoretical contribution, this study offers a cautious observation regarding the
classical school of state militarization (Andreski 1954 and 1968, Janowitz 1977). It addresses
the misleading argument of the traditional assumption that high military participation ratios
flatten social stratification and supports the more recent literature that criticize this view,
emphasizing that wars benefit elites and leave the brunt of the cost on the masses to bear,
particularly in developing countries (Hewedy 1989, Ross 1999, 2001; Bowman 2002; Torvik
2002; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Scherbak
2008).

Rogers, who said during the Great depression that "money was all appropriated for the top in hopes that it
would trickle down to the needy" (Hunt 2011).
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Essentially, the analysis developed in Chapter Eight, demonstrates that assuming
unproblematic relationships between the promotion of nationalist policies, intolerant foreign
diplomacy, and an extremely coercive state on one hand and a socially inclusive society, on the
other, obscures the examination of social exclusion, particularly its political dimension.
Consistent with this rare scholarly consensus, I argue that state militarization implies
constant failure of social movements, collapse of social demands, consequent political
alienation and apathy among people, all of which reflect systemic problems in the durabilit y
of social exclusion. Consequently, advancing the scholarship of social exclusion in the
framework of opportunity hoarding by repressive state elites is a useful alternative for policy
debates concerning the tolerable boundaries of militarized states and their consequences on
economic redistribution, political polarization and social marginalization.
As a general conclusion, this research contributes to our further understanding of social
exclusion, with implications for societal and structural changes. Most fundamentally, it
suggests that fast-paced privatization of industries and social services in institutionally week
societies and concurrently repressive/militarized states is not compatible with policies aimed at
social inclusion and social welfare. The creation of a more inclusive society requires a twin
commitment of creating opportunity and a bedrock of support. This type of commitment is
impossible within militarized states. Unless an autocratic state changes its tendency towards
increased militarization, particularly in peacetime, the probability of greater social inclusion in
a society is slim. However, since the findings of this research are based on a case study, the
generalization of the above suggestions into a grand theory or a policy lesson may be
misleading without further comparative studies, as the findings might overlook significant
differences existing within other post-Soviet republics and other developing countries. This
leads me to the limitations and shortcomings of the current research, which will be discussed
in the following section.
9.4 Limitations
There are several limitations of the current research that need to be acknowledged.
This dissertation provides mainly qualitative evidence for the assertions regarding the
negative effect of privatization and state militarization on the maintenance of social exclusion
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in post-Soviet Armenia based on historical analysis of political events, but it cannot
quantitatively test all implications directly due to the shortage of consistent longitudinal data.
Another shortcoming is related to the idea of examining social exclusion of not
bounded groups, but as a problem of a larger section of a society versus a small class of
powerful people. Here the emphasis is on the power relations rather than particular policies
directed to certain marginalized groups. It is not about state policies against a societal class or
a group discriminated based on gender, ethnic belonging, creed, or religious practices. It is
about the powerful elites, who exercise domination and hegemony over the powerless that
are defenseless against the former. It is about a few individuals on top of the state hierarchy
and their networks versus the vast majority of citizens.
Indeed, one may collectively call these socially excluded people the underclass, but
then there exists the problem of measurement. What are the benchmarks for measuring the
excluded? How do we define and measure the underclass without limiting them to poverty
lines? Or how do we define and measure the excluders, without including specifications? As
mentioned several times in this dissertation, there was a lack of precise benchmarks of social
exclusion for the excluded populace over the studied period, therefore durable social
exclusion here was examined in a mixed combination of indicators of the three dimensions of
social exclusion. Due to this specification issue together with the shortage and inconsistency
of annual data on quantitative measures of social exclusion, I have presented a very broad
picture of social exclusion in Armenia with broadly defined and measured excluded groups.
One may also notice that indicators of economic exclusion, such as high Gini coefficient
rates, may have been strong in mid-1990s, and indicators of social and political exclusion,
such as political arrests, assassinations, human rights violations, and unconstitutional
breakdowns of social protests, have been more prevalent since the end of 1990s; thus the
durability of social exclusion in Armenia was not persistently and necessarily expressed by
all three aspects in different administrations of the examined period.
Achieving greater social inclusion implies, first of all, the refinement of exclusion
measurements. Whereas this study is based on mostly a qualitative evaluation of the problem,
one may always think of more accurate, more creative and more quantitative ways of
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measuring social exclusion within a society. The choices are ample, but finding the best
method to measure social exclusion in a certain society may require a unique approach. In
future research, in order to avoid methodological errors and present a more consistent picture
of social exclusion over a time period, a specifically narrow layer of the society that is
deprived of certain resources and opportunities should be chosen. The importance of a
straightforward differentiation between social groups (the excluded and the excluders) is also
important in order to meet effectively the needs of the excluded.
A third irksome issue is related to the dynamic nature of the phenomenon of social
exclusion. On one hand, a researcher has to consider the multidimensional and durable
character of the problem, on the other, he/she needs to be very specific about what factors
cause which form or aspect of the problem. For example, it is possible that whereas an
agency-related factor explains the emergence of social exclusion more accurately, the same
factor may not have a significant influence on the durability of the problem. The durability of
social exclusion might be conditioned by structural factors, rather than agency-related
factors. Since the effect of certain factors on social exclusion as a multidimensional
phenomenon is complicated to capture, the different dimensions of social exclusion must be
disentangled for analytical purposes. A failure to do so may lead to overlooking fundamenta l
causal differences existing among each dimension of social exclusion.
The united analysis of the three aspects of social exclusion has been a major research
approach in Western mainstream literature on the theme, which I followed. However, in the
case of post-Soviet Armenia, where a narrow-specified group of the excluded was not
chosen, the disentangled method of examining economic, political and social dimensions of
the problem may have been more appropriate. Also, a clear separation of causal factors in
future research is essential. Whereas in this dissertation I have tried to show that the
privatization process has impacted the economic aspect of social exclusion in Armenia, and
state militarization has affected predominantly its social and political aspects, the task should
be handled more distinctively in the early stages of future research on social exclusion.
In the course of conducting this research, comments have been made on both the
advantages and shortcomings of the case study as the research design of this dissertation. The
first reason for the methodological preference of an exploratory case study over a
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comparative study for this research was related to the shortage of research on social
exclusion in potentially comparable post-Soviet studies.297 Comparative research embodies
the logic of hypothesis testing with a greater strength and validity and leads to the formation
of new perspectives and theories. It allows to discriminate, to connect, and to challenge
existing theories by providing historical explanations of several cases. Nonetheless, whereas
it is beneficial to conduct comparative research on social exclusion, because it broadens our
comprehension of social phenomena, only certain countries can be successfully measured
cross-nationally. I have not chosen the comparative method because of the latter's potential
limitation to comprehend socio-political actors, institutions, structures and phenomena
characterized by the boundaries of a single nation as thoroughly, as a case study can do.
The existence of social exclusion cannot be explained by the same factors in all
countries. The formation of social exclusion and emergence of social movements against it,
for example, may be the consequence of quite similar welfare policies and similar formal
institutional frameworks, but different historical-cultural factors and other contextual
variables, which in turn affect a state's structure, alliances between different clusters of
society, elite cohesion, strength or weakness of political parties in policy making, and many
more. Differences in the institutional frameworks, the state structure, policies and norms can
make the comparison between countries difficult, and the more different the countries are the
more difficult it can be to make sense of the comparison. The interpretation of the findings
then becomes a challenge. In this sense, it is not reasonable, for example, to compare the
multidimensional problem of social exclusion of a periphery or a semi-periphery, which
Armenia is, with that of a liberal democracy. As already mentioned, the comparison is also
difficult, because social exclusion in all its three dimensions has not been studied thoroughly
either in Armenia or in most of comparable countries in post-communist transition.
Therefore, first of all, a case study with multiple measures of analysis was a most appropriate
initial step to my research question.
This research, as a case study, allowed me to conduct an in-depth investigation of
economic, social and political processes related to social exclusion and to provide a great
297

Earlier in this dissertation, I have explained my choice of the case study as the research method. The
reasoning behind this choice was more clearly specified in the "Research Method" section of chapter 4.
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amount of detailed description about each of those processes. Whereas it did not intend and
did not produce results that account for the emergence of social exclusion in a number of
transitioning countries, it generated new perspectives and conjectures that, if applied to other
cases, might be expanded into a grand theory. In this regard, this case study provides only a
blueprint for generalizing the findings of this research to other transitioning countries. The
privatization and the state militarization factors have yet to be tested on other cases in order
to be considered valid. Therefore, a cross-national comparative study involving countries
with similar socio-economic status, but different degrees of social exclusion (or different
socio-economic status, but similar degrees of social exclusion) is an intuitive continuation of
this research. Armenia may be relevant to be compared with the South Caucasus countries
and Central Asian countries, but difficult, if not irrelevant, to compare with Russia and the
Baltic states in the post-Soviet region, or a few of the Eastern European countries in the postcommunist space. The latter comparison may indeed lead to remarkable findings but it will
require extensive research not only regarding the history and transitional trajectories of the
compared countries, but also regarding their geo-political situation, natural resource wealth,
and why some have inherited or have been able to design institutional frameworks with
separation of powers and the rule of law, while others have failed to do so. Even then, the
more paradoxical inquiry is that similarly designed institutional frameworks perform well in
one of the compared countries and dysfunction in another, thus increasing social exclusion in
the latter.
9.5 Future Research and Prospects of Greater Social Inclusion
As I was writing this dissertation, some interesting themes were nurtured for further
research. A particular interest towards the association of militarized state elites, the defeat of
social movements, and the increase and durability of social exclusion was developed. Several
inquiries in this regard are important: Is the state militarization hypothesis valid for other
transitioning countries experiencing the problem of social exclusion? If it is valid for other
transitioning/developing countries, does it also pertain to developed countries? For example,
in the context of the US, does American involvement in a war (whether direct or indirect),
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have any impact on income inequality or other expressions of economic exclusion in the
US?298
Another question left for additional research is how strongly does recent experience
of an external war matter for the militarization of state elites and the failure of repeated
collective action?299 Since state militarization in Armenia was reinforced by individuals, who
were in fact civilians with no military training, but became militarized due to war
participation, it becomes critical to understand the role of field commanders and
paramilitaries as opposed to traditional military officers in non-classical state militarization,
modern revolutions, and patterns of social exclusion. Similarly important is whether the
experience of a civil war has the same kind of effect on the non-conventional militarization
of the state? To test whether the manipulation of an external threat, a potential war, as well as
a civil war is a foundation of state militarization and social polarization in developing
countries (and not just in post-Soviet Armenia), we can compare the recent modern
revolutions that are reactions against several forms of social exclusion.
This dissertation has mostly focused on role of the state elites in explaining social
exclusion, paying minor attention to the role of formal and informal institutions. The
exploration of a wide range of domestic factors was clearly beyond the scope of a single
dissertation project, and is a separate topic for further research. There is definitely need for
more research on the complex relationship between not only state elites and socially
excluded groups, but also between institutions, economic development and social equality.
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Jonathan Caverly, for example, strongly challenges the prevailing view that democracies are necessa rily
more casualty averse. At the same time, Caverly (2013) believes that as militaries become more highly
capitalized, the idea that wars benefit elites and damage the poor is reversed.This is a view that the findings of
this dissertation do not support. Caverly, being a former military officer, argues: “[...] democracies will build
larger, highly capitalized militaries as inequality in wealth rises" (Caverly 2013:2). According to him,
militarizat ion limits military casualties, and most importantly, shifts the cost burden to tax payers. This makes
relatively poorer citizens more supportive of increased defense spending. Caverly emphasizes that an increase
in income inequality makes the mentioned trends more pronounced.
299 In the comparative chapter of this dissertation, I argued that those states that experienced an external war are
more militaristic and authoritarian towards their own societies. But, indeed, authoritarian elites can rise without
the incidence of a recent war. However, first, war-related elites obtain authority and power more easily. Second,
they also more easily sway public perceptions regarding national security, nationalism and the need for
militarizat ion. And finally, they use the militarization tendency for national security as a foundation and a cover
for their coercive strength in general.
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Furthermore, in this dissertation I did not take into account the effects of internat ional
factors on social exclusion persistence, leaving the role of the international community to
future research. The effects of transnational factors, both constraining and beneficial to social
inclusion, were briefly acknowledged but not discussed. Most of the local factors explaining
social exclusion in any of the South Caucasus countries, for instance, are often greatly altered
by the international involvement in the region. International factors, such as foreign aid,
economic sanctions and prospects of diplomatic ties, and the presence of international
security forces, interact with domestic conditions to explain the overthrow or persistence of
authoritarianism and its effect on democratic consolidation in the post-Soviet region. This is
particularly vital for a country like Armenia that is small, poor, has no routes for external
trade and is surrounded with countries that egregiously apply economic sanctions on it.
Therefore, in the light of the recent wave of political transitions in the Middle East, Asia and
more recently in Ukraine and the Crimea, the significance of international dimension in
regard to political exclusion, revolutionary successes and democratic consolidation becomes
more essential and will offer valuable lessons for policymakers and academics. Numerous
international factors that can potentially influence social exclusion should be identified and
their interdependence on each other and on domestic factors should be described.
Our knowledge of the subject matter may also be substantively improved by the
analysis of specific policies that hamper the economic, social or political inclusion of certain
social groups. Earlier, I pointed to the analysis of political processes leading to social
exclusion as one of the strengths of the current study. Yet, the present analysis can be
expanded and advanced by further narrowing its focus to particular policies. For example,
examining particular tax policies unfavorable for the establishment and development of small
and medium businesses, granting economic opportunity basically to the wealthy in the
country, would lead us to a better identification of economic exclusion of the mentioned
social groups. Another specific way of capturing social closure and opportunity hoarding
could be achieved by investigating the policy positions of business leaders (to the extent
possible) to establish linkage between their policy preferences, state policymakers’
preferences, and policy outcomes that discriminate against the poor and the middle classes in
several aspects, such as exclusion from basic rights, basic capabilities and basic welfare
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rights (access to health, nutrition, education, housing, water supply, sanitation and social
security); exclusion from the employment market; and finally, exclusion from political
participation and leadership. Research into the mechanisms used to block legislative
opposition to these policies would strengthen claims of all three aspects of exclusion. In
terms of social implications, addressing the identified policy priorities will permit
counterbalancing stratification and supporting the excluded with more concrete measures.
While the situation in Armenia is challenging for many in the society, the hope is that
with additional research the problem of social exclusion will be better understood by more
citizens and political leaders. Greater understanding and awareness of the problems
exacerbated by this level of social exclusion may lead to the formulation and implementation
of policy recommendations that will result in more people being included in the decisionmaking process and treated more equitably within the economic, political and social systems
of Armenia. Such changes would improve the lives of many Armenians and allow Armenia
to assume a more important political and economic role in the Caucasus region.
The scenarios of greater social inclusion in Armenia are varied, but, considering a
socially inclusive transition as a lasting process that takes time to root, an optimistic stance
can be taken. The most general recommendation based on this study is to emphasize the
significance of an impartial method of economic redistribution in the process of transition to
capitalism and the development of anti-militarist frames in the fight against social exclusion
in countries with authoritarian regimes, such as Armenia. The privatization process of
transition is nearly over in most of the world, and more so in Armenia. Consequently, there is
little help that policy recommendations regarding drawbacks of privatization can do in
alleviating social problems, such as social exclusion. However, the redistribution of resources
and opportunities that were unfairly allocated between different social groups as a
consequence of the privatization process requires thorough political reforms and new socioeconomic policies. In the case of Armenia, for example, developing regional cooperation by
ending the Karabakh conflict, which is a fundamental obstacle to the economic and political
dimensions of greater social inclusion, will produce deep socio-economic reforms beneficial
to middle classes. Particularly, it will offer prospects of new economic opportunities that
might constitute an enhancing factor in economic inclusion of the larger society. In these
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political processes, "the role of the elites in power should not be underestimated as a
blocking force to reforms that might undermine particular interests" (Freire and Simão
2007:20).
Considering the economic and political processes discussed at length in this
dissertation that hinder the formation of egalitarianism and inclusion in the Armenian
society, at this point it is difficult to transfer the knowledge stemming from this dissertation
to concrete action items. Incapable of providing specific policy recommendations to decrease
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, except the more general suggestions related to the
private markets and militarized elites, the chapter concludes that the only possible foundation
for socially inclusive societies is "a morally and democratically inspired view of the respect
due to the dignity of every human being" (O'Donnel 1996:2). 300
"Ultimately ... [it] can only be a moral argument: the decent treatment that is due to every
human being. An additional argument is one of public interest: the improvement of the
quality of our democracies is tantamount to advancing toward such decency. (O'Donnel

1996:19-20)
A "decent treatment of every human being" seems to be a good moral agenda of
advancing social inclusion. Another most important aspect of this moral agenda is the
development of intolerant attitudes towards and punitive treatment of those, who create and
perpetuate social exclusion. In the case of developing countries with repressive state elites
and with institutions of poor performance, a disciplinary and punitive treatment of elites
practicing exclusionary activities should be a primary requirement of achieving greater social
inclusion. A first prerequisite of this task is the need to guard against excessive concentration
300

Some of the social inclusion scenarios, general guidelines and policies that I came across in existing
literature have potentialities but also limitations that prevent us from applying of these strategies to mitigate the
increased social exclusion in the case of Armenia. A few of those recommendations are:
 Equipping the excluded individuals with the necessary knowledge and skills to access economic
opportunities, therefore supporting them to avoid the poverty trap of welfare dependency;
 Determining participatory techniques that can help facilitate the involvement of the excluded people in
political processes and policy-making;
 Ensuring that intermediaries (NGOs, local government, etc.) working with the excluded communities
have expertise in working with these groups;
 Embedding the social economy into formal partnerships will provide an opportunity to improve social
inclusion (for example, creation of co-operatives and trade unions stimulate multi-sectoral development);
 Investigating how local institutions can be made more responsive and inclusive of the excluded groups
(OECD/Noya 2008; Percy-Smith 2000; World Bank 2013).
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of power and to support healthy democracies through effectively functioning institutions,
such as an independent security system, fairs courts, and a parliament with plural political
representation. This type of requirement has been largely unaddressed and has certainly been
out of the scope of effective policy interventions in regard to the problem of social exclusion.
Carving feasible steps towards approaching this agenda may be the target of intellectuals,
who are concerned about the problem of social exclusion in developing countries.
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Department of
Political Science
347 SSB, One University Blvd
St. Louis, MO63121-4400
Telephone: 314-516-5521
E-mail: amc06@umsl.edu

Information for Participation in this Survey
You are invited to participate in a survey, which is part of a research study about the impact
of privatization and state militarization on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia conducted
by Anna Martirosyan, a doctoral student of Comparative Politics at the University of
Missouri-St. Louis. You have been asked to participate in the research because of your
student status (I have identified students as a comparatively politicized and informed group
representative of Armenian society). Please read this form and ask any questions you may
have before agreeing to be in the research. Your participation in this research is voluntary. If
you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

What is the purpose of this research?
The purpose of this survey is to develop data capturing public perceptions and attitudes of
social exclusion in Armenia.
What procedures are involved?
If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked to complete a one-time survey
of twenty five (25) questions. Completing the questionnaire will take approximately 20
minutes. About 300 students from different universities of Yerevan, Vanadzor and Gyumri
are expected to be involved in this research.
What are the potential risks and discomforts?
There are no significant physical or psychological discomforts, as well as costs, that may be
associated with this research. No other type of risks will arise from the answers provided by
the participants, specifically that all the participants will remain anonymous and their
answers confidential. There is no question in the survey indicating the identity of the
participant.
Are there benefits to taking part in the research?
There are no direct benefits to participants for taking part in this research. The primary
benefit for participation is to help create an original dataset presenting public perceptions of
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social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Without this dataset, the overall research
concerning social exclusion will not be completely accurate, which means that your
participation is invaluable for the results of the research. If requested, a copy of the findings
will be provided at no charge.
What about privacy and confidentiality?
The only people who will know that you are a research subject are members of the research
team (I, my dissertation advisor and the IRB members). No information about you, or
provided by you during the research will be disclosed to others. When the results of the
research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that
would reveal your identity. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study,
and that can be identified with you, will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with
your permission or as required by law.
Data collected via this survey will be stored in a database on a campus file server which
requires a specific user id and password combination that only I have access to.
Can I withdraw or be removed from the study?
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may withdraw from participating in this
research at any time without consequences of any kind. You also may refuse to answer any
questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.
Who should I contact if I have questions?
The researcher conducting this study is Anna Martirosyan, a PhD student at the University of
Missouri-St. Louis. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later,
you may contact the researcher at amc06@umsl.edu or at (374-10) 34-65-73.
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Public Perception of Social Exclusion
Survey Questionnaire for University Students in Yerevan, Vanadzor and Gyumri
1. Age
2. Residence
3. What is your understanding of social exclusion?






Labor market exclusion – because exclusion from the labor market is a very important
concept to cause poverty and inequality;
Service exclusion, such as access to health, educational or social services;
Political incapacity or passiveness– not being able to participate in politics or policymaking because of poverty and/or social status;
Exclusion from social relationships, networks and/or events;
All of the above

4. Do you think there is social exclusion in Armenia?
Yes

No

5. Do you think that after independence social exclusion has increased in Armenia?
Yes

No

6. Are both you and your parents currently employed?
Yes

No

7. Are your parents currently employed?
Yes

No

8. If ‘yes”, are you and/or your parents:






Self employed
Employed by a governmental entity
Employed by a local or international non-governmental organization (NGO)
Employed by a local or international private /business company
Other

9. If ‘no’, what is the reason?





Can’t find a job
Can’t find a job with decent salary
Family matters
Retired
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Disability
Other

10. How far above or below the level of absolute poverty would you say your household
is?(“Absolute povertyrefers to a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter,
education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to
services.” (UN, 1995: 57) According to ArmStat, in 2006, the complete poverty line was
21,555 AMD (about US $70) per month for an Armenian household).







Considerably above
A little above
About the same
A little below
Considerably below
Don’t know

11. How far above or below the level of overall poverty would you say your household is?
(Overall poverty includes “lack of income and productive resources to ensure
sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to
education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness;
homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments and social discrimination
and exclusion. It is also characterized by lack of participation in decision-making and
in civil, social and cultural life. It includes also the poverty of low-wage workers, and
the utter destitution of people who fall outside family support systems, social institutions
and safety nets.” (UN, 1995: 57))







Considerably above
A little above
About the same
A little below
Considerably below
Don’t know

12. Does your family receive remittances from Russia or any other country abroad?
Yes

No

13. If you were granted an opportunity to leave Armenia for studying, working or just
residing in another country, would you accept it?
Yes

No

14. Do you think that Armenia is comparatively an egalitarian society?
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Considerably egalitarian
A little egalitarian
Somewhat egalitarian
A little non-egalitarian
Considerably non-egalitarian

15. Do you think you are excluded of (doing) something that you deserve to have or to do?
Yes

No

16. Would you say that you often use public or private services, such as usage of cell-phone,
visiting a doctor, public or private sports facilities, dentist, post-office, cinema or theatre,
cafés or restaurants, medium to large supermarkets for clothes and other products, or go
for holidays/vacation in or outside Armenia?
Yes

No

17. Has anything happened in the last 10 years that makes you feel better about your social
and economic status?
Yes

No

18. Is there anything that you expect to happen in the near future that will improve your
standard of living?
Yes

No

19. Have you or a family member currently or in recent years been actively involved in civil
activities or organization, such as labor unions, social clubs, political party, pre-election
campaign, women’s organization, or other volunteer or civic group?
Yes

No

20. Is there anything that you expect to happen in the near future that will increase your
participation in policy making or political activities?
Yes

No

21. Have you ever participated in demonstrations?
Yes

No

22. If yes, what was (were) the reason(s)?
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23. What/who would you change in order to make Armenia economically, politically and
socially a more egalitarian country to live in: (you can mention 1, 2, 2 and more of the
options)













Your own lifestyle (your mentality, education, aspirations and habits)
The President
The National Assembly of Armenia
The domestic security system (military and defense system, law and jurisdiction, police
activities, customs rules, etc.)
Political parties
Mass media
Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman
Local NGOs
The international approach to Armenia, such as more foreign aid and/or fewer sanctions
All of the above
Other
N/A

24. Among these institutions which one(s) do you trust more? Please rate each of those on a
scale of 1-10, 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest score.
a) The President
b) The National Assembly of Armenia
c) The domestic security system (military and defense system, law and jurisdiction, police,
customs rules, etc.)
d) Political parties
e) Mass media
f) Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman
g) Local NGOs
h) The international NGOs
i) Diaspora Armenians
j) Market relations/businesses
k) Other

Thank you for your participation!
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Department of Political Science
347 SSB, One University Blvd
St. Louis, MO63121-4400
Telephone: 314-516-5521
E-mail: amc06@umsl.edu

Information for Participation in this Interview
You are invited to participate in an interview, which is part of a research study about the
impact of privatization and state militarization on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia
conducted by Anna Martirosyan, a doctoral student of Comparative Politics at the University
of Missouri-St. Louis. You have been asked to participate in the research because, as political
elites and representatives of research organizations, you have excellent knowledge and
awareness of the political environment in Armenia. Please read this form and ask any
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the research. Your participation in this
research is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

What is the purpose of this research?
The purpose of this semis-structured interview is to gather data that will help us understand
the type of interactions between state elites and (para)military figures in post-Soviet Armenia
that act as obstacle of social inclusion.
What procedures are involved?
If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked 15-18 questions, to which you
will answer orally. The interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes. About 15 political
elites, representatives of research organizations and think tanks are expected to be involved
in the interview process of this research. I will meet with each interviewee individually.
What are the potential risks and discomforts?
To the best of my knowledge, there are no significant physical or psychological discomforts,
as well as costs, associated with this research. If there are any, even minimal, risks
threatening your well-being that I am not aware of, I would like to ask beforehand if you
would like to remain anonymous. Your request to remain anonymous will be honored.
Are there benefits to taking part in the research?
There are no direct benefits to you or any other participant for taking part in this research.
The primary benefit for participation is to help understand the factors that affect social
exclusion in Armenia and the ways that the Armenian government has dealt with it. Without
395

stories about specific policies and relationships uncovered during these interviews, the
overall research concerning social exclusion will not be completely accurate, which means
that your participation is invaluable for the results of the research. If requested, a copy of the
findings will be provided at no charge.
What about privacy and confidentiality?
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study, and that can be identified with
you, will remain confidential if you require and will be disclosed only with your permission
or as required by law. When the results of the research are published or discussed in
conferences, your ideas will be cited and due credit will be recognized, if you do not wish to
remain anonymous.
Can I withdraw or be removed from the study?
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may withdraw from participating in this
research at any time without consequences of any kind. You also may refuse to answer any
questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.
Who should I contact if I have post-interview questions?
The researcher conducting this study is Anna Martirosyan, a PhD student at the University of
Missouri-St. Louis. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later,
you may contact the researcher at amc06@umsl.edu or at (374-1) 34-65-73.
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State Elites' and Researchers’ Opinion on Privatization,
State Militarization and Social Movements
Interview Questions for political party members, research organizations and think tanks,
Diaspora Armenians involved in Armenian socio-economic and political life
1. According to several surveys, the Gini coefficient in Armenia is one of the highest among the
post-Soviet states. Other socio-economic indicators have also deteriorated for a large number
of citizens after the independence in Armenia. Do you think that these facts indicate the
emergence of social exclusion in Armenia? Can you talk about the problem, particularly
focusing on factors that could have played a role in its emergence and further persistence?
2. How has the Armenian government ever dealt with the problem of social exclusion in the
country?
3. How would you describe the privatization process, specifically privatization of firms and
social services in Armenia’s dual transition? What impact did it have on the labor market?
4. Can you comment on individuals that have acquired firms/factories during the privatization
reforms?
5. Can you talk about policies or a policy that have (has) been exclusively beneficial to business
leaders in Armenia during the last 15-20 years?
6. What are the existing tax policies regarding the establishment and development of small and
medium businesses?
7. Are there any linkages between business leaders’ policy preferences, state policymakers’
preferences, and policy outcomes? What are, if any, the mechanisms used to block legislative
opposition to these policies?
8. How do you explain the repeating waves of demonstrations in Armenia (1996, 2004 and
2008)? What are the claims and demands of the demonstrators?
9. Do you see any similar trends in those demonstrations?
10. Do you think that the demonstrators have fair basis to mobilize?
11. Who are the actors and groups involved in those movements? Do you see any linkages
among these social groups and opposition political parties?
12. How important is the role of the Armenian military leaders in the failure of those social
movements?
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13. Can you describe the military establishment in Armenia, and the role of the Nagorno
Karabakh war in the post-war military involvement in the Armenian government and policy
making?
14. How would you describe the state elites’ relationship with the military authorities in
Armenia?
15. Do you have any recommendation or policy lessons for restoring a measure of greater social
equity for Armenia’s transition to a democracy and capitalism?
16. Do political forces capable of proposing and implementing them exist? Who and why?
17. What can the Diaspora Armenians do to help or can they help at all?
18. Do you have any other comments?
Thank you for your time and insights!
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University of Missouri - St. Louis
Application for Exemption from Review by the Institutional
Review Board

1. Using categories described in item II(a) of the Guidelines, list the category of research
activity that you believe applies to your research.

My research method is based on the SURVEY and the INTERVIEW procedures, II (b and c).
2. Briefly describe the nature of the involvement of the human subjects (personal interview,
mailed questionnaire, telephone questionnaire, observation, etc.) and the reason you
believe this project qualifies for exemption from review.

Based on my preliminary assessment, the survey procedure includes at least 300 students
(older than 18) from universities in 3 largest cities of Armenia (Yerevan, Gyumri and
Vanadzor). Since computer assisted, email and online questionnaires are not feasible to
conduct in Armenia due to the lack of Internet and computer technologies in the country, I
will personally attend the selected universities and deliver the questionnaires through the
support of student friends and/or of university administrators. The survey tries to capture
public perceptions and attitudes of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Students are a
comparatively politicized and a representative sample of the Armenian society.
The research also includes structured interviews with elected or appointed officials and main
political party elites in Armenia. There will be at least 10 personal interviews conducted.
Undertaking interviews with political party elites will enable me to better assess coalitionbuilding processes between the military and state elites in Armenia, and how they transform
the Armenian state and class structures, creating social mobilization. On the basis of the
data gathered in these interviews, I will be able to pinpoint key (para)military leaders active
in state politics, and the type of interactions between state elites and those (para)military
figures, that act as obstacle of social inclusion.
I firmly believe this research qualifies for exemption from review due to the nature of the
interview and survey questions that I have constructed. The answers of the participants could
not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability and cannot be damaging to their
financial standing, employability, or reputation.
The survey participants are older than eighteen years. Moreover, the survey will be
anonymous. The interviews will be similarly anonymous, provided the interviewee requests
for it. If the interviewee requests for anonymity, their request will be honored.
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3. Are the data recorded in such a manner that subjects can be identified by a name or
code?

Only the interviews will be conducted in such a manner that subjects can be identified by
their names. If subjects request for anonymity, their names and positions will not be revealed
in the research.
If yes:
a) Who has access to the data, and how is it being stored?

The interviewees will be identified by their names and positions they hold within the
government or the political party they represent, unless they require to stay anonymous. The
interview digital recordings will be stored in my UMSL student online storage and in my
personal computer, both of which are password-protected. I will be the sole individual to
have access to that data during the research, which I will share exclusively with my
dissertation committee advisor and those, who have legal right to view it, such as IRB
members.
b) If you are using an assessment tool (e.g., the Beck Depression Inventory), what is
your procedure for referring the subject for follow-up if his/her scores are significant?

N/A
c) Will the list of names and codes be destroyed at the end of the study?

The list of names and codes will be destroyed after the defense of my dissertation.
4. Age of subjects: Adults (persons age 18 and older)
Minors (persons under age 18)

Yes _X__

No____

Yes ____

No____

5. If your project uses a questionnaire or structured interview, attach a copy of the
questionnaire or interview questions to this form.

Both survey and interview questionnaires are attached to this form.
If a consent form will be used, attach a copy to the protocol.

A consent form will not be used.
Submit an original and 1 copy of this application, with attachments (number all pages), to the
Office of Research Administration, 341 Woods Hall.
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